

*After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:*

- Historical analysis of diplomatic relations
- Defense diplomacy
- Nuclear and Energy diplomacy
- Commercial and Strategic diplomacy
- Analysis of bilateral relations

## **DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

The foundation of the India–Russia relations were laid during the Cold War era. After the Cold War ended, the initial years of Boris Yeltsin’s rule were not smooth. Otherwise, India and Russia have had a relationship which has nurtured as friction free in the last many decades, with both nations having a strategic vision about each other for many years. In the post-Cold War period, the relationship is strong but lacks direction, though officially, in 2000, India and Russia became strategic partners, reiterating a special and privileged partnership when Dmitry Medvedev during his visit in 2010. Russia, however, is not comfortable with the growing Indo–US proximity. During the Cold War, defence ties were the most important elements of our relation. In the post-Cold War era, the US, France and Israel have emerged as direct competitors to Russia in providing defence supplies to India. In 2012, the two nations celebrated the sixty-fifth anniversary of diplomatic relations and reaffirmed their cordial bilateral relations.

## **DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS UPTO INDIA’S INDEPENDENCE**

The origin of Indo–Russian ties in the modern era can be understood through the colonial prism. The period of early nineteenth century saw the Russian Tsar expand to Central Asia. The British perceived this as a threat to the sovereignty of the British Indian empire. The British were now determined to halt Russian advancement beyond Central Asia. In order to stop the same, the British started the Anglo–Afghan wars. The primary aim of the wars was to make regions near Afghanistan a buffer to protect the British Indian territory. The ultimately unfolding of the Great Game by the British and Russians would accept the British as the paramount power in Afghanistan. When the Russian and the British agreed to respect each other’s interests, the Great Game concluded with the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907. This revolution and the subsequently established Soviet Russian state distanced Russia from India. The leaders of early Soviet Union were not keen on supporting the Indian National Movement. The Russia leaders thought that the Indian national movement against British colonialism is a bourgeois-led movement and did not have a strong revolutionary potential. They felt that a strong revolutionary impulse was

needed for fight against imperial rule, which the Indians somewhat lacked. Further, as the Indian National Movement progressed, Russia got busy with their own internal concerns, as a result of which, up until the very end of World War–II, India and Russia had very limited interaction.

## **DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS FROM 1947 TO 1962**

When India became independent, it adopted the policy of non-alignment. The NAM tried to maintain ideological neutrality in the exciting era of bipolarity. In the initial years of Indian independence, up to 1953, Stalin was not very keen about India. Stalin did not appreciate the non-aligned posturing of India and perceived Indian leaders as capitalist lackeys. Things did change after the death of Stalin in 1953, and there were two issues at the global level where Soviets and Indians found space to converge. The first was Indian protest at the UN about its decision to extend the Korean War north of the 38th parallel. The second was Indian support for the People's Republic of China to enter the UN. However, what actually acted as a factor compelling India to tilt towards the Soviets was the US. In 1954, the US established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), an alliance initiated by the US for South Asia and South East Asia. In 1955 came the Baghdad Pact for West Asia. India began to perceive these two alliances as an attempt by the US to encircle India. India also condemned American support to Pakistan with arms as it brought the Cold War at India's doorstep. The situational changes in Asia also compelled the Soviets to view India in a different light. After the death of Stalin in 1953, with the coming of Nikita Khrushchev to power, Soviets began to view India favourably as a counter balance in East–West confrontation. India also responded to the changing Soviet posturing. India offered strong condemnation of Anglo–French aggression of Egypt during the Suez crisis but did not up the rhetoric in the case of Hungarian invasion by the Soviets.

The period of Nikita Khrushchev did not witness any significant tilt of Soviet to China. Nikita Khrushchev favoured the improvement of ties with the US while Mao tried to criticise it and tried to promote his own image as a sole representative of revolutionary movements. This difference between the Soviets and China led to Soviets favouring India during the 1959 Chinese aggression. After the 1962 war, the Soviets gave an aggressive push to defence ties with India. After 1962, India adopted the path of defence modernisation. The Soviets decided to use it as an opportunity to build ties with India before any western country could fill this strategic space and emerged as the topmost defence supplier for India by the late 1960s. In the 1965 Indo–Pak war, India appreciated the role of the Soviets during mediation through the Tashkent Declaration. This also led to India and Russia's convergence on global issues like the Vietnam War and Czechoslovakia. This period saw strengthening of bilateral defense ties.

## **DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR**

Though the Soviets did support India in 1959 when the Chinese adopted a hard-line position on the border, in 1962, during the Sino–Indian war, the Soviets stood along the Chinese theory that the border between India and China is a colonial legacy. To rectify this tilt, the Soviet Union, post the 1962 war, gave support of arms to India which helped a lot in the 1965 war. Gradually, in the early 1970s, the world again witnessed tectonic shifts, the most important of which was the US tilt towards China. This was perceived by the

USSR as a threat to them. These events again led to mega regional shifts. In the 1970s, the US explored options of undertaking rapprochements with China, India began to fear a Beijing–Washington–Islamabad axis. Henry Kissinger did not send positive vibes to India and tried to make it clear that an Indo–Pak conflict could also come to involve China. India acted hastily. Since 1969, India and the USSR were negotiating a diplomatic and strategic engagement. India speeded up the negotiations and in 1971, concluded a twenty-year India–Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The treaty gave India the needed strategic support from Russia in any eventuality of conflict. Shipments of arms began to arrive from Russia to India. After the creation of Bangladesh towards the end of 1971, the India–Russia treaty acted as a great strategic stabiliser for India and the region as it deterred any Chinese or American intervention unfavourable to India.

The Soviets also vetoed the UN resolutions that advanced that India and Pakistan undertake a ceasefire. Soviet support successfully helped India to neutralise the external threats and helped it safeguard its territory. After the 1971 war, when India conducted the nuclear test in 1974, the Soviets did not condemn it and, in fact, went on to support India with the supply of heavy water for the nuclear programme which got halted when American and Canadians took back their supplies. India, on the other hand, also showed outright support to the Soviet Union. In 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, India at that time in the UN General Assembly abstained from voting which had advocated that Soviets stop military intervention in Afghanistan. Domestically, within India, cutting across party lines, all parties had an understanding that relations with Russia were serving the Indian national interest and thereby needed to continue. Thus, during the entire Cold War period, the USSR supported India in development and arms and also provided strategic support at both global and regional levels.

## **DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

The era of Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev saw internal policy adjustments in both nations. Due to these adjustments and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet territory, the relations suffered. The coming of Boris Yeltsin in Russia saw Russia undertake rapprochements with the West again, which, in turn, affected the Russian tilt to India. However, in January, 1993, Boris Yeltsin visited India and concluded the twenty-year Indo–Russia Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. In 1989, when Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, it not only paved way for the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan but also, due to Pakistani support to extremists in Afghanistan, succeeded in creating a rift in Kashmir. From the 1990s began the rise of Kashmiri extremism. Problem erupted in 1996 when the Taliban took over Afghanistan. India and Russia, along with Iran, began to support the Northern Alliance. This convergence of interests of India and Russia in Afghanistan from 1996 paved way for warming up of bilateral relations, ultimately cultivating in Strategic Partnership in 2000.

The rise of China in the post-Cold War era today is something that is adding that additional push to the contours of the India–Russian relations. Bilaterally, the strategic partnership agreed upon in 2000 has been elevated to special and privileged strategic partnership in 2010. One of the key drivers of our relationship in the post-Cold War period is our assertion for a multipolar world. The resurgence of Russia in the world to project itself as an independent pole in the international system suits India as it will prevent any

form of unipolar assertion by either the US or China. The second driver of Indo–Russian relation is the convergence of views about regional power play. Russia is comfortable with a strong India in South Asia while India would prefer an independent Russia at the global level as it would give India more space to manoeuvre its strategic policy. The third and most important driver of our relationship with Russia is that in India, there is very little obligation to deepen ties with Russia in contrast to the US. It has been felt that Russia has served Indian national interests well and would continue to do so. However, the challenge for India is how it would find a balance between growing Indo–US proximity and support to Russia if Russia continues to resort to more nationalistic assertion as witnessed under Putin.

## **DEFENCE DIPLOMACY**

The defence diplomacy began between India and Russia after 1962. The defence relation has persisted over a period of time and has become bedrock of mutual trust. More than 70% of Indian defence equipment today is of Russian origin. These weapons have also proved their worth at a time when India needed them in conflicts. During the Cold War, to save forex, the two sides have used Rupee–Rouble agreements, which significantly contributed in helping India save forex. India, in 1980s, resorted to a twin policy of diversification and domestic industrial development in defence. Russia helped India with technology transfers. At the end of the Cold War, there was a global decline in arms trade but India and China remained top importers. The priority for India in the post-Cold War period was to ensure that it had a reliable spare parts supplier.

Crisis of vast military industrial complexes of the Soviet and their failure to sustain at the end of the Cold War led India to seek alternative routes. India explored the possibility of Israel and France, along with the US, acting as potential suppliers. In the first decade following the end of the Cold War saw Russia trying to consolidate its military industrial complexes. However, one concern did remain. Indian armed forces complained about problems in spare parts and issues in the maintenance of Russian equipments. Part of the blame is on Indian defence and foreign policy negotiations that failed to develop a deeper perspective on the life cycle of products. When they were negotiating projects, agreements on product life cycle needed to be taken care of. At times, we ended up taking some equipment which became obsolete after a few years and its production plants also shut down, thereby making spare parts availability a huge concern.

Russia created the Rosoboron export in 2000, which is a state intermediary body that monopolises arms export. India raises the issue of support after sales at almost all India Russia Intergovernmental Commissions on Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC TC) and this platform helps us to resolve our issues. Despite certain concerns, India continues to have a robust defence cooperation with Russia as the arms have proven their mettle and majority of our arms are of Soviet origins, which have come to be well accepted in the Indian military circles. Since 2007, the two are working on developing a fifth-generation combat aircraft. The MIG-35 has had India embark upon a mega defence modernisation programme. The offset clause invoked under our defence procurement policy would now warrant more Russian assistance and Russia has not shied away from helping India develop Indian military industrial complex. Russia and India continue to have bilateral exercises and Russia continues to support us for supplies of multirole

transport aircrafts, combat aircrafts, including an aircraft carrier admiral Gorchakov inducted in the Indian navy in November 2013 as INS Vikramaditya.



## INDRA-2017

India held an international drill with Russia in 2017. India dispatched around 350 soldiers with anti-submarine warfare and aircrafts for Indira combat exercise in Vladivostok. In the Indira-2017, India deployed assets from army, navy and air force for the first time making it a tri-services operation in an integrated theatre. The exercise facilitated knowledge of each other's doctrines, tactics and procedures.

Russia and India will continue to have joint development of weapons and continue to interact through institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation. India is undertaking domestic production of Brahmos missile, T-90 tank and Sukhoi aircrafts. Indian reliance on Russia will not decrease despite diversification and delays in projects because Russia remains committed to defence technology transfer, which India feels it needs for the development of its domestic defence industry. Russia, similarly, will not reduce its dependence on India as India acts as the biggest testing ground for Russian weaponry. As China goes on to supply arms to developing nations in future, it will try to undercut the Russian influence, thus necessitating Russia to stay with India so as to be able to use India as a springboard to other developing markets despite an Indian tilt to the US.

Thus, both use defence cooperation to enhance their overall diplomatic engagement. Russians also continue to provide economic aid and cooperate with India on a case-to-case basis.



## India–Russia Space Cooperation

Indo–Soviet space cooperation began in 1960s. In 1963, with UN assistance, India launched a satellite from Thumba equatorial launch site. On 19th April 1975, India's Aryabhata was launched on a Soviet Kosmos–3M rocket from Kapustin Yar range. In 1979, Bhaskara-I was launched from Kapustin Yar range once again. In 1984, Indian astronaut Rakesh Sharma visited space in the Soyuz T-10, which was an issue of great political prestige for India. Today, Russia is the most important strategic space power for India. In 1992, Russia agreed to provide India cryogenic rocket engines but due to India being a non-signatory to MTCR at that time, the deal was later suspended. The sudden suspension of the deal came as a serious setback to Indian space programme. Russia, however, agreed to give KVD-1 engines to India. At the end of Cold War in 1994, both countries signed a space cooperation agreement and have been working in collaboration over GLONASS and the Indian Moon Mission.

## NUCLEAR AND ENERGY DIPLOMACY

Energy stands to be one of the most promising areas of cooperation between India and Russia. Russia is an energy supplier while India has a huge demand of energy. As India is



a net importer of energy, Russia is in a strategic position to cooperate in this regard. India has been importing coal and oil from Russia and in future it might also look for import of gas. Russia has tremendous amount of oil in East Siberia. Both China and Japan are keenly interested in importing East Siberian oil through a pipeline. This pipeline route via Kozmino Bay could also be explored by India. If India collaborates with the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative, it will give India access to rail and road networks in Mongolia and Daqing, a route that will be used by Russia to export oil to China. The OVL already has a 20% stake in Sakhalin-I and is in a joint venture in Sakhalin-III with Rosneft. More OVL participation will be required to meet India's growing energy needs.

India–Russia nuclear cooperation goes back to 1960s. In 1961, India had concluded research and development agreements with Russia in Hungary for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). India concluded a contract with the USSR in 1976 for supplying of heavy waters. During the Cold War period, Russia also supported India by supplying fuel at Tarapur in 1982 and in 1988, agreed to help construct reactors and supply light water for reactors at Koodankulam after Pokhran-II.

In October 2013, Russia succeeded in operationalising the first unit of the reactors at Koodankulam but the construction of subsequent units have been delayed and India's nuclear liability law related issues (explained in the chapter on Indo–US relations) have acted as constraints.

## **COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY**

The trade during Cold War between the two was based on the Rupee–Rouble agreement. The foundation of this agreement was dismantled in 1992, which led to a decline in trade. Today, the two have created the India–Russia Inter Governmental Commission on Trade and the India–Russia Forum on Trade and Investments, which are core institutional mechanisms available to oversee trade. There have been regular interactions of CEOs through the India–Russia CEO's council. The trade target has been 30 billion dollars by 2025, when the bilateral trade at present is only around 8 billion dollars. Russia–China trade is at 66 billion dollars, with a target to take it to 100 billion dollars. A major reason for weak India–Russia trade is an over dependence on arms trade. Although, in recent times, oil has picked up, yet logistical constraints have prevented the trade from flourishing.

There are no direct overland trade routes possible today, though the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC) will try to establish that connectivity. Moreover, inadequate information about business potential and poor knowledge of Russian language act as barriers. It is necessary to replicate the arms development and production models between India and Russia in the commercial and economic sectors also. The economic relations also suffered when the Supreme Court, in 2012, declared 2G licenses in telecom as null and void after Russian AFK Sistema had teamed up with Shyam Telecom Services. India is negotiating a CEPA with Eurasian Economic community presently on railways, fertilizer production and aircrafts construction.

The Indian PM also held an interaction with CEOs at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. It has been decided that India will be a participating country in the International Industrial Exhibition in 2016 and Russia will be at the India

Engineering Sourcing Show in 2017. A joint study group has been studying the possibility of an FTA and both sides affirmed to early conclusion and preparation of a report. A special notified zone at Bharat Diamond Bourse is to be created soon to promote diamond trade. Russia has decided to setup six additional reactors for India and agreed to undertake localisation of equipments to promote Make in India. India expressed hopes for cooperation in natural gas in fields at Gydan Peninsula and Gulf of Ob. To promote cooperation in science, both sides have agreed to work together under the framework set by the Arctic Council with the Russian Scientific Centre in the Spitsbergen Svalbard archipelago. A couple of MoUs on space cooperation and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) have been signed.

## INDIA–RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

In this section of the chapter we shall build upon the previous sections to undertake an analytical survey of various themes of the bilateral ties that will help us map out the broad spectrum of the relationship. We shall adopt a cohesive approach and delve into three core themes, that are defence, trade and connectivity.

### Theme 1: Analysis of Defence Diplomacy

India and Russia continue to deepen their defence engagement through bilateral arms trade. Quantitatively, India remains at the topmost position when it comes to defence imports. In absolute terms, despite competition from Britain, France and the US, Russia remains the top defence supplier to India. The Indo–Russia defence ties have also witnessed a transformation to a model of cooperative production on shared risk partnership from the erstwhile model of a supplier–consumer relationship. Russia has, in fact, over a period of time, favoured more technology transfer to India to assist India in augmenting its capacities.



In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Indian side placed multiple defence orders from Russia that ranged from Talwar class frigates under Project 11356 to MiG-29K shipborne aircrafts. Indian demands spearheaded a culture of innovation in the Russian defence industrial complex to cater to advanced needs. Indian requirements of defence products made Russia technologically more productive as it enabled in creating a system of innovation that pushed Russians to produce half a generation more advanced equipments. There was an overall improvement in Russian aviation and missiles technology industries. This development was taken positively even by Russian defence corporate houses as it enabled them to establish long-term strategies to meet Indian requirements. The Russian corporate houses in the avionics industry used Indian orders as a springboard to spearhead

innovations in engines (thrust vector controls) and radars (phased m-array radars).

The Indian Navy ordered 45 MiG-29K shipborne fighters. As Russia began to meet Indian requirements, the Russian Navy too began to show a positive interest in next generation ship borne fighters, clearly proving that Indian requirements had a multiplier effect on Russian armed forces too. The Chinese too were not very far behind in importing Russian technology. However, the Chinese imports were not only lesser in value but also in quantity as China favoured to import only those technologies that it could clone in China. Uniquely, the cooperation with India led to no possibility of creation of unlicensed clones whereas such possibility continues to remain high for transfers done to China. This Indo–Russian cooperation today sees its manifestation in the form of a newly emerging cooperative model where Russia intends to jointly work with India in production of military hardware. The recent ongoing project of fifth generation fighter aircrafts and military transport aircrafts is a testimony to the fact.


In recent times, the Indian establishment has undertaken a policy of diversification allowing other players in India defence industry as well. It has gained momentum in the recent times. India, with its growing economic clout, has drifted towards the purchase of high priced niche products. The recently concluded Rafale deal (explained in the chapter of India–France Relations) proves the point. The US too has emerged as a serious competitor to Russia. In this context, for Russia to remain competitive, it has to explore next generation weapon system market.



## Theme 2: Analysis of Commercial Diplomacy

Although defence and nuclear energy are two core dimensions of the diplomatic ties between India and Russia, economic cooperation has the potential to unleash a new era in the bilateral relationship. The current bilateral commercial diplomacy is to the tune of 10 billion dollars, with a target of reaching 20 billion dollars by 2020. One of the core features of Indo–Russia trade has been the presence of state enterprises mediating their interactions in each other's territories. This has had a positive effect because the Russians are more comfortable in dealing with Indian state officials due to such ties existing since the Cold War era. Furthermore, it has led to India and Russia explore relations in various dimensions ranging from national security to investment intensive technologies. In the post-Soviet decade, not only have Indian companies evolved business interests in Russia, but several Russian firms have also tied up with state governments in India to promote joint ventures.





One of the key barriers to India–Russia trade is geographical distance between the two nations and the lack of direct connectivity. Distance and logistics are not barriers in India–Europe or India–China trade relations, for that matter. Surprisingly, logistics and distance barriers are eclipsed when it comes to items of national security (nuclear energy, space and defence). Despite the barriers, India has been able to penetrate Russian markets for exports of textiles, yarn, and food stuff and pharmaceuticals. Another hindering factor in the commercial relationships is lack of awareness about commercial opportunities in each other’s territory. At times, even sudden changes in legal regimes and taxation structures have affected the firms. Sistema of Russia has faced such issues due to legal regime changes in India while India’s ONGC has faced issues due to taxation levies. The Intergovernmental Joint Commission as a forum has been used to raise such issues. India is paying attention to the Russian idea of establishing the Eurasian community. There is considerable progress in the recent times on development of the International North–South Transit Corridor (INSTC) which will facilitate connectivity between Indian ports and mainland Russia.

A very peculiar feature thus observed in India-Russia trade relationship is that the relation is more like old relatives who have warm feelings for each other in their hearts and not in actions and the moment either side receives a new relative, its the new relative who gains more attention. Information vacuum stands to be one of the most crucial barriers in these bilateral relationships, which can be easily mitigated with establishment of media outlets that would advertise the business potential in each other’s country. There is also a problem of lack of experts in the two countries to facilitate trade. During the Cold War, the erstwhile USSR had trained experts who had business knowledge of individual countries as good as the local businessmen of the concerned state. In the post-Cold War Russian Federation, this element is missing. Its impact is visible in the bilateral trade ties between India and Russia. Despite India having major influence in the field of IT, hardly any IT firms have presence in Russia. The same is true from the Russian side as well. Despite India being fourth largest consumer of energy globally and Russians being pioneers in oil and gas, Russian energy firms are not that active in Indian markets. Custom barriers play a very crucial role in acting as trade barriers. Russians have set price controls for imported goods. Every good exported to Russia has to pay custom duty, leading to price rise. The price rise happens over and above the minimum price set, thereby creating complications. Bureaucratic delays on both sides at times lead to financial losses for private contractors. Absence of support by banks in financing bilateral exports on both sides acts as a hurdle in bilateral trade cooperation.



Russian investors have tremendous amount of capital to invest. India should cash upon this opportunity and promote Indian brands and products in Russia. India can, in future, explore joint business manufacturing in the Eurasian Union. Kazakhstan, for that matter, offers a competitive environment which is investor friendly to manufactures. Attempts should be made to understand each other's culture as it will facilitate trade. A dedicated investment fund can be created where Russia can use the fund to support Make in India and Smart City projects. Thus, India and Russia do have the potential to boost their economic cooperation and make it as strong as the political cooperation.


### Theme 3: Transport Connectivity—The Strategic Dimension



Defence, security, energy and technology are the core issues that dominate the discourse of India–Russia Strategic Partnership while issues related to connectivity and accessibility are yet to find mention. The INSTC is an attempt by Russia, Iran and India to boost transport connectivity amongst themselves and the Central Asian states. The INSTC links the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea to the Russian Federation. Studies by various transport experts have proven that the INSTC could provide multiple benefits to all players, especially to Russia and India.

The INSTC, which had been initially envisaged by Russia, Iran and India today has eleven member states who also wish to reap economic benefits from the proposed corridor. Strategically speaking, the INSTC has multiple benefits for India. The first is that the corridor provides India with viable surface transport connectivity to the Eurasian region. A study by the Iranian Ministry of Road Transport suggests that the corridor will reduce transport costs by 30% and shall provide a 40% shorter route as compared to the route passing through China and Europe to reach Russia from India.

With the Sagarmala initiative of India and the India–Myanmar–Thailand highway, the corridor will connect Europe and Russia to the ASEAN states. From the Indian point of view, the INSTC and India– Myanmar–Thailand highway could transform India into a potential transit hub. India also gains from the corridor strategically as it helps India bypass Pakistan and reach Europe via Iran (also helps reach Afghanistan via Iran) and market goods easily. Despite such a great potential, the ground reality is that the container traffic from India through Astrakhan has not reached its full potential. There are lots of factors that constrain the full utilisation of the corridor.



## ANALYSIS OF INDIAN PM VISIT TO RUSSIA, 2015

The Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Russia from 23rd to 24th December, 2015 to participate in the bilateral annual summit. The last time the Indian PM met his Russian counterpart was on the sidelines of BRICS summit in Ufa in July, 2015. During the visit of the PM, he addressed a joint group of Russian and Indian CEOs as well as a gathering of ‘Friends of Indian Community’.



Russia has committed its support for the Make in India initiative. The two sides have agreed to emphasise upon investments for facilitating high technology initiatives.

A joint study group to establish a Free Trade Agreement between India and the Eurasian Economic Union held its first meet in Moscow on 31st July, 2015. The two sides have decided to enhance multi-model connectivity through the International North–South Transport Corridor. Russia has committed its support for the speedy implementation of Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project. India has decided to explore the possibility of LNG supply from the Gydan Peninsula and the Gulf of Ob. At the level of cooperation in education and science and technology, the Tomsk State University and IIT Mumbai have been nominated as coordinators under the Russia–India Resource Centre initiative. The two sides will promote cooperation in High Performance computing education system and research methodologies. To enhance cooperation in the information sphere, UGTRK and Prasar Bharti have concluded an MoU for news exchange. A tripartite MoU has been signed between OJSC ‘GLONASS’, Glonass Union and the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing to integrate Russian and Indian Satellite navigation systems. India and Russia have agreed to strengthen cooperation amongst the anti-narcotics agencies while also deepening their interactions on counter terrorism and prevention of extremism. The two have agreed to closely cooperate with each other to maintain stability in Afghanistan.



## **22<sup>nd</sup> India–Russian Intergovernmental Commission Meeting, September 2016, New Delhi**

The intergovernmental commission meeting acted as a preparatory meeting for the India–Russia Annual Summit held in Goa in October 2016. During the meeting, the focus was to strengthen cooperation in the spheres of trade and investment and expand cooperation in the oil and gas sector. A consortium of Indian Oil and gas firms along with Gazprom have established a joint working group to establish an energy bridge between Russia and India through gas pipelines. A major theme of discussion in the meeting was connectivity. The two sides reiterated implementation of the INSTC project and Green Corridor for custom facilitation. The two sides espoused the idea of creating dedicated freight railway corridors. India is aggressively working with Russia and supporting it under the Pharmacy 2020 programme. Wockhardt and Pharmacy ECO are jointly producing insulin under the same programme.



## *E d of Section Questions*

1. Discuss the Domestic factors bringing India and Japan closer?
2. How is Pivot to Asia bringing India and Japan closer to each other?
3. “Indo-Japan naval cooperation is an attempt to avoid the Thucydides trap.” Discuss.
4. Discuss the core dimensions of of Indo-US Defense diplomacy.
5. “Indo-US Nuclear deal is an attempt to balance China”. Do you agree?
6. “India has de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy.” Examine the statement in the light of Indo-Israel relationship.
7. Discuss the core dimensions of Indo-Russia nuclear and energy diplomacy.