

PART-I

1 CHAPTER

India and Pakistan Relations

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Diplomatic history during Cold War
- Diplomatic history since the end of Cold War
- Analysis of Kashmir Problem
- Nuclear diplomacy
- Jihad as a Grand Strategy of Pakistan
- Wullar barrage dispute
- Kishanganga dispute
- Indus Water Treaty Issue
- Conclusion and final analysis

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONS AND A BRIEF UNDERSTANDING OF CORE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ISSUES SINCE 1947 TILL END OF THE COLD WAR

India and Pakistan, since their inception in 1947, have had sharp rivalries with each other. The conflict between the two has vacillated from a clash of national identities to territorial disputes. In the twenty first century, the two have become lethal nuclear rivals of each other. Peter. T. Coleman rightly pointed out that 95 per cent of the most serious disputes in the world can be resolved, but India and Pakistan come under the irresolvable 5 per cent. The relations have always been locked in a vicious cycle. They begin with much optimism and fanfare but soon get engulfed by uncertainties, generating complications that lead to the suspension of dialogue, only for the cycle to continue again with a fresh round of optimism the next time. Though the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both countries have prevented a major conflict, small-scale conflicts like Kargil crisis of 1999 did take place. General Monty Palit has rightly stated that, over a certain period of time, the Indo–Pak relations have become, in a sense, a sort of communal riot disguised in armor. Both sides today have a perception that the other side sought to inflame the conflicts.

In the initial years after independence, in the 1950s, the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan led to the military strengthening its influence in Pakistan. Over a period of time, Pakistan developed a semi-alliance with the USA by becoming part of the CENTO and the SEATO. Pakistan always wanted a western security guarantee for itself against India but could not succeed in the same. During the 1950s, due to intense wariness of a communist

China and the Sino–Russian relationship, the USA also provided economic and military aid to India to ensure that India does not fall into the Soviet trap. The commonality of having the USA in the region as an intermediary for both states paved an opportunity for India and Pakistan to work upon the Indus Water Treaty, 1960. The US's support to India and India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the Sino– Indian conflict of 1962 were two factors that resulted in Pakistan deciding to instigate unrest in Kashmir in 1965. The US, consequently, became disillusioned with both and suspended its aid of military hardware to both India and Pakistan. This allowed the Soviets to step into resolve the stalemate, leading to the Tashkent Declaration after the 1965 war.

Things changed in 1971 when the East Pakistan war (Muktijuddho) broke out and India succeeded in helping slice away East Pakistan, thereafter known as Bangladesh. India's R&AW played a very successful role in the covert operations carried out, demonstrating the capability to create a new state. The USA supported Pakistan to the extent that it now decided to create trouble for the Indian army. The USA feared that the newly victorious Indian army could attempt to invade West Pakistan, thereby depriving the US of a base to contain the Soviets. The USA not only entered into a rapprochement with China but ended up colluding with Chinese intelligence to create unrest in India. The USA–Pakistan–China axis led to the birth of insurgency in India's North-East and the Khalistan problem. This successfully diverted the attention of the strong Indian army to two different ends of the country. This, in the long run, ensured the survival of West Pakistan.

In West Pakistan, which had, by then, become Pakistan, the dominant region was that of Punjab. The Punjab in Pakistan also had the largest share in the Pakistan army. This aligned the centre of military power in Pakistan. Post-1971 till almost the end of the Cold War, India never perceived Pakistan as a serious rival. But, from the 1990s, the situation changed. As Pakistan began to sponsor unrest in Kashmir, India began to again perceive Pakistan as a source of regional destabilisation. Matters got more complicated after both sides acquired nuclear capabilities. The two states have developed a repeatedly reinforced paranoia about each other. Pakistan is determined that even if it cannot win in Kashmir, it would continue to support extremism in the valley to bleed Indian resources. In the recent times, India too has harboured a similar view with respect to support to Balochis to bleed Pakistan. Over a period of time, certain views have evolved. Today, the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan believes that Pakistan has to emerge as the forerunner of an idea of Islamist awakening, and such an awakening would also absorb Indian Muslims. The Indian RSS continues to believe that Pakistan as an independent state is an unacceptable entity and a civilisational challenge to the existence of India. There has never been a serious attempt to build up ideological and cultural ties between both states and due to the absence of goodwill, and the two have not been able to promote intraregional integration in goods, capital and ideas for the same reason.

Krishna Kumar aptly states that the two sides have an iron curtain that prevents them from building a pool of common knowledge about each other. The two sides, since Nehruvian times, have taken steps to normalise relations, only to have the talks hardly yield positive changes in the relations. During the 1990s, the foreign secretary level talks began but failed to achieve anything as the Kashmir problem became a precondition for dialogue. Vajpayee initiated the concept of composite dialogue, which also failed to yield

results despite the fact that the composite dialogue was to be on all subjects concerning the two, ranging from water issues to travel to Sir Creek. The composite dialogue got suspended after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, only to be revived again as a 'dialogues' in 2011. The 2011 talks began without the precondition of any particular item but still failed to achieve any breakthrough. The intense rivalry between the two today is visible at the SAARC level and their interactions with the Islamic world. If Pakistan prevented India from joining the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) then India excluded Pakistan from the BIMSTEC. Though, in the recent times, social networking platforms have led to the people from the two states establishing a connect, this connect has not yet permeated to the level of a cross-border alliance between the two states.

We now turn our attention to a brief analysis of some of the core conflicts between India and Pakistan. Both sides feel that fear, hatred and a sense of persecution are the key drivers of the conflict. The conflict not only revolves around the disparity in size between India and Pakistan—Kashmir, water issues and the Siachen glacier issue also constitute the three core geostrategic issues affecting the two. The complexity of the conflict has been certainly aggravated by presence of nuclear capabilities and Islamic extremism. A study of Indo–Pak trade tells us that immediately after the Partition, the two states reached an all-time high in trade. The bilateral trade dropped in 1950s and after 1965, the figures fell to abysmally low levels. In 1956, the two sides had agreed to provide the MFN clause for goods trade with each other. The agreement on the MFN clause however could not be concluded till 1970s.

A study by Nisha Taneja and Eugenia Baroncelli has found that India and Pakistan collectively constitute 90% of the GDP of the region and peace between the two states could yield a 405% rise in trade at the bilateral level. It is important to note here is that both states have a collusion of interests on items of international trade, signifying the possibility of a tacit cooperation in existence between the two states. Instead of using this to leverage South Asian integration, ironically, the South Asian states have explored the global markets of North America, Europe and China. The intraregional trade in South Asia is so low today that, at times, it is described as inverse regionalism. Weak trade facilitation mechanisms, protectionism, lack of transit facilities and mutual suspicion are major factors in deterring trade practices. Though there is a call for the expansion of bilateral Indo–Pak trade, some Pakistani firms do fear that Indian firms could dominate Pakistan if free trade is facilitated. However, many in Pakistan do believe that the opening up of trade between the two states could lead to greater material gains for both. The two states together have a great potential to emerge as a net exporter of ferrochrome to the world. Indian companies have the potential to export trucks, tires to Pakistan as the same commodity is imported by Pakistan from third countries via Dubai.



Apart from trade, conflicts related to water issues have played a role in the Indo–Pak

relations. Brahma Chellaney is of the opinion that future wars in Asia could be driven by issues related to water itself. In undivided India, when water issues used to crop up in the Punjab region, the British government used to resolve such issues through semi-judicial commissions. After the Partition, the localised disagreements on water issues were transformed into conflicts of an international nature. In 1947, the division of Indus, Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab, Jhelum and Beas were taken up at the level of an inter-dominion conference but no concrete solution came up. As there was no success in resolving issues related to water at the inter-dominion conference, India demanded financial reparation if any allowance was made to Pakistan. In 1950, in response to Indian request for finance reparation, Pakistan demanded delimitation of waters through International Court of Arbitrations. India summarily rejected any third-party intervention to resolve the bilateral water issues.

In 1951, an American expert, David Lilienthal, published an article discussing the development of the Indus Basin through financial contributions by the World Bank. The director of the World Bank, Eugene Black, convinced India to allow the World Bank to work as a conduit for a possible agreement related to the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan. Nearly ten years later, after long-drawn negotiations between both sides with aggressive assistance from engineers and technicians, on 19th September 1960, an Indus Water Treaty was born. The uniqueness of the Indus Water Treaty is that it was a treaty not negotiated by diplomats but by engineers, with the World Bank becoming a non-political signatory to the treaty. The treaty was designed in a manner that it focused more on developing the Indus Basin than merely allocating water, with the emphasis being on increasing the productive capacity of the Indus Basin. The World Bank acted as an agency to facilitate economic upliftment and did not resort to the resolution of political disputes between the two sides.

In 1978, there emerged another issue on the Salal Dam. India had built the storage dam some 64 kilometres away from the Indo-Pak border on the Chenab River. Pakistan objected to the construction of the Salal Dam. In 1978, after negotiations, India decided to lower the height of the Salal Dam and assured Pakistan that the dam would be used only for generation of power. This agreement was hailed by the international community. In 2005, Pakistan again objected to India's 450 Megawatt Baghliar Dam constructed on the Chenab River. Pakistan invoked provisions of the Indus Water Treaty and sought arbitration from the World Bank. A neutral expert was appointed for arbitration. The verdict was announced in 2011 in favour of India. The Pakistani ISI took the decision of the verdict as a snub to Pakistan. They began to promote militant organisations to bring about a shift in their tactics. The Pakistan based militant organisations initiated mass protests in Pakistan alleging that India is resorting to water terrorism. A new wave of anti-India sentiment had been generated by Pakistani organization all over. India has never flexed its muscles on water issues with Pakistan as such moves are tantamount to illegality, but the diversion of waters by India is one of the established nuclear red lines stated by Pakistan. The water issues between India and Pakistan have still remained a national issue in each country and neither of the sides has explored larger environmental concerns due to climate change to emerge in the policy discourse. The water related issues between the two states will always generate emotionalism as there is no regional level institution today that can capably solve the problem.

The other significant problem is the lingering Kashmir issue. When the Partition of India and Pakistan happened, the British failed to integrate Kashmir into either of the states. Both the states subsequently developed a feeling that massive injustice had been done to both parties. Kashmir, thus, became a political issue in the bilateral domestic politics of India and Pakistan. The civilian and military leadership of Pakistan used the Kashmir crisis to divert public attention from the task of nation building in Pakistan. One reason why the Kashmir issue has not been resolved till date is because initially, during the Cold War, the USA and the USSR saw Kashmir as the symbol of a systemic struggle between the East and the West, exploring no avenues for resolving the issue through a regional solution framework.


During the Cold War, India thought that it has provided a political solution to the Kashmir problem through Article 370 and the Simla Agreement of 1972. However, the truth is that even till today, under the leadership of Modi, India has not been able to evolve an effective strategy to deal with the Kashmir problem. Pakistan has always resorted to a violent approach of forcefully snatching away Kashmir and the wars in 1947–48, 1965 and 1971 are a testimony to the fact.

In 1984, the Indian R&AW came to know that Pakistan had purchased specialised clothing for very low temperatures for its army from a supplier in London. The R&AW alerted the Indian army and during their one of the operations, the army found a Pakistani expedition team in a place near Siachen. Before the Pakistani expedition could resort to any adventurism, India occupied Siachen. India considers Siachen strategically crucial. The Indian army, since then, has favoured a policy of status quo on Siachen while it is the only issue where Pakistan seeks an agreement. The strategic significance of Siachen for India is control of the Karakoram region that Pakistan and China have expanded into, under the pretext of developing a Karakoram highway. India feels that its presence in Siachen can keep the China–Pakistan activities under check. The roots of the Siachen occupation for India, thus, are not embedded in topography but the higher geopolitics of the region.

After the 1962 war, as India was defeated, Pakistan witnessed the military weakness of India and decided to teach India a lesson. They chose Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch, which exists between Sindh and Rajasthan, as a possible weak spot. Though Pakistan made a military attempt, it was unsuccessful and it later decided to submit the matter to a foreign mediator. In 1968, a three-member commission was formed. India favoured Yugoslav and Pakistan favoured Iran, while the UN appointed a Swede to the commission. The final judgment of the commission gave some territory to India and some to Pakistan. Both sides gained some territory but also lost territory. Both sides faced political consequences for the settlement and India became determined not to resort to outside mediation in future.

After independence, most of the leaders in India had proposed the creation of Pakistan. Opposition arose due to the fact that Pakistan became a Muslim state in contrast to the secular Indian state. Nehru was the chief proponent of the stated idea and believed that the Western states had exacerbated the problem by giving Pakistan economic and military aid and had taught Pakistan to coerce India. Nehru had even hoped that Pakistan would collapse but that did not happen and eventually, the two sides got mired in a new

strategic landscape where neither they were at war nor could become peaceful neighbours. Though the economic liberalisation of 1990s fuelled another tool that could be used to foster ties, nothing concrete worked out at the level of normalisation. Manmohan Singh and Modi have tried using the commercial stick, but it has still not found any resonance in Pakistan. Indian officials feel that a number of attempts were made to resolve the conflicts with Pakistan but the record has been mixed and normalisation has not been achieved.



Despite these efforts made by various Indian PMs till date, the imprint of the past and geopolitical calculations of Pakistan's relations with the West, China and Russia, coupled with a possibility of nuclear escalation, have remained some of the key obstacles to efforts of normalisation. All along, India's efforts to initiate normalisation has met with provocation and escalation from Pakistan.

During the British era, they perceived the area that later became Pakistan as strategic for the Raj because Pakistan acted as the North West bulwark in the efforts to contain Russian ambitions. After the Partition, as India wanted to stay away from the Cold War politics but Pakistan, by an alliance with the USA, brought the Cold War right to the doorsteps of India. At the end of the Cold War, the Western support for Pakistan dipped and India took advantage of the leverage by shifting its strategy to economic liberalisation to foster relations with the USA.

After 9/11, USA again began to revive the idea of engaging with Pakistan to tackle Islamic extremism. Since India too supported the idea of USA's global war on terror, both sides, India and Pakistan, were now with the USA. This made India uncomfortable yet again. However, though the US has brought India and Pakistan together to cooperate with each other, the process has not yielded any significant dividends. Though both states have nuclear weapons and have ruled out a possibility of a fully-fledged nuclear war, they have resorted to continuing a sub-conventional war by using the ISI and the RAW. Only a few options remain in bringing about normalisation. One is that both sides resort to a 'do-nothing' approach. India has largely followed the idea of 'masterly inactivity' for many years. The other option is transforming the ties through economic means and economic integration. India also exercises the following options to manage Pakistan.



The Pakistani establishment has a feeling that India has never accepted the idea of allowing Pakistan to exist as a state. The Pakistanis believe that India wants to militarily crush Pakistan. Pakistan uses an analogy with Israel to explain India's position with respect to itself. Pakistan feels that both Pakistan and Israel were created by communities who perceived an impending threat of persecution by a majority state as they constituted a minority. Both remained under threat from neighbours. Pakistan feels that after the Partition, the Hindus wanted to take revenge by attacking a minority-constituted Pakistan. Pakistan further maintains that to meet this threat, both countries (Pakistan and Israel) used a common strategic policy of building up of alliances with the West as a security guarantee. However, Pakistan alleges that neither Israel nor Pakistan got adequate support from the West for their security (Pakistan uses 1971 crises as an explanation), which compelled them to go nuclear for their own security and survival. In Pakistan, the army had dominated its national security and foreign policy discourse since the 1950s. This is the reason that in Pakistan, the army has an upper hand in dictating diplomacy with India. The Pakistani army feels that the R&AW has entrenched itself deeply in conflicts internal to Pakistan and has unleashed an inner leviathan in Pakistan to destabilise it from within.

Since its inception, Pakistan has sought to build a link between its religious identity and its geostrategic location. For Jinnah, Islamic Pakistanis, being followers of monotheistic Islam, were naturally more allied to the monotheistic Christians than Hindus. Using the religious angle, he favoured a deeper alliance with the US. Jinnah articulated that only monotheistic people could resist the Soviets in the world. Jinnah asserted that Hindus and Indians could not be trusted in the fight against communism and advocated that Hindu Indians were more sympathetic towards Soviets. Jinnah tried to market Pakistan as a Muslim Israel to America, which shared the same values and same god. Pakistan, therefore, succeeded in developing a nexus built upon religious values with the USA to tackle a godless communist Russia.



After having a brief glimpse of some of the conflicts and basic perceptions of India and Pakistan, we now turn our attention on the mechanisms and tools that can help us explain their conflicts. In the section ahead, we attempt to view the same by analysing the Indo–Pak relationship since the end of the Cold War.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONS AND A BRIEF UNDERSTANDING OF CORE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ISSUES SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

In our attempt to understand the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan, we have argued in the previous section, that the Indo–Pak rivalry began immediately after the Partition over Kashmir. Just prior to Indian independence, there were two categories of states under the British. Firstly, there were states of British India and secondly, there were the Princely States. The concept of Princely States was that such states could enjoy nominal independence under the British Raj provided their defence, foreign policy and communications were managed by the British. At the time of independence, based upon their demography and location, a Princely State could either join India or Pakistan, as was announced in the provision by Lord Mountbatten.

Kashmir posed some difficulty because it was a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh. Initially, Hari Singh was reluctant to join either India or Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan launched a campaign by sending its troops disguised as tribesmen to forcefully annexe the state of Kashmir. A revolt against the rule of Hari Singh was fomented by Pakistan. Hari Singh had his own fears. He never wanted to accede to Pakistan as he feared that a Muslim state of Pakistan would soon integrate the Muslims of Kashmir thereby relegating him to a minority status. He also had similar concerns for India, as he thought that if he acceded to India, a socialist Nehru would strip him of the privileges he enjoyed. As Pakistani tribesmen reached Kashmir, Hari Singh panicked and began to make frantic requests to India for help. India, led by Nehru, decided to assist Hari Singh only if he acceded to India. Once Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession, thereby acceding Kashmir to India, Indian troops landed in Kashmir. The troops were able to stop the onslaught by Pakistani forces but by then, one-third of Kashmir had fallen into the hands of the invaders. Nehru, heeding the advice of Mountbatten, referred the case of Kashmir to the United Nation in 1948.

After enormous negotiations, discussions and resolutions at the UN level, the body advised a ceasefire agreement on 1st January, 1949. Consequently, a new Ceasefire Line was created in Kashmir. As the time went by, the Kashmir issue got embroiled in Cold War politics with the UN passing some critical resolutions over Kashmir. UN asked India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people while urging Pakistani troop withdrawal from the region. Pakistan refused troop withdrawal and India did not follow up with the UN recommended action, citing the alleged refusal of Pakistan to comply first.

In 1962, India had a border conflict with China. After its defeat in the conflict, it decided to upgrade its military with assistance from the USA and the UK. The British and Americans too used this opportunity to induce bilateral dialogue between the two states. The US sent its Secretary of State, Dean Rusk to persuade Nehru to initiate a dialogue

with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. From 1962 to 1963, though there was dialogue between the two sides, nothing favourable was achieved. As the talks between the two could not yield any results, it motivated Pakistan to launch yet another offensive in 1965.

The 1965 war was a military stalemate. The USA did not want to be involved in the resolution of conflict between the two as the previous US attempt had not yielded any result. This allowed the USSR to broker peace after the 1965 conflict through the Tashkent Agreement as it saw the bleak US interest as an opportunity to expand its Asian influence. The declaration stated that the Indian and Pakistani forces would pull back to their pre-conflict positions (pre-August 1965 lines), no later than 25 February 1966. Further, the nations would not interfere in each other's internal affairs, economic and diplomatic relations would be restored, there would be an orderly transfer of prisoners of war, and the two leaders would work towards improving bilateral relations. The Tashkent Agreement led to maintenance of status quo by the two sides.

Another conflict between India and Pakistan happened in 1971, which originated in the domestic political exigencies in Pakistan. In December 1970, Pakistani held a general election. As per the result, the Awami League (led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehaman) won the election in East Pakistan while Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept the polls in West Pakistan. The PPP and Awami League began negotiating a power sharing agreement but by March 1971, the two reached a more severe deadlock. The Awami League protestors, on failure to reach a power sharing agreement, initiated a massive protest to seek autonomy. The Pakistani army began to suppress the Awami League supporters in Dacca city from March, 1971. As the suppression continued, the supporters of the Awami League began to leave their country and started a migration to the Indian state of West Bengal.

As this refugee influx began, India took up the issue diplomatically. As the matter was being negotiated diplomatically, India's R&AW began to design a plan to invade East Pakistan and break it away from the control of West Pakistan. The RAW began to train and support the Mukti Bahini movement. The Mukti Bahini movement was a liberation force trained for covert capabilities. Witnessing renewed unrest, on 6th December 1971, Pakistani Air Force launched strikes on Indian air bases in North India. India perceived the attack as an attack on the sovereignty of India and decided to militarily retaliate. The Indian forces entered deep inside East Pakistan and captured around 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs). India subsequently supported Sheikh Mujibur Rehaman and succeeded in seceding East Pakistan from the West. Bangladesh was finally born out of the conflict.

The crushing defeat of 1971 came as a big blow to Pakistan. The attention of the world subsequently diverted due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Kashmir issue became dormant till the end of the Cold War. After East Pakistan seceded, the US and China began to use Pakistan to create troubles for India. The CIA of USA, along with Pakistani ISI, began to create unrest in Punjab by supporting extremism in the form of the Khalistan movement. Indian army at that time was led by General K. Sundarji. To intimidate Pakistan, Sundarji chose the state of Rajasthan to launch a massive military exercise codenamed as Operation Brasstacks. Sunderji was interested in using the Brasstacks to test newly built radars by India. The sheer magnitude of the exercise, involving around 1,50,000 soldiers, generated anxieties in Pakistan. The Pakistanis too responded with their own military exercises, codenamed as Sledgehammer and Flying

Horse.

As the situation became tense and appointed to the build up for a future war, the Soviet and US diplomats and officials of CIA and KGB swung into action and began to work with R&AW and ISI officials to reduce tensions. As the crises de-escalated, in an interview to Kuldeep Nayar, Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan resorted to nuclear signalling by arguing that Pakistan was on the way to have a nuclear weapon. Rajiv Gandhi authorised the nuclear scientists of Indian to begin work on Indian nuclear bomb. As the crisis defused, General Zia died in a plane crash in 1988 and subsequently, under US pressure, the Pakistani army decided to go for elections, with Benazir Bhutto assuming power.

Bhutto began to initiate a new round of dialogues with Rajiv Gandhi but as the military in Pakistan began to create unrest in Kashmir from 1989, the newly launched peace process was jeopardised. The ISI of Pakistan began to launch a massive rebellion in Kashmir. The initial Indian response was to suppress it with an iron fist. This inflamed the local sentiments and gave the ISI an opportunity to take advantage of this newly created fault line. As the crisis in Kashmir began to precipitate, India warned Pakistan that any attempt to enhance infiltration in Kashmir would result in conflict. In 1990, the USA again stepped in to defuse tensions. The crisis was temporarily defused but the attempts at infiltration from Pakistan did not end. India switched its tactics to maintain order in Kashmir, and eventually, Pakistan resorted to the use of proxy terrorists in Kashmir to initiate a proxy war.

The test of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 led to a new dimension of conflict. The US and other powers tried hard to persuade India and Pakistan to roll back their nuclear weapons programmes, but their efforts failed. Scholars were divided about the future of the relationship at the time. Some believed that the acquisition of weapons would lead to strategic pessimism and would reduce the possibility of escalation while others argued that Pakistan, being a revisionist state, could provoke a status quo power like India with its nuclear weapons. This is a classical security dilemma because, theoretically speaking, if in a situation of international anarchy, both states are endowed with nuclear capabilities, then it could be only used as a defensive tool and not an offensive one. Thus, a state is compelled to respond to the choice of the other state to acquire such military capabilities. This counter-action leads to a spiral of hostility in the system. A status quo state may not undertake any steps but a revisionist state may wish to during about territorial changes and may construe the moves of a status quo power as a sign of weakness. This perception of the revisionist power then enhances its vision.

We also further need to understand that in Pakistan, the military dominating the policy discourse is rooted in its history. When India became independent, it resorted to the use of democracy and brought the army within the control of the political executive. In contrast, Pakistan, after its creation, failed to create elements of democracy. Nehru sought elections while Jinnah continued to rule as an unelected Governor General of Pakistan. As Jinnah died in the early years, the constitutional experiment was overtaken by the first military coup in Pakistan in 1958. Pakistan began to resort to the use of its military to quell civil disturbances and maintain order. The army gradually began to develop a bigger hand and began to emerge as a dominant player.

Due to differences in politico-military relations of both states, the foreign and security priorities were contemplated differently and this often brought the two on a collision course. However, as the two armies, prior to independence, were trained under the British umbrella, it is interesting to note that the two sides used old strategies in the conflicts of 1947–48, 1965 and 1971. Many efforts have been made to resolve the crises and resort to negotiations but such attempts have failed to deliver results. The newly elected Indian PM, Narendra Modi tried to break the ice by inviting Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony in 2014. In December 2015, the PM made an unscheduled surprise trip to Lahore. However, the subsequent Pathankot, Pampore and Uri attacks led to the suspension of dialogue once again. Let us now turn our attention to analysing Kargil conflicts, the Kashmir issue, Operation Parakram and the process of composite dialogue. We shall begin with the Kargil conflict.

As mentioned, in 1998, India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons. In order to defuse rising tensions, Indian PM Vajpayee, initiated a dialogue by visiting Lahore in February, 1999. Vajpayee launched a new bus diplomacy between Amritsar and Lahore. During his meeting with Nawaz Sharif, Vajpayee launched a series of confidence building measures (CBMs).



The visit of Vajpayee to Lahore was a watershed event. Vajpayee also visited Minar-e-Pakistan where he publicly asserted that a stable Pakistan is in India's interest. This was the most important statement ever by an Indian head of the state on Pakistani soil, as Vajpayee endorsed the idea of the existence of Pakistan, which had been a long-standing concern for Pakistan. The Minar-e-Pakistan was chosen as a venue to announce this because it was the same place where the Lahore Declaration was passed to establish Pakistan in 1940. Vajpayee appointed a journalist, RK Mishra, as an interlocutor for the dialogues on the Kashmir crisis. Nawaz responded by appointing Pakistani diplomat Niaz Naik. For the first time, India decided to bypass official diplomatic channels for talks on Kashmir as Vajpayee, by appointing RK Mishra, injected new blood into the negotiations.

As the dialogue was brought back on track, it got abruptly suspended as from May, 1999, as the Pakistani army intruded into Kargil and launched an offensive. The Indian forces launched a mega counteroffensive and were able to drive off the intruders by mid-July. Pakistan had launched intrusions in Kargil assuming that Indian army would be busy in counterinsurgency in Kashmir and would not be in a position to respond appropriately. The Pakistani army also assumed that the Indian side would not resort to any escalation as there could be nuclear threat. The most important Pakistani assumption was that USA would step in and resolve the conflict swiftly. All these assumptions were flawed and they exposed Pakistani weakness. However, none of these things materialised. At the end of July, the end of military operations finally concluded the fourth Indo-Pak war in 1999. The new atmosphere of trust and good will was abruptly interrupted due to the Kargil episode. Vajpayee was deeply pained by the breach of trust by Pakistan.

The Northern Light Infantry (NLI), armed with surface-to-air missiles was the

Pakistani force that penetrated inside the LoC and occupied Indian favoured posts which were vacant. As per an agreement between the two, during the winter months, both states had earlier decided to withdraw troops from forward posts. Pakistan occupied the vacant Indian posts and occupied Batalik, Turtuk and Dras in Kargil. In May, 1999, the Indian Air force (IAF) launched Operation Safed Sagar, which was a sustained air strike meant to support the ground troops and was aimed to flush out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control. This air strike came as a big blow to Pakistan as it was never a part of the planned calculations. The innovative airstrikes by India also caused an extremely detrimental psychological impact on Pakistan who found extremely difficult to retaliate. The IAF used innovative bombing mechanisms to cause landslides and avalanches. A massive strike by IAF on a logistical camp in Muntho Dhalo in Batalik sector caused havoc for Pakistan as it was the sole supply depot for the forces of the Northern Light Infantry Regiment (NLI).

By the end of July, 1999, the intruders were completely driven out from the unoccupied posts. Pakistan, alarmed by the Indian response, immediately sought to seek partial de-escalation and an end to air and ground strikes from Indian. In the course of conflict, diplomatically, China favoured a neutral stance but the ground reality was different. Musharraf had visited Beijing during the hostilities. China also kept supplying armament to Pakistan to sustain the war while the Chinese army enhanced patrolling and troop presence on the Sino– Indian border when the conflict was underway. During the crisis, Sharif went to the US and met Clinton on 4th July, 1999 in the belief that the US support would help control the crisis. However, Sharif was surprised and shocked to his core when Clinton asserted that the conflict had been initiated by Pakistan and that they had no right to violate the sanctity of the LoC.

As the crisis ended, Pakistan yet again learned a hard lesson. Vajpayee initiated a dialogue with Pakistan again in 2001. He favoured meeting Musharraf at a probable multilateral meeting. However, LK Advani insisted that Musharraf be called for a bilateral meeting. In May, 2001, the Agra Summit took place, which again failed as no headway was made on issue Kashmir and cross border terrorism from the Pakistani side. However, it was decided that Vajpayee and Musharraf would again meet on the sidelines of the UNGA session in September, 2001. Due to events around 9/11, the meeting was cancelled. Pakistan came under tremendous US pressure to sever its ties with the Taliban. India on the other hand, allowed the US to use Indian military base to launch military action on the regime of Taliban in Afghanistan. The USA preferred to go for Pakistani bases than Indian bases because of closer proximity to Afghanistan. On 1st October 2001, after the Jaish-e-Mohammad launched an attack on Kashmir assembly building, the Indo–Pak relations deteriorated yet again. Things came to a head after the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th December, 2001.

The analysis of the Kargil conflict clearly proves that the major agenda of Pakistan behind launching the Kargil conflict was to exploit the cleavages within India over Kashmir. Despite Pakistani provocation, India continued to resort to dialogue with Pakistan. The hard-line approach of the Pakistani military, trying to exercise deeper control over Pakistani politics and diplomacy, failed to achieve peace with India. The decision of the Pakistani army to resort to covert activities yet again proved that Pakistan favoured a territorial change, strengthening the argument that a revisionist state like

Pakistan will continue to challenge a status quo power like India.

Kashmir is so central to the domestic politics and identity of Pakistan, that despite its failure every time in war over Kashmir with India, it is not willing to abandon its claims. In fact, it has continued with a range of proxy pressures on India. Pakistan has always felt that its existence is incomplete without Kashmir and has tried to ensure that the Kashmir question remain alive forever. India, on the other hand, has always believed that the unrest in Kashmir is partially due to the recalcitrant irredentism of Pakistan and partially a law and order issue. The Indian government has not been successful in realising or addressing the domestic causes of discontent and alienation of the Kashmiri population. This policy followed by India till now, even under the Modi era, has failed to address the deep-seated discontent in the valley. Whenever these deep-seated factors responsible for discontent stir up unrest in the valley, Pakistan further steps into sow more discord and stokes the crisis. The Indian strategy is again to resort to the use of force and this reinforces the alienation and causes more antipathy towards India amongst the Kashmiri people.

The Indo-Pak relationship took a severe plunge in December 1999 when IC-814 was hijacked and taken to Kandahar. The IC-814 was a routine flight from Kathmandu to Lucknow. The hijackers landed the flight in Amritsar before it reached Lahore. India, at that time, lacked any contingency plan to deal with such crises. The negotiations led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, Mushtaq Ahmed Zarg and Ahmed Umar Syed. This was followed by attacks by terrorists on Amaranath Yatris in 2000. Despite these issues, Musharraf was yet again invited for a dialogue in 2001. The talks again did not occasion in any material success as Musharraf wanted to accomplish some tangible progress on the Kashmir dispute in a single meeting. Some R&AW officials present in the one-on-one Musharraf-Vajpayee meeting also stated that no success could be achieved in the talks because Pakistan refused to accept its support to terrorists and insisted only on solving the Kashmir issue while India favoured discussions on issues unrelated to Kashmir. Senior R&AW official asserts that LK Advani, present in the meeting, pressed for the addition of Pakistan involvement with terrorism as part of the final communiqué while Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh favoured that Musharraf be given a leeway on Kashmir without such insistence as demanded by Advani.


On 13th December, 2001, while the Parliament was in session, terrorists of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) stormed the Parliament complex in New Delhi and began to fire indiscriminately. The Indian security officials swung into action and eliminated the terrorists. After the Parliament attack, there were calls for strong military action on Pakistan. The Indian government, however, resorted to coercive diplomacy. India broke off existing diplomatic ties with Pakistan and recalled its ambassador (High Commissioner of India). India closed its airspace for civilian aircrafts of Pakistan while sending Indian jets at forward positions. The army was asked for a timeline for a possible strike on Pakistan. The Indian army stated that any substantial operation against Pakistan would require a minimum of three weeks. In the meantime, Musharraf went public and announced a host of measures to ensure that none of the terror groups use Pakistani soil to wage terrorist attacks against any state. Such announcements in public made it all the more difficult for India to launch a military offensive. India finally made a choice to mobilise its forces along the international border on the West and keep the IAF ready all times. As the tensions escalated, the US, led by Bush, immediately

resorted to defusing tensions.

India resorted to public display of anger. Vajpayee and the then Army Chief asserted that time had come for some action. Despite all this, the army never resorted to any cross border surgical strikes. This could not happen because by the time the Indian forces had reached the international border, lot of time had elapsed and Pakistani forces too were adequately beefed up. Apart from the possibility of a nuclear escalation, the USA too had been pressurising for restraint. Due to mounting pressure from the US, both sides began a phased withdrawal. India, despite troop mobilisation under Operation Parakram, did not use force against Pakistan.

Indian analysts and R&AW officials assert that Operation Parakram was successful as it was able to raise the issue of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism at the global level. However, no structural change ever happened in the Indo–Pak relationship after Operation Parakram. Due to enormous pressure on Pakistan from the US, Musharraf finally declared a unilateral ceasefire with India along with LoC in 2003. The Indian army, on the other hand, began to search for a new doctrine. In fact, senior officials in the army assert that since the Kargil War, the army had been looking for options to fight a limited war with Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella. This process accelerated in the aftermath of the Parliament attack. This led India to toy with the idea of the Cold Start doctrine, as a doctrine for limited war. Under the Cold Start doctrine, it has been decided to break the large ‘strike corps’ into division sized integrated battle groups, which, with thorough speed, will resort to rapid mobilisation. Such mobilisation will resort to swift manoeuvre over Pakistan and capture a limited strip of land through air, ground and naval action. Such captured territory is to be used as a bargaining chip with Pakistan.

In 2002, Kashmir witnessed elections. After the elections, in 2003, Vajpayee visited Srinagar and announced fresh dialogues with Pakistan. In 2004, the Vajpayee government was replaced with the government of Manmohan Singh. Manmohan decided to carry forward the idea of composite dialogue. Manmohan stressed the idea of negotiating with Pakistan as he strongly believed that India would not be able to position itself as a global player if it remained mired in conflict with Pakistan. The diplomatic ties were re-established and a process of normalisation began.




The Manmohan Singh government carried forward the legacy of composite dialogue even in its unilateral decisions. It decided to reduce troop presence in Kashmir and decided to help in establishing a channel for negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. The back-channel diplomacy launched by India was led by Satinder Lambah. It resulted in start of Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service. Musharraf paid a one-day visit to India and attended an Indo–Pak cricket match. However, a crisis erupted again as terrorists struck

the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus service. The negotiations continued in 2006 and Manmohan even offered a new treaty of peace, security and friendship to Pakistan. However, Pakistan responded to the offer of the treaty by asserting that Kashmir remained their central question. The peace process was derailed in July, 2006, when LeT cadres orchestrated the Mumbai blasts. The LeT organised bomb blasts in local trains in Mumbai. The peace process moved at an extremely slow pace after the blasts. In September, 2006, the two sides established a Joint Mechanism for Investigation and Countering terrorism. In December, 2006, Musharraf announced a four-step package approach for the Kashmir problem.



In 2007, Pranab Mukherjee visited Pakistan and continued the discussions. In February 2007, the Samjhauta Express was bombed. As the Samjhauta Express bombings were not done by any Pakistani group, the talks continued. Investigations had found Hindu terrorists responsible for the blast. In February, the Pakistani Foreign Minister visited India and a nuclear pact to reduce nuclear risks was concluded. The ousting of Musharraf had somewhat put the composite dialogue in jeopardy but it was the Mumbai blasts (26/11) in 2008 that altogether halted the peace process. Pakistan had a new civilian administration led by Asif Ali Zardari. After the Mumbai attacks, India resisted any military action as it feared that the Zardari regime was still nascent and if India militarily retaliated, Pakistan would resort to escalation as the army was cornered in Pakistan. Further, upon retaliation, India would have been branded as an aggressor, affecting its moral international standing for an attack on Pakistan that would, in any case, serve little strategic utility. Subsequently, under intense pressure, the Zardari government resorted to some cosmetic actions by detaining leaders of LeT and JeM. The Pakistanis favoured resumption of the composite dialogue once again but the Indian side declined the request. The Manmohan Singh regime did make more attempts to normalise ties with Pakistan but the Pakistani military dominated its diplomacy and did not allow any major changes on the ground. As mentioned earlier, even Modi tried to break the ice with Pakistan, but terrorist attacks in Pathankot, Pampore, Uri in 2016 and Kupwada in April 2017 have again led to the suspension of the composite dialogue.

Our analysis of the Indo–Pak relations thus far proves a few things. Pakistan has adopted a two-point strategy on Kashmir. It asserts, firstly, that they are fighting for the rights of Kashmiri Muslims. Pakistan insists that it has any control over non-state actors in Kashmir. Our analysis also points out, secondly, that all regimes in Pakistan have continued with the policy that Kashmir is the core central issue and that Pakistan would rest only when it succeeds in taking Kashmir from India, suggesting that Pakistan would remain a predatory power. India today, under Modi Government, has understood that it has to face a revisionist state called Pakistan.



July 2014, Modi decided to resume dialogues with Pakistan. However, his government made it clear that Pakistan should not meet any separatists as doing so would lead to the suspension of talks. In August, 2014, Pakistani High Commissioner Abdul Basit had a meeting with Kashmiri separatist Shabir Shah, leading to India suspending the talks. In 2014 and 2015, Pakistan undertook repeated ceasefire violations. Despite this, Modi made a surprise visit in December, 2015 to Lahore. This again ignited the hope of a fresh dialogue. But the subsequent attacks in 2016 in Pathankot, Pampore and Uri and the one in Kuparada in 2017 have brought the dialogue to an end. The awarding of death sentence to Kulbhushan Jadhav and refusal to grant him counsellor access (despite such a provision permitted by the Vienna Convention) in 2017 have added new irritants in the relationship at the bilateral level. However, in May 2017, the International Court of Justice has put a stay on the execution of Jadhav.



Jaw for a Tooth—29th September 2016 Surgical Strikes the Case of India's Loss of Virginity

On 18th September, 2016, there was an attack on an Indian camp in Uri in Kashmir. The assessment of R&AW suggested a Pakistani hand in the attack. Till now, India had been exercising a policy of strategic restraint and had never wanted to escalate conflict with Pakistan but the Uri attack had crossed all thresholds. India could have instructed R&AW for a covert strike in Pakistan, but, post-Uri, there was a rising discontent amongst the Indian population, who demanded that India give a befitting response. India responded by, firstly, deciding not to attend the SAARC summit in November, 2016, planned in Islamabad. Regionally, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan stood with India and decided to back out of the SAARC summit. Then started a diplomatic policy of isolating Pakistan. Internationally, India began to persuade foreign firms and states not to engage with Pakistan. Domestically, India began to threaten Pakistan by asserting that India would resort to creation of more dams on the Indian side of the Kashmiri Rivers. On 29th September, 2016, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned the journalists for a news briefing where Indian army DGMO Ranbir Singh announced that the Indian army had carried out surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads along the LoC.

The Indian strike was well planned. A few days before, the government instructed R&AW to activate its cells in Pakistan. The R&AW assets in Lahore, Islamabad and Muzaffarabad were activated. On the night of 28th September 2016, the Indian forces along the LoC launched artillery fire. The launching of artillery fire was done with an intention to divert and distract the attention of the Pakistani army. Around 100 Special Forces from India's Parachute Regiment crossed the LoC. The

forces crossed the LoC at around four different places almost 4 kilometres inside the Pakistani side of the LoC. The Indian forces launched heavy firing and destroyed approximately six launch pads across the LoC. Since 1971, India, for the first time struck on the other side of the LoC and gave a strong response to Pakistan's anti-India activities.

INDIA–PAKISTAN AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE—AN ANALYSIS

During the British times, Kashmir was one of the states under British suzerainty. In 1946, the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission to India defined the status of such states. As per the Cabinet Mission plan, once the British paramount ceases, the crown would no longer hold paramount power and such power would be transferred to the states. There will be an end to political arrangements between the states, crown and British India. The state will fill the void by establishing a relationship with India, Pakistan or would remain independent. Two instruments, namely, Instrument of Accession and a Standstill Agreement were proposed by Mountbatten. Jinnah interpreted that, as per Cabinet Mission Plan, the situation post lapse of paramount would be such that states would gain independent status of being sovereign in nature. Congress, through a resolution on 15th June, 1947, held that on lapse of paramountcy, the will of the people of concerned states would be required to ascertain their choices as lapse of paramountcy did not tantamount to the independence of a state. With this interpretation, the Congress raised objections when the Maharaja of Jodhpur began to negotiate an accession with Pakistan. India insisted its interpretation in case of Junagadh. A referendum on Junagadh happened and its population voted in favour of India. Kashmir was ruled by Hari Singh. In September 1947, there was a communal trouble in Poonch province in the state. Simultaneously, Pakistani tribesmen had started pouring in and had unleashed a campaign of carnage in other areas reaching up till Srinagar. On 24th October, 1947, Hari Singh requested arms and troop support from India to stop the Pakistani-sponsored menace. As Hari Singh had not acceded either to India or Pakistan, troops from India could not be sent. Mountbatten asserted that the accession should be determined by a plebiscite after the tribesmen have been driven out of Kashmir. Nehru accepted the views of Mountbatten.

Mountbatten contended that as India has not signed a formal accession treaty with Kashmir, if it sends troops to Kashmir, Pakistan would do the same and this may lead to a war. It was decided by Nehru to inform Hari Singh that only if Hari Singh acceded to India would there be any troop commitment. Nehru, however, clarified that such an accession is conditioned and once law and order is restored, the will of the Kashmiri people about their future would hold sacrosanct. Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession and sent a letter to Nehru to that effect. In the letter Hari Singh stated that Kashmir had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan. As per the agreement, Pakistan provided postal and telegraph services in the state. Hari Singh also complained that Pakistan had put a lot of pressure on him and one of the pressure tactics was the tribal raids. He wrote that in this emergency, instead of allowing Pakistan to destroy his state, he preferred concluding an instrument of accession with India. The Indian government accepted the accession and decided to provide military help to Kashmir. Pakistan immediately declared that the accession was an act of fraud and it summarily rejected the accession.


The challenging of the legality of the accession by Pakistan was an unsound political move. Indian policy was clear—it was aimed at driving out invaders from Kashmir. Once law and order would be restored, there would be a plebiscite under the observation of UN. Mountbatten urged Nehru that an international agency like the UN can ensure impartiality in the plebiscite. On 15th January, 1948, India argued in the UN that after normalcy prevailed in the state, there would be a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. The UN subsequently established a UN commission for India and Pakistan with power to exercise mediatory influence. As the UN commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) came to the subcontinent, there arose disagreements over de-militarisation in Kashmir. In 1949, India included representatives of Kashmir in its Constituent Assembly and worked on Article 370. Pakistan immediately raised objections to the same. India clarified that as its Constitution was being discussed, the Kashmir region could not be left out. However, India asserted that the inclusion of representatives of Kashmir did not change its position on ground. India assured that after the plebiscite, if Kashmir decided to go the other way, its representation in the Indian parliament would automatically cease. India further clarified that the instrument of accession was conditional on a plebiscite but was legal.

The Indian Constituent Assembly debated about an Article 370 (which was debated as Article 306A) to give representation to Kashmir till conditions conducive for a plebiscite were created. The UNCIP yet again made an attempt under McNaughton's leadership to create a conducive condition for plebiscite by advocating demilitarisation. However, the UNCIP failed and the UNSC terminated the UNCIP in 1950 and appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the UN Representative to the Security Council. Owen Dixon again proposed the idea of a plebiscite after demilitarisation. In 1951, the Indian government supported the creation of a Constituent Assembly of the state of Kashmir which would frame its own Constitution but India clarified that it remained committed to a plebiscite and against forced marriages. The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir adopted a Constitution for Kashmir on 17th November, 1956. The Constitution declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. Though Pakistan objected to this provision, India clarified that the legality of Kashmir's accession to India (as happened in October 1947) could not be challenged but that did not change India's position of a plebiscite to allow the Kashmiris to determine their future, provided conducive conditions are created. India alleged that the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir and the subsequent Pakistani membership of SEATO and Baghdad pact in 1953 and 1954 had not created a condition conducive for a plebiscite. India also alleged that Pakistan had not withdrawn its troops on the other side of the ceasefire line. India, by 1960, began to assert that it would not accept international mediation and would resort to a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan over Kashmir but continue to support plebiscite. India advocated a shift of treating the Kashmir problem as a world question to treating it as a domestic issue.

When Pakistani tribesmen had invaded Kashmir, the UNCIP was instructed to work intly with the two states and create a condition conducive for a plebiscite. To immediately halt the hostilities, the UNCIP, through negotiations, helped India and Pakistan sign an agreement in 1949 in Karachi. As per the Karachi Agreement, a ceasefire line was drawn as a temporary arrangement to divide the line between Kashmiri territory left with India and Pakistan occupied Kashmir which they called Azad Kashmir. The Pakistani army decided to take over the operational control of the Pakistan occupied

Kashmir and stationed its troops in the region. India had alleged that this troop presence of Pakistan was one of the reasons why a condition conducive for a plebiscite had not been created. The ceasefire line came into effect from 1st January, 1949.

India alleged that the stalemate over Kashmir could not end and a plebiscite could not happen as Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from the PoK which was a necessary condition for restoration of peace leading to a future plebiscite. As time progressed, in 1965, Pakistan launched another conflict with India. The India army gave a befitting response to Pakistan. In the subsequent Soviet brokered negotiations a Tashkent Agreement was concluded and both sides agreed to maintain a status quo. In 1971, in the war with East Pakistan, as explained in the previous section, India yet again gave a serious blow to Pakistan by slicing off Bangladesh from its control. After the 1971 war, India and Pakistan signed the Simla agreement in 1972. Under the Simla Agreement, Pakistan diplomatically paved way for recognition of creation of Bangladesh. Under the Agreement, the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1948 was re-designated as Line of Control (LoC).



Under the Karachi Agreement, the demarcation in the North at point NJ9842 was not clear. The two sides had no disagreement in the glacier area as the terrain was uninhabitable. In 1970s, Pakistan undertook expeditions in the region near NJ9842 in an area called the Siachen glacier. India too launched an expedition in the Siachen glacier. Pakistan eventually made an attempt to occupy the glacier. In 1984, Indian army, under Operation Meghdoot, thwarted Pakistan's efforts and successfully occupied the Siachen glacier.


Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, as mentioned above, the ceasefire line was now renamed as LoC and thereby the tenure of UNMOGIP to maintain peace on the ceasefire line came to an end. The Simla agreement of 1972 gave India an opportunity to put the conversion of the Kashmir issue from an international to a bilateral issue on paper. In 1972, under the Simla Agreement, Pakistan agreed to resolve Kashmir bilaterally without any third-party intervention. Though India gained at this point in 1972, however, critics point out that India lost an opportunity in 1972 to make the LoC as an international border. Due to lack of clear demarcations, firing across the LoC continued from the Pakistani side in 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.




The Simla Agreement of 1972 could not solve all the problems and proved unable to stabilise Kashmir. Since the 1950s, Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference (NC) was in power. In the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, he was dismissed many times only to be reappointed again. In 1987, Kashmir held elections. After the death of Sheikh Abdullah, Farooq Abdullah, his son, decided to form an alliance with the Congress for the elections. In the 1980s, various social and religious organisations who wanted to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully formed Muslim United Front (MUF). The MUF too wanted to use the 1987 elections to put forth Kashmiri grievances peacefully at the legislative forum. Farooq Abdullah won the elections. The MUF alleged that the elections were rigged, after which the MUF candidate Mohammad Yusuf Shah was imprisoned. This led to mass protests in the valley.

A Pakistani militant outfit leader Syed Salahuddin too fuelled the protestors through his group, known as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), which had been originally founded by Muhammad Ahsan Dar. The HM group mobilised Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq, Majid Wani, Javed Ahmed Mir and Yasin Malik and formed the Jammu and Kashmir liberation front (JKLF). As the MUF cadres were suppressed, they began to cross over to Pakistan for support. In 1979, the USSR had invaded Afghanistan. To contain the Soviets, the USA began to take help from Pakistan. The CIA had provided arms, ammunition and money to the ISI to train Mujahideens to fight the Soviets and create an enormous amount of resistance to the Soviet rule in Afghanistan. In 1989, as Soviet rule ended, Pakistan's ISI started developing confidence about the fact that a successfully trained Mujahideen campaign could also be launched in Kashmir.

The 1987 elections and the suppression of MUF had given Pakistan a fertile ground to fuel unrest in the valley. After the elections of 1987, when MUF cadres reached Pakistan for support, the ISI began to train them with arms and ammunition. In 1993, 26 social and religious organisations united to form the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC began to raise the call for the independence of Kashmir. The USA too had given tacit support to APHC leaders in India and it was financially backed by the CIA. As the JKLF received support and training from Pakistan, in 1989, they attacked a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit, Tika Lal Taploo. The assassination created tremendous fear amongst the Kashmiri Pandits. The HM too vocally began to assert that Kashmiri Pandits immediately leave the valley. Kashmir, which had been home to Sufi Islam and Hinduism, who had always coexisted peacefully, witnessed communal crisis. As violence against the Hindus unfolded in the valley in 1990, the central government decided to appoint Jagmohan Malhotra as the new governor of Kashmir. The exodus and ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits continued in the early 1990s as the ISI succeeded, through JKLF and HM, in arming the local population and inciting revolt against the Indian state for the sake of Kashmiri self-determination. From 1990 to 1994, the Indian security forces launched a massive campaign against the insurgents and terrorists in the valley. The Indian forces launched a ruthless campaign to suppress the insurgents with an intention to break the organisations from within. By 1996, HM and JKLF were severely weakened.



The Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) had been created by Hafiz Saeed and was active against the Soviets through Jihad in Afghanistan. Through the support of the ISI, the LeT started turning its attention towards Kashmir from the 1990s. The ISI successfully transformed the LeT into a proxy group against India. The LeT is ideologically linked to the Ahl-i-Hadith interpretations of Islam. Since 1990s, the ISI of Pakistan launched a campaign that sought to infiltrate Kashmir with the Ahl-i-Hadith ideology. The Ahl-i-Hadith interpretation is interlinked with the Wahabism school of Islam, which is one of the most orthodox and stringent forms of Islam practised in the world. Since 1990s, attempts have thus been made to Wahabise the Kashmiri society, which has always practised a softer, Sufi ideology-oriented Islam.




Through a dedicated department known as the Joint Intelligence North (JIN), the ISI began to provide support to separatists and terrorist groups to encourage infiltration into Kashmir. They carry out clandestine activities in the Kashmir region. In 1990s, to counter the ISI campaign, R&AW stepped in and launched Operation Chanakya. The R&AW began to form 'political cells' in Kashmir to counter the separatists. In South Kashmir, Kuka Parray alias Jamsheed Sheraji, in association with R&AW formed, the pro-India counter-insurgency outfit called Ikwan-ul-Musalmeen. The Ikwan group neutralised Pakistani groups in South Kashmir. Jamsheed was in reality a member of state assembly of Kashmir. R&AW created factionalism within the Hurriyat where Kuka Parray played an instrumental role in creating factional split within APHC to encourage moderate leaders.

The R&AW also created the Muslim Mujahideen to neutralise Pakistani groups in 1990s. In 2003, the R&AW also succeeded in creating a split in HM. The basic idea of Operation Chanakya was to neutralise ISI groups using Indian counter-insurgency groups.

All this while, ISI fuelled their campaign of spreading Wahabism in the valley and also initiated an attempt to introduce the idea of slicing off Kashmir from India to be controlled by Pakistan. By 1996, there was public disillusionment over ISI-sponsored violence and its attempts to Wahabise Kashmir. The R&AW and Indian forces aggressively ended the terrorist campaign in the valley and violence was drastically controlled by 1996. As the ISI received a setback, they initiated a new campaign of violence with a new tactic. In the period from 1999 to 2002, the ISI resorted to a new *fidayeen* phase of the campaign. The idea was to attack army camps, zero down on targets and terrorise the Kashmiri population. The logic behind ISI sponsored *fidayeen* attacks were to cause a psychological blow to the Indian forces, Indian people and the Indian state. The ISI now used Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for the campaign. This period saw the Kargil intrusions and an attack on the Indian Parliament. India pointed out Pakistan's role in the Parliament attacks and initiated Operation Parakram. Under intense pressure from the USA, Pakistan acquiesced to the dismantling of Taliban infrastructure.

The hostilities between India and Pakistan along the LoC and the international border had increased between, 2001–2002. In 2003, to de-escalate the rising tensions, the two sides concluded an agreement to maintain a ceasefire. As per the agreement in 2003, both sides would maintain peace and tranquillity on either side of the LoC and allow completion of fencing of the LoC. In 2005, India and Pakistan agreed not to develop new posts and defence works on either side of the LoC. The period post the ceasefire agreement in 2003 saw a sharp decline of violence and tranquillity had been achieved in Kashmir again.



The period from 2001-2002 onwards saw a resurgence in Indian economy. The benefits did not percolate evenly everywhere. As the situation became normal by 2008, another controversy created a storm. In 2008, the Indian government, along with the government of Kashmir, decided to undertake a land transfer of 99 acres to the Sri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB). Such a land transfer immediately assumed a communal dimension and Hindu–Muslim violence broke out. After intense and heated debates, the government decided to stall the transfer to the SASB. However, the political parties had already begun to believe that Islam was under threat in Kashmir and violence unfolded. As an atmosphere of unrest prevailed, certain events in 2010 sparked massive protests. In 2010, the Indian army carried out an encounter of terrorists in the Machil Sector in the district of Kupwara. Investigation found that instead of militants, the army had killed civilians living in Rafiabab area in the fake encounter. A month later, in June 2010, during a police crackdown, some innocents were killed in the Srinagar area by the police. This

W led to massive protests. The protestors began to pelt stones at the security forces. The protestors demanded the Indian troops to 'quit Kashmir'. The ISI saw an opportunity to revive their support to the protestors in the valley. The R&AW found evidence that the ISI had begun to use social media platforms to mobilise the Kashmiri youth against India. The ISI reinvigorated their idea of liberating Kashmir from India.

The Indian government announced measures to curtail tensions. Apart from an all-party meeting, the government decided to appoint inter barterers with Kashmir. The army, too, brought the perpetrators of Machil fake encounter to task.


However, an understanding of deeper dynamics of protestors and stone pelters point out different factors for the uprising. Apart from the anger against the security forces, the protestors were also frustrated due to lack of employment as there were no jobs for the youth, with instances of violence arbitrarily perpetrated by security personnel alienating Kashmiri youth further. The ISI took advantage of such alienation to instil the ideology of Wahabism and radicalism amongst the youth, exhorting them to enrol for Jihad. As the situation turned to normalcy, again sparks erupted. In 2013, the government hanged Afzal Guru. His hanging for his role in the Parliament attack caused a massive unrest in the valley. In 2015, the PDP decided to form a government in Kashmir in alliance with the BJP. The people of the valley did not favour such an alliance. This angered the youth and certain sections of the youth again found solace in extremism.

Burhan Wani was a classical example. He joined the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The HM, adequately supported by the ISI, aggressively used the social media for radicalisation and indoctrination. The HM made him the commander of South Kashmir. His youthful age and sincerity found immense resonance amongst alienated Kashmiri youth. On 8th July, 2016, the Indian armed forces killed Wani in an encounter. His death led to an upsurge in the valley. Lakhs of people attended his funeral. The ISI and HM, through social media, instigated the youth to resort to stone pelting against the Indian forces. The Pakistani army's ceasefire violations and the ISI's social media-led mobilisation from 2016 to 2017 have led to massive unrest in the valley yet again. Prem Shankar Jha has called the 2016 unrest in the valley as a Kashmiri intifada. Stone pelting in 2016–17 has emerged as a cult in Kashmir. This radical suicidal stone pelting, in the face of pellet guns and other armed forces ammunition, is an outcome of Pakistan-sponsored radical Wahabi indoctrination amongst the youth. The ISI of Pakistan, according to R&AW, has earmarked 1000 crores to be given to groups in Kashmir to create stone-pelting led unrest. The R&AW found that in 2017, during by-elections for Lok Sabha from Srinagar and Ananthnag, the ISI had deliberately created a fear psychosis amongst the population to deliberately have a low voter turnout. After the by-elections, ISI resorted to a massive international campaign to highlight the low voter turnout.

The R&AW has found that Pakistani strategy is to instigate Kashmiri youth to obstruct forces and pelt stones at them, which will inevitably lead to forces using fire upon youth. The more youth are killed, the more it would alienate the Kashmiri population further from India. Such alienation will provide the ISI to activate HM and other groups to radicalise youth by preaching Wahabism. The radicalised Wahabi youth would resort to Jihad to create more unrest in the valley.

A lot of suggestions have been put forward for resolving the crises. The most

important, however, is that the government should address the alienation of the Kashmiri youth and bring them into the mainstream society. There should be immediate job creation and political mobilisation of the youth and efforts should be taken to connect the youth to the political processes in the country. Pakistan too needs to stop ceasefire violations. Alienation of the youth, coupled with anger, has led to a serious crisis in Kashmir today. Radical Islam and Wahabism too has affected the youth who have moved away from the system. Taking advantage of the void created by the failure of institutional mechanisms by the state and the central government's side, Pakistan is back in the valley with a vengeance.



Pakistan has to give up its territorial ambitions over Kashmir and cease all support to non-state actors in the valley. By establishing a conducive condition, a possible solution could be achieved. India, on the other hand, has to rectify its policies and initiate an immediate dialogue and political solution for the Kashmir crises. Till the time Pakistan continues to fuel unrest in Kashmir, R&AW will continue to resort to a similar strategy in Pakistan territory of Baluchistan and FATA region.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

In the previous sections of the chapter, we have analysed the complex Indo-Pak relationship since partition. In 1998, the two also tested their nuclear weapons. A new combustible mixture has emerged due to the nuclear option. The international community has always had serious concerns about the future of India and Pakistan as both have fought violent and bloody conflicts in the past. What also added to international concerns was the refusal of the two to renounce their right of acquiring nuclear weapons. All such international concerns got aggravated in 1998 when both tested their weapons. There are different views that have erupted on the impact of regional security in the post-test period.

Let us have a look at the optimistic view. In India, this view is propounded by Sumit Ganguly. He opines that the leaders of India and Pakistan are interested in their national survival. Both leaders realise that either party has adequate capabilities to inflict harm on its adversaries. Thus, if there is a crisis, both sides would strive to exercise caution with an intention to ensure that crises are not escalated to the nuclear level. This, as per the deductive logic propounded by Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz, would lead to the prevention of escalation of conflict to a nuclear level and would bring about stability.

Ganguly adds further details to his argument. He observes that the Partition has had a profound impact on both India and Pakistan. Pakistani leadership continues to feel, despite losses inflicted upon them in 1965 and 1971, that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda. Though, since 1971, the South Asian region has not witnessed a war it has witnessed

limited conflicts in 1999 and Pakistani sponsored ethno-religious insurgency in Kashmir. It is well accepted that the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 has played an important role in preventing escalation of conflicts, including the Kargil intrusion, into a fully-fledged war. Despite further escalation of tensions during 2006 Mumbai attacks, then the 26/11 attacks and recent attacks in 2016 and 2017 from Pathankot, Pampore, Uri and Kupwara, both sides have exhibited restraint and have not violated thresholds. Ganguly asserts that Pakistan may resort to a proxy war but knows its limitation. Pakistan knows that if it initiates any conventional conflict with India, India too would resort to retaliation and this could push both towards a war. India, however, has followed a mixture of resolve and restraint. It has given Pakistan substantial responses to Pakistani provocation. Yet the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan would remain a robust tool to avert full scale wars in future.

There is also a pessimistic view advanced by S. Paul Kapur. Firstly, the pessimists agree with the optimists on the fact that if players have nuclear weapons, they would behave strategically and strive for international stability. Instead of challenging the optimistic school on this account, the pessimists argue that organisations which are given the responsibility to manage nuclear weapons could go rogue and indulge in destabilising strategies. For pessimists, organizational pathologies would short circuit the adoption of stabilising strategies. Paul Kapur adds further that if a state acquires nuclear weapon, it may create incentives for a state to create destabilisation. He observes that there could be a possibility that there is a weak state in the scenario, say, which is not satisfied with the territorial boundaries with a neighbouring strong state. The neighbouring strong state is a status quo power with stronger military while the weaker state may position itself as a revisionist state. The weaker state may want to alter the boundaries to seek a boundary favourable to itself but knows that if it resorts to a conventional conflict against the strong state, the strong state would inflict heavy damage in retaliation and thereby, the weak state prefers to live with undesirable boundaries. Kapur asserts that acquisition of nuclear weapons will change the scenario. Let's say that the weaker state acquires nuclear weapons. Now, through them, the weaker state has tried to overcome strong state's conventional military might with actuation of nuclear arsenal.

Now let's assume that the strong state threatens the weaker one with a military catastrophe. The weaker state, to mitigate the threat by the stronger state, could launch a nuclear strike. On first strike by the weaker state, the stronger state could resort to massive and unacceptable retaliation. But, the stronger state, in such a scenario, would not prefer to launch a full-scale attack or resort to a conventional war against a weak for the fear of nuclear escalation. The strong state may resort to strategic restraint and at times, if needed, resolve to a limited extent with no possibility of crossing the nuclear threshold. If the weaker state develops the understanding that the stronger state would exercise strategic restraint, then, it may embolden the weaker state to resort to tactics to attempt to alter boundaries because it would know that the stronger state would not employ its full military power in its response to the opponent. More importantly, the weaker state may try to indulge in destabilising behaviour due to availability of diplomatic incentives for itself. The weaker state may provoke the adversary. Such provocation will push the stronger state to respond, which could push the conflict towards nuclear escalation. As the tensions rise, the international community would intervene. Such intervention to defuse crises

could lead to a territorial settlement that may prove profitable for the weaker state. The weaker state would eventually, through international intervention, seek to get a territorial settlement that it may not have been in a position to get bilaterally with the stronger state. Thus, the weaker state could also deliberately resort to provoking the stronger state to push crisis towards nuclear escalation.

If the provocation by the weaker state increases, there could be retribution by the stronger state. If the weaker state, after provocation, say happens to alter the boundaries by capturing some territory, it could invite a strong action from the adversary. The stronger state may not only inflict tremendous harm through a conventional military attack but may try to breach the nuclear threshold. The conventional military attack by the stronger state could be stronger than what the weaker state could anticipate. There could be a possibility that the response by the stronger state could weaken the weaker state's nuclear controls. To prevent such a possible fear, the weaker state could hand over its nuclear launching authority to the armed forces with a hope that if the stronger state retaliates, the nuclear command does not lose the ability to respond. Thus, apart from just the organisational pathologies, the insulation from full scale retaliation and possibility of international intervention can also lead to destabilising behaviour. Therefore, a dissatisfied state with a weaker military could acquire nuclear weapons to cause destabilisation. This is a situation of strategic pessimism which advocates that having nuclear weapons will not always lead to rational calculations but, at times, can create incentives to cause destabilisation and escalation.

Now, let us apply the two views in the context of the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan. Though, India and Pakistan tested their weapons in 1998, but the idea of acquiring such weapons goes back to the 1970s. After India defeated Pakistan in the 1971 war, in 1974, it demonstrated its capabilities through a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). The Pakistani defeat in 1971 war and subsequent Indian PNE brought about a major shift in Pakistani strategic thinking and it began working on the development of its own nuclear weapon. The development, in a covert manner, continued by both states in 1980s. By the end of 1980s, the two had capabilities to develop their weapons at a short notice.

The reasons that drove India to explore the nuclear option were different from Pakistan's. India failed to get international security post Chinese nuclear test in 1964. This led Shastri to authorise a Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP). The SNEP later in 1974 manifested as PNE. Indira and Rajiv Gandhi played important roles in the development of India's nuclear capabilities. For Pakistan, on the other hand, the trigger was their defeat in 1971. Pakistan understood that only a nuclear weapon could help them overcome the threat of the conventional superiority of India. If we apply strategic pessimism here, then some more factors can help us understand Pakistan's bid for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan was not happy with the partition in 1947. It wanted to alter the boundaries with India. After Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession with India in 1947, Pakistan tried to alter the boundaries through 1947–48 war and 1965 war. With the Pakistani territory of East Pakistan also lost in the form of an independent state (Bangladesh) in 1971, Pakistan realised that it would not be able to fight a war with India over Kashmir ever again. But, Pakistan did not give up the cause of Kashmir fully. It decided to challenge territorial boundaries in Kashmir after it acquired capabilities that could alter the strategic situation. This compelled Pakistan to acquire

nuclear weapons. As the acquisition of weapons was going on, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and subsequent mujahedeen campaign by the US gave Pakistan a new idea on how to resort to a proxy model to alter the status quo in Kashmir. As the Cold War ended in 1989, bolstered with arms, training and knowledge from the mujahedeen campaign, coupled with a capability to produce a nuclear weapon at a short notice, Pakistan unleashed proxy insurgency in Kashmir in 1989. Pakistan began to realise that it could use the nuclear option if India resorted to a conventional attack upon Pakistan due to provocation in Kashmir. Pakistani strategic elite clearly knows that it can continue to support insurgency in Kashmir as the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has neutralised the Indian option of conventional conflict with Pakistan.

Therefore, as the Pakistani side began to support insurgents in Kashmir, the Indian side immediately enhanced its security presence in Kashmir to suppress the insurgents. The Pakistani side responded by enhancing their presence along the international border. Indian side responded by deploying armoured units from the international border till the LOC. As the crises escalated, Pakistan feared a full-scale attack from India while India feared an attack on Kashmir. To defuse the crisis, the US government sent its Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to the region. The Gates Mission succeeded in defusing the crises by warning Pakistan that in case of an attack from India, it would be defeated. As the crisis deescalated, both sides announced normalcy again.

One view which explains why the two sides did not go for a war in 1990s is the view by Sumit Ganguly. According to him, despite massive infiltration by Pakistan in Kashmir, India exercised caution because it was aware of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. In 1965, when Pakistan had undertaken infiltration, Indian troops had crossed over the ceasefire line and destroyed the assembly points used by the infiltrators in Pakistan. In 1990s, when this massive infiltration happened again, the Indian side enhanced force presence at the LoC but did not undertake any forceful measures. The Indian officials at that time offer a different perspective. They argue that India never wanted to escalate the 1990 crisis into a war as India did not perceive the situation at that time volatile enough to occasion a full-fledged war. The then Indian Foreign Secretary SK Singh stated clearly that assuming that the 1990s crisis could lead to war is a mere conjecture. According to this logic, then the 1990's crises that happened in the backdrop of nuclear weapon did into stabilize but created a possibility of destabilization as witnessed in Pakistani support to insurgents in Kashmir.

Again, in 1998, Pakistani army men carried out an intrusion in Kargil. They crossed over the LoC and entered into the Indian side. When the Indian side observed these intrusions, in 1999, Indian forces carried out an intense air and ground offensive and drove out the intruders. As the Indian side had suppressed the insurgency in Kashmir by 1996, the international attention on Kashmir too began to decline. Pakistan wanted to make an incursion in the region again without harming vital its security interests of India. The prime intention of making an intrusion in Kargil was to slice off a part of the National Highway 1A as doing so would make it difficult for India to supply logistics to the Indian troops in the Siachen glacier. India launched an offensive to dislodge intruders but ensured that neither the ground troops nor its air force crosses the LoC. India exercised tremendous restraint. Pakistan thought that its nuclear capabilities would prevent an Indian conventional response and also the international attention in case of crisis between two

nuclear armed players would be beneficial to Pakistan.

The optimists argue that the nuclear weapons in the context of Kargil prevented escalation. However, the Indian officials argue differently. Indian Army Chief during Kargil conflicts, VP Malik, asserts that India did not cross over the LoC as it wanted international support and had cared for the world's opinion. Even G Parthasarathy asserts that India did not cross the LoC to ensure that the world would accept that Kargil had happened because of Pakistani provocation. Indian response was rooted in self-defense. VP Malik further states that as the political leaders wanted the forces to eject the intruders, they exercised fluidity and flexibility by granting the forces the authorisation to cross over the LoC if need be. He asserts that there was no nuclear threat in the picture and if the tactical operation did not go well, India could have crossed the LoC. Even Brijesh Mishra asserted that if army would have requested the need to cross over the LoC and the political leadership would have accepted the request if circumstances had necessitated thus. According to the official view, crossing the LoC would not have triggered any nuclear backlash from Pakistan.

As the crises of Kargil ended, new situations erupted and now the Indo–Pakistan conflict was at an all new level. India demanded that Pakistan hand over terrorists responsible for attacks on India, failing which India would strike Pakistan and snatch their territories. In January, 2002, Pakistan declared LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed illegal and banned their activities. Musharraf asserted that Pakistani territory would not be used against India by terrorists. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visited India to assure India of serious steps taken by Pakistan to dismantle terrorist infrastructures. India, in the wake of visit of Colin Powell, decided not to strike but did not remove its forces from the borders. In May, 2002, Pakistan ambushed Indian troops in Kuluchak in Jammu. India decided to attack Pakistan from Rajasthan across the LoC and sieze territory and destroy Pakistani forces. Consequently, Musharraf assured the world that Pakistan would permanently end infiltration. The USA Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, visited India and assured India once again of Musharraf's pledge. India began to withdraw the plan and decided to end Operation Parakram.

Why did India not resort to attacking Pakistan despite escalation of conflicts in 2001–2002? One view is that the nuclear weapons prevented any serious conflict escalation and India exercised restraint. The other view is that Indian officials did not feel the need to attack Pakistan as they believed that Operation Parakram had delivered the desired results. Indian officials observe that there was no point attacking Pakistan because they received assurances from the US that Pakistan would dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. They further clarify that their goal was to ensure that terrorism does not emanate from Pakistan and Operation Parakram and USA assurances achieved this goal.

Since the stand-off, the two sides have not witnessed any form of major crises escalation. India's use of coercive diplomacy has sent a strong message to Pakistan. The future relations post 2001–2002 have taken a different turn. The US has de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and has, over a period of time, bolstered Indian capabilities. It has given India a nuclear deal in 2005. The US is now working with India to strengthen its defence apparatus through the Indo–USA DTTI (explained in the chapter of India and USA relationship) and the LEMOA. Pakistan, on the other hand, has tilted towards China,

which has been attempting to bolster Pakistani economic capabilities. Nuclear weapons have played a considerable role in crisis prevention strategy. Nuclear weapons have played a considerable role in crises prevention strategy. Despite Pakistani provocations in the form of 2006 Mumbai train attacks, 26/11 attacks in Pathankot (2016), Pampore (2016), Uri (2016) Kupwara (2017), Krishna Ghati (2017); India has resorted to a strategy of diplomatic isolating Pakistan and on provocation, has followed a mixture of resolve and restrain.

There is, however, an alternative view that suggests that post 9/11, Pakistan started taking steps to dismantle terrorist infrastructure within its territories, which led to a serious backlash by the terrorist groups against the state of Pakistan. Many terrorist group nurtured by Pakistan have evolved a sense of betrayal by the Pakistani regime. As a result of this, such groups have gradually turned against the Pakistani establishment. In recent times, Pakistani diplomats have globally started voicing a concern that Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism. As the terrorist groups have organised themselves in NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan region, the attention of the Pakistani army has been diverted from Kashmir to maintain internal security. Thus, Pakistan is finding it extremely difficult to fight along three fronts, namely, a proxy war against India in Kashmir, a combo of Al-Qaeda-Taliban and internal groups resorting to aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan has been now started alleging that India's R&AW is funding terror groups in Pakistan. India has, on the other hand, summarily dismissed such allegations.

India has also decided to inflict harm upon Pakistan for their provocation through the Cold Start doctrine. Under this doctrine, India, on Pakistani provocation would inflict harm upon Pakistan, capture their territory to use it as a bargaining chip in the post-conflict period and yet the depth of the incursion by India under the Cold Start will not be intense enough to trigger a nuclear response by Pakistan. Pakistan has, in the recent times, brought about a shift in its attitude. It has started using Kashmir as a launch pad to attack other Indian cities like Varanasi, Lucknow, Ajmer and Hyderabad and so on. This gives Pakistan not only the option of deniability but a brilliant strategy of showcasing the disgruntled Indian Muslims and their suppression to the world.

ANALYSIS

Our discussion in the preceding section has proven that the Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific. The potential motivation for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons began with its perceived asymmetry with India in conventional warfare. The response of the USA in not fully supporting Pakistan outright in the 1965 and 1971 wars aggravated Pakistan's fear that the US would not be able to function as a long-term security guarantor. The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 made Pakistan perceive India as an existential threat. It therefore decided that acquisition of nuclear weapon would provide it with a tool to face India equally. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons are not just a response to conventional superiority of India but also a tool to ensure the stability and survivability of Pakistan. Though India advocates a No First Use (NFU) policy, Pakistan has stated that it does not have any confidence on India's NFU and they have, therefore, not accepted the NFU as a viable policy.



Pakistan's idea of strategic deterrence is based upon the logic of developing conventional capabilities first. Pakistan believes that developing conventional capabilities will help them ward off a conventional attack from India. Based on this logic, Pakistan has sought to buy the F-16 fighter jets from the US. This is driven by the logic that Pakistan should not allow India to exploit any Pakistani faultlines—from sub-conventional to conventional to nuclear level—as this may endanger the security of Pakistan. Pakistan further believes that if India ever resorts to a full-scale conventional attack, Pakistan would resist the same through conventional preparedness, but, if the survivability of Pakistan is under a threat, then it may exercise a nuclear option.



The four conditions are not officially mentioned by Pakistan. In fact, they believe that the essence of deterrence is ambiguity and some amount of uncertainty will create dissonance amongst Indians about the extent they can push Pakistan. Pakistan deliberately favours an stability–instability paradox as a central element of their security competition with India. The stability–instability paradox is an international relations theory regarding the effect of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. To aggravate matters further, Pakistan strives for developing a large nuclear stockpile. Pakistan believes that the Indo–USA nuclear deal, the NSG waiver for India and a potential NSG membership for India will allow India to buy uranium globally and use its own uranium for its weapons programme, which might contribute yet again to an existential threat to Pakistan. This has compelled Pakistan to explore the idea of developing an offensive deterrence posture.

Nuclear weapons by Pakistan have allowed them an umbrella to facilitate a proxy war in Kashmir. Pakistan has also developed an understanding that because of its nuclear weapons, it can continue to resort to a proxy war, and if conflict escalates, international intervention will pressurise India not to wage a war against Pakistan. Such international intervention legitimises the Pakistani idea of inflicting a low intensity conflict on India. Pakistan also knows that even if the US and others may become critical about Pakistan, no power would abandon a freelancing nuclear power like Pakistan for the fear of a nuclear

conflict in Asia and the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists or other rogue states. Thus, today, it is not a nuclear capable Pakistan that deters India, but an ambiguity that allows Pakistan to indulge in the risk-seeking behaviour of supporting terrorists and proxies. The nuclear weapons offer a shield to Pakistan's adventurism and offer them immunity in the long run. Pakistan uses terrorism as a rational strategy as it is designed to generate security and survivability for Pakistan. This kind of militancy has been nurtured by Pakistan to hide its domestic, economic and political weaknesses and the state uses it as a tool of asymmetric warfare (through non-state actors) to confront India. Nuclear weapons, its augmentation of conventional forces and use of militant proxies today form a combined grand strategy of Pakistan. Therefore, jihad today forms a core of grand strategy of Pakistan.

JIHAD AS A GRAND STRATEGY BY PAKISTAN

The origin of Pakistan's practice of training insurgents could be seen as early as the 1950s when the US and Pakistan came together to tackle the USSR. The US had provided the Pakistani army training in guerrilla tactics and the Pakistani army realised that such a tactic could also be used against India. In time, Pakistan developed the idea of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. The approach was carefully articulated. The army began to take advantage of the terrain in Kashmir. It provided support to dissenters, used the civilian support to fuel hatred and used their loyalties for launching anti-India attacks. Pakistan began its guerrilla campaign from 1947. It has nurtured this non-state actor led guerrilla warfare action to keep itself ready for a 'day after' nuclear attack, also if need be. More importantly, Pakistani has used the guerrilla non-state actor tactics to transfer a culture of Wahabism in the Kashmir valley. From 1960s, Pakistan began to work upon a model of gradual infiltration. For Pakistan, infiltration is a strategy entailing minimum casualty and maximum results. Pakistan began to toy with the idea of sending religious zealots and fundamentalists as part of the infiltration campaign. For Pakistan, infiltration began to emerge as a concept of conflict of the future. Pakistan today effectively uses infiltration tactic in Kashmir. Every year, since 2003, despite a ceasefire agreement in place, Pakistan has resorted to ceasefire violations. The ceasefire violations start routinely from September–October every year from the Jammu region. Pakistan resorts to firing and mortar shelling. This diverts the attention of the Indian forces to protect the population affected. Pakistan then uses this diversion of the Indian forces to infiltrate terrorists across the LoC, a process that gets completed in November. From December till June, the area remains under snow. The non-state actors in Kashmir thereafter resort to guerrilla warfare tactics. This is a classical diversionary tactics Pakistan has nurtured to wage low intensity conflicts against India. They applied this tactic for the first time in 1947 when they sent tribesmen to Kashmir and they continue to do the same till today.

OTHER DISPUTES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

One of the major disputes is about the Wullar barrage or the Talbul Navigation project on Jhelum River in Kashmir. The dispute goes back to 1984. India wanted to establish a barrage at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on Jhelum River. that the project entailed the creation of a 439 feet long and 40 feet wide barrage which would store 0.30 million acres feet of water which would make the river navigable during summer season. Pakistan had taken the matter to Indus Water Commission (since 1986) as it alleged that the Wullar

barrage violated the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the creation of the barrage would be used by India as a geostrategic weapon to restrict water supplies to Pakistan. India uses the term Tulbul Navigation Project while Pakistan uses the term Wullar barrage to refer to the project. Since 1986, there have been negotiations between the two sides to resolve the dispute, but it still persists.

Let us turn our attention to Indus Water Treaty. Before Partition, the water of Indus River the Indus system was jointly used by India and Pakistan. After the Partition in 1947, the two sides concluded an inter-dominion accord where it was decided that on annual payments from Pakistan, India would release a sufficient amount of water to Pakistan. It was decided in the inter-dominion accord that the two sides in future will negotiate a permanent solution. In 1951, the former chairman of Tennessee valley authority, David Lilienthal visited the region and recommended joint operation and development of Indus basin. Based upon the idea propounded by Lilienthal, the then chairman of World Bank Eugene Black convinced India and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement for water sharing. The meetings began from 1954 and finally concluded in 1960 with Indus Water Treaty (IWT) signed between Nehru and Ayub Khan.


The Indus basin has three eastern flowing rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) and three western flowing rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab). As per the INT, 1960, India got control over the Eastern Rivers while Pakistan got control of Western rivers. India, however, as per the IWT was allowed to use the water from the western rivers for the purpose of consumption with restricted use of the river water for storage. On the western rivers, except for specific cases, India was not to build storage and irrigation systems on the rivers. In the IWT, if there were to be a disagreement between India and Pakistan, there was a provision to seek mediation and arbitration. As per the Article XII of the IWT, a modification is permissible when both parties agree for the need of the same. To make sure that neither of the parties is violating any of the provisions of the IWT, the treaty provides for a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) where there would be one commissioner appointed by India and one by Pakistan. Whenever a project is initiated by one party, it has to share the information with the other party. If there is ever a dispute, first there are to be bilateral talks. If talks fail, the aggrieved party can seek third party (neutral party) intervention.

Jhelum is a west flowing river, one of its tributaries in Kishanganga. The Kishanganga in Pakistan is called Neelum river. India authorised the National Hydropower Corporation to establish a dam named Gurez on the Kishanganga River. To generate electricity, the National Hydropower Corporation envisaged the creation of a 20 kilometre long tunnel to divert water. The water through the tunnel could be diverted through the tunnel to generate 300+ Megawatt electricity at Kishanganga hydroelectric plant (KHEP) in Bonar Nallah. Pakistan objected to the KHEP project alleging that the diversion of the water will reduce the availability of water Pakistan requires for the Neelum–Jhelum hydropower plant and thereby also reduce the original share of river water due to Pakistan under the IWT by 15%. Thus, in 2010, Pakistan approached the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). The ICA gave a final decision in December, 2013. As per the ICA, Pakistan will need at least 9 cubic metre per second water flow in the river which shall be maintained by India and India would be able to, after ensuring 9 cubic metre per second flow in the river, go ahead with KHEP project.

Pakistan had also raised four design related issues at the ICA, but out of the four, only one was settled while the rest could not be settled at the bilateral level between the two. In June 2013, India initiated a new 850 hydropower station to be constructed as the Ratle plant on the Chenab River. Pakistan raised objection to the Ratle plant and took up the issue for arbitration by the court of arbitration at the World Bank. Pakistan, on 19th August 2013, requested the World Bank to constitute a court of arbitration. India, as per the IWT, had to respond to the request on 19th October, 2013. On 4th October, 2013, India requested that a neutral expert be appointed. If a state requests a neutral expert be appointed, then such a request has to be accepted immediately. The World Bank, however, chose to sit on India's request. On 19th October, 2013, when the Pakistani request matured, the World Bank advocated both the setting up of a court of arbitration and appointment of a neutral expert. India objected to the proposal, observing that it would complicate the process. India threatened that it may not participate in the court of arbitration as it had requested for a neutral expert's appointment which had to be accepted immediately, but it was not. The World Bank exercised a pause to the two processes and urged the two states to find an alternative resolution mechanism. The matter was taken up at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission. After the Uri attack happened in September, 2016, India decided not to hold the PIC meetings with Pakistan till it stopped funding terrorists. However, in March 2017, the suspension was lifted and the possibility of an agreement is awaited in future.

CONCLUSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Jinnah is the founding father of Pakistan. He always wanted a relation between India and Pakistan that would be similar to the US and Canada. Today, seventy years later, such a union is a distant dream. The two countries have fought four bitter wars and are nuclear armed players now. If the two sides are not engaged in an outright war, then both are in a state of cold war. In the last few years, the two seem to have been following a unique mechanism. The leaders of the two states normally meet on the side of any global summit (Modi met Sharif on the lines of Ufa Summit in 2015). Both announce that official level talks have resumed. Modi, in December 2015, also paid a surprise visit to Lahore. The moment talks are announced, in a short span of time, there is a Pakistan-sponsored jihadi attack against India (Pathankot air base attack, January 2016) and the dialogue breaks down. Apart from a jihadi attack, there could also be a ceasefire violation along the LoC, which is a condition sufficient for the talks to break down. Then starts a phase of allegations. India accuses Pakistan of state sponsorship to terrorism (India recently also provided evidence of Pakistani mutilation of Indian soldiers in Krishna Ghati in May, 2017), while Pakistan accuses India of creating destabilisation in Pakistan. The talks derail and later are resumed yet again with the same fanfare, only to be broken again.



The seeds of discord were laid down extremely deep at the time of Partition.

Congress never accepted the Partition. They always held the idea that the two sides would eventually unite due to a shared culture and heritage. However, for Pakistan, India not accepting the Partition was an attack on its identity, nay, its very existence. It is an enduring theory of Pakistan's leaders that India wants to absorb Pakistan. Though India has taken many steps to assuage such concerns, they have had a limited impact upon Pakistan. Even after the 1971 war, India through the Simla Agreement in 1972, accepted that Pakistan can exist as a neighbour of India. But, as there was no pressure exerted upon Pakistan in 1972 over the permanent resolution of the Kashmir issue, they took it as an opportunity to keep the Kashmir issue alive.

Recent statements by RSS leaders in 2017 of an '*akhand Bharat*' have again revived Pakistani suspicions. Pakistan, till today, feels that Kashmir is its jugular vein, serving as a unifying agenda since Partition. Pakistan continues to use irregular warfare through proxy groups to destabilise Kashmir as it harbours a feeling that it can continue to bleed India through this low-intensity conflict practised through indoctrinated religious zealots. Pakistan ideologically radicalises its proxy groups through the inflammatory '*Ghazwa-e-Hind*' hadith. Groups created by Pakistan wage a war against India in the delusional belief that India and Kashmir belong to the territory promised to them by Prophet Mohammad. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan interprets *Ghazwa-e-Hind* as also including Pakistan, and thus resorts to terrorist strikes against Pakistan with an intention to free Pakistan from US influence. In time, it is expected that Pakistan shall also become aware of the dangers of fuelling religious extremism in its neighbouring territory. Peace between India and Pakistan is possible only if Pakistan gives up its ambition to seek territorial readjustments, disconnects its support to terrorist groups and extends a genuine hand of friendship. Such a friendship has the potential of changing the course of not only Asia but the world.