

Organizing Immigration – a Comparison of New Zealand and Norway

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Introduction

Immigration policy is an extremely complex and sensitive field of politics and administration. Policy is developed at the international, national, regional and local levels (Cornelius et al. 2004) and involves specific cases about asylum, refugees, citizenship, residency, reuniting families, and work permits (Lahav 2004). Public opinion and people's attitudes towards immigrants are in a constant state of flux and are influenced both by changes in general policy and by conflicts surrounding individual and high-profile cases (Givens and Luedtke 2005). The integration of migrants requires input from a range of public services such as housing, education, employment, health, police and social welfare. Immigration is a 'wicked' issue (Rittel and Weber 1973) that cannot easily be solved within one sector or policy area or at one administrative level. Immigration policy involves balancing control, co-ordination, agency autonomy, professional competence and judicial rights.

The research questions covered are:

- a) How is immigration administration in Norway and New Zealand organized and reorganized by the political-administrative leadership?
- b) What characterizes the current structure of the immigration administration in the two countries? Stability or a state of flux?
- c) How much is the political-administrative leadership preoccupied with avoiding blame when organizing immigration administration?
- d) What perspectives may be used to explain comparative similarities and differences between the two countries?

After introducing the context of immigration in both countries, the chapter introduces theoretical perspectives about hierarchy, realpolitik, cultural features, myths and blame-avoidance to interpret the organizational responses to policy dilemmas. Roles of different actors in conflicts about whether immigration should be vertically or horizontally structured are then considered.

The Immigration Context of New Zealand and Norway

New Zealand

In contrast to Norway, New Zealand is largely a nation of immigrants who have arrived since 1840. Seventy per cent of New Zealanders are European in origin, with the indigenous Maori making up 16 per cent. Pacific Islanders and others of non-European origin each constitute 7 per cent. Most of the latter group have migrated since the early 1990s.

The demographics are a result of different stages at which immigration policy has interacted with the state of the economy. New Zealand has tended to restrict entry during periods of high unemployment, and hold out the welcome mat during boom times. Since the late 1970s the country has swung markedly between major net losses and gains of people. New Zealand is currently one of the world's most immigrant societies, with 19 per cent of its people born overseas, compared with Norway at 7 per cent.

Migration has been a major issue since 1972, when Britain's entry to the European Community made it clear that the nation would need to find a new identity and livelihood based on its Pacific location. From being one of the world's wealthiest nations per capita in the early 1950s, New Zealand slid towards the bottom of the OECD league table during the 1970s. It began regaining ground after radical restructuring of the economy in the late 1980s and since 1997 has grown faster than the OECD average.

Some key statistics show the scale of the changing impact of migration during the past 20 years. Net migration increased from 2,500 in 1990 to 42,500, the highest ever, in 2003, while the numbers of temporary workers and students rose from 20,000 to 100,000 during this period, reflecting the development of international education as one of New Zealand's top five largest export industries.

Norway

Before 1970, Norway was mostly a source of emigrants. Of 59,000 immigrants in 1970, 84 per cent came from Western countries, and the limited flows of migrants were not seen as a problem. After 1975, in common with European Union countries, Norway began controlling immigration, which has fluctuated largely as a result of external pressure, for example, requests from international organizations to take refugees. The major change has been the increase in numbers of non-Western immigrants, whose proportion of the total population in 2004 was 4 per cent, or 250,000 people. Most of these non-Western immigrants came from Asia, Africa and South America, but the largest increase from the late 1980s has been from Eastern Europe.

Immigration policy in Norway primarily focuses on people in three categories – those seeking refuge, family reunification or work. The first big wave of migrants, seeking asylum from wars and political oppression, came in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, with a peak in 1993, reduced numbers until the late 1990s, followed by a liberalization of the policy which led to a new peak of arrival numbers

in 2002 and then a major decline. The second group, the largest during the last decade, has been immigrants connected with family reunification. The third group, of people seeking work permits, is an issue that has changed recently because the EU has become more important in pressuring Norway to open access, and Norway has needed more foreign workers.

Theoretical Perspectives

Instrumental or structural theory, linked with bounded rationality, provides a useful framework for understanding the development and actions of the immigration administration in New Zealand and Norway (Simon 1957; Egeberg 2003). Different strategies to organize hierarchy and conduct negotiations are central features in such an approach, eventually related to avoid blame. This body of theory is supplemented with an institutional approach focusing on administrative culture and myths.

Hierarchy

According to a hierarchical perspective, political leadership will try to design the administrative apparatus, defining the relationship between the political leadership and subordinate leaders, levels and organizations, so as to fulfil major political goals. Two major preconditions for this are that political leadership scores high on controlling the reform process and engages in unambiguous organizational thinking (see Dahl and Lindblom 1953).

This perspective focuses on the role of politicians and administrative leaders in designing the apparatus. Political leaders facing questions of organizational design must attend to the issue of vertical and horizontal specialization (Gulick 1937; Simon 1957; Hammond 1990; Egeberg 2003). Vertical specialization focuses on the allocation of authority in the line organization, across hierarchical levels and institutions and among leaders, with strongly centralized or decentralized public organizations or systems of organizations at the extreme ends of the spectrum. Horizontal specialization involves the way functions or tasks are divided on the same level among units in one public organization or among public organizations like ministries or agencies. Political executives are potentially faced with several questions about the vertical and horizontal forms of structure: should there be one ministry or more dealing with immigration questions, including regulation and integration? Should there be subordinate agencies or an integrated solution? If regulation and/or integration questions are organized in subordinate agencies, should the independence and authority of these agencies be strong or weak? Should the handling of appeals be integrated in a ministry or taken care of by an agency and how much independence should this agency have?

Realpolitik

This perspective tells us that there is heterogeneity inside the political-administrative apparatus and the environment (March and Olsen 1983). Executives' attempts to

design or redesign the central administrative apparatus can be modified or hindered by disagreement in the political executive, by negotiations between the political executive and subordinate administrative bodies, or by interest groups in the environment. Negotiation features may modify the hierarchical control of immigration policy-making processes, leading to a more open structure of participants, but also to more discussion and negotiations on how to define problems and solutions in immigration policy. This may lead to compromises and modifications in policy content and organizational solutions, but also to decisions that potentially will have greater legitimacy (see Mosher 1967).

The following questions flow from this perspective. Is the political-administrative leadership homogeneous concerning how to define and organize the immigration administration or are there tensions and conflicts? What are the attitudes and roles of other stakeholders like the professionals in the apparatus, political parties and external interest groups? How do heterogeneity and conflicts influence the design of the apparatus and efforts to avoid blame?

Culture

The hierarchical and realpolitik perspectives are both based on an instrumental logic, and take it for granted that formal structure and norms are the most important factors in adopting and implementing policies in different areas. One may argue, however, that informal norms and values are also important, a view that is typical of a cultural-institutional perspective (Selznick 1957; Peters 1999). According to this perspective, public organizations develop gradually and are characterized by certain distinctive cultural features. The context and conditions under which the organization was born are important for understanding the paths or routes chosen, in other words the public organization is path-dependent (Krasner 1988). When reforms occur, historical traditions and informal norms play an important role (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). If they are compatible with traditions, reforms are likely to be implemented quickly, but if not, there may be obstruction or modifications (Sahlin-Andersson 2001).

We will discuss some of the main trajectories and historical traditions in the immigration apparatus concerning cultural norms and values. Is there agreement among political-administrative leaders, civil servants and external stakeholders about what is appropriate or is this changing and tension-ridden? What are the implications of the cultural paths for the design of the immigration apparatus and eventual effort of avoiding blame?

Myth

According to a myth perspective, changes or reforms in public organizations are mainly about the 'presentation of self in everyday life' (Goffman 1959). It is important for political leaders to be seen to be furthering reforms that are regarded as modern. They can increase their legitimacy, not only by acting in certain ways, but also by talking in certain ways about what they intend to do. Meyer and Rowan (1977) stress that, ideally, political leaders who are able to balance talk and action will be the most successful. Brunsson (1989) labels this as the potential success

of double-talk or ‘hypocrisy’. The conscious manipulation of myths and symbols may help political executives to take and implement certain decisions, like reforms in the immigration administration. But myths may also represent a deterministic environmental pressure that undermines the influence of political leaders (see Olsen 1992), or else opposing actors may further counter-myths to obstruct their control. Moreover, double-talk is not always a guarantee of success (see Christensen and Læg Reid 2002). What is more generally the role of myths concerning designing the apparatus and avoiding blame? Is this eventually connected to certain ways of defining the goals and purposes of immigration?

Blame-avoidance

Many studies of public reforms indicate that the structural devolution of agencies and public companies has decreased the influence of the central political leadership and increased the influence of agency executives (Christensen and Læg Reid 2001a; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The central levers of control are weakened, and the distance between political and subordinate units increases, making political signals more distant and other signals more compelling (for example, judicial or professional considerations, client interests, and so on). Decreased political control may nevertheless be masked by symbols, and devolution may be a better option for avoiding blame than centralization. But centralization may, on the other hand, make more consistency between accountability and blame, even though it potentially may create overload and capacity problems.

There are many ways for political leaders to avoid blame, from impression management, through policy positions to agency strategies (Hood 2002, 16). However, we will examine how blame may be avoided through ‘organizational reorientation’ (Laughlin 1991) or reorganization (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2004, 128–9, 165), and focus more on blame strategies conducted between political executives and subordinate agencies than between politicians and the general public (Hood 2002, 16, 26). We will see blame-avoidance as having aspects from all the perspectives presented – primarily as politically trying to design the handling of blame, or engaging in negotiations to cope with blame, but also having aspects of cultural tensions and the manipulation of symbols.

Developmental Features in Designing the Central Immigration Apparatus

Immigration policy is a politically salient issue in many countries and as a result political executives can be expected to allocate a lot of attention and resources to the field (see Pollitt et al. 2004). A more open question is what implications political salience has for the amount of control political executives exert over immigration policy. We focus here mainly on the organization of immigration policy in the central political-administrative apparatus.

Main Structural Changes

What are some of the main changing and stable features of the apparatus? Is there stability or change with vertical or horizontal dimensions of structure? What are the trends concerning centralizing or decentralizing of the system? Is the apparatus becoming more or less horizontally specialized?

New Zealand In contrast to Norway, New Zealand has had considerable stability in the administration of immigration, with the function managed by the Department of Labour since the department was founded in 1891. Before 1951, when the administration of border controls was taken over from the Department of Customs, the primary focus was assisting migrants from Britain.

Policy, regulation and delivery are contained within a single department, responsible to a minister, who with an associate handles appeals against administrative decisions, a workload that has doubled since 1998 to 4,000 appeals a year. The only horizontal organization is the use of three appeal tribunals, set up in the 1990s to reduce the pressure on politicians. Integration is also organized by the Department of Labour, with some sub-contracting to local authorities and non-profit organizations. The pressure on ministers has been such that a review of immigration legislation was launched in 2006 to simplify and reduce the length of appeals, and delegate more decisions to officials.

Immigration remained relatively immune from restructuring between 1986 and 1999, when textbook-like New Public Management prescriptions were applied throughout New Zealand's public sector. In contrast to the division of most government functions into policy and delivery organizations, sometimes with funding also separated, the Department of Labour retained both policy and delivery within the department. In 1987, a chief executive from a Treasury background reorganized a department that had previously delivered through generalist staff in large regional offices. Following the principles of decentralization and separation of roles promoted by the Treasury, the department was restructured into a central policy group and four operational divisions responsible for outputs of immigration, industrial relations, occupational safety and health, and employment, that is, a horizontal internal specialization.¹ The immigration division was given some policy capacity and the ability to decentralize decisions about immigration applicants.

New Zealand adopted outputs budgeting and accrual accounting to 'let managers manage and hold them accountable for results' (Norman 2003). The Labour Department was an early and enthusiastic adopter of these techniques for decentralizing service delivery and increasing management accountability. Despite a relocation of Employment Services in the late 1990s, this structure remained in place under two chief executives, the second also from a Treasury background, until the appointment of a new chief executive, also from outside the department, in June 2003.

1 Employment was merged with the benefits function of the Department of Social Welfare to form a new entity, Work and Income, in 1997. In turn this body was absorbed into the Ministry of Social Development in 2001.

Norway The central organization of the immigration administration in Norway was for a long time not seen as an urgent need. A fragmented structure was feasible given the small number of migrants. This changed significantly in the late 1980s, and since then, the issue of organization has dominated. When the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (NDI) was established in 1988, the structure became more co-ordinated under the Ministry of Local Government, but with the Ministry of Justice and Police retaining the responsibility for regulation of the Immigration Act. This changed in 2001 when the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs (MLGRA) was also given regulatory authority, NDI was given more autonomy and the Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) was established. The minister changed the act in 2004, trying to control NDI and IAB more, and in 2005/2006 the immigration unit in the ministry was divided into regulation and integration roles. Parallel with this change was a division of the NDI into one directorate of regulation and one of integration. Internally NDI changed a lot between 2000 and 2005, moving from horizontal specialization for regulation based on geography to using a client and a process principle for design. After the general election in 2005, with an incoming Red–Green government, the whole immigration field was moved into a new ministry eventually labelled Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (MLSI).

Also in Norway a system of performance management, labelled Management-by-Objective-and-Result, was introduced in central government from 1990 onwards. Since 1997 it has been an integral part of the Government Financial Regulations and the state budget system. After being a ritual during the first years, from 2001 it became a more potent steering tool between the ministry and the NDI (Ramslien 2005; Christensen, Læg Reid and Ramslien 2006).

Immigration structures have changed considerably, starting in 1988 by becoming more vertically specialized and less horizontally specialized, with the merging of a fragmented structure. In 2001 the organization of immigration became even more vertically specialized, through the structural devolution and decentralization of the two agencies. However, it also became more horizontally specialized, resulting in a fragmented structure. In 2004 it moved in the direction of more control and vertical integration, through procedural changes, but in an even more horizontally fragmented direction through dividing the department in the ministry and a division within NDI.

Actors, Conflicts and Cleavages

What are some of the main actors and driving forces behind the development features? What is the role of the political–administrative leadership, the Parliament/political parties, interest groups, and so on? What are some of the main instruments of changing the system – new laws, internal changes that are more limited or adding up, changing political signals trying to change the actions of the civil servants, and so on?

New Zealand Immigration administration in New Zealand has involved an almost bi-partisan approach by the major political parties, National (right of centre) and Labour (left of centre), but a third party, New Zealand First, has tapped into

unease about growing ethnic diversity and forced the major parties to modify their approaches.

The extent to which immigration is politically sensitive has fluctuated with unemployment rates. With unemployment reaching nearly 11 per cent of the workforce during the early 1990s, the spectre of immigrants competing for jobs arose as it had done during previous periods of high unemployment. Before the 1970s, migration from Asia had been heavily restricted, with a bias in favour of Europeans between the 1880s and the 1950s. 'Over full' employment during the 1950s and 1960s encouraged a wave of unskilled migrants from Pacific Islands. As unemployment rose in the late 1970s, the government cracked down on overstayers with a controversial series of dawn raids on homes. Since 2001, unemployment has decreased to 3.5 per cent, resulting in employers clamouring for speedy admission of staff from outside the country.

In 1991, the National government created a points system, which provided semi-automatic rights of entry based on criteria such as education, relative youthfulness, health status, skills and financial wealth. This policy was adopted to stimulate economic growth after the 1980s when 137,000 more people left than arrived. Immigration was also seen as a way of creating closer links with the fast-growing markets of Asia.

The points system led to a dramatic turnaround, to net migration of 113,000 between 1990 and 1997 – a total of more than 200,000 new citizens because 92,000 New Zealanders left during the period. The points system fostered rapid growth of an industry of immigration consultants whose practices came to be of increasing concern as examples of corruption, fraud and incompetence periodically emerged. By 2005, the government decided to formally license consultants, through a proposed Immigration Advisers' Authority.

The influx of migrants during the 1990s most affected Auckland, New Zealand's largest city and business centre. The 2001 census showed that more than two-thirds of migrants who had arrived during the previous five years had settled in the Auckland region. One politician, more than any other, has seized on public, and particularly Auckland, disquiet about 'out-of-control' immigration. Winston Peters entered Parliament in 1978 and as a minister in the 1990 National government fell out with colleagues over economic and foreign investment issues. He successfully stood as an independent and then formed the New Zealand First Party, a name chosen to emphasize a nationalistic message. The party won two seats at the 1993 elections and 17 seats in the first proportional representation election in 1996. Mr Peters went into coalition with the National Party and became Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer.

Immigration has provided Mr Peters with a topic which has generated maximum publicity during election years. In 2002, for example, he proclaimed that immigration was the number one election issue and sought major cuts in the numbers of migrants and a clear demonstration of the economic benefits for New Zealand. The New Zealand First Party was severely punished by voters in 1999 for its coalition with National, but in 2005 had sufficient votes to keep the Labour Party in office as a minority government, in return for which Mr Peters gained a role as Minister of Foreign Affairs outside Cabinet.

Criticism about migrant flows prompted the National government to tighten the criteria for entry during the 1990s and the Labour-led coalition government in 2003 to launch a new 'Skilled Migrant Category' to change 'the focus from passive acceptance of residence applications to the active recruitment of the skilled migrants that New Zealand needs'. That change coincided with the highest ever year of net migration, a result of New Zealanders returning or not travelling because of fear for their security after the 2001 destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York. Interest also grew in New Zealand as a distant and safe destination. Keeping New Zealand safe from potential terrorists became a major new political concern as net migration in 2003 reached the highest level ever of 42,000 people.

A succession of administrative failings led to the National Party proposing in the 2005 election campaign to merge the Immigration Service and the Citizenship Office of the Department of Internal Affairs to create a new Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The National Party criticized the Immigration Service for being a 'shambles, characterized by administrative delays, secrecy, bureaucratic blunders and ineffective audit and fraud investigation', and saw organizational change as a way of creating a 'properly resourced and managed department capable of providing efficient and secure services with a case management focus'.

Norway In Norway, the first major reorganization in 1988 was a process of negotiation and consultation, with little conflict. In contrast, the long process leading to 2001 reorganization involved sharp conflicts and negotiations among the political parties, with some in the middle of the political spectrum constantly changing their views. Interestingly, the Labour Party, traditionally in favour of political control of the civil service, was most consistently in favour of furthering the increased autonomy of NDI and the establishment of IAB. The Conservative Party and the Progressive Party (the most right-wing) were strongly against the proposals for structural devolution, because they thought that the political executive was giving away control over a politically sensitive area. In most other areas the right-of-centre parties supported NPM-like structural devolution, but in immigration, they feared that the resulting policy and practice would be more liberal. The NDI and the interest groups supported the 2001 reorganization. The 2004 process was strongly politically controlled by the minister who had support from most of the political parties, but NDI, IAB and the interest groups disagreed. The 2005 process was handled inside the ministry and had few conflicts. The main instrument of structural change was changing the Immigration Act in 1988 and 2001, while in 2004, the focus was on procedural changes, and in 2005 an internal reorganization was driven by the political leadership.

How do different actors define the goals and content of immigration policy and how is that eventually leading to certain ways of designing the system? Overall, there seems to be a relative agreement over time among most of the political parties in Norway about the content of immigration policy. The consensus is that one has to control immigration (the security argument), but also that Norway should be open to receive asylum seekers and refugees, as well as economically motivated immigrants who are needed for the workforce. Immigrants should also be treated well and share major benefits in the welfare state. The Progressive Party is the only one heavily

against this policy, favouring more control, fewer immigrants and tougher policies on benefits and assimilation into Norwegian society. The attitudes and attention of the parties also reflect the changing external pressure, for example, the large increase of asylum seekers from the late 1980s and family reunification in the last decade.

The disagreement among the actors is mainly about how to realize the main shared goals and definitions of immigration policy. The political-administrative leadership is constantly changing their views about this, resulting in quite different structural solutions, something that partly shows a lack of insight and rational analysis. The other actor groups mostly have a consistent set of attitudes which couple policy and structural solutions, but have different views on effects. The main reason for the eventual agreement on the reorganization of 2001 was that different views on structural design could be joined, reflecting different attitudes to appropriate public steering models. The political-administrative leadership wanted more autonomy for NDI and IAB to solve capacity problems in the ministry and to avoid blame. NDI managers thought professional autonomy was appropriate, while IAB supported an extreme model of autonomy, based on judicial expertise. The interest groups supported the new structure because a lay element – which they saw as democratic – was included in the sub-boards of IAB. When political leaders realized that they had lost control through the new structure, partly because of increased distance between politicians and the discretionary authority, they decided to vertically integrate more, against the vested interest and alternative models of the other main actors. The political leadership had several times been urged to clarify some of the main concepts in the Immigration Act, because they were too ambiguous, but had not shown the will or ability to do that, something that obviously added to the undermining of control. On the other hand, that also provided them with more political flexibility, if needed.

Current Features of the Immigration Apparatus

What are some of the main characteristics of the current design concerning vertical and horizontal specialization? Are there features that are typically ‘modern’, reflecting something unique with immigration today or pushing the design in certain directions, or is the design reflecting a revitalization of ‘old’ definitions of problems and solutions?

New Zealand

Political controversy and failures of administration have prompted the current chief executive of the Department of Labour to simplify the structure of immigration to strengthen vertical accountability, as in Norway. During 2003, the department experienced allegations of corruption in its Thailand office, a sex-for-visas scandal involving an Auckland immigration officer and an enquiry by the Ombudsman into comments made on an internal record about the arrival of an asylum seeker from Algeria.

The chief executive concluded that decentralization of operational units had weakened management controls at the Department of Labour, and reduced the core

professionalism of the department. He restructured in 2004 to 'focus on labour market performance in an integrated way' through three divisions, each with policy and operational staff: Immigration is part of a Workforce division which also tackles issues of skills and levels of participation in the workforce.

Linking migration and the labour market remained as the department's rationale for retaining a function it had managed since 1981, and the re-election of a Labour government in 2005 meant the department narrowly escaped losing its largest function as proposed by the National Party.

The 2004 reorganization sought to centralize both vertically and horizontally, bringing policy and operations together and incorporating linkages with labour market issues within the one division. The appointment of a deputy secretary with experience in the Department of the Prime Minister and the Treasury signalled an intention to take a broad approach to immigration and seek to regain respect from other parts of government. The department centralized contact with the media and during 2005 the deputy secretary became the public face of immigration, actively trying to defuse controversies by keeping them as administrative rather than political issues. In an example of vertical geographic integration, applications from high-risk countries were also centralized to Wellington for scrutiny by a specialist migrant profiling group, for fear of further cases of corruption in dispersed offices.

The use of horizontal organization for immigration is distinctly limited compared with Norway. There are three quasi-judicial bodies, the Residence Review Board, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority and the Deportation Review Tribunal, which provide independent assessments of departmental decisions and ministerial decisions in cases of disagreement. Currently supported by the Department of Labour, these may be moved to the Ministry of Justice as a result of a 2006 review of the Immigration Act. The legislative review, the first since 1985, aims to reduce the workload of the Immigration Minister and the Associate Immigration Minister by having 'a single procedure for determining refugee and protection status', a single right of appeal and delegation to a small group of senior officials in the department to reduce the number of relatively minor issues which have to receive ministerial attention.

The 2004 reorganization of the department contrasts sharply with the techniques used in 1988, when the New Zealand public sector was reorganized using prescriptions for accountability drawn from public choice, transaction cost and agency theory perspectives (The Treasury 1987; Boston et al. 1996). The Immigration Division was assessed on its ability to process applications, using criteria established through a separate policy process.

By 2000 both officials and ministers had become frustrated at the extent to which the outputs focus was narrowing public service attention towards the easily measurable and auditable, and a modified planning system, emphasizing 'strategic intent' and links between outputs and outcomes, was adopted. For immigration, this change led in 2002 to the reduction of seven outputs to two which focused on skills and settlement as outcomes of policy. The outcome expressed in the 2005/06 corporate plan was 'productive work and high quality working lives', with immigration contributing to an 'increasingly international work force'. The Workforce Division structure since 2004 has signalled a major departure from an operational focus to integrated policy and delivery responsible for balancing political sensitivities and competing forces of

economic results, humanitarian ideals, security and the integration of migrants into New Zealand society. Perhaps the 'modern' aspect of this development is the focus on what constitutes 'public value' (Moore 1995), a concept that has particularly been developed in Britain (for example, Kelly and Muers 2002; Stoker 2005) as a means for describing a 'post' New Public Management paradigm. If NPM stood for private sector methods and efficiency, public value is a 'third way' effort to reconcile the best of traditional public-sector values and market-like techniques (NPM). With the move to outcomes, New Zealand has placed definitions of public value at the forefront of its planning process. The New Zealand changes represent a reassertion of migration policy as a broad political outcome rather than a narrow technical and criterion-based operational service, such as the efforts during the 1990s to distance immigration from politics through the use of a semi-automatic points system for entry. The emphasis on broad outcomes is set to continue from late 2006 with a fundamental review of the Immigration Act.

Norway

The current structure of the central immigration administration in Norway is a rather complex and hybrid one. The vertical specialization is the most ambiguous one. The main feature is that the ministry in charge, the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (MLSI) is enacting some kind of frame steering and cannot interfere in single cases handled in NDI and IAB, unless they are related to national security and foreign policy considerations, meaning overall a considerable professional autonomy. It can also ask the agencies to temporarily stop the handling of certain groups of cases, and also control economic-administrative processes in the agencies. This main structure, established in 2001, was somewhat modified in 2004. First, the ministry may give instructions and guidelines to the NDI on how to enact the discretionary professional judgements in using the immigration law and handling certain groups of cases. Second, it is a large board, inside the IAB, which on the initiative from the ministry, NDI or IAB, may treat single cases of a principle nature, not to change the decision in NDI in the current case, but to change the practice in this type of cases later on. Traditionally, the handling of cases in IAB is of appeals to a no decision in NDI, while this new board, consisting of a majority of lay members together with judicial expertise, may also handle decisions in NDI with a positive outcome. This is seen by opponents as indicating a potential for more restrictive decisions and immigration policy.

The horizontal specialization is characterized by a division in MLSI having the responsibility for NDI and IAB and a division for integration having a new subordinate agency labelled the Directorate of Integration and Multitude (DIM). It is also important that immigration has been moved from the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs, meaning that instead of being near to local authorities it is now connected to an even more complex ministry, like in New Zealand.

A second question we would like to discuss is whether the current structure is in a state of stability or flux? What are some of the main debates and political cleavages about the system? The central immigration administration in Norway has

been constantly changing during the last two decades, and there are few reasons for expecting stability in the near future. The incoming Red–Green government in 2005 was elected on a ticket sceptical towards NPM, so generally one can expect that there could be some vertical integration in the immigration administration in the near future, following up the reform in 2004 and giving NDI and IAB less autonomy, but the government has a lot on its plate, including the large reform of merging unemployment, national insurance and social services, so the political leadership in the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion will probably have capacity problems. They promised in the declaration when they formed the government that they should evaluate and take a look at IAB, particularly its lack of openness and transparency, so this may lead to changes.

In recent years there has not been much debate about the immigration administration, even though many controversial cases have been in the media's eye. The debate before the changes in 2004 showed that most of the political parties agreed on the increased control, so the cleavage was primarily towards the agencies and interest groups that for different reasons supported an even more autonomous structure. Public opinion and parties seem generally to have moved to the right, in a more restrictive direction, like the rest of Europe, but this development has not been tightly coupled to any specific way of organizing the immigration administration. A Left–Right cleavage is still evident here, with the Progressive Party being the villain and by far the most restrictive, both on the regulatory and the integration side. But the distance between the rest of the parties is rather narrow, in their agreement on somewhat tougher measures on the regulatory side and accommodating on the integration side.

The structural change made in the immigration administration in 2001 very much reflected NPM thinking in providing agencies with more autonomy to prevent the political leadership from interfering in single cases. The main argument in 2001 was quite the opposite in 2004. Even for a Conservative minister, supporting NPM fully in any other respect, it was problematic with too much autonomy, so she argued that immigration was a deviant case concerning the main structure and wanted to bring it more in line with the traditional way of organizing in the central civil service. However, the reorganization did not bring back the old structure, but created a hybrid structure combining old and new. The current structure is rather unique, both concerning the autonomy of NDI, but also because of the quasi-court-like structure of IAB and its lay elements.

The problem of putting the new system into practice was revealed when the NDI granted temporary residency permits to nearly 200 Iraqi Kurds in the autumn of 2005. News of the granting of the permits set off a political storm when it broke in the media in March 2006, and a commission was set up to investigate the agency. The Commission evaluated the agency harshly and accused it of following a more liberal practice than the one instructed by the ministry. It was blamed for 'stretching' the rules and for not informing the government ministry in charge of immigration that it was implementing a practice that was in conflict with the ministry's view. The head of the NDI was heavily criticized but he had already left the agency when the 'asylum scandal' was revealed. The new director, formerly the deputy, was forced to resign and a public hearing in Parliament has been held. The media eventually

allowed for a more balanced view of the scandal, pointing to biases of the media coverage, the political actor's views and the Commission's work, saying that the humanitarian factor should also be given more weight.

Discussion and Analysis

Instrumental Design Control by Top Leaders

New Zealand Major changes in migration policy and structure began during the early 1990s as a political response to the worst depression since the 1930s. Just as an early government of the 1870s had used immigration to stimulate economic development, the National government of 1990–99 wanted a catalyst for economic growth. The migrant-friendly strategy used a simple set of criteria against which entry applications could be easily assessed. This was a market-like system that promised a reduction in the need for judgement by public servants. It fitted well with a period of 'breaking bureaucracy' when government organizations were using service techniques imported from the private sector to respond to citizens as clients. The Department of Labour's decentralized structure mirrored the policy expectation that a points system could be reasonably automatic in its functioning and that relatively unskilled staff in the immigration division could be directed through the use of targets and performance specifications.

The migrant-friendly policy, however, proved to be too successful, with inflows quickly exceeding targets, creating social integration tensions. This marketplace approach to immigration differed considerably from earlier phases of migration, when settlers from Britain, the Pacific and Indo-China were 'pepper-potted' as much as possible around New Zealand. The points-based, market model allowed no government control over settlement other than for the small annual refugee quota of 500 people. Immigrants from Asia overwhelmingly settled in Auckland, seeking the diversity of a large city, and proximity to an international airport with regular connections to their homes. The upmarket suburb of Howick came to be jokingly known as Chowick, for the number of Chinese immigrants attracted to it.

This laissez-faire approach brought a political backlash most completely exploited by Winston Peters and the New Zealand First Party, and research by the Department of Labour into employment difficulties of migrants contributed to the more constrained 'skilled migrant' policy which became operational in 2004.

Norway Reorganization of the regulatory side of immigration has been heavily dominated by hierarchical control. In the 1980s administrative leaders were strong actors, in the 1990s the political leadership played a more central role in collaboration with the administrative leadership, while the process leading up to the 2004 reorganization was dominated by the minister and her political staff, as were changes made in 2005. Such close political involvement is a result of increases in the number of immigrant cases, their growing unpredictability and fluctuation, increasing pressure and capacity problems, and the heightened political sensitivity

of this policy field. Increased political salience did much to make the political leadership more active (see Pollitt et al. 2004).

What about the organizational thinking characterizing the reorganizations? How clear was it? The 1988 reorganization was mostly about increased co-ordination and rationalization, not because of any crisis, but to prepare for the increasing influx of immigrants. The solution selected was a kind of half-way solution because it was not politically or administratively possible to organize the whole immigration administration in one ministry at that time. Another part of the reorganization, the establishment of the NDI, was more rational and represented an anticipation of future capacity problems. An older, tried-and-tested agency solution was used, which combined political control with some delegation of responsibility for handling individual cases (see Christensen and Roness 1999).

The 2001 reorganization, which established the IAB and gave the NDI more autonomy, was rationally motivated, in the sense that it was necessary to solve capacity problems in the Ministry of Justice and move immigration out of a large ministry so that it could focus on other types of policy. Concentrating all immigration policy in one ministry had instrumental elements to it, but also limitations, given capacity problems at the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs. It is interesting that the political leadership shifted so easily from supporting a centralized model to emphasizing the benefits of an autonomous model. The potential effects of the new structure were not well discussed or understood. What might be the effect of the increased independence of the NDI and the IAB concerning political control? What would be the effects of the layman element in the IAB, something with which the Norwegian system had had little experience?

The 2004 reorganization was in some ways an example of a clash between a revitalization of a hierarchical model, a central steering model that was de-emphasized in 2001 and alternative models of professional and judicial autonomy. But it was a gap between the minister's arguments for stronger hierarchical control and the rather modest measures she decided on. And the structural solution was so complex that it was impossible to foresee the consequences.

Negotiations and Conflicts

New Zealand The main conflict has been that generated by Winston Peters, a skilled populist politician, whose ethnic background as both a Maori and of Scottish origin has enabled him to appeal to the more than 80 per cent of New Zealanders who are from Maori or British Isles origins. Peters' high profile in this subject has encouraged people with grievances to provide him with a steady stream of examples with which he has embarrassed both National and Labour-led governments.

The public support he has tapped has prompted both major parties to adopt a more hands-on approach to immigration. As a country which prides itself on playing an active international role in humanitarian causes, New Zealand has been very conflicted over issues raised by immigration. A widespread New Zealand instinct is to give vulnerable refugees and migrants seeking a better life a 'fair go'. Almost all New Zealanders can trace links to immigrants, mostly from Europe, who sought to create a better life in this remote country on the other side of the world. But there is

also a strong national pride in the achievements of earlier immigrants in creating a nation that has European standards of living, a strong welfare state and a reputation as one of the least corrupt of countries. People who are 'not like us' and from countries with traditions of corruption or low wages are seen as a serious threat.

For governments since the early 1990s, policy has been an act of balancing the economic, humanitarian, ethnic and integration issues, with the strategy in 2006 looking, ironically, increasingly like the strong public service model of the 1950s and 1960s, in which national interests were paramount. The promises of NPM to deliver market-like efficiency and reduced bureaucracy have been found wanting.

Norway Even though the structure of the immigration administration was pretty fragmented before 1988, there was not much conflict over attempts at co-ordination or the establishment of the NDI. Neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Ministry of Local Government was very eager to merge immigration in one ministry, even though that would have strengthened one of them.

During processes of the 1990s, which culminated in the 2001 reorganization, negotiations were primarily marked by the fluctuating views of some political parties. This led to the postponement of the establishment of the IAB by some years, while a winning coalition was established. The Labour Party, in power for most of the decade, consistently supported a new independent structure of first and second instance bodies (the NDI and the IAB), while the Conservative Party and the Progress Party were strongly against it; the other parties took a middle position. The change in attitude of the Christian Democrats finally made the reorganization possible. The NDI and other relevant public and societal actors mainly supported the new structure. The cleavage among the parties over this question was primarily about different views on capacity problems and political control, but also about what solution could best fulfil the rights of immigrants and the professional quality of the decisions.

The process leading to the reorganization in 2004 was characterized by a cleavage between political actors and all other relevant actors, and was dominated by the minister. Most political parties supported the political-administrative leadership's attempts to reorganize and potentially increase political control over immigration policy and practice. Most of these actors refrained from saying openly that the structure they had supported in 2001 was not working as they had intended and therefore needed to be changed. The Conservative minister was, however, pretty clear that the 2004 reorganization was designed to resolve the inconsistency between the organizational structure and the problem structure. It was easier for her to admit this, because she and her party had opposed the 2001 reorganization. In other words, hers was a kind of 'we told you so' reaction. The fact that it was not possible for her to strengthen political control even further reflects the negotiations that took place in the cabinet and the prestige that the Christian Democrats had invested in the 2001 structure.

The leaderships of the NDI and the IAB were against the reorganization in 2004. They argued that it was too early to change the 2001 structure, which they thought was working well. Given that both had increased their influence as a result of the 2001 reform, they were reluctant to relinquish this new power. Both the NDI and the

IAB asked whether the complicated structure proposed in the 2004 reorganization would be easy to use in practice and whether it was really a good way to strengthen political control.

The Significance of Cultural Traditions

New Zealand Two changes of organizational culture, both within the one department, have affected immigration since the late 1980s. In 1988 restructuring sought to break up a slow-moving generalist and regionalized bureaucracy in favour of specialization by function, overseen by a generalist policy division. Immigration became an operational division with narrowly focused efficiency targets, relatively lowly paid roles, with emphasis placed on processing applications and minimizing judgement that policy thinkers were expected to factor into the criteria for admission.

The division gained a reputation as a processing machine, offering limited scope for initiative and requiring little engagement from its staff beyond a client service and control measures. This operational culture showed increasing serious shortcomings from the late 1990s onwards with a series of politically embarrassing episodes.

The culture change sought since 2004, reflecting a 'whole-of-government' approach, is towards a bigger picture service, integrating policy and operations, connecting immigration with the needs of New Zealand employers and taking a new active role in the process of settlement. This is the culture which the structure of the Workforce Division and its deputy secretary seek to represent.

Norway The fragmented structure that existed before 1988 represented different cultural traditions in different ministries and agencies. The structure established in 1988 aimed partly to overcome these cultural differences between integration issues and regulation issues. But this did not happen and the regulation side continued to dominate. In 2005 this resulted in the NDI being split into two agencies, one for regulation and one for integration, and also in the splitting of the ministerial department into two departments.

Even though the NDI in 1988 was a new type of structure for the immigration field, there was also a considerable degree of cultural continuity. Moreover, the political leadership had established traditional routines for coping with an agency that traditionally combined professional autonomy and political control in a rather non-controversial way. What became both organizationally and culturally problematic during the 1990s was that the NDI had to adjust to new problems – an increased influx of new immigrant groups and the resulting capacity problems. This required internal organizational changes, the recruitment of new groups of personnel, and cultural renewal which seems to have created 'organizational confusion' reflected in problems of processing cases and in an increasing backlog.

The reorganization in 2001 brought major changes in the formal structure. Judicial competence in the ministry weakened when many jurists moved to the IAB. Staff of the NDI became more heterogeneous as a result of expansion. This changed the culture and informal professional norms and values in both the ministry and the NDI, while the IAB had a homogeneous jurist-dominated culture that was traditionally typical for the ministry. The NDI was headed by a director with a lot

of experience in refugee questions who made much use of informal contacts. The leadership of the IAB played a quite different role that was more compatible with the demands for increased political control. They insisted on some kind of 'super-autonomy' from the ministry.

With reorganization in 2004, the cultural features of the immigration administration were largely re-established. Given that both the NDI and the IAB opposed the reorganization, and that the changes made were complex but not substantial, the chances of the reorganization having any major effect on political control were probably rather slim because of cultural resistance.

The Significance of Manipulating Symbols

New Zealand Divisionalizing was a symbol of efficiency during the reorganization of 1988. In the spirit of *In Search of Excellence* (Peters and Waterman 1982), the creation of divisions showed a department that was focusing on its core business, sticking to its knitting, and running a loose-tight structure (loose in allowing managerial discretion, and tight on core values of client service and efficiency). This form of organization was seen to create accountability, focus, closeness to clients, and a minimum of bureaucracy, with staff led by managers who were expected to behave as real managers, not process-bound administrators. The points system at a policy level in the 1990s echoed this market-like vision of public service efficiency. Immigration clients were to be given a clear set of criteria with which they were often assisted by immigration consultants with the aim of making entry to New Zealand possible with the minimum of public service bureaucracy.

The high net migration of the 1990s through to 2003 created new symbols such as out-of-work doctors driving taxis or the Asian takeover of the main street of Auckland. The current challenge of the Workforce Division established in 2004 is to create new myths and symbols that reconcile New Zealand's core tension around migration. On the one hand, people with skills are needed to replace departing New Zealanders and to meet the ambitious government goal of lifting New Zealand back to the mid range of OECD per capita income. On the other hand, New Zealand does not want to lose advantages of security, an environment less spoiled by human habitation than most countries, or traditions of a strong welfare state and minimal corruption. Basic trade-offs lie between security and economic development and humanitarian ideals affordability and community integration.

Norway During the process leading up to the reorganization in 1988, myths and symbols did not play a major role. Even though the first signs of NPM-influence in Norway emerged in the early 1980s, the new structure was supported by some rather straightforward instrumental arguments. When in the mid-1990s the Labour government started the process that culminated in the reorganization of 2001, it was seen as modern to move individual cases out of the ministries. This argument became stronger in 2001 and helped garner support for change. Strangely, the new structure in 2001 was a somewhat radical experiment, different to relationships between most other ministries and agencies, particularly in the ban placed on ministerial interference in individual cases.

The symbols used before the 2004 reorganization were in some ways consistent with the Conservative view before 2001 that too much structural devolution and too much autonomy for the NDI and IAB could undermine political control. The problem was, however, that the Conservative Party was now in a government that before 2001 had supported such a structure as modern. So it was difficult to say, without losing credibility, that what had been deemed modern in 2001 was now problematic and not appropriate at all in 2004. While it was stressed in 2001 that devolution was the normal situation and in line with modern administrative policy, in 2004 the structure was seen as deviant and not used in most other policy fields.

Blame-avoidance

Has avoiding blame been a major motive for the political executive concerning designing and changing the system? Has avoiding blame become more typical over time because of increasing pressure and conflict in immigration policy? What are the instruments or levers used to avoid blame, what are the effects, and is this changing over time?

New Zealand Immigration has been almost continuously in the glare of political and public attention since the early 1990s. For politicians, it is a portfolio full of individual exceptions, with 'endless opportunities for things to go wrong'. From over-qualified immigrants driving taxis, to rapid change of the ethnic mix in parts of Auckland, to fears about security and arguments about the treatment of overstayers and vulnerable refugees, the immigration portfolio is full of some of the least soluble public-sector dilemmas.

One effect of New Zealand's use of New Public Management techniques has been to distance politicians from responsibility for management efficiency within their departments, a different approach from Norway. Chief executives are responsible to ministers to deliver on performance agreements spelled out through annual statements of intent and indicators, but are employed by the State Services Commission. Ministers are annually asked for feedback about the performance of the chief executive and department. This clarification of roles has enabled New Zealand cabinet ministers to more easily blame public servants.

To a large extent blame has been laid at the feet of officials who managed the decentralized model of immigration within the Department of Labour. Since 2004, a new chief executive has carried out a major restructure, and brought in an outsider to head the reshaped immigration division. The deputy secretary has become the sole spokesperson for immigration in an effort to make cases an administrative rather than political issue. Delegated authority for admitting migrants from high-risk countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan has been centralized back to head office. A review of legislation initiated in 2006 aims to reduce the number of appeals that reach ministers, while also delegating authority to senior officials for many more exceptions to the rules. Moving the appeals tribunals to the Ministry of Justice is also likely to distance them from any accusation that they might be biased by Labour Department views.

Norway In the reorganization in 2001, a blame-avoidance element was clearly recognizable since immigration cases had increasingly become politically sensitive issues for political executives. So the combination of capacity problems in the Ministry of Justice and Police and a wish to get rid of politically problematic single cases was the basis for moving the regulatory side to the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Affairs, giving NDI more autonomy and establishing IAB. The thought was that moving single cases out of the ministry would transfer most of the blame focus onto NDI and IAB. But this did not happen at all. Political executives still got the blame in one case after another, without having information about the case or being able to influence decisions (see Brunsson 1989). The minister could not stand this situation politically and used her hierarchical power to decide on a new solution in 2004.

The 2004 reorganization was preceded by several individual cases that had been damaging to the political leadership and by severe criticism of the NDI's role. Normally avoiding blame would be associated with structural devolution and moving individual cases away from the political leadership, as in 2001. However, the minister obviously thought that combining more control and potentially getting blame was better than less control without getting rid of blame. But political constraints in the cabinet made it difficult to return to the structure of 2001, so the resulting structure in 2004 was complex and hybrid. It was potentially ambiguous concerning blame-avoidance, but maybe better at blame-deflection. The NDI and IAB were against the reorganization and did not care much about helping the political leadership to avoid blame. The minister also made blame-avoidance more complicated by saying that the 2001 structure deviated from the normal civil service structure and needed adjustment, but she belonged to a government consisting of parties that before 2001 argued that this structure was modern and appropriate. This symbol inconsistency became, however, a problem in the process of strengthening legitimacy.

Avoiding blame may also be seen as a clash between different steering models that represent different cultural norms and values. When the political leadership had problems with sensitive single cases after 2001, it was not easy to blame the professional or judicial culture in NDI and IAB, since the media and public saw responsibility lying with the political leadership. On the other hand, NDI and IAB did not have good cultural reasons to help the political leadership to avoid blame, and it was often easy to say that problems were of a political kind and to 'pass the buck'. The difficulties of blaming NDI and IAB were also connected to the political leaders' inconsistent use of symbols of what was a modern organizational solution.

The new structure introduced in 2004 is so complicated that it may potentially be used by the ministry, the NDI and the IAB to deflect or disperse blame. The lesson of the 2004 reorganization seems primarily to be that strategies to avoid blame are difficult to achieve in practice (Hood and Rothstein 2001, 44). The asylum scandal in 2006 an example of the complicated blame-avoidance strategies from political executives and agency heads under this new construction.

Conclusion

Interestingly, neither New Zealand nor Norway have chosen to establish a stand-alone immigration ministry/department. In New Zealand the stable connection with the Department of Labour is remarkable, while in Norway immigration has more been pushed around and combined with other policy areas. In both countries there has been a recent increase in vertical accountability and political control as a result of scandals and problematic cases. One clear difference that may explain some of the differences in structure is that New Zealand has focused on labour market-related immigration, while Norway has a tradition of focusing on asylums, refugees and family reunifications. New Zealand has had remarkably few structural changes in the history of immigration administration, but has lately had more internal restructuring pointing in a more holistic direction. In Norway the newer history of immigration is filled with continuous and diverse reorganizations, and the structure has become more fragmented. In New Zealand blame has certainly been significant, but more blame had been laid on administration, while the Norwegian case shows more blame problems for the political leadership.

Reforms to immigration policy and administration have been partly influenced by the sector-specific features such as unpredictability, complexity and high political salience. Both countries have active anti-immigration political parties. In New Zealand, immigration issues have been strongly associated with fluctuations in the economy and unemployment levels. In Norway the pressure is more on the asylum side and the big variation in asylum seekers depending on wars and conflicts abroad.

Reforms in both countries have also reflected the more general NPM movement which has dominated reform processes during the last two decades, especially in New Zealand but also to some extent in Norway. In New Zealand this mainly occurred in the late 1980s and during the 1990s, with accountability systems that introduced private-sector accounting and transferred full responsibility for Human Resources Management from a central personnel agency to heads of government agencies such as the Department of Labour. In Norway the main trend has been more about structural devolution, disaggregation and establishment of 'single-purpose-organizations'. It is, however, not a linear development. After a long period of decentralization we can now see stronger political centralization and strengthening of the role of the ministry.

A surprising contrast is the extent to which immigration administration has avoided an NPM trend towards increased vertical and horizontal specialization. New Zealand was a radical NPM reformer in the late 1980s, but has had considerable stability in the structure used for the administration of immigration. Perhaps the major reason for this was that a chief executive from a Treasury background used NPM techniques to reorganize immigration within the Department of Labour in advance of external pressures to do so. This structure lasted from 1988 to 2004, although with increasing criticism about its fitness for purpose.

In contrast, Norway, a reluctant NPM reformer, has been an eager immigration reformer. In the first generation of reforms the NPM flavour was obvious, focusing on structural devolution and increased vertical specialization. In the second generation

of reforms the pendulum has swung back somewhat to strengthening the central immigration administration and political control. The reforms are a mixture of the traditional Norwegian administrative model, NPM reforms, and post-NPM features, representing partly organizational innovations.

Norway has experienced a reorganization fever in recent years (Christensen, Læg Reid and Ramslien 2006). The organization of the central immigration administration in Norway has changed considerably during a short period. Reorganization has been a routine activity, represented by the reforms in 1988, 2001 and 2004. Reforms have followed reforms, resulting in hyperactivity around formal structures. In contrast, New Zealand has opted for allowing a variety of practices within the same formal departmental structure, with changes made more frequently in procedures and policies about entry criteria for immigrants than in the vertical and horizontal specialization of formal organizations. The first generation of reform in the early 1990s sought to create a market-like system to simplify the admission of new immigrants. Changes since 2004 have sought to reverse the unintended consequences of this strategy, which very successfully turned around net migration losses of the 1980s, but led to a series of unanticipated economic and social consequences.

Organizational thinking has been ambiguous in the case in Norway. The means–end understanding and rational calculation about the effects and implications of different organizational forms are not particularly strong and dysfunctions and unexpected side-effects are normal outcomes. The best way of getting rid of such reforms seems to be to launch new reforms, which are also often ambiguous (see Brunsson and Olsen 1993). Norway is strong on political control of reorganization in the immigration field but rather weak on rational calculation (see Dahl and Lindblom 1953).

The changes made are also complex, especially with the 1988 Norway reorganization which involved co-ordination of immigration and the establishment of an agency. The reform of 2001 finally merged all immigration policy and administration in the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, but at the same time increased the autonomy of the NDI and the new appeals board, the IAB. The 2004 reform weakened the vertical inter-organizational specialization through increased use of hierarchical control levers, but in a somewhat ambiguous hybrid structure.

How can we understand these reorganization processes? The analysis has shown that we have to combine insight from different theoretical approaches to understand the reform processes and its outcome. The processes surrounding the reorganizations in Norway differed according to how much they were controlled and how strong a role negotiations had to play. The reorganization in 1988 was approved following non-controversial consultations between several ministries; the reorganization in 2001 was actually postponed for some years because the political leadership had problems getting a majority; while the 2004 reorganization was most subject to political–hierarchical control and also involved the most conflict, since traditional cleavages between political control and agency autonomy were strong.

The motives behind the 1988 reorganization were clearly to bring more co-ordination into a fragmented structure, but the pressure to do this was not particularly strong. It was not primarily any negative effects of the 1988 structure that led to the

reorganization of 2001, but rather an overall increase in pressure in the handling of immigration cases, both those from the NDI and the appeals, which led to capacity problems and a desire on the part of the Ministry of Justice to rid itself of the regulatory burden. The 2004 reorganization was very much coupled to the effects of the 2001 structure which the political leadership experienced as lacking in control and creating political problems in many individual regulatory cases.

The cultural elements became significant primarily after the reorganization in 2001, when some of the old cultural traditions were weakened and had to be re-established and developed, something that might have undermined the intended effects. The effects of the reorganization in 2004 will potentially be muted because of the new path-dependency, which favours professional autonomy. The symbols used in 2001 to support the new structure are somewhat problematic and backfired on the political leadership when they began to argue in a contrary way preceding the reorganization of 2004.

In New Zealand, a system-wide shift towards outcomes has provided an organizing rationale for the 2004 redesign of immigration delivery by the Department of Labour. Increasing frustration from politicians of both major parties about public disquiet and administrative errors by the department laid the groundwork for a management-driven reform of the department. The department was under pressure from the proposal by the major opposition party to relocate immigration in a new agency alongside passport management. Political pressure, generated by a series of controversies, most of which had been initiated by the New Zealand First Party, prompted a structural change to symbolize a change in practices. Combining policy and administrative roles into a Workforce Division signals a shift towards more active management of immigration on behalf of New Zealand citizens, rather than passive acceptance of immigrants with sufficient qualifying points. More explicit rules about linking migration with New Zealand's economic priorities have been followed by proposals to license immigration consultants and tighten rules about appeals against department decisions.

A main lesson from this analysis is that the formal organizational models represent broad categories that allow big variation in actual practice. There is not a tight coupling between formal models and practice. The accountability relations are more complicated in practice than in theory and change over time, between countries and between crises and normal situations. Different and changing national contexts, external pressure and political situations constrain the room for organizational design and an active administrative policy.