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1. What are the obstacles in bringing about police reforms in India?

The state governments are the single obstacle to bringing about police reforms in the country. The state governments see the police force as a powerful arm to further their short-term interests and, therefore, have been successful in stymieing police reforms in India for over 50 years. Many in the police force have also gone along for their personal interests and also because there is no accountability.

2. Are Chinese intrusions and Pakistan's ceasefire violations case of India's foreign policy failure?

Chinese incursions and Pakistani ceasefire violations against India are the result of a difficult and adversarial neighbourhood. To the extent that India has not been able to make this neighbourhood friendly and resolve the disputes involved, it may be treated as a failure of policy on India's part. But in international relations, you need two to tango. You need two hands to clap or shake hands. Pakistan from its very birth has built its identity and nationalism on a perception of hostility towards India. Without this perception, the army in Pakistan could not have remained in power for such long durations. It is not just a coincidence that ceasefire violations on the Line of Control (LoC) take place whenever a civilian government starts talking about peace and normalisation of relations with India. While India has had its shortcomings in dealing with neighbours in general and Pakistan in particular, the roots of India-Pakistan problem lie within Pakistan's army dominated polity.

The Chinese incursions could be seen as an effort on the part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) towards strengthening its claims and bargaining position on an undefined border and vague Line of Actual Control (LAC). Perhaps, this is their move to get prepared to negotiate the border from a position of strength in view of China's phenomenal economic growth and unprecedented military modernisation. But China is also passing through an internal civil-military imbalance where PLA has become more assertive and politically ambitious. This is reflected in China's territorial nationalism, not only in relations to India but also other neighbours like Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and in the South China Sea region. The new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping is trying to control the PLA's excessive enthusiasm. Let us hope that China in its transition to a great Asian power remains sober and peaceful.

3. What is the impact of India's emerging ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar on Chinese influence in north-east India?

One of the main impacts of India's growing ties with Bangladesh is the easing of tensions with regard to demarcation of the border, especially in states like Tripura and Assam. Most importantly, states in the northeast want to increase connectivity by using the Chittagong port, which opens up a quicker access to the sea for them. India and Bangladesh have also collaborated on closing down northeast insurgent camps in Bangladesh, especially with regard to the ULFA. With Myanmar, India has developed a broad relationship of economic connectivity, trade, and political openness. Myanmar is also passing through

political reform with Aung San Suu Kyi taking part in democratic elections. Democracy in Myanmar will further broaden its ability to be inclusive with regard to its ethnic minorities, who mostly live in the India-Myanmar border area. This in turn will strengthen existing India-Myanmar cooperation in fighting insurgencies in the region. That said, growing ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar, while strengthening connectivity of India's northeast to the outside world, do not directly impact on China's influence in the northeast, which is culturally minimal, to say the least. Most of the ethnic groups that migrated to the northeast from Yunnan in China are neither Han nor do they seek any great historical connection with the Chinese empire. Hence, given China's limited influence, both politically and socially, India's growing relationship with Bangladesh and Myanmar are significant by themselves and not as a counter to Chinese influence in the region.

4. Why do states like Bangladesh and Myanmar support insurgency in India?

There is considerable change in the policy followed by both Bangladesh and Myanmar in supporting insurgency in northeast India. Bangladesh started supporting insurgency after 1975 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the country, was killed in a coup on 15 August 1975. After his killing, right wing forces asserted themselves in Bangladesh. After a series of coups and counter coups, General Zia ur Rahman came to power. He reversed the policies followed by Mujib. He started following a policy that was hostile to India. One of the offshoots of his policy was the revival of support to northeast insurgents that was earlier taking place during the Pakistan rule. However, after coming to power in January 2009, Sheikh Hasina reversed this policy and is taking action against Indian insurgents groups who have been using Bangladeshi territory.

As far as Myanmar is concerned, some misunderstanding was created in the Indo-Myanmarese relations after 1962. This prompted Myanmar to allow Indian insurgents to use its territory. Moreover, India's border with Myanmar is densely forested which is used by insurgents sometime without the knowledge of Myanmarese authorities. However, in recent times, Myanmar government has taken several steps against Indian insurgent groups.

5. What is the basic reason of insurgency in northeast India? How the problem can be tackled efficiently?

There are four basic reasons for insurgencies in the Northeast. First, there was a historical absence of pre-British and British colonial policies to integrate the hill areas of then Assam to the rest of British India. Hence, the absence of historical linkages has created a space for later day feelings of cultural and political differences amongst ethnic communities with the rest of India. Second, most of the ethnic communities view 'the use of force' as more effective than non-violent dissent in getting New Delhi's attention which is physically so far away. Third, the continuous lack of economic opportunities creates incentives for unemployed youths to join armed movements where they earn a salary. Fourth, existence of external help from Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar has perpetuated the insurgencies.

Problem can be tackled by use of efficient policing since absence of law enforcement has led to increase in armed violence. Effective policing should be supported by good governance, civil and political rights. The use of dialogue and negotiations is the only solution to these armed conflicts.

6. How can BCIM corridor project boost strategic ties between India and Myanmar when it is believed to be aiding insurgency in India's northeast?

The cooperative principle behind the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) is based on the “principles of mutual trust and respect, mutual interest, equitable sharing of mutual benefits.....and securing win-win outcomes.” The BCIM-EC Joint Study Group, which held its first meeting in December 2013 in Kunming, China, is aimed at improving physical connectivity, trade in goods, services and investment (including finance), environmentally sustainable development and people-to-people contacts. However, this a double-edged sword because when connectivity is exploited to encourage drug trafficking, small arms trafficking and promoting insurgency, then the principle of “mutual trust” is compromised. Such a breach of trust can not and should not be ignored or underestimated. In order to ensure that connectivity is not misused, stringent rules and implementation mechanisms have to be put in place. This can be made possible through built-in safeguards and improved facilities and infrastructure at the border check-posts.

7. In the book on Guerrilla Warfare, what was Mao referring to when he talked of interior lines, exterior lines and enemy's rear?

Mao and other strategists have spoken of interior and exterior lines as part of their strategy to defeat an adversary. In Mao's context, he applied this thought from the position of a larger though poorly trained army pitched against a numerically inferior but better-trained Japanese force. He realised that with "tactical speed", which is conduct of operations at greater levels with speed, he would be able to hit the Japanese at a number of vulnerable points along the periphery of their positions, maintaining an offensive character of operations. The control over interior lines, which are better coordinated through communication inter-linkages and cohesion, would subsequently require a strategic victory to finally defeat an enemy after it has been suitably weakened. In order to easily represent it diagrammatically, it can be seen as:
The rear is considered as the area behind the enemy lines in a case where the gulf of defences and resources point in the opposite direction.

8. Can you explain the growing numbers of foreign forces in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean?

The escalation in the number of piracy attacks in recent years has increased the presence of foreign navies in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean Region. In 2008, recognising the growing danger posed to international shipping by pirates, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions to allow countries to send warships to the region. Several countries, including the United States, members of the European Union, Japan, China, Russia, Iran, United Kingdom and India have deployed warships in the region to secure the

Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Collective efforts include deployments by the European Union and the multinational coalition task force, Combined Task Force (CTF 151) and the CTF -150. CTF 151 was established in January 2009 with a special mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia. While the CTF 150, established in 2001 at the beginning of US launched War on Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), has a wider mandate and conducts maritime security operations not just in the Gulf of Aden but also the in Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy, deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, has recently crossed the milestone of escorting 1000 ships through piracy infested waters.

9. Which all are the international laws/conventions that govern wars? Which institutions enforce them?

The international laws/conventions that govern wars at present are the four Geneva Conventions, and its three additional protocols. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which revised the Xth Hague Conventions of 1907, are primarily aimed at protecting the victims of wars as they were conceptualised in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Conventions seek to protect the sick and the wounded, shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of wars (PoWs), and civilians caught in a war zone. While the Conventions consist of 417 articles to deal with these issues, there is no provision that deals with the conduct of war in the original four. The drafting of the Conventions were heavily influenced by the German concentration camps and the Japanese treatment of PoWs. The two additional protocols of 1978 however deal with the conduct of war, and provide provisions to even deal with internal armed rebellions. Protocol I sets limits on methods and means of attack, especially conventional weapons that led to limitless and indiscriminate destruction of life. The international bodies that debate on these Conventions and the protocols are the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. As far as international law is concerned, the weakness lies in the lack of a permanent implementing body. While cases can be tried in the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, the implementation of judgments would then depend on a particular state. Since not all countries are members of these courts, most notably the US, their military personnel cannot be tried in these courts

10. What is the difference between cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism? What is India's position on both the issues?

From the technical angle, the difference between cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism is only nominal in that the means are the same, but the goals may be different. The same vulnerabilities in networks and systems can be used to attain a variety of goals, from crime to terrorism. As a hypothetical example, the systems of a high-value target such as a nuclear plant may be taken over by criminals and held to ransom or by terrorists for destructive purposes.

Currently, the focus is more on the use of cyberspace by terrorist organisations for allied purposes, such as recruitment and collection of donations. Social media is also being used to spread misinformation. However, as more and more high value targets make their appearance in cyberspace, attempts to carry out cyber-attacks to wreak economic havoc, instigate violence and destroy critical networks will increase proportionately.

In India, there has been an early focus on the issue of cyber-terrorism. As early as 2001, for instance, an India-US Cyberterrorism Initiative was established under the larger Counter-terrorism Dialogue. The Mumbai attacks of 2008 were largely cyber-enabled, both in planning and prosecution. The IT Amendment Act of 2008 had additional sections on both cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime, with a number of amendments being made to existing sections and new sections added to take these threats into account.

While the legal frameworks are in place to address both the issues of cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism, capacity building in terms of training to law enforcement personnel, improving forensic capabilities, devising mechanisms for closer collaboration with foreign law enforcement agencies and governments are all required to give teeth to the laws. Till such a time, cyber-criminals will continue to flourish and cyber-terrorists will have a free run.

11. Is Deep Sea Mining by China a reason for its assertiveness in South China Sea and Indian Ocean?

China has been allotted contracts for exploration only in two areas by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for a period of 15 years, and therefore, it cannot form the basis of Chinese assertiveness:

The assertiveness shown by China in the South China Sea is due to its sovereignty claims on the islands of the Paracel and Spratly group. In the Indian Ocean, China could be viewed as expanding its maritime footprint and presence rather than being assertive.

12. Despite India being an age-old victim of terrorism, why does India lack a coherent counter-terrorism policy?

Until recently, the terrorism challenge that India confronted was largely limited to those states that shared a border with Pakistan (in particular Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab). Given Pakistan's role in supporting and sponsoring terrorist groups that operated in these states, India's counter-terrorism efforts were largely focused on three aspects:

- 1) the diplomatic effort to highlight and bring international pressure to bear upon Pakistan to stop its support for and sponsorship of cross-border terrorism;
- 2) the employment of security forces (armed forces, paramilitary and police) and intelligence agencies to tackle this challenge in a particular state; and
- 3) forging an understanding and accommodation with moderate elements within the state concerned.

Although the activities of terrorist groups in these states did spill over into other states of the Union, there was no all-Indian dimension to this challenge. Further, even where there was no cross-border dimension, as for instance in the case of the Naxalites in West Bengal, the challenge was largely confined to a particular state. As a result, counter-terrorism was largely focused on dealing with the particular challenge in an individual state.

Compounding this lack of a national perspective on terrorism is the distribution of powers between the Centre and the State under the Indian Constitution. Powers over the police are vested in the state governments and the Centre's efforts to establish national-level institutions to deal with the challenge of terrorism do face opposition as seen in recent years in the case of the National Investigation Agency and National Counter Terrorism Centre.

The need for a comprehensive national-level institutional mechanism and approach to counter terrorism emerged only over the last decade because of three trends:

- 1) the decision of Pakistani terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to expand their jihad to all parts of India (attacks on Red Fort, Parliament, Mumbai);
- 2) the emergence of the Indian Mujahideen as a pan-Indian Islamist group and its terrorist campaign spread across several parts of India; and
- 3) the terrorist campaign unleashed across several states by radical elements among the Hindu Right.

The final straw that forced a reassessment of mechanisms and approach was of course the Mumbai attacks in November 2008.

Although a comprehensive blueprint was indeed drawn up subsequently, this meaningful effort has been successfully crimped and cramped by Centre-State disputes over jurisdiction as well as turf wars among various investigation and intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, India today does have a national level institutional framework to deal with pan-India terrorist campaigns and some significant successes have been scored over the last few years. Be that as it may, there is indeed a case for bringing greater public pressure to bear upon the central and state political leaderships as well as the various government agencies to further strengthen this framework.

13. What is the difference in the nature of internal security challenges in Nagaland and Manipur?

The nature of internal security challenges in Nagaland and Manipur has certain common factors, but also significant differences. The common factors are that both the states are affected by ethnic conflicts over land and issues of identity, and suffer from extortion by armed groups and easy availability of arms. The situation in both the states is further complicated by overlapping state demands on the same piece of territory by the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah--NSCN (IM) and the NSCN--Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Nagaland, and by the NSCN (IM), the United

National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Manipur.

The differences are that unlike Nagaland where the conflict is mostly intra-ethnic, between the Naga armed groups; the conflict in Manipur is more intense as violence is inter-ethnic, as between Nagas and Meiteis and Nagas and Kukis. As a result, unlike Nagaland, where there are four major armed groups, Manipur suffers from nearly 32 different armed groups. This renders the atmosphere insecure. Unlike Nagaland, Manipur also suffers from deep seated hill-plain divide, where the Meiteis mostly inhabit the fertile Imphal valley, whereas the Nagas and Kukis live in the hill districts.

The internal security challenges in Manipur are rather daunting. There are no significant peace talks between the union government and the PLA and the UNLF (neither groups have signed cease-fires); whereas in Nagaland, the peace process between the government and the NSCN (IM) and cease-fire with the NSCN (Khaplang) fosters a measure of accountability and stability.

14. Do TPP versus RCEP show Cold War mentality?

To some extent, yes. The TPP and the RCEP show the Cold War mentality of the USA and China respectively. Yet, we must note that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are not necessarily two contending trade liberalizing models limited to the USA-China politics. Their arrival has posed stiff political challenges for many countries. While the success of the TPP hinges on the global economic authority of the USA and how the negotiation process unfolds, the future dynamism of RCEP will depend heavily upon how China and the ASEAN conduct their negotiation process and accommodate the interests of other regional powers, including India. Hitherto, it has been no secret that both RCEP and TPP will greatly affect and influence the ASEAN and the role of its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partner countries, including China and India.

15. How external state and non state actors are creating problems in India's internal security?

India's internal security problems are a manifestation of internal weaknesses and external attempts at waging a proxy war. Inadequate socio-economic development, apathy towards the genuine grievances of the people, political brinkmanship amongst other reasons, has created internal contradictions, which have led to over five decades of internal strife. Similarly, a number of internal security challenges faced today are fuelled and controlled from Pakistan.

If we divide the internal security challenges into four main groups, to include, Jammu and Kashmir, Northeast India, Left Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the Hinterland, then the first and the last are a direct manifestation of Pakistani influence. It is part of Pakistan's state policy to bleed India through a thousand cuts, given its obvious disadvantages on the conventional war fighting front. The use of non-state actors is essentially the employment of a proxy element, which gives the state of Pakistan a degree of deniability. However,

there is no doubt that none of the so called non-state actors like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) could have operated with impunity without the active funding, logistical and military support of Pakistan. The close linkages of the ISI and such groups are well documented as is their direct involvement in attacks like 26/11. These groups aim to not only create instability in states like J&K, they also have a larger aim of destabilising the country. This is done through sporadic terrorist strikes, which spreads terror and panic. This could also adversely affect the ability of the Indian state to pursue economic modernisation. The flooding of the country with counterfeits is also a way of weakening the economy.

Therefore, the non-state actors operating from Pakistan are the proxies of the state, functioning under a clear charter of state policy.

16. Why did we fail to detect and diagnose the cyber terror attacks on our leading IT city despite the fact that it emanated from a very "traditional source"?

To recap the sequence of events leading to Bangalore, on the 20th of May 2012, a 26 year old woman was murdered in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. The ensuing riots that started in Myanmar around the 3rd of June left 80 dead and 80,000 displaced. Pages were created in Pakistan and West Asia, and even as far as Australia, containing misleading information and morphed pictures and placed on Facebook, and other social networking sites and websites, primarily to incite the population in those countries to rise up in protest. These had the desired effect not just in those countries but also in India where they were juxtaposed with unconnected incidents in Assam to inflame passions and threat of violence against people from the North-East of the country.

Detection of misinformation on social media of the type that led to the events in Bangalore is not possible without the creation of considerable investment in different capabilities. If one considers the data flowing through the social media networks, as per statistics, Facebook gets 5 billion pageviews a month in India alone, and Youtube gets about a billion pageviews. On a global scale, 60 hours of video are uploaded to youtube every minute and 4,000 tweets are sent every second. Moreover, there is a very thin line between monitoring data and monitoring content and there is a big question mark as to whether monitoring data alone will be sufficient. There are many issues to be resolved before an efficient monitoring mechanism can be put in place.

17. How an Indian can make a difference in improving India's defence system against China and Pakistan?

Every Indian can and should make a contribution in making India a strong and prosperous country in which all of us feel secure and live harmoniously. This can be done by doing our best in which ever field of activity we are involved in. Hard working, tech savvy and productive citizens are essential for India's sustained economic growth. A strong economy will generate resources for development as well as for defence. Technological advances will contribute towards better defence systems. There are many career choices which can be made if one wants to make direct contribution towards developing defence

systems, both in PSUs and in private sector. One can make innovation in any field and it will have a direct or indirect positive impact in improving India's defence potential. Obviously, no defence system is designed with an eye on a particular adversary or potential adversary.

18. How safe is the Indian coastline? What steps has the Government taken recently to improve the security of our coastlines?

India's coastline continues to remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks as well as to smuggling of drugs, arms and explosives. However, the situation is not so bleak. Thanks to the various measures undertaken by the government, the country's coastal security situation is fast improving. Some of the measures initiated by the central government are:

It is important to emphasise that given the nature of the problem, India's coastline cannot be made foolproof; it can at best be managed efficiently so that the consequences of any untoward incident are minimised to the extent possible.

19. What are the pros and cons of India agreeing to International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) especially from the point of view of internet, free speech, cyber security, etc?

Signing the ITRs would have made very little difference within India since there is comparatively very little regulation within the country. However, it could have provided a fig leaf to the actions of governments that have tried to tightly control internet content in other countries.

In and of themselves, the proposed ITRs are quite innocuous, with even the contentious provisions, such as, the Article (5A) on the "Security and robustness of networks" and Article (5B) on "Unsolicited bulk electronic communications" or spam being, on the face of it, necessary for the well-being of cyberspace. At the same time, the apprehensions that these provisions would be liable to misuse through deliberate misinterpretation are also well-founded given attempts at controlling the Internet by several countries. The passing of these ITRs would have legitimised such efforts and this was the reason why there was opposition on the part of other countries to bring the Internet within the ambit of the ITRs and giving a greater role to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

India, with the third largest Internet user base, is increasingly seen as a swing state on matters of internet governance. The Indian Government decided to take a considered view on signing the ITRs and is one of the 45 countries that have deferred that decision. Countries have to ratify the ITRs by January 1, 2015.

20. India has Andman & Nicobar and Lakshdweep, we can use them as our Naval and Airforce Strong base to guard India or break of String of Pearls?

The 572 islands of the Andaman and Nicobar chain running in a north south direction of around 780 km long places this eastern most "Outpost" of India close to the South East Asian nations on Chinas' radar scan.

Although we have an integrated command based at Port Blair and a number of Naval, Air Force and Coast Guard bases, the assets (in this regards I refer to

ships and aircraft) presently, are not sufficient to place the vast sea area and islands under surveillance. A number of the Islands are uninhabited and offer a safe haven for elements inimical to the security of India.

As and when the required numbers of assets are available there would be the requirement of placing them at places that offer logistics support that would require the requisite infrastructure to be constructed. More importantly these places or bases would require to be in close proximity of navigable choke points so that the time required to reach the area would be the shortest.

There are two points to be kept in mind. Firstly, aircraft given the speed and potent reach are always considered an omni present threat. The nations adjoining the area would question our intentions. We may reason and give the rationale of anti piracy and anti smuggling but it may not go down well with them. Secondly infrastructure to support these assets would require to be constructed. There would be a requirement to duplicate and maybe triplicate similar infrastructure given the extent of the Island chain. This would be a costly affair.

21. Why 50 per cent of the Indian Navy has surpassed 20 yrs service life, as per the CAG 2013 report? How will it impact our defence preparedness?

This is due to the delay in procurement of equipment, weaponry and ships to replace the ageing and obsolete inventory held by the Indian Navy. The term 'ship' here also covers other assets like submarines and aircraft (both manned and unmanned). The impact on defence preparedness could be seen under the three prisms of a ship's ability to float, move and fight. All three are impacted by ageing of assets and equipment fit.

The impact of ageing could be viewed under two broad aspects:

Technological Advantage: The advantage of a ship over its adversary is dependent on its ability to detect first and shoot faster and further. In today's age of fast evolving technologies, this aspect though an expensive issue is factored in the plans and is often hampered by delays in procurement. Inordinate delays in turn not only increase the cost but also affect the efficacy of the procured equipment as it could have been surpassed by another available technology.

Failure Rate: Ageing increases the failure rate, thereby affecting not only the availability of the asset and/or equipment, but also impinges on the cost of repairs and confidence level in the capability of the assets or equipment.

22. Does Indian army have sniper school & survival school?

India does have a sniper and survival school. However, these are known by different names. Infantry School Mhow, the premier institution for Infantry officers and soldiers, runs a number of training courses or programmes. Amongst these, they also run a sniper course which teaches the basics of the weapon and its employment in all battle situations. While we do not have a course specifically called as a survival course, however, two different schools run training on similar lines. The first is the Commando Wing. This runs a commando course which has an extremely rigorous schedule. It includes

survival training, living off the land, long distance marches, escape and evasion, launching raids as some of the important aspects taught. The second course is run by the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School, which teaches counter insurgency skills and jungle warfare. This also includes lessons on survival skills. In addition to this, infantry battalions also carry out training at their own level for specialist groups amongst their soldiers to imbibe similar qualities specifically suited to their respective operational role.

23. What steps the Indian Government is taking to combat terrorism?

Before taking a look at the measures undertaken by the government to combat terrorism, it is important to understand the different levels at which terrorism affects society and the security of the country. Terrorism essentially instils an innate sense of fear in the everyday life of a citizen, thereby diluting the perceived control of the state over law and order and its ability to govern. This state of lawlessness creates conditions which help the terrorist group achieve its political aims. In order to achieve this, the spectre of fear has to be unpredictable, sensational and display the helplessness of the state in the face of loss of life and property.

This is achieved in case of India by terrorist groups through underground modules all over the country. In the case of a group like Indian Mujahideen, support in terms of training, funding and logistics is provided by Pakistan. The modular nature of the organisation makes it difficult to establish a hierarchy and thus tracking its activities are much more difficult. Recruitment to such groups fuels on perceived sense of alienation and deprivation.

In order to fight this kind of threat, the government functions against terrorism at a number of levels. First, there is a concerted effort to address the root cause of alienation which affects communities or sections of society. This is done by addressing genuine concerns and through awareness campaigns that dispel false propaganda. Second, intelligence agencies keep track of radicalisation attempts by overground workers and recruitment agents in order to stop this process at its inception. Third, human and electronic means are used to tap into existing networks and cells to pre-empt terrorist strikes and arrest leaders, both inside and outside the country. Fourth, international cooperation with other countries facilitates follow up on suspects and cases in progress. Fifth, laws are legislated to provide the necessary legal framework for speedy conviction of terrorists through fast track special courts. Sixth, specialist agencies like the National Investigation Agency (NIA) have been established which investigate and prosecute terrorism related crimes in special NIA courts. These are some of the measures undertaken to fight terrorism. However, the best defence against terrorism is to ensure that the people do not have the incentive to pick up arms against the country by providing them equitable political, social and economic opportunities.

24. Is China's aircraft carrier, Liaoning, fully operational? What is the current status of India's aircraft carrier?

The Chinese aircraft carrier, Liaoning, recently completed sea trials after a 37 day sea sortie from November 26, 2013 to January 01, 2014 in the South China Sea. Sea trials are a major part of sequential events that make a ship fully operational. Other facets, to name a few include:

All these issues require time for fusion so that the standard operating procedures are streamlined and the viability of meeting strategic and operational targets is achieved. This could take time as China is operating an aircraft carrier for the first time and, therefore, could make mistakes that would stretch the time period. Although the carrier could be termed as operational when the flight operating standards are met, a fully operational status could be termed as reached when operations with escort assets and adequate shore support targets are also achieved.

In contrast, INS Vikramaditya would achieve fully operational status in a shorter time frame. This is due to the fact that escort assets and shore support facilities exist and India has the experience of operating aircraft carriers since 1961. The first indigenous aircraft carrier is likely to be commissioned in 2018 after which it would also follow the path of trials before becoming fully operational. The second indigenous carrier is, as per reports, in the design phase with a planned commissioning date of 2025.

25. What can be India's contribution towards fighting the global terrorism based on the experience gained so far?

The most important contribution that India can make in fighting terrorism globally is propagating the right conceptual framework. Delinking terrorism from religion, terrorism being bad and unacceptable under any pretext like 'root cause', defeating terrorism without putting people to hardship are the ideas that would resonate across the globe. Defeating terrorism at home through synergised efforts of all agencies of the government and cooperation of the people will send the right message to all the countries affected by terrorism. Besides setting an example of how to eliminate terrorism, India could and should cooperate with other countries through information sharing about terror networks, their financing, arms trafficking and cross-border linkages etc. However, it is not advisable to get directly involved in fighting terrorism on foreign soil.

26. What should be India's foreign policy so that the J&K issue could be settled within the ambit of the Constitution of India?

When one talks about the settlement of Kashmir issue, the most obvious challenge before India is how to deal with Pakistan. India has taken a stricter stance post 26/11 Mumbai attacks on the issue of state-sponsored terrorism, making it clear that it cannot hold talks on Kashmir issue in the shadow of militancy abetted by Pakistan. India's policy on the issue has been consistent: it is opposed to third party mediation on Kashmir issue, a bilateral issue to be peacefully resolved between the two neighbours. However, until Pakistan

decides to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign policy, it is difficult to expect any major breakthrough on the issue. Opting for militancy in order to coerce India into acceding to its agenda in Kashmir has had serious consequences for Pakistan itself. The prolonged collusion of successive regimes in Pakistan with religious extremists has not only dented country's image internationally, but has also caused a severe backlash in the form of incessant violence within Pakistan.

Therefore, what is more consequential is the policy course Pakistan pursues, not so much India's. As noted earlier, India has been committed towards improving ties with Pakistan and has been willing to conduct talks on Kashmir amongst other pending issues. More significantly, India has never out-stepped constitutional norms vis-à-vis J&K, which it regards as its integral part by virtue of the Instrument of Accession signed in 1947. India's foreign policy adheres to the constitutionality of J&K being a part of the Union of India. Therefore, any talks/negotiation on the Kashmir issue, now or in future, could only be held within India's existing constitutional framework.

27. Can India develop and implement a strategy to strike hard at Pakistan's vulnerable border outposts in retaliation of Pakistan abetted terror strikes and border ceasefire violations?

The question indicates that India does not have a strategy to deal with Pakistani outposts, as part of the overall border management policy of the army/paramilitary/government. Therefore, the issue needs to be placed in the right perspective.

First, India does not have a policy of pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan's defensive positions. Any action that is initiated by India is in response to Pakistan's ceasefire violations from posts on the borders. This is relevant both to the Line of Control (LoC), where primarily the army is deployed, as well as the international border (IB), where the Border Security Force (BSF) is located. Therefore, while India is not the aggressor, there is a clear policy laid down, with adequate decentralisation of powers to the level of subordinate commanders, even as control is maintained over possible escalation.

Second, India has a robust deployment both on the LoC and the IB to stop cross border infiltration. However, Indian forces do not retaliate against the Pakistani posts unless they are directly linked or involved in support of infiltration through fire of weapons.

Third, the choice of responding to the terrorist related incidents supported by the Pakistani forces on the borders as well as on the IB is left to the armed forces to decide. They plan in their wisdom and according to a well defined strategy target the involved posts in order to ensure that a suitable response is delivered for necessary effect.

Fourth, as events of the last few months would have indicated, India has both the will and the capacity to respond to the Pakistani forces in the language they understand and with greater intensity than they can, clearly sending a message

that even as India is not an aggressor it is well capable of retaliating in a robust manner.

Therefore, while it is not India's policy to initiate pre-emptive military action, adequate measures have been put in place to respond to any aggression from the Pakistani posts or action by the terrorists or combination of both.

28. What is the influence of China's growth on north-east India and the Indian Ocean region?

The influence of China's growth on northeast India can be two-folds. The first is one in which the people of the northeast could get inspired by the Chinese economic growth model, especially in its south western province of Yunnan, and emulate such a globalising model. Already, the chief ministers of the region are ardent supporters of the "Look East" policy which aims to create land and rail connectivity between India's northeast, Myanmar, and Yunnan in China. This could foster economic connectivity and bring in prosperity to the northeast. The other influence is more security related. China's claim on Arunachal Pradesh and its water diversion plans on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet are creating a public perception in the northeast that China is a threat to India. Hence, while China's influence with regard to economic connectivity could be positive, its territorial claim and water diversion plans are negative influences.

Similar is the case with the Indian Ocean. China views the Indian Ocean, especially the Malacca Strait, as the lifeline for its energy supplies and exports, which is critical to maintaining its internal growth. It wants to collaborate with other Indian Ocean countries to ensure the safety of these lanes. However, China is an authoritarian regime with a closed political system. Hence, its military modernisation, acquisition of an aircraft carrier and assertive claims on the South China Sea is creating an atmosphere of militarisation of international waters. The Chinese influence is thus highly securitised.

29. Can you explain the initiatives taken by India towards enhancing her maritime interests?

Maritime interests of a nation are extensive and cover a vast ambit. They broadly include protection of national integrity ranging from military intervention, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy actions; economic growth through trade and commerce; exploitation of the sea resources under the nation's jurisdiction and maintaining the ecological balance.

India has been taking initiatives towards enhancing her maritime interests by engaging neighbours and other international players at various fora so as to ensure a stable regional security environment. These fora are at political, diplomatic and military levels. The main thrust is to work out common grounds to tackle maritime terrorism and piracy as well as ensuring freedom of navigation on the high seas especially in the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are responsible for ensuring that the nation maintains the freedom to utilise the seas for its national purposes and therefore safeguard India's National Interests at all times. Both of these

services have ongoing plans to induct ships, aircraft and develop infrastructure to support this responsibility.

Economic growth in the maritime arena is being enhanced by developing port infrastructure, rail and road connectivity and ship building capabilities. There is an equal impetus given towards harnessing the resources from the sea, mainly oil and gas. Fishing, however, remains a weak area and could be developed so as to put India in the top slot of fishing nations.

30. In near future, what kind of security threat China poses before India?

India does not perceive any immediate threat in terms of an attack from China. Presently though, China is engaged in 'infrastructural intimidation' on the border and assertion of its claim over many Indian territories. In the security field, we see a growing Chinese presence around India. Its provocative military presence in Pak-Occupied-Kashmir is the latest example in this regard. India also has immediate concerns regarding use of disruptive technologies by China which may impinge on our cyber and space security. Besides, India suspects that China is using Pakistan as proxy to implement some of its own strategic designs against India.

It is debatable whether China has succeeded in undermining India's interests and reducing its global and regional influence? China's opposition to NSG waiver to India, its ambiguous stand on India's entry into the UNSC, its earlier reservation about India's entry into East Asia Summit and its opposition to ADB loan for a project in Arunachal Pradesh in India, its claim over entire Arunachal Pradesh in last couple of years and its decision to issue stapled visas to Indian citizens of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) all are pointers towards its intention to do so.

The current war of nerves between India and China will remain limited only to diplomatic domain in the short-term. However, India needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with China.

31. What is the difference between insurgency, militancy and extremism?

The difference between insurgency, militancy and extremism often tends to take the shape of the context in which it has been used and therefore, its implied meaning becomes more relevant than the actual one.

Purely from a definitional point of view, the Indian Sub Conventional Doctrine defines insurgency as "an organised armed struggle by a section of the population against the state, usually with foreign support. Possible causes of an insurgency including ideological, ethnic or linguistic differences; or politico-socio-economic reasons and/or fundamentalism and extremism. Interference by external forces may act as a catalyst to provide impetus to the movement." There can be other definitions, though this essentially gives an idea of an insurgency.

Militancy is a condition which experiences the use of violence, being combative or predisposed to fight.

Extremism is a state wherein a person or an organisation holds extreme political or religious views.

If one were to compare these terms, an extremist may not necessarily be committing a crime under law. A number of groups, political and religious, fall under this category, for instance, the separatists in Kashmir and Maoist supporters. Militants can include any individual or group which takes to violence. This need not only include terrorists and insurgents, but also religious groups which take to violence to further their beliefs. An insurgency may have within its fold both militant groups supporting it as also extremists who propagate its ideology.

32. What is the difference between insurgency and terrorism?

Insurgents, by and large, target the security forces and the state apparatus. They work to mobilise the people, acquire popular support and eventually overthrow the government. Insurgents, in Mao Tse-tung's famous formulation, are the fish and the people are the water in which these fish swim. In contrast, the common people are the targets of terrorist violence today, although this was not the case when terrorism first emerged in the modern era. When terrorism came to be first employed as a strategy in the late 19th century, the targets were symbols of political authority—kings, emperors, viceroys, political leaders, government officials, etc. Further, these attacks were intended to serve as 'propaganda by deed', meaning advertisement for the cause. And these attacks were carried out only as the final resort and mainly against autocratic rulers and governments. In contrast, 'there are no innocents' is the motto of contemporary terrorists who moreover target democracies in the first resort. And, unlike 19th century terrorists who proudly proclaimed that they are indeed terrorists, terrorists today cloak themselves in the garb of freedom fighters and holy warriors.

Be that as it may, both insurgents and terrorists engage in violence in order to attain certain political or increasingly politico-religious objectives-national liberation and independence, establishing a communist system of government or an Islamic form of government, restoration of the Caliphate, etc.

33. How the insurgency in Kashmir is different from the Maoist insurgency or the insurgency in Assam?

The insurgency in Kashmir is different primarily because it arises from differing perceptions with Pakistan and the people of Kashmir valley on the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union at the time of independence and the special status accorded to the State through Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The insurgency in J&K has been actively assisted by the Government of Pakistan and the two countries have fought in 1948, 1965, 1971, and in the Kargil sector on this issue. It has been the official policy of the Government of Pakistan to bleed India through a thousand cuts in order to weaken its resolve that J&K is an integral part of India. Pakistan has, therefore, not lost any opportunity to exploit any discontent in J&K. There are reportedly 22 camps in Pak occupied Kashmir where militants are being trained to be

infiltrated across the LOC to attack security forces and vital installations in the State.

The Maoist insurgency originates from apparent discontent over agrarian reforms and exploitation of the local population, especially tribals; and now has the stated objective of the overthrow of the Indian State and parliamentary democracy. It has got its support by exploiting local grievances against the local government to organise an armed liberation struggle against the Indian State. It draws inspiration from Mao Tse Tung's Communist movement. It is not limited to any one state since the Maoists do not believe in parliamentary democracy and is currently spread in parts of at least 9 States in India. Maoists have been reported to have got training from the LTTE and are actively seeking cooperation from insurgent groups in the North East, especially the PLA.

In Assam, there are a number of insurgent groups which are active. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Paresh Barua faction seeks a sovereign Assam and has its origins in the fear that continuous migration of persons from erstwhile East Pakistan and now Bangladesh will alter the demographic character of the State of Assam to the detriment of its indigenous people. Who are the indigenous people of Assam still remains to be resolved. The BODO insurgent movement also called for an independent BODO State as these tribals felt that they would be discriminated if they stayed within the State of Assam. Then there are a number of other militant groups based on tribal identity and geographical contiguity who have taken up arms to fight for their tribal identity which they feel is not getting due recognition and support within the State of Assam. Both the ULFA and BODO groups have received training and arms from Pakistan.

34. How internet-based social media could be a threat to security, and what can be done about it?

Internet based social media is per se not a threat to security. It follows in a long line of technological innovations that have enhanced human interaction, enabling both the conveying of information, news and opinion at a rapid pace, as well as widening and deepening the democratic discourse. Like any other advancement in technology, its use comes with challenges, making it a double edged sword, in this case, for those involved with safeguarding public security. They are concerned by its potential for disrupting public order, either involuntarily through the unchecked spread of rumours, or deliberately through the propagation of misinformation with the intent of creating enmity between groups. A combination of the two was witnessed recently and has led to calls for regulating social media. However, the nature of the medium is such that it has raised valid questions as to whether such regulation is possible without infringing on the fundamental rights of the citizen relating to freedom of speech and privacy.

Even as that debates continues, there are many other steps that the government can take to get in front of the problem. In the first instance, the authorities can use the same medium to provide correct information and nip

rumours in the bud. Existing technologies and laws provide sufficient leeway to the authorities to effectively monitor internet traffic, including social media, in real-time, but are under-utilised for a variety of reasons, largely to do with coordination. In fact, along the matrix of cyber security challenges, social media pales in comparison to other challenges, such as securing critical infrastructure and countering cyber espionage, which are much more pressing and can have greater negative consequences.

35. Is Agni V an ICBM?

Since the tested range of the Agni V cannot be independently verified, only DRDO's claims could be taken into account. Nonetheless, DRDO declares the system to have around 5000 km range, which is normally identified as an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).

There is no single globally accepted international definition for ICBM ranges, which vary from 5500 km by some groups to anything above 7000 km by others. The literal meaning reflects a capability of the system being able to travel from one continent to another farther one, if one is to trace the origins of ICBM technology and its initial application in the US-Soviet missile competition during the Cold War. In our case, if the intended target is China, then the need for intercontinental coverage doesn't arise as Beijing would be roughly within 4000 km from Delhi.

36. How prudent is an idea to formulate a national counter-insurgency policy in view of the LWE and northeast insurgencies?

I completely agree with you on the need for a national counter insurgency policy. It may have been noted by you that some countries undertake this kind of planning process on a regular basis. It not only provides guidance and direction, it also helps in synergising the efforts of various organs of the government.

In the Indian context, the LWE is in fact an exception wherein there have been broad policy parameters laid down by the government. However, these have not been replicated in other areas like the Northeast. To be fair to the government, this process does have its share of challenges. This includes differences in approach between the centre and the states, large variation in the nature of challenges in different areas and external support to terrorism in case of J&K. Amongst the few attempts in this regard, the army did come out with a sub conventional doctrine in December 2006, which lays down broad parameters. However, this does not substitute the need for a national policy which is very much recommended.

37. Is it viable for India to set up military bases abroad? Which are the other countries with bases abroad and where all?

A "military base" is a facility established or operated by the military or one of its branches that shelters military equipment and personnel, and facilitates training and operations, in pursuit of a country's national security objectives. More than 1,000 military bases and installations exist around the world; most of these are operated by the United States, which has a military presence in

over several dozen countries (details of which can be surfed on the internet). These range from vast installations, like Guantanamo Bay, to smaller military bases or training camps, nuclear missile sites, rest and recuperation camps and refuelling stations. In addition, the US and some of its NATO allies complement this vast military presence with an even more elaborate network of port-of-call rights, and landing rights for military aircraft. In so far as India is concerned, it has traditionally engaged in defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries as an important component of the national security strategy. It encompasses visits, contacts, exchanges, exercises, port calls and training facilitation to build and maintain trust in the interests of mutual security. The Indian Navy in particular has been forging strong partnerships with a number of navies in the Indian Ocean region, the more notable ones being the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Singapore, Vietnam and Japan. In this regard, India has also been engaging the island nations strategically located in the Indian Ocean region.

38. How terrain is helping terror in J&K?

Mountainous and jungle terrain helps insurgents as not all areas can be patrolled or kept under surveillance. It has natural camouflage and cover. Technology cannot provide all the solutions given the frequent rain or snow fall or mist. However there is a correlation between say forest cover and insurgency and also roots of insurgency related to forests or its products.

In Jammu and Kashmir illegal felling may be one source of funds for insurgents . At times the anti- nationals elements generate a discourse on logging by the state to bring in the green agenda and thus grab international attention. The Indian Army through its Operation Sadbhavana has a green mission wherever possible. However there is a serious environmental degradation in Kashmir valley due to changes in rainfall and snow patterns, neglect of wetlands and pollution due to urbanisation. The deteriorating state of the Dal lake is a case in point . Forests that is not only in quantity but quality are important for the water recycling regime.

In naxal affected forest region the relationship is more direct. Tribals depend not only on trees or forests but also on forest related products such as mahua , tendu leaf, etc. Their cultural and livelihood practices are related to NTFP (No timber forest product). The naxal struggle is one manifestation of the clash of perceptions on forest and mineral wealth pitted against the needs of an industrialising India.

39. Has the joint command at the ANC been a success or a failure? What is the way ahead?

The raison d'etre for setting up of a joint command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has been in existence since the 1970s. The issue was expedited in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict. Based on the Kargil Review Committee and on recommendations of the Group of Ministers, the joint command came into existence on October 8, 2001, with elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard operating under one unified command. The main duties entrusted to the command were broadly:

The Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) was initially established as an 'experimental' command. One aim was to observe if other such 'theatre commands' could be established, based on the functional success of the ANC. The ANC, given the existent assets and infrastructure that were placed under the joint command, by and large has met all its main duties described above with relative success. Any further increase is considered not feasible given the constraints of available land and associated issues, like ecological aspects, etc. Although the issue of more theatre commands is an ongoing debate, the ANC could be considered a success as 'jointness' was inherent due to the small size of forces positioned there, distance from mainland India and geography (proximity of land, sea and air), which brought about more interaction at the functional level.

40. What is the difference between Left Wing Extremism, Naxalism and Maoism in the Indian context?

Naxalism and Left-Wing Extremism are used interchangeably. On March 2, 1967, Naxalites, as they are generically known in India, who were then members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), led a tribal peasant uprising in Naxalbari village, Siliguri sub-division, Darjeeling district, West Bengal. Since then, all those who subscribed to the idea of an armed over-throw of the state have been generically referred to as Naxalites, the term having its origins in Naxalbari village. On the other hand, the term Maoists refers exclusively to cadres and leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). All Maoists are Naxalites, but all Naxalites are not Maoists.

41. What is the linkage between development and spread of extremism?

It is a truism that underdevelopment often creates the conditions for insurgency and spread of extremist ideologies among the people, who perceive that their needs are not being taken care of by the government. While it has been the policy of governments around the world today to emphasise on "inclusive development", there are always groups in every state who feel alienated because they perceive that they are left out of the developmental efforts. Such perceptions coupled with inefficient and corrupt governance create an ideal condition for extremism and militancy. More than lack of development, it is the perception of injustice, misgovernance and inability of the system to engage the disaffected lot that lead people to violence and extremism.

42. What are the major demands of Naxalites from the government, and the challenges government is facing to fulfil those demands?

The objective of the Naxalites is to seize/capture political/state power through protracted armed struggle. All the other demands are meant to achieve this goal. The major demands include rights over water, forests, land and mineral wealth (jal, jungle, zameen and khanij).

Lack of political consensus, implementation and monitoring of development schemes and programmes, issues of governance and security force preparedness are the challenges the government is faced with.

43. What is the difference between Maoism and Naxalism?

Naxalism originated as a rebellion against lack of development and poverty at the local level in the rural parts of eastern India. The term 'Naxal' derives its name from a village called Naxalbari in the State of West Bengal where the movement had its origin. The Naxals are considered far left radical communists who support Maoist political ideology. Their origin can be traced to the split that took place in the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967. It led to the formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist and Leninist). Initially the movement had its centre in West Bengal. Thereafter, it spread into less developed areas of rural central and eastern India, such as, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

Maoism originated in China as a form of Communist theory derived from the teachings of the Chinese political leader Mao Zedong. It was widely applied as the political and military guiding ideology of the Communist Party of China till 1977-78. It emphasised the advancement of people's social and economic life by establishing a classless society through armed revolution. It was rooted in the anti-imperialist struggle and supported armed revolution in order to achieve political transformation. Naxalism is actually based on the principles of Maoism to achieve a similar transformation in India.

44. May India develop a military industrial complex? What are the prospects?

The term 'military-industrial complex' acquired negative connotations since its use as such by Eisenhower in his farewell address. The apprehension is that such a complex would acquire its own interest and thereby fuel armaments and arms racing. This is what transpired in the US in its arming across breadth and depth in both the nuclear and conventional dimensions. Clearly, this is not how India views itself or envisages its future. Instead, it prefers the term 'defence industrial base'. Its history of conquest and as a once colonised state is attributed, among other reasons, to deficiencies in military technology. Consequently it is resolved to be better prepared in defending its freedoms. The template for this endeavour was set up early, in the Nehruvian period itself. Today, India has a technological edge conferred by the DRDO, as also a production system based on OFB and major PSUs. It has decided to reduce the external content in its armaments to 30 per cent. Given that its growing economy permits greater resources for allocation to defence (even though the percentage is maintained at 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP), it has evolved its Defence Procurement Procedure over the last half a decade so as to bring in private sector participation in defence production. The private sector is enabled to do so in partnership with foreign defence companies. Additionally, the companies from abroad are required to broaden the defence production base by transfer of technology through the programme of offsets. These measures would enlarge India's capacity. India would nevertheless require to be alert to the phenomenon observed elsewhere of armaments build up acquiring its own logic.

45. How do national security structures of any country strike a balance between surveillance and privacy? How far CMS fits into it?

Surveillance has always been an essential function of a government, carried out through its intelligence agencies. On balance, it has been seen that people are willing to forego their privacy to a considerable extent in return for security. At the same time, privacy is increasingly seen as an individual right and governments have had to walk a fine line between intruding into the individual's space in the interest of national security and ensuring that privacy rights are not trampled upon in the process.

Cyberspace has brought a new dimension to this dilemma in that governments, if they so desire, can obtain a veritable deluge of information ranging from communication to location records. There is a legitimate concern that such untrammelled power has the potential to be misused. Checks and balances in the form of minimisation and oversight procedures have not been able to cope with the data deluge. While a global debate is on in the wake of the Snowden revelations about the US and other countries using the current dominant positions of their internet companies to collect intelligence, countermeasures might result in a reduction in external surveillance, not necessarily internal monitoring.

The Central Monitoring Service is currently an open source intelligence gathering service under the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). While there have been reports that the CMS has also been tasked with analysing internet content, the establishment of such a system is still in the early stages, and in no way compares with the scale and size of the surveillance capabilities of the US National Security Agency.

46. How do Naxalites financially sustain their movement? What are their sources of funding?

Financing of terrorism usually fits into three categories. The first is state sponsored, wherein an external state sponsors and funds terrorism to facilitate the achievement of its strategic aims. This is essentially the case in J&K. The second is globalisation of terror finance, where a group raises funds employing the power of modern day inter-connectivity which links the financial systems of the world. It makes funds raised in Europe as convenient and accessible as those raised locally. The LTTE exploited this mechanism in the past. The third category is privatisation of terror finance. In this case, a group raises funds locally and essentially on its own. The Naxalites fall in the third category, as do most insurgent groups in the Northeast.

The Naxalites are known to have a very elaborate taxation system, wherein every produce in the area is taxed, from tendu leaves to agricultural produce. They also resort to extortion from vehicles, businesses and households. Every type of vehicle has a fixed rate, which is systematically collected in the region. A very large percentage of their income also comes from extortion of large business houses which have their business interests in the region. These could

vary from mining companies to manufacturing units. Reports have indicated that illegal mining carried out by locals is also taxed. There are also reports, though yet to be verified, regarding raising of funds through taxation of opium farms. The extent and scale is still a matter of speculation, however, given the inaccessibility of the area, it does pose a serious threat to the state agencies. The funds collected are sent to the Central Committee, with a small percentage allocated for the operational and administrative support of the local cadres

47. How and from where do the Naxalites procure their weapons?

The Naxalites procure weapons from different sources and by different methods. There are numerous reports that link Naxalites to a number of militant and criminal groups throughout South Asia. These groups have interacted with Maoists from Nepal, insurgent groups of India's Northeast, ISI-backed Islamists from Bangladesh and criminals from Myanmar. Weapons flow among these groups without much check. The details of Naxalite's sources of weaponry are as follows:

1. Initially, the Naxalites collected weapons from the local people. These were old vintage type muzzle loader guns and locally made shotguns used for killing animals and hunting. Some of them also used bows and arrows. Their main weapon used to be their human strength, that is, their large numbers. Later they started looting arms and ammunition from the local police outposts in the Naxalite infested areas. After gaining confidence, they started raiding the armoury and ambushing the police and security force patrol parties to loot/snatch their arms, ammunition and equipments, like bullet proof jackets, night vision devices, communication sets, etc.
2. The Naxalites also obtained weapons by bribing or coercing members of the security forces to sell or give their firearms and the ammunition along with their equipment.
3. Naxalites also have their own local arms factories. The manufacturing of arms demonstrate a wide range of craftsmanship, right from assembling makeshift weapons from discarded parts to more advanced forging process. These factories also produce homemade mortar rounds and components for improvised explosive devices. As reported, they even have laboratory to test the improvised explosive devices, land mines, claymore mines and other sophisticated explosives/ammunition.
4. It was initially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that had provided the Naxalites the training in the handling of weapons, mines and grenades at a camp near Bastar in Chattisgarh State. Later when the LTTE fighters fled Sri Lanka after their 2009 defeat, it is suspected that a few Tamil fighters began providing training of all types to the Naxalites in exchange for safe haven.

5. The Nepalese Maoists have not only exchanged training and weapons with the Naxalites, but also their strategic planning.
6. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) has helped Indian Maoists to procure weapons and ammunition through Myanmar and Bangladesh.
7. There is a relationship between the ULFA and Naxalites to smuggle drugs through Bangladesh border in exchange of weapons and ammunition.
8. There is no shortage of explosives with the Naxalites. They are able to procure the same from the mining contractors operating in the Naxalite - controlled areas, including fertilizer distributors and mining companies that maintain stocks of explosives, blasting caps and detonators.
9. The Naxalites have also procured foreign weapons, ammunition and explosives from external militant and criminal groups operating within and outside of India. Such shipments are traded for smuggling services or purchased with funds from banditry, extortion or revolutionary taxes. Purchasing weapons from the outside is very expensive.

According to an article published in 2009 by India Daily News, Naxalite expenditure reports seized by police showed that, over a six-month period, one zone command spent more than three-quarters of the unit's budget on weapons. Such evidence suggests that their effort to procure weapons from outside have certain limitations; obtaining them locally is far cheaper and can be done by virtually any Naxalite fighter. The Naxalite arsenal is thus vast and diverse, consisting of arms and ammunition manufactured in China, Pakistan and India. How many weapons are held by the Naxalites is anybody's guess.

48. What is non-traditional security?

Post-Cold War expansion of the security agenda – After the end of the Cold War, human security was added to the security agenda. It included: (a) Environmental security (b) Economic security, and (c) Societal security. Threats to a nation were no longer only from the enemy's military. Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats, also called non-military threats, began to be factored in. Among the well-known NTS are energy, food and water which are in a nexus. Other topics include climate change, environmental security, economic security, pandemics, social issues, etc.

The UN's Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 – This report highlighted the need for a shift from the exclusive stress on territorial security to focusing on people's security, and instead of seeking security through armaments to gaining security through sustainable development. It identified seven security essentials. These are: (i) Economic security (ii) Food security (iii) Health security (iv) Environmental security (v) Personal security (vi) Community security, and (vii) Political security. This then spawned the view that the state was also responsible for these issues

The NTS are security challenges that are not considered mainstream. The methods and tools employed to address non-traditional security challenges are evolving. It includes unconventional thinking and it challenges orthodox

understandings. The 21st century presents new paradigms to security. Politico-military threats have been joined by security issues relating to energy, water, food, environment, climate change, and so on.

Some examples of topics added to non-traditional security are:

1. Environmental degradation including climate security
2. Economic disparities
3. Chronic poverty
4. Diseases and pandemics
5. Trans-national crimes, human trafficking and drugs
6. Migration
7. Energy, water and food
8. Resource wars
9. Disaster management (including role of military in disaster relief)
10. Terrorism
11. Corruption
12. Responsibility to Protect

49. What are the challenges and merits/demerits of making a transition to an all-nuclear submarine force in India?

While nuclear submarines (SSNs and SSBNs) have certain distinct advantages over conventional submarines (SSKs), the idea of an all-nuclear force -- in an Indian context - seems rather stretched. This is because conventional submarines, though constrained by operating endurance, have other benefits that their nuclear counterparts do not provide. A diesel-electric submarine's biggest advantage is that it is smaller, harder to detect and much cheaper to build. The fact it costs a fraction of the price of a typical nuclear vessel, makes it an irresistible proposition. Its attractiveness is further enhanced by its ease of operation and the absence of the risk of dangerous nuclear leaks.

That said nuclear submarines confer an edge to a fighting force that SSKs find difficult to match. The fact that SSNs are bigger, tougher, more heavily armed and longer-ranged than conventional submarines makes them indispensable assets. They can also do things that diesel-electric submarines generally can't – like crossing an ocean underwater and at high speed and travelling for weeks at a time under ice in Polar Regions. The powerful weapons and sensors they host cannot be matched by conventional submarines.

Notably, barring some top-tier navies such as the US Navy, Royal Navy and French Navy, no other submarine operating force has completely done away with conventional submarines. While the SSKs simple advantages like ease and quietness of operations have been a factor of interest, the past few years have seen technological advances that have helped diesel-electric submarines overcome their traditional disadvantage of less submerged time before surfacing to charge batteries. Air independent propulsion technology and fuel cells have made it possible for conventional submarines to remain underwater much longer than earlier.

Most powerful navies today prefer a mix of nuclear and conventional submarines – each meant to perform specific roles. Many contemporary maritime forces use non-nuclear submarines like the German Type 214 that can travel long distances without surfacing. In fact, many – like the Norwegian Navy, which patrols the Arctic’s fringes – have prioritised procurement of non-nuclear submarines. India’s emphasis on building the Scorpene class and the proposed P-75I (both conventional submarines), while inducting the Arihant (SSBN) at the same time into the fleet, reflects a preference for a mixed fleet of submarines.

50. How is organised crime in India reinforcing terrorism? What are the linkages especially with regard to terror funding?

Crime and terrorism can potentially have a very close linkage. While there may or may not always be a linkage between the two, however, both international case studies and those in India do point towards it.

If we look at some of the regions in the country affected by terrorism, this linkage becomes apparent. In the Northeast, extortion is the fundamental basis for funding all forms of terrorism. In addition to this, kidnapping has been used extensively for spreading terror and raising funds. Human trafficking, drug trafficking and gun running are some of the other criminal activities that have been common in these areas.

In J&K, counterfeit currency has been a major source of funding terrorism.

In the Maoist terror movements, extortion is yet again a common phenomenon. They have also indulged in robberies of banks to fund their movement. There have also been reports of cuts being enforced on drug yielding crops in the region.

The Indian Mujahideen has also resorted to crime to raise funds. This includes robberies, kidnappings, etc.

There are also a number of insurgent groups which over a period of time have morphed into crime syndicates. What began as an ideological movement is now merely a means of generating profit. This is especially the case with insurgent groups in Northeast India.

51. Do you think India has succeeded in bringing peace to the northeast in the last few years? What should be India’s future strategy?

Yes, there is no doubt that today the Northeast is more peaceful than before. The violence levels in the last few years have come down considerably. In fact, the number of violent incidents has steadily come down since 2008. Till November 2011, the region as a whole witnessed 537 violent incidents as compared to 1561 incidents in 2008, 1297 in 2009, and 773 in 2010. Correspondingly, the number of security forces and civilians killed has also reduced drastically from 466 in 2008 to 61 in 2011 (till October).

The prevalence of relative peace in the region is mainly because most insurgent groups, such as the ULFA, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB- anti-talk faction), Dima Halam Daogah- Joel (DHD-J), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), have been rendered ineffective with the arrest of their top leaders. These arrests also eventually forced these rebel groups to announce ceasefires and initiate talks with the government. In few instances, these talks have resulted in the signing of memorandum of settlements between the government and the insurgent groups.

In the future, the government should continue to engage the insurgent groups in dialogue as well as encourage other groups to shun violence and come to the negotiating table. Simultaneously, it should take steps to address genuine grievances of various ethnic groups residing in the region so as to prevent potential ethnic clashes. In recent months, reports abound that the Maoist have been making inroads in the region by forging ties with insurgent groups. The government should be mindful of this emerging trend and enhance the capacity of the police force to effectively deal with the left wing extremism in the region. Most importantly, the government should improve governance and expedite developmental activities in the Northeast.

52. What is the difference between the lexicons 'Anti-terrorism' and 'Counter-terrorism'?

On the face of it, both “anti-terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” seem similar and the difference borders on semantics. While the official glossary in the Indian context does not differentiate the two, international writings do highlight essential differences.

The primary difference between the two derives from the former being reactive and defensive while the latter includes proactive and offensive measures in terms of the steps that it involves to fight terrorism. As an illustration, anti-terrorism includes legislations that aim at framing laws for prosecuting terrorists. On the other hand, an operation of the kind undertaken in Myanmar to pre-empt a future terrorist strike can be described as counter-terrorism.

53. What steps should the Indian Government take to counter threats arising from the ISIS?

The ISIS has emerged as a major security threat in the West Asian region. As India has huge stakes in the region, the rise of the ISIS and its implications has been of concern for India. So far the ISIS has not been a direct physical challenge for India, but India needs to remain cautious of the potential threat. The ISIS has in the past threatened to launch attacks on India. In fact, Indian nationals have been captured by the ISIS in Iraq and Libya. Further, there have been reports of some Indian youths joining the ISIS.

Security and intelligence cooperation with the countries of the West Asian region could provide important and critical information regarding the activities and the strategies of the ISIS. Information and intelligence exchange can help India formulate effective strategies to deal with the further spread of the ISIS.

India also needs to check radicalisation of some sections of its youth. Monitoring the radicalisation taking place in the cyber space particularly

through the social media is important as it has emerged as the easiest means for communicating radical ideologies and also for finding new recruits.

There are around seven million Indians living in the Gulf region. There is always a possibility of some of them coming in contact with the radical elements at the local level. The government should make coordinated efforts to keep a tab on such elements. Effective de-radicalisation programmes would also help in bringing the radicalised youth back into the social mainstream.

54. Why is it that despite democracy and equality among its citizens, the European countries have failed to restrain its youth from joining the ISIS whereas India has been somewhat successful?

Radicalisation in any society is a complex, and at one level, an idiosyncratic phenomenon. Yet at macro-level certain factors can be fathomed in Europe that may have led to youths joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Initially some European fighters were attracted to the Syrian conflict due to the narrative of freedom and democracy built around the 'Arab Spring'. Muslims in Europe also felt disillusioned by the perceived hypocrisy of the Western governments which on one hand preached freedom, equality and human rights, but on the other hand did not act when atrocities were committed against Muslims in places like Gaza. The effort by many European countries to recognise the state of Palestine is to address some of such concerns of their Muslim population.

The freedom of movement offered by the European Union (EU) makes it easy for citizens of its member states to travel with ease across the continent. For example, EU citizens can travel freely till Cyprus and from there fly or ferry their way to Turkey and cross over to Syria. Prisons in Europe have also been an active radicalisation and recruitment grounds for fighters in Europe, particularly in countries like France and Belgium where Muslims comprise at least 50 per cent of the total prison inmates.

Probably the most important factor is that Europe has failed to manage its diversity. Unlike India and to certain extent the United States, Europeans have struggled to assimilate migrants into their society. European society has witnessed many controversies related to the question of identity of its Muslim population like the 2009 Swiss referendum on minarets, the French banning of veils in public, the Clichy-sous-Bois uprisings in Paris (2005) and the Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy (2005-06). Added to these were heinous crimes like murder of Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch of Moroccan descent, and the Madrid train bombings (2004) and London bombings (2007).

The proponents of multiculturalism believe that the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe has led to social exclusion of Muslims which has in turn made some of them attracted towards extremist ideologies. While those against multiculturalism argue that multiculturalism has led to creation of 'parallel societies' among migrants which undermine European values of equality, freedom and democracy. In 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron and the then French President Nicolas

Sarkozy each had declared that multiculturalism has failed in Europe. Added to this were tough economic conditions and unemployment in some European countries. The economic recession further accentuated the sense of economic and social exclusion among the Muslims in Europe. In such a scenario, the idea of establishing a just and equitable caliphate that the ISIS propagates seems to be an attractive alternative for few misguided youths.

55. What kind of security threats does a radicalised south Punjab in Pakistan poses to the border states of India?

Rising religious radicalism in Pakistan is a cause for major concern to India. For one it is not a phenomenon with purely internal security and stability implications for Pakistan. It is trans-national in its approach and character, and seeks to reach out to the Muslim communities and societies outside Pakistan as well. This could adversely affect sections of the Indian Muslims. It could accentuate sectarian differences among the Indian Muslims, destroy notions of religious pluralism and could make various sects more orthodox, doctrinaire and militant in pursuit of their wish to impose their interpretation of the faith. India's bordering areas, especially those across south Punjab of Pakistan, which cannot be totally insulated given the dictates of geography, would be the first recipients of this virus, adding to India's already considerable headache in managing border areas.

Besides, increasing sectarian tensions and growing radicalisation could weaken the state apparatuses and even cause a breakdown in the law and order situation in Pakistan. This could make many people leave their home and hearths and seek refuge in India. How will India deal with that situation? Would it allow them easy entry into the country's bordering areas in Indian Punjab and Rajasthan with its concomitant security and social implications, or would it stop them in the no-man's land and force them to live in appalling conditions and face international opprobrium for that? It is about time that the government does its homework and be ready with possible solutions.

56. Under the sixth schedule of the Indian Constitution, how administration differs from a district to a regional council? Please explain in the context of the recent clash between Rengma Nagas and Karbis?

The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution that functions under Article 244 (2) offers representative councils to the states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura. The major difference between a district and a regional council is that while the district council covers a particular district, for instance, the Karbi Anglong District which witnessed the clash between the Karbis and the Rengmas in December 2013, the regional councils can be constituted by the governor of the state to cover regions which may compose of one particular ethnic community. An example is the demand by the Kuki National Army for a Kuki Regional Council. The idea of a regional council is that it transcends state borders to form councils based on the inhabited areas of a particular ethnic community.

With regard to the clashes between the Rengmas and the Karbis, it started after nine Karbi youths were found murdered near Chumukedima in Nagaland. The dead included one Karbi student leader. In retaliation, some Karbi militant cadres attacked a Rengma village in Karbi Anglong. It must be noted that the Rengma Nagas have lived in Karbi Anglong for many decades now without violence between the two communities; but attacks on Karbi youths in Nagaland can bring about retaliation on a totally unrelated Naga tribe just because it owes allegiance to the larger Naga ethnic identity.

57. How do social networking sites affect India's security? Should it be regulated?

Social networking sites (or social media) and the challenges that it throws up in the space of cyber-warfare are indeed issues that have drawn the attention of security and law enforcement agencies in recent times. The mass exodus of a number of northeast Indians from many parts of India in the aftermath of the ethnic strife in Assam, triggered by a cyber hate campaign in 2012, was a major turning point. However, from a long term perspective, shooting the messenger may not be the most ideal solution. As technology grows, so will the challenges. In such a scenario, engaging with the medium and optimising its potential for our advantage is the way forward.

Social media analysis generated intelligence or SOCMINT is being developed as a successful model in many countries abroad to isolate hotspots or subjects that go viral and is used as a predictive tool. India too is looking at these models, but is still at the stage of experimentation, trial and error. The Mumbai Police has launched a project called “Social Media Lab”, the first of its kind in the country. The lab would monitor relevant information from Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, as well as all other open sources in the public domain. About 20 specially-trained officers are supposed to work in shifts.

We need many more such pilot projects across the country to develop a truly credible data base and this will require huge investments in terms of both infrastructure and human resource. We also need to work on network availability constraints, language barriers and, most importantly, organisational adaptability in terms of this new medium. There are also pressing questions regarding rights to privacy, misuse of data and loopholes in the legal regime that needs to be navigated.

This is still a work in progress, yet I believe engagement and not regulation is truly the way forward.

58. Is there any solution possible for naxalism as what has happened in Sri Lanka with LTTE?

To begin with, it is essential to identify the basic differences and similarities between the two movements. The first and foremost difference is the LTTE was fighting for a sovereign and separate State. It was an ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the Naxalite/Maoists/LWE in India is fighting for equality, social justice and dignity of marginalized people, tribal rights and good governance. Second, while the LTTE was identified as a terrorist organization, this is not the case with Maoists. They have very limited trans-boundary activities. However,

there are incidents of Maoists targeting civilians. These occasional incidents can not be compared with the LTTE. The Maoist movement has been thriving because of their nexus with political leaders. That was not the case with LTTE. Finally, in terms of lethality, till date, the Maoists use firearms looted from police and other security agencies. On the other hand, LTTE has been one of the dreaded organisations in the world with military might -Army/Navy and Air force and it was fighting and operating like a Rogue state. LTTE was responsible for killing of top political leaders, including former PM of India, Rajiv Gandhi. However, they have some basic similarities like political goal, indoctrination and training programmes, guerilla tactics, mobilization of front organizations, formation of military wings, etc.

Considering these basic differences between these organisations/movements, only military or police action is not a viable solution to the Maoist problem. Military action could suppress the movement. However, that may not bring a permanent solution to the problem. Earlier, on two occasions (1970s and 2002-03 in Andhra Pradesh), police actions were taken against the Maoists. Interestingly, the movement revived with more vigour. There are also strong possibilities of collateral damage if military action is taken against the Maoists. Adopting the LTTE or Sri Lankan model against the Maoists in India is not advisable. Rather, this problem can be tackled through both development and police action (only in high conflict zones) depending on the local situation. There is also a need of strong political will to resolve the menace by taking appropriate action against the nexus between Maoists and some political leaders.

59. What is the solution to the insurgency problem in Manipur? Should AFSPA be repealed?

It is very difficult to suggest a solution to a problem as complex as prevailing in Manipur. The state is captive to a number of unfortunate and complex competing realities which probably makes it the most difficult insurgency to resolve. Manipur has a diverse ethnic population with Meitis controlling the Valley, Nagas on the surrounding hills and Kukis interspersed in between. There are a number of other smaller tribal groups as well. First, there are competing interests between the Nagas and Meitis. The demand for Nagalim or Greater Nagaland includes the Naga inhabited areas of Manipur. In fact, Muivah, the leader of the most powerful Naga insurgent group NSCN (IM), belongs to Manipur. On the other hand, the Meitis want to preserve what has been a single geographic entity for centuries. They have also traditionally controlled both the political and economic power in the region. However, this is getting threatened as a result of different ethnic loyalties and affiliations. Similarly Kukis also seek their rights in the fragmented society. Even amongst the Meitis there are different groups supporting insurgent groups which further their interests. The insurgent groups are also affiliated with political parties which makes it a marriage of convenience between the gun and political power as well as funding. Thus there are vested interests in keeping the insurgency

going. Insurgency is also increasingly seen as a profitable business and insurgencies have in reality morphed into criminal activity.

A solution to the problem lies in the people of the state rejecting this fragmented political setup and collectively deciding to fight for a better life than being given by their leaders. While the blame generally tends to be placed on the Central Government for all ills of the state, in reality the mismanagement and corruption within is eating away the local system. Second, people will have to rise above their petty local politics and think of their state and country to gain from the progress being made. After all industry and tourism can only flourish through peace. Third, given the excellent education levels, more people should join the national mainstream through central jobs, employment in the private sector and bring a fresh perspective to the area.

AFSPA is more a perceptual problem rather than a legal one. If one was to look beyond a few cases of alleged human rights violations, it will be proved that it is not the law which is the reason for excesses. The local police in my experience is more high handed in their dealing than the army. However, given the prevailing perceptions, there is a need to ensure that greater transparency is brought in. There should also be improvement in the law to include the Do's and Dont's sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Some provisions can be relooked to make the law more in touch with prevailing realities.

It should also be borne in mind that the army can only operate if an area is declared disturbed. The law is redundant in the absence of this notification. And it is up to the government to decide whether an area is disturbed or not. Once that is done, the army has no choice but to come to the aid of civil authorities.

60. What could be the solution to the issue of left wing extremism particularly in a state like Chhattisgarh?

Besides weakening the Maoists' lethal capacities through calibrated use of legitimate force and reducing violence, it is also essential to ensure that governance is improved; development schemes and programmes are implemented effectively; and their implementation is monitored rigorously, so that those prone to sympathising with, or supporting, the Maoists would, in the long run, realise the needlessness and futility of doing so.

61. Why has India failed to tackle the problem of Naxalism despite so many policies in place?

The reason lies in the government's inability to properly implement policies on the ground. Some of the key inhibiting factors in this regard are:

- **Terrain:** The areas where the Naxals operate are thickly forested, hilly, remote, and have limited roads and tracks. There are no proper detailed maps available as some of these areas have not been surveyed properly.
- **Location of villages:** The villages are located in remote areas separated by thick jungles. There are no good roads or tracks connecting these villages, with the result that there is lack of communication. Generally the local people move on foot. To approach these people living in such

remote areas from the district/tehsil headquarters takes considerable time. A determined government machinery is the only device to approach the people in the region.

- **Poverty:** Most of the people live in extreme economic conditions as there are hardly any employment avenues available. Therefore, they are easily motivated and lured to join the Naxalite organisations.
- **No Presence of Government Machinery:** There is no presence of state government in these remote areas with the result neither these poor people are aware about the policies of the government and their benefits, nor the government has shown any interest to know about the needs of these tribal people. This has been taken advantage of by the Naxals to endear themselves to the local people.
- **Deployment of Security Forces:** There is no presence of police in some of these remote areas. Even if it is there, they are not effective. The Central Forces i.e. BSF, CRPF and the ITBP are thinly deployed as compared to the requirement. Moreover, the area has been heavily mined by the Naxals and therefore the security forces have not been able to dominate these areas.
- **Lack of Proper Training:** To operate against the Naxals, no proper training was imparted to the security forces at the time of their induction, and therefore, they initially suffered heavy casualties. Besides this, the central armed forces also do not enjoy special powers like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in these states. In addition, the fear of human rights violations has made the security forces adopt a defensive posture.
- **No Development:** The affected areas have been neglected by the state governments. These areas remain economically deprived and backward as the local government never tried to approach or communicate with the common people. Now several efforts are being made, but the development progress has been very slow.
- **Political Attitude:** The most important aspect is the political attitude of the state governments when it comes to implementing the programmes and taking necessary effective measures to deal with the Naxalite problem. While Andhra Pradesh has largely succeeded in controlling the situation, other States have failed to view and acknowledge the prevailing situation in the correct prospective.

The Naxalites are well entrenched and are spreading their wings to larger areas. Their movement has so far been well planned and organised. Pro-Naxal activists have been placed at all strategically important locations to counter government plans. These activists not only agitate against government policies but also effectively resist the implementation of developmental policies. To neutralise the Naxalite movement, constant, determined and well- coordinated efforts are required on all fronts. There is an urgent need to ensure that the policies and programmes of the government reach the people. However, all this would take time may be a minimum of five to six years.

62. What are the threats posed by communication networks to the internal security of India?

Communication networks are a part of our critical information infrastructure which was defined in the IT Act, 2000 as “the computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety.” Communications networks are crucial to the connectivity of other critical infrastructure, viz. civil aviation, shipping, railways, power, nuclear, oil and gas, finance, banking, communication, information technology, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, space, defence, and government networks. Therefore, threats can be both through the networks as well as to the networks.

Securing the networks is complicated by a number of factors. In the first instance, much of the hardware and software that make up the communications ecosystem is sourced externally; as a case in point, Chinese manufacturers such as Huawei and ZTE have supplied about 20 per cent of telecommunications equipment while Indian manufacturers have about 3 per cent of the market. As recent incidents have shown, foreign governments are not above taking advantage of the market penetration and dominance of their companies to infiltrate and compromise telecommunications networks. This is a potent combination of expertise and resources.

The task of securing the networks is also complicated by the fact that much of the infrastructure is in the hands of private companies who see measures such as security auditing and other regulations and frameworks as adding to their costs. The government in the National Telecom Policy of 2012 has set a target for domestic production of telecom equipment to meet the Indian telecom sector’s demand to the extent of 60 to 80 per cent by 2020. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology has also repeatedly urged telecom companies to take note of vulnerabilities in their equipment and told them they would be held responsible and subject to penalties if the vulnerabilities are not addressed. A number of other measures, such as making local certification mandatory, have been announced, but there is a need for a more integrated and strategic approach to securing the networks since they are so crucial to the economic, social and political wellbeing of the country.

63. What constitutes the "civic action programme" undertaken by the union government in areas affected by LW (left wing extremism)? How does it work?

Before answering the question, it is important to understand the circumstances and conditions which characterise any insurgency. Most areas affected by such movements are severely impacted in terms of the ability to render even basic civic amenities to the common people. These include provision of food supplies, medical support, transportation in case of emergencies, schooling and basic recreational facilities. Given the limited ability to govern such areas effectively, the insurgents fill the void and run a parallel government.

It is under these circumstances that security and administrative agencies reach out to the people in the far flung areas to provide them these very basic amenities to enable sustenance and support. These civic action programmes are funded by the government and are undertaken based on the local requirements and conditions. This implies that these cannot be generic in nature and must address the local needs of an area. Even as basic needs are addressed, these programmes also help re-establish the writ of the state and convince the people of the need to support the government against the insurgents.

Based on these very guidelines, civic action programmes have been undertaken in LWE affected areas. Initiatives differ from overall capacity building to include roads, medical facilities and schools to specific needs of local areas depending on the needs of the people. This could include a water supply scheme for a particular area and a vocational institute in another.

64. What is the role of Indian Navy in identifying, assessing and controlling non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean?

The Indian Navy has a prominent role to play in addressing non-traditional threats. This task is done in tandem with other agencies like the Indian Coast Guard, maritime wing of police, governments of states with coastlines and intelligence agencies to name a few. Non-traditional threats can be broadly divided into two areas – those like maritime terrorism and piracy that require to be addressed by kinetic means, and those like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue (SAR), pollution control, etc., that require to be addressed by benign means. Although pollution control is under the ambit of the Coast Guard, the Indian Navy provides the required assistance that is sought.

The Indian Navy has mechanisms in place to assess, identify and address these issues. These include identifying strong points and strengthening weak points so as to better manage situations both developing and developed. This involves deploying assets that would aid in combating the threats that arise from such non-traditional threats.

Issues like terrorism and piracy that require application of force are addressed by patrolling areas identified as the most vulnerable with suitable assets in tandem with other agencies. For example, along the coast the Indian Navy has identified suitable places and established detachments that work with other agencies to assess the situation and patrol designated areas. Ships and aircraft also patrol the maritime zones of friendly nations on their request to combat terrorism and piracy. In addition, ships with embarked armed helicopters have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 to combat piracy as part of the ongoing international effort.

The benign role is assumed and assets deployed so that assistance is rendered both internally and externally in a fast and humane manner. The deployment of assets during the 2004 tsunami is a classic case in which relief was provided within 24 hours to the states on the east coast of India and Sri Lanka and

within 72 hours to affected nations like Indonesia and Maldives. Unlike the threats emanating from terrorism and piracy that could be assessed based on intelligence inputs, disasters do not come with any warning and therefore the Indian Navy is always ready at short notice to deploy its assets as and when ordered.

65. To what extent is Illegal Immigration a Security Issue?

To the extent that illegal immigration threatens to overshadow the population of a particular state. For instance, illegal immigration has threatened to change the demography of states in India and several other states in the world, so much so that there is a pervasive fear in these societies that the states' ethnic composition will change in favour of the migrant. Additionally, illegal immigration becomes a security issue when their names are added to a country's voter list. Linkages found between illegal immigrants and underground gangs, terrorist organisations and insurgent groups are also of serious security concern. Worse of all, since immigration is illegal, it is difficult to trace their networks and secret locations in order to bring the guilty to justice.

66. Why India is a victim of frequent terror attacks? Is it due to intelligence failure or lack of adequate capabilities with law enforcement agencies?

In order to better understand the trajectory of terror strikes against India, it is important to co-relate this with the causes for the same as also the contributory factors, which become catalysts in the process.

India is not a victim of terror attacks because of intelligence failure and poor law enforcement capabilities. These are limitations which preclude successful counter terrorism. In that sense, these become contributory factors or one could also term them as facilitators.

The causes for terrorism are diverse in relation to India. International studies usually classify terrorism in terms of different generations. One way to classify these could be anarchist terrorism, terrorism fuelled by independence struggles, followed by communist revolutionary movements and finally jihadi terrorism. This progression spreads across a century through its varying stages. However, India's case is different. Here, historical factors, political opportunism, socio-economic factors and insensitivity to religious feelings have often led to estrangement of groups. Their perception of having been wronged by the state has been the cause of armed struggles. This can be seen in the case of Nagalim movement, Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Naxal affected region. These have in some cases been exploited by foreign powers to further their strategic interests.

However, evidently, in each case, as the query alludes, weak intelligence and enforcement has allowed the separatist movements or insurgencies to fester and aggravate. This has also been evident in the case of terrorism in the hinterland by the Indian Mujahideen.

67. What are the short-term and long-term solutions to the Kashmir insurgency?

Kashmir is a difficult issue woven into the nationalist consciousness in both India and Pakistan over the decades. India considers it its secular crown; Pakistan regards it as its jugular vein and its terra irredenta (un-redeemed territory that rightfully belonged to it). Hence, to expect an early solution is unrealistic. But the two countries must take measures to improve bilateral relationship progressively and create conducive atmosphere for such thorny issues to be discussed in a dispassionate manner.

Short term measures could be keeping the official and unofficial lines of communications alive even in the face of gravest provocations from the spoilers, and keep discussing the issues isolated under the composite dialogue. The progress made through dialogue begs for better dissemination through media. More regular dialogue between security establishments is another measure which may moderate Pakistani approach towards India. Moreover, peace along the LoC and international border should be ensured by both the countries at all costs.

Long term measures could be setting up a high level joint body from both the countries at a semi-official level and encourage it to thrash out issues related to Kashmir, and identify shortcomings in various approaches adopted by both the countries so far. There is also a significant body of literature on how to resolve the Kashmir issue based on measures adopted by countries at the international level while dealing with similar cases. Issues like porous borders, shared control, joint sovereignty, neutral terrain, etc., have been discussed in the available literature. Such efforts can tap into the existing literature and suggest alternatives to both the governments.

68. What efforts India is making towards cyber security? Wouldn't indigenisation of telecom equipments help?

The government has been contemplating various steps to strengthen cyber security within the country. These include the delegation of responsibilities of securing cyber space to various agencies that have the capability to undertake these responsibilities and dialoguing with various stake holders including the private sector which owns much of the cyber infrastructure. That said, administrative and technical measures form only part of the solution. Many of the current threats require a response in the form of user education; the general population has to be apprised of basic cyber security measures, and law enforcement and judicial professionals also have to be updated to deal with cyber issues. Much of this is happening, but at different speeds, since policy making and responsibilities are spread across different ministries. Moreover, areas such as law and order are the domain of the states. A nodal agency on cyber security has been suggested to have a holistic approach to cyber security as against the fragmented approach that currently prevails.

As far as the indigenisation of telecom equipment is concerned, many countries are considering similar steps. This is the case because telecom and data networks are the arteries that connect the various critical infrastructures.

However, the dispersion of technical know-how and manufacturing capabilities across the world, and cost considerations, and the lack of an eco-system in telecom component manufacturing within the country, just to name a few factors, are the challenges to operationalising such a policy. Many of these issues are addressed in the IDSA Task Force Report on Cyber security.

69. What is India's perception regarding maritime security in the Indian Ocean?

India's perception of maritime security stems from the "Freedom to use the Seas". This is an important aspect that is the focus of any maritime nation's outlook. There are some issues that require to be viewed and assessed when correlating maritime security to the Indian Ocean Region as they form the basis of India's perception.

Therefore the perception of India vis-à-vis the IOR is based on ensuring a safe and stable maritime environment that will firstly ensure security of India's national integrity and sovereignty; secondly, protection of our national interests; thirdly, ensure safe passage of maritime trade both national and international; fourthly, ensure cooperation amongst nations to combat and reduce the impact of non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy and natural disasters.

These aspects require certain mechanisms that exist in the form of engagement with India's maritime neighbours. India also engages the extra regional maritime players who have a stake in the IOR. This has led to bilateral and multilateral understandings at the diplomatic, economic and military levels that cover the issues highlighted above.

70. What is meant by hawala transaction? How does it work, especially in reference to terrorist organisations?

The hawala system has been functioning for centuries. It has been mentioned by the Egyptian scholar Sarakshi referring to its roots in the 11th century. The system even then merely involved "transfer of debt" and not physical movement of money. Since it is based on trust, traditionally it functioned between close associates and relatives. The promissory notes kept for record keeping are called hundi.

The system is popular even today because in most cases it is cheaper, faster, and more convenient, to transfer funds. It has a larger network and is even considered more reliable by some. However, it needs to be noted that despite its large scale use, the system is illegal in India. Given the fact that transfer of money in the hawala leaves no traces, it is misused by criminals and terrorists to transfer money. However, in most cases, the usage is limited to immigrants working in foreign countries who want to remit their earnings to their villages in the country.

A hawala transaction involves giving a certain amount to a hawaladar in place A. He calls his counterpart in place B and asks him to deliver the said amount to the recipient. A small charge is taken for facilitating this transaction. This transaction does not involve physical transfer of money. At the end of the

month, books at both ends are tallied and adjusted to cater to the mutual business.

Terrorists use this for transferring money from various destinations and not necessarily obvious locations like Pakistan. In fact, it is more difficult to trace money being sent from Europe and this has been exploited for some time.

The system of book keeping is also unique and is often only understood by the hawaladars.

71. What is the centre's stand on recent Kashmir violence? What can the centre and state do together for a permanent solution?

The Centre's stand on the recent violence in Kashmir is that it was a result of young people being misled by Pakistan-based anti-national forces linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba. Instigated by these forces, large mobs indulged in stone pelting and defied curfew orders. This provoked a reaction from the CRPF and Jammu and Kashmir Police, which resulted in the unfortunate loss of lives. The Centre therefore instructed these forces to adopt maximum restraint in dealing with rioting crowds and simultaneously maintain law and order.

The Unified Command, which brings together the Centre and the State security apparatuses, must ensure that the channels of instigation resulting in such serious law and order problems are blocked. Moreover, since the intellectuals and the media of the Valley have explained the summer unrest as a spontaneous uprising against mis-governance, it is important for the Centre and the State Government to work towards an all-party consensus on improving governance and identifying immediate developmental priorities for the State. The consensus thus achieved must be made known to the people of the state and sincerely followed through.

A similar consensus on engaging with the separatist leadership and the Government of Pakistan and its follow-up may lead to a permanent solution to the problem in Kashmir.

72. What is the deterrence against 'Terrorism'?

S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: A wide range of drivers influence individuals/groups to employ violent methods against state authority – socio-economic, ethnic, ideological, religious, among others. As such, there cannot be a single magic bullet to deter terrorist actions. Nimble and vigilant security structures are essential as are measures to address the causes of their real or perceived grievances.

73. What is the difference between a military station and a cantonment?

Both the cantonments and the military stations are primarily meant for exclusive use of the military personnel in performance of their bona fide duties. The land and facilities built on the land belongs to the government, either because the land was purchased by the government at some point of time or taken on perpetual lease. The cantonments are governed by the Cantonment Act as amended from time to time.

Cantonments are notified places governed by an Act of Parliament; the Cantonment Act, 2006 being the latest. Military stations on the other hand are created by an executive order by the government and have no statutory backing. These are governed under Defence Services Regulations and not as per the Act of Parliament. The cantonments have its land categorised depending upon their usage as A1, A2, B1, B2, B3, B4 and C categories; A1 being for exclusive use of troops. In military stations, the land is analogous to A1; exclusively for military purposes with no other function envisaged.

The cantonments have a mixed civilian and military population. As laid down in Schedule VII, entry 3, of the Constitution of India, the cantonments have a municipal body for local administration. Besides having the barracks, offices, garages and training areas, etc., which are used only by the troops, the cantonments also have other facilities like schools, hospitals and markets for the troops and their families as also the civil population living within the area. The land is managed by Defence Estates Department of the Government of India. The cantonments, numbering a little over 60, are old establishments. The last of the cantonments was established in 1962.

The civic functions of the cantonments are looked after by Cantonment Boards, with a defence services officer as the President of the Cantonment Board (normally also designated as Station Commander) and an officer from Defence Estates Department as the Chief Executive Officer. The Board has other elected and appointed members as well. The members are elected by the voters who have been living within the cantonment and are registered voters thereof. The Cantonment Board provides services like schools, hospitals, roads, sanitation, arboriculture and permission for renovation of the buildings. In short, it functions as a municipality.

The military stations are also built on the land acquired or leased by the government, but for the sole purpose of use by the military. The Cantonment Act does not apply on military stations and there are no civilian inhabitations therein though some civilian employees may be working there. The military stations came up in more recent times with the expansion of forces, i.e., when new units had to be raised. The administration of a military station is looked after by the military authorities themselves.

74. What is the difference between urban terrorism and hinterland terrorism?

The terms “urban” and “hinterland” have both geographical and socio-economic connotations. Urban refers to the towns and cities in any country. Urbanisation is often related to better development, higher income, and politically sensitive areas, which makes them more visible parts of a country. It is also for this reason that the urban centres tend to come up higher in the list of terrorist targets, given the sensational impact terror strikes in such areas could potentially make. In the Indian context, the wave of terrorism witnessed in

Punjab had an urban flavour to it, when it was unleashed in towns like Jalandhar, Amritsar, etc.

On the other hand, hinterland refers to areas in the interiors, which are usually away from the coast. In terms of development, these areas are often at a disadvantage when compared to more developed regions elsewhere. The reference to the coast is linked to the spread of development around ports in the past, given the economic activity generated from there. While this may not be completely relevant in the present context, the term continues to be used for areas with limited development. In the Indian context, insurgency in the Naxal-hit areas can be associated with this description.

However, these classifications are not strict and are at times overlapping. Terror strikes by groups in regions other than the border areas are often described as terrorism in the hinterland. In some cases, this can also happen in urban areas as evident from bomb blasts in cities such as Varanasi, New Delhi and Ahmedabad. In that sense, urban terrorism becomes a subset of hinterland terrorism. Therefore, the usage of these terms tend to be more contextual in nature, rather than guided by any strict definitional parameter.

75. What strategies could be employed to contain the arms nexus prevalent between the separatist-extremist groups & some of the neighbouring countries?

It is a well established fact that the transfer and smuggling of arms does take place across India's borders. This is especially an acute problem in the case of Northeast India. The challenge is accentuated because of porous borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar. It is also difficult to stop such activities due to limited control over the border areas of these countries. In some cases, there is also collusion between state and non-state agencies to smuggle arms. These arms come from weapon markets in Cambodia, Laos and are often sourced from China.

There are two major factors which lead to the smuggling of arms. First, it takes place as a result of terrorist groups and smugglers active in the border areas exploiting it as an illegal trade to make money. Given the high profit nature of this kind of trade, the incentive to undertake gun running remains high. This is furthered because of the need for such military hardware by terrorist groups like CPI (Maoist) in the hinterland, which may not have access to sophisticated weapons, with the exception of those captured from security forces. Second, weapons smuggling is done as part of a state sponsored strategy to destabilise India.

In both these cases, the measures required to be put in place to prevent this activity are similar. First, cooperation with countries which are not directly involved in gun running should be strengthened by way of intelligence sharing and mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties. Second, fencing along borders should be completed urgently to limit free movement. Third, there is a need to enhance the employment of electronic means for surveillance along the borders. Fourth, both the strength and capacity of border guarding forces should be enhanced to ensure that they are better equipped to stop gun

running. Fifth, intelligence along border areas needs to improve. This can best be accomplished by coordination between intelligence, border guarding forces, local police and the people in the area. Sixth, stringent laws should be employed to ensure conviction through newly amended acts like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 2012, which can book offenders under counter terrorism offences. Last, since the nature of this crime is international in its scope, there is a need to highlight it and build pressure upon countries in the diplomatic fora to curb the existing trend.

76. What is the approach of armed forces and their response to urban terrorist strikes?

The question seeks clarity on the approach of “armed forces” to urban terrorist strikes. It may be presumptuous on my part to assume that the word “armed forces” has been used by mistake and the question actually relates to police and NSG. However, I will attempt to answer both aspects.

The armed forces in our context comprise of the army, navy and air force. These forces are never the first responders in case of a terrorist strike in urban areas. The first response will almost always come from the police, anti-terrorism cells and, thereafter, specialised forces like the NSG. However, as was the case during 26/11, support of the armed forces can be requisitioned. Therefore, their role is likely to remain in support at best in most areas in the country. The only exception can be disturbed areas where the armed forces are deployed. A similar attack in Srinagar could witness a greater role of the army in support of the police and central armed police organisations (CAPOs) like the CRPF.

This brings me to the approach of the police and CAPOs. Their approach can be better understood by first understanding the aim of terrorists when an urban strike is undertaken. They want to spread the fear of unknown, discredit the ruling elite, achieve the greatest possible publicity through the sheer audaciousness of the target and nature of attack. Large scale civilian casualties are one of the means of spreading this very message as seen during 26/11 and 9/11 attacks. Therefore, the approach of the security forces is to minimise collateral damage, civilian casualties and loss of property. This limits the sensationalisation of the assault, thereby defeating terrorist aims. Security forces also aim to neutralise the terrorists in a systematic and clinical manner, displaying the efficiency and capability of the state vis-à-vis the terrorists. Finally, and probably most importantly, it is the ability to bring back life to business as usual, which is the best way of defeating the terrorist aim of spreading fear in the society at large.

77. Are there any Private military and security companies in India? If no, why?

There are companies in India offering military relevant services and others providing security. The latter are more visible and much in demand after 26/11. The former are fewer as they are catering to a narrower more specialised field. Nevertheless, they have figured in areas such as demining in Sri Lanka. Their profile is lower than similar companies in the US for instance, since India has the necessary military and paramilitary wherewithal in the state sector to provide the military related services, be it in terms of planning, management,

logistics, consultation, maintenance, security etc. The profile of companies such as Xe Services etc is higher due to the outsourcing of many military relevant services to them by the US in the GWOT. This was done to reduce the visibility as a target of the US military and to reduce pressures and expenses on the US military. These companies hire an international staff. Indians also work for these companies. These companies undertake tasks such as logistics, maintaining bases, provisioning dining facilities and even protection of assets. They have come under controversy, especially where they have had to open fire. They blur the distinction between combatant and non-combatant and occupy questionable status in domestic law of the host country. Some dubious companies have been known to undertake politically sensitive missions earlier in the African continent. The case in India is considerably different and in prosecution of wars or internal security India would not depend on such companies.

78. Considering the fact that arms of foreign origin were used in recent Naxal attacks, what is the current state of arms trafficking in India? What specific measures are being taken in this regard?

The terrorist and insurgent groups operating in India get arms and ammunition essentially from two sources. In the first instance, weapons are moved from across the border. These can be pushed in as a result of state sponsorship, as seen in the case of Pakistan in J&K. It could also be smuggled along with drugs and fake currency as composite loads, as is common along the borders of Punjab and Rajasthan. Finally, it is trafficked from countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal for profit. This is a major source of weapons for insurgent groups in the Northeast. Most of these weapons are of Chinese origin and reach the clandestine Southeast Asian arms markets. These are then bid for and bought with the aim of trafficking. The Naxals can potentially procure these weapons from groups in the Northeast, given their comfortable financial position.

The second source is indigenous. It needs to be reinforced that most weapons used by the Naxals are of Indian origin and are snatched and looted from the police and central police organisations. Given the large scale of looting that has been in progress, there has not been a very critical need for weapons from outside for the Naxals.

One of the steps initiated for reducing arms trafficking is the establishment of a border fence, which has brought down incidents of smuggling. The deployment of border forces has also been augmented and made more dynamic to improve anti-smuggling measures. The positioning of electronic surveillance devices has helped in keeping an eye on the borders. Improvement in scanning of people and vehicles has also taken place, which has helped reduce trafficking. However, having said this, there is a lot more that needs to be done to stop trafficking of arms, especially in areas which have difficult ground conditions or where borders are porous, as in the case of Nepal.

79. Why is it that China doesn't have a blue-water navy while India has one? Though China aims to build one by 2040 but what took China so long to realise the need for it?

Both China and India covet strong maritime power status but describe themselves differently – the former calling itself an aspiring ‘blue-ocean power’; the latter choosing to highlight its navy's potent ‘blue-water’ capabilities. The difference in sea-going status is more about ‘nautical semantics’ than ‘strategic substance’, but it does highlight the importance of political ideology in the way maritime notions are conceived.

In theory, a blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating in the deep waters of the open oceans. The term is more colloquial than doctrinal and most sea-going states differ on its specifics. Yet, all sides broadly agree that a ‘blue-water’ navy is capable of prolonged and sustained operations across the open oceans, and is adept at power projection in the distant seas.

Even though smaller and less capable than its Chinese counterpart, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N), the Indian Navy (IN) plays up its ‘blue-water’ status because of its keenness to be recognised as a regionally dominant force. To make itself relevant to the security and the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, the IN realises it must dispel any impression that its mandate is limited to brown-water (coastal security) and green-water (littoral defence) functions. The PLA-N, on the other hand, despite its well-developed and growing capabilities, is reluctant to be seen as a ‘blue-water’ navy with aspirations for extra-regional dominance. Heightened political sensitivities about China’s perceived power-projection in the Asia-Pacific, places an imperative on the PLA-N to define its mandate in conservative terms, lest its intentions are interpreted as being hegemonic.

According to a recent Kanwa report, China has plans to build 10 aircraft carriers that would give it blue-water status by 2030. The report brings out an interesting facet of the Chinese strategic thinking. In China’s telling, there is one global blue-water force – the US Navy (USN). It is the only true transoceanic maritime power, capable of expeditionary operations and power projection in the vast maritime commons. The PLA-N’s prime ambition is to be able to challenge the US naval power in the open oceans in future. The Indian Navy, on the other hand, has extremely cordial relations with the USN and sees the latter as a partner, and not a benchmark for future development. If anything, the recognition of the IN’s ‘blue-water’ status by the USN and other regional navies validates the former’s role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

80. Can India alone deal with the non-traditional threats coming from the Indian Ocean?

Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean and has an area of 73,556,000 sq km including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. This vast area is home to many littorals and Island nations. Therefore, any activity in this ocean is subject to a plethora of issues stretching from strategic interests both intra and extra regional, national jurisdiction of maritime zones, varying national laws dictated by types of governance and economics, to capabilities and capacities of nations

to address both traditional and non traditional threats that affect the existing security scenario.

Non-traditional threats, such as piracy, terrorism, drugs and arms trade, and natural disasters, are trans- border issues that affect most of the nations that are either located in the region, or use the Indian Ocean as transit for their maritime trade, or have a presence for their strategic interests.

The vast expanse of the area, number of nations involved, the magnitude of laws and the capacities and capabilities of nations make it a difficult task for one nation to deal with non-traditional threats. This is the reason why nations engage each other via bilateral and multilateral dialogues and understandings. India, on its part, engages nations in the Indian Ocean so that a comprehensive framework, optimally utilising national assets to counter the non-traditional threats, can be established.

81. What steps/policies need to be put in place for a better civil-military synergy in a low intensity conflict environment in India?

The civil-military relations are a challenge in most countries even during routine peace time activity. Given the peculiarities of low intensity conflict operations, it tends to get more tenuous. This happens due to certain distinct conditions under which such operations are conducted. In the Indian context, in most cases central armed forces are deployed for bringing violence under control. This has been witnessed in almost all the states of Northeast India where insurgency has threatened the region and in J&K. It is the failure of state governments, which results in the calling out of central forces, both Central Armed Police Organisations (CAPOs) and the army. However, despite this reality, local resentment, both real and artificially galvanized by insurgent groups, builds against this deployment over a period of time. This has been witnessed in J&K, Manipur, Assam and Nagaland amongst other regions. Given the need to appeal to this popular sentiment for political reasons, state level political parties oppose deployment of forces, question their method of operations and exploit rare cases of violations and mistakes.

Another dimension is the command and control aspect of this force. The fundamental requirement for success in any insurgency is to ensure cohesiveness and seamless coordination of security forces. However, at times this is adversely impacted by competing interests of local police, which operates under the state and the central forces deployed in the region. Orders and decisions, which should ideally be taken as a cohesive group, tend to get influenced by local politics. This has been witnessed in relation to the AFSPA debate in J&K, where the local political views and the recommendations of the army are contradictory leading to strained relations.

These differences can only be resolved through a united political will to fight the common adversary that the country faces, which is the insurgents and external inimical powers. Also, a strong and unbiased unified command structure is needed where decisions are based on objective assessment of threats rather than political expediency. Lastly, police and central forces need to rise above

service and force specific interests. This can be achieved through mature and high calibre leadership in areas affected by low intensity conflicts

82. What are conventional and non conventional threats to maritime security and how maritime security can be precisely defined?

Maritime Security is a subset of national security and therefore nations would view it in direct correlation to their national interests. Therefore, the definition could vary from nation to nation and a generic definition would be more appropriate. Maritime Security is a term that encompasses the aspects and issues arising from the oceans surrounding the nation that impinge on its national interests.

The division of conventional and non-conventional threats again varies from nation to nation. Conventional threats traditionally would be the military threats faced by a nation from another nation that impinge on its sovereign integrity, trade, maritime area under its jurisdiction as per international law in which the various laws, both international and national, apply.

Non-conventional threats would cover a host of other aspects. The major ones being terrorism, piracy, natural disasters, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal immigrants, changes in the climate and ecology to name a few.

83. How has India's counter-terrorism strategy changed post 26/11?

India has been fighting terrorism in all its manifestations for a number of decades. However, over a period of time, the focus has shifted from home grown insurgents to terrorists sponsored, abetted and financed by Pakistan. This shift in the source of terror is also reflected in the country's strategy. From a stage wherein, insurgent leaders joined the mainstream and became Chief Ministers of States like Mizoram, to the LeT, the nature of threat has completely transformed. While this reality was evident before 26/11, however, it became all the more apparent thereafter, and forced policy makers to take more resolute and stringent steps to counter the threat.

Amongst the specific steps, at the legal level, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) was strengthened, reinforced and equipped to handle terrorism in all its manifestations. The limitation of inadequate security forces were addressed by opening NSG hubs at places other than Manesar in order to ensure faster and more effective reaction to crisis situations. Intelligence gathering, sharing and dissemination became a priority and the NATGRID was established, which is in the process of formalization. A Multi Agency Centre was established which is likely to evolve into the NCTC, thereby honing the inter-agency capability to fight terrorism. At the diplomatic level as well, India has pushed for international recognition of terrorism in all its forms and a number of UN Resolutions have been passed to provide a cohesive effort against terrorism. Yet another initiative has been the targeting of terrorism finance, which has received an impetus with both the UAPA and Anti Money Laundering legislations becoming more effective. A long-term step has also been to address the alienation of certain sections of the population through better integration,

concessions, and targeting of hardline propaganda machinery, both from within and outside the country.

84. Is not the crisis over "AFSPA" a result of some major strategic errors of the Government of India?

India's approach in dealing with the separatists has been more than democratic and unusually humane, giving them considerable political space despite their abrasive anti-national postures. India has allowed them to meet external adversaries in its own capital city and travel to foreign countries for garnering political and financial support.

India has always favoured a political solution to Kashmir problem. In 1947, India gave up the military option by appealing to the United Nations for a negotiated political solution. Again, in 1965 India chose the political way out to find a solution, even restoring the strategic Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan to show political flexibility. Yet again in 1971, India allowed its long term political considerations over-ride short term perspectives. It did not stop here and agreed to the ambiguous 1972 Simla Agreement. India has taken measures like visit to Pakistan by Prime Minister, de-escalation of Kargil conflict by non-retaliatory actions at the LoC, back-channel dialogue with Pakistan, allowing travel and trade across the LoC in J&K, running Lahore Bus Service etc. While the government feels that it is dealing with its own people, the separatists do not think they are Indians.

Any revision or removal of AFSPA from selected valley districts – rightly resisted by the armed forces – is a red herring as the current protests have been provoked by the police and not military action. Any concession under duress will become the baseline for further demands by the separatists in the next phase of their agitation.

India has been categorically rejecting the right to self-determination by the separatists and wants a solution within the framework of its constitution, which implies that the separatists must accept that J&K belongs to India and no dispute over its status exists. It is high time that the softness in handling separatists is examined fully in the interest of the nation's sovereignty and any attempt to challenge Indian Statehood by the separatists be dealt with firmly, leaving no room for violence in the society.

85. Please elaborate on tactical missile vs. strategic missile.

At first glance, the distinction is a factor of distance over which they are used, the context in which they are employed and the warheads they can carry. Generally, short-range missiles are termed tactical while long-range missiles are termed strategic. Battlefield missiles (like the Scud-type) are tactical while long-range missiles targeting bigger targets like cities are termed strategic. The former typically use conventional warheads while the latter typically use nuclear warheads.

Exceptions include short-range 'tactical' nuclear weapons and long-range missiles mated with conventional warheads. An example of the latter is the Pentagon's Prompt Global Strike (PGS), which generated concerns from Russia

as regards the ambiguity enveloping such use (distinguishing a nuclear-armed long-range missile from conventionally-armed one). The issue also generated concerns vis-à-vis bilateral arms control agreements like New START. While the US continues to insist the treaty does not prevent it from developing and deploying such capabilities, Russia does not quite hold this view. The US is concurrently developing alternative systems like Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (FHTV) to perform long-range conventional strike missions (time-dependent anti-terrorist operations for instance).

86. Is employment of UAVs / UCAVs instead of manned aircrafts a better option for combating insurgency and terrorism in India?

India follows the principle of minimum force during combating insurgency and terrorism. With this as the backdrop, the employment of aircraft for offensive roles is ruled out given the possibility of collateral damage and escalation involved. It is only helicopters which are used for logistics (supply) and casualty evacuation in our context, and at times for movement of forces to ensure better mobility and flexibility. Therefore, while UAVs and UCAVs may not have a direct replacement role vis-à-vis aircraft, however, they can certainly be used for surveillance and tracking purposes. This would help conduct clinical and hard intelligence based operations which are in the spirit of India's counter-insurgency doctrine. Their employment for precision and guided strikes is not relevant in the Indian context, as it is against the very ethos of minimum force - a fundamental principle followed scrupulously.

87. How can the armed forces effectively protect national security interests with commitment towards an impeccable human rights agenda?

The military is committed to following national policy on human rights as defined in the Human Rights Act of 1993. It is a mistaken impression that national security would tend to suffer in any form were the military to affirm its human rights commitments. On the contrary, a military that is in sync with societal culture and national policy is one that is more combat effective. Human rights would not so much come into play in conventional war as would humanitarian law. The military is cognisant of the humanitarian laws, in particular the 1960 Geneva Conventions Act. In so far as subconventional conflict, especially counter insurgency is concerned, adherence to human rights is a force multiplier. It reduces alienation and discredits insurgent propaganda. This enables easier access to intelligence from the people and thereby intelligence based operations. This cycle leads to a lesser imposition on human rights. Therefore, national security is served by adherence to human rights commitments.

88. In the Indian context, how can human intelligence and technical intelligence be used in combating terrorism?

Human Intelligence or HUMINT, refers to intelligence gathering by means of interpersonal contact with its emphasis on human beings, as opposed to the more technical intelligence gathering involving SIGINT (Signals intelligence), IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and MASINT (Measurement and signature

intelligence). Together these can play a very important role in combating terrorism.

Terrorist activities in India are carried out by modules that consist of local youth, often supported by external actors. HUMINT is crucial in gathering information about these modules. However, since these are largely loosely structured organizations, there is scope for the police to sneak into their set up. Through increased use of police, particularly beat-level policing, police can gather enough information about these outfits. Thus, unlike NIA or other agencies that take actions once an incident has occurred, HUMINT can prevent the very happening of the same. The beat constable, who knows every household in his limited area of responsibility, should be the pivot of the entire police system, which is at the forefront of fighting the menace of terrorism. So we must strengthen beat policing to overcome our serious inability in the sphere of intelligence gathering and then take suitable measures to augment intelligence sharing. Since our police are still not technically qualified, HUMINT becomes more crucial to them as compared to the military, which is technically more qualified and can take adequate care of threats emanating from across the borders using TECHINT for its purposes. Also, technical intelligence will prove more useful for the military and paramilitary than the police. So through a combined use of these two intelligence mechanisms, we can be more effective in countering terrorism.

89. How can India fulfill its vision of becoming the net security provider in the Indian Ocean?

India's ambition to be a "net security provider" is a reflection of its keen desire for strategic prominence in the Indian Ocean. By encouraging regional stability through capacity-building, increased maritime diplomacy and provision of military assistance, New Delhi aims to burnish its credentials as a strong and dependable Indian Ocean partner.

New Delhi often projects its maritime rise in benign terms, expressing its desire to shoulder more responsibilities by providing "public goods". Its preferred approach has been to assist small island states in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with capacity building programmes, greater domain awareness capability, as well as by physically undertaking maritime surveillance activities in their regional waters. While recent years have seen India expand its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, the Indian navy has consistently highlighted its cooperative security approach, aimed at tackling the entire spectrum of security threats within the broader region – including challenges such as piracy off the coast of Somalia.

In order to fulfil its vision of being an effective net security provider, however, India needs to look beyond the challenges of securing Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and preventing transnational crime to play a greater developmental role in the region. The fact remains that the bulk of the Indian navy's operational energies are spent in securing the Indian Ocean sea-lanes and in ensuring a stable maritime neighbourhood. By providing greater

economic and developmental assistance, India will be able to lend greater substance to its maritime initiatives.

For the success of its Indian Ocean strategy, India also needs to develop its strategic relationships, providing not just hard-security aid to small island states, but also economic and developmental assistance. New Delhi's greatest challenge in the Indian Ocean is the dilution of its strategic leverage, brought on by the gradual fraying of its bilateral relationships. Providing strategic depth to its regional security ties will lead to an all-round recognition of India's pivotal role in strategic security in the IOR.

90. There are media reports suggesting that India uses antiquated weapons. Is that true or India has the required advanced weapon system? Also, whether 49 per cent FDI in defence is enough to ensure India's security preparedness?

There is no force in the world which can claim to have its entire range of weapon systems at the cutting edge level. Normally, depending upon the threat perception of a country and the capability it chooses to develop, a policy is formulated which lays down the mix of weapon systems that is required to be maintained. This is usually a combination of weapon systems which are state-of-art, grade two, and finally those which are in a state of obsolescence, i.e., ones which would soon need replacement, failing which they would become obsolete.

The Indian armed forces are no exception to this rule and aim to maintain this proportion. However, there is a degree of misbalance in the ideal percentages which has crept in during the last few years as a result of the scale of inductions needed to modernise the forces, limited indigenisation capability for weapon systems, and slow procedures for procurement. The impact of these limitations has been particularly acute in certain critical areas of defence preparedness, leading to shortcomings.

However, there has been a renewed focus on vital areas of defence preparedness. This has been accompanied by an attempt to manufacture weapon systems in India under the "make in India" initiative of the government. On the other hand, in order to make up for the critical deficiencies, direct government-to-government procurement has been initiated, which will speed up the process. There is also an attempt to empower the private sector in India, which may not have the experience to manufacture high end weapon systems. However, they have the required financial backup and technical skills to develop the necessary capabilities.

The decision to allow 49 per cent FDI must also be seen in this perspective. On one hand, it will bring foreign capital and, on the other, the necessary technological inputs. In case of certain special projects, the government is also willing to increase the percentage of FDI on a case-to-case basis. While the jury is still out on the success of the initiative, however, it is clearly a step in the right direction.