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CHAPTER

Challenges in the Indian Foreign Policy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Section 1: Strategic consequences of India's economic performance on the Foreign Policy of India
- Section 2: Issues related to defence diplomacy of India and national security of India
- Section 3: Oceanic rivalry in the Indo–Pacific and the Samudra Manthan
- Section 4: India's quest for a global power status

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we present an analytical survey of the multiple challenges that the Indian Foreign Policy is likely to face in the times ahead. The deliberate reason to put this chapter towards the end of the book is to provide the readers with valuable insights on multiple themes argued in the various chapters of the book so far. This chapter is divided into multiple sections for ease of understanding.

Section 1: Strategic consequences of India's economic performance on the foreign policy of India

Section 2: Issues related to defence diplomacy and national security of India

Section 3: Oceanic rivalry in the Indo–Pacific

Section 4: India's quest for a global power status

SECTION 1: STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF INDIA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA

Throughout the book, in the different chapters dealing with India's relationship with other countries, we have argued about the dimension of commercial diplomacy. Since the coming of Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister of India, a unique feature that India's foreign policy has witnessed is an aggressive thrust in economic diplomacy. This section primarily delves into the idea of the economic strategy that India intends to apply for its growth, development and security. For India to emerge on the global stage, what matters the most is how its economy functions and thrives. It is in this section that we shall argue how India, through a strong economic performance, can reclaim its rightful place in the world from an emerging to a predominant power. When the Cold War ended, a chaotic

situation ensued in the international system as no one was able to correctly understand or predict where the world was likely to go from there. However, Henry Kissinger, in his work entitled *Diplomacy*, argued that the ‘new world order’ of the 21st century was likely to revolve around six major powers, namely, the USA, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and, in all likelihood, INDIA. Kissinger did predict that India had the potential of emerging as a power. If, indeed, the fledgling nation had the potential, the question was how this potential could become reality. The answer to these questions is how India responds to the four-point challenge it witnesses.



India’s global power status will largely depend upon the nature of its economic growth and development. As we shall argue forcefully in the chapter on concluding debates in the foreign policy of India, mere economic growth is not the sole criteria for greater status, because other factors like India’s civilisational past and its global contribution to religion, philosophy and culture become equally relevant and play a role in its growth. However, economists do argue that for India to emerge as a strategically important power in Asia and the world, it needs to have a sustained growth rate of seven to eight per cent. A growth rate of seven to eight per cent will give India the needed resources that can also ensure the modernisation of the armed forces to meet the challenges the nation may face in order to emerge as a global player.

One of biggest threats India has witnessed on its way to achieve a global power status is from its immediate neighbour, Pakistan, which has held India back on many accounts, including the incurring of unnecessary expenditure on defence and counter-terrorist intelligence. India has clearly understood that it needs to attain an aggressive economic growth rate to tackle Pakistan, which has been spending resources on cross border terrorism. Its nuclear capable army may also be used to hold India back. If Pakistan, as a nation, continue to so indulge in unnecessary expenditure, its resources would drain and a time will come when it would be on the verge of collapse. However, if India, through aggressive economic development, is able to bolster its military capabilities, its strategic fortunes will further rise and thereby compel Pakistan to bolster its own capabilities. It would then become highly likely that, due to lack of resources, the Pakistani economy would no longer be able to support its military, consequently compelling Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism and normalise ties with India.


The Indian establishment had thus far favoured this long-term logic to mitigate the threat of Pakistan, but since 2014, India has been shifting towards a new strategy due to changing ground realities. In recent times, China, Pakistan’s all-weather friend, has decided to assist Pakistan in bolstering its economy through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). New Delhi has been deeply concerned with the CPEC initiative as it may improve Pakistani economy, which may, in turn prove detrimental to India. India’s R&AW has, over a period of time, made it difficult for Pakistan to realize the dream of the CPEC. With the mention of Baluchistan in the Indian PM’s Independence Day speech in 2015, Pakistan had received the signal that India would make the realisation of the CPEC tougher for Pakistan. Since January 2017, Pakistan has started lending greater support to

India to seek Indian participation in the CPEC for the larger benefit of the region. India has refrained to comment upon such proposals from Pakistan till date; however, it seems that Pakistan has realised that it will not be able to support its economic growth without cooperation from India. As Indian economic performance increases through initiatives like Make in India, Skill India and so forth, the pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with India will also increase.

The second issue for India is the management of China. Both India and China, in the initial period of the Cold War, had similar levels of development. The difference in economic propulsion was laid down between 1980 to 2000. China, in this two-decade period, enhanced its economy and used it to propel its military and eventually emerged as the most major economic and military power of Asia in the 21st century. For India to match up to China, it has to grow economically as also widen its share in world trade. To achieve this, India will have to deepen its economic ties in Eurasia, the Trans-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. In recent times, India has expressed willingness to be part of the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) to reach the Eurasian landmass. It has established a single seamless whole with Japan, Korea and Australia in Asia-Pacific while bolstering economic and defence ties with France and Germany Europe. India has also concluded a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US and enhanced its valued strategic partnership.

India's role in Asia and the world at present, to a large extent, depends upon the strategic consequences of the economic competition India will face from China. For India to meet this economic competition, it would have to achieve a growth rate of at least seven per cent per annum and above till 2020. Otherwise, if China continues to grow the way it is growing, it may emerge as the only pre-eminent Asian power, which, in some sense, it already is. To meet the Chinese challenge, there is no need for India to be a part of any anti-China alliance. Instead, what is necessary is to deepen engagement with all nations that world assist India in its economic renewal. In fact, throughout the book we have seen that the core focus of Modi's foreign policy doctrine is to engage with other nation states to help India bolster its economy, which would help India to garner the impetus for the great power capabilities it aspires for. India has already seen a new wave of economic reforms through demonetisation and Goods and Service Tax (GST) that will help India to take advantage of globalisation and enhance Indian strategic capability.

For India to further enhance its strategic capabilities in the future, it needs to strengthen the 'Square of Power' as envisaged by Niall Ferguson.



India has to increase private investment but at the same time enhance public investment in strategic industries (defence and nuclear) to translate economic growth into strategic capability. India will have to manage economic performance more aggressively and address challenges in the Indian Ocean. Thus, we observe a direct relation between

India's strategic capabilities and its economic performance. India has to simultaneously take advantage of globalisation and integrate itself more aggressively with the international political economy. India has resorted to signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) too. A strong economic foundation can help India meet the 3-D challenges of Development, Defence and Diplomacy. To meet the 3-D challenge, at the foreign policy level, the Modi government has decided to seek help from the 4th D, that is, the Diaspora. At the level of development, India needs to generate resources to address social backwardness. At the level of defence, India would have to undertake fiscal empowerment to enhance strategic capabilities. Diplomacy has to be geared up to play an increasing commercial role. The ability to use the skills and capital of the diaspora will largely depend upon domestic economic performance.

Thus, here we have clearly articulated the fact that India's influence in the world can be effectively projected if India enhances its economic performance, since a strong economy can help India to develop its strategic capabilities.




Economic Dimension of the Indian Foreign Policy

The aim of this case study is to identify and elaborate the link between India's foreign policy and its economic policy. The link was recognised for the first time by Nehru, who believed that foreign policy is always the outcome of the economic policy of the state. Nehru's idea was that a country having successful economy can shape its foreign policy more independently and effectively because economic policy is an instrument of foreign policy. In the initial periods after independence, when India adopted non-alignment, it was coupled with a mixed economy at home. Through non-alignment, India was able to focus on its national interests of getting resources from the bipolar world for its domestic development. Using non-alignment as a development strategy, India from 1949–1951 was able to secure loans from the US, the USSR and China. The Soviets helped India in setting up its infrastructure for the public sector. India, during fifties and sixties, continued to resort to approaching international players for support for domestic development and there emerged as a significant link of economic development and non-alignment. In 1981, India approached the IMF for support to India under Extended Fund Facility. When USA initially showed reluctance to support India at the IMF, India suggested that in that scenario, it would be compelled to seek support from the USSR. Consequent to this, the US abstained from voting on the issue of India's request of loan from the IMF. India pursued an aggressive inward looking economic policy and a non-aligned foreign policy to approach the USSR or Britain and so on, continuously bargaining its way with more powerful nations. Thus, the policy adopted by India of a mixed economy almost became a corollary to the foreign policy of non-alignment.

However, when the Cold War ended, the NAM as a platform became marginalised. Since then, India has tried to position itself as a major world power, gradually evolving an understanding of the responsibilities that are attached to the status of being a global player. To achieve the status of a great power and fulfil global responsibilities, India has to rejuvenate and enhance its economic profile. Under the

Modi government, initiatives to improve skill sets through Skill India and improve infrastructure are being carried out in an aggressive way. The improvement in domestic manufacturing through Make in India will generate core economic wealth which India can use to execute those responsibilities that are the legacy of its foreign policy. Under the Modi government, India has evolved an aggressive, liberal, outward oriented foreign economic policy, leading to improvement in bilateral trade ties with all nations. If India intends to play the leadership role in South Asia and Indian Ocean, India would have to advocate for more global investment and trade flows.



In recent times, at the diplomatic level, there has also been an inclination to have an 'economic diplomat' as the foreign secretary. The government's choice of selecting Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar as the Indian foreign secretary reiterates the same logic.

Economic diplomacy has emerged as a core tool of Indian foreign policy in the last couple of decades. The most visible manifestation of the same in India's foreign relations has been seen in the recent Modi government's foreign policy doctrines. The only feature missing in the Indian foreign policy is a coherently articulated doctrine of how to use economic diplomacy for helping India achieve the status of a great power.

SECTION 2: ISSUES RELATED TO DEFENCE DIPLOMACY OF INDIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDIA

In this section, we attempt an analysis of the national security strategy of India. India, at present, is not only facing conventional military threats but also a large number of non-conventional or non-military threats. The reasons for non-conventional threats range from poor governance to rise of communal conflicts to environmental stresses. All such non-conventional threats arise from either within the nation or outside and contribute to the detriment of the overall development of the country. India's predominant threat remains conventional threats, ranging from attacks from a hostile state to proxy wars and terrorism. At the internal level, Naxalism and insurgencies continue to break the state.

A new feature of security threats India has started witnessing is that they come at a very short notice and may emanate from unexpected quarters. In April 2015, the civil war in Yemen led to an immediate threat to the Indian diaspora in Yemen, who had to be evacuated post haste. After Indian became independent, the Ministry of Defence was designated as the main decision-making body. During the Nehruvian era, the defence establishment was brought under the bureaucratic control of civilian bureaucrats. The Vajpayee government established the National Security Council and appointed a National Security Advisor (NSA). Despite institutional structures being available, the problem India faces is the absence of an articulate defence and national security strategy. The political executive has no consensus on what may constitute to be national security threats

for India. Moreover, due to an absence of a coherent policy, the actions taken at the national security level remain ad-hoc. Scholars assert that India should announce its national security strategy for at least a minimum of ten-year period. In order to do this, the first step is to state the national security objectives very clearly. The national security objectives can be defined on the basis of the study of the geopolitical environment externally as also the challenges found internally.

India faces multiple threats externally. India's biggest threat today is from China. We have argued at length in the chapter detailing the relationship between India and China that India still perceives China as an unreliable player. The recent economic rise of China, its assertion in the South China Sea on the sea lanes of communication and repeated incursions into the Indian territory across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) suggest that the possibility of an armed conflict in future cannot be ruled out. Whether such a war with China is going to be a limited or a full-scale war, is a matter of speculation. The rising Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, which India perceives as its backyard, has opened up a new theatre of conflict.

The other threat remains from Pakistan and its continued sponsorship of cross border terrorism. The deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has become a fountainhead of pro-Pakistani extremist fundamentalism, has emerged as new challenge to the stability of Asia. Pakistan's strategy of maintaining strategic depth in the region against India will only lead to more chaos. The rising threats of piracy in the shores of Africa and maritime threats in the Gulf have increased India's problems in the recent time. Pakistan's ISI and Chinese intelligence have spearheaded multiple cyber-attacks on India and the nation has now become more vulnerable at the cyberspace level.

All the above mentioned threats press for the finalisation and enunciation of a national security strategy to ensure a coherent response to the crises situations. An important element to mitigate the above threats lies in intelligence. In 1968, India created a body for external intelligence gathering, called Research and Analysis wing (R&AW). Since its creation, RAW has not only played crucial role in getting intelligence input from our neighbourhood but has also developed capabilities to undertake high profile covert operations. In recent times, the RAW has effectively curtailed online jihad operations of ISIS and its impact on India and has responded adequately and more intensely to Pakistan funded cross-border terrorism. Thanks to the sustained work of RAW, Pakistan today is more vulnerable to collapse than it was during Cold War. Keeping this in mind, India should aggressively strive to establish a national security doctrine. It needs to conceptualise its national interests in concrete terms and work by taking opportunities in the age of uncertainty bred in the modern era. As the world moves to a more polycentric system, India needs to leverage its grand strategy and emerge as global power.

SECTION 3: OCEANIC RIVALRY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE SAMUDRA MANTHAN

In recent times, there is a new unfolding of oceanic rivalry between India and China at the maritime level. As the two nations turn towards the sea, we are going to witness a clash of the dragon and the elephant. The next few decades of the Asian century will lead to an altered global maritime environment due to the strained relationship between China and India. A study of these two nations' past shall provide valuable insight into the orientation

of both powers towards the sea.

Historically, India's priority was to protect its territorial frontiers from invaders from the north-west. For China, the threat was mostly the west and they built a great wall to stop the tribes pouring into the Chinese territory from that direction. Though both states faced threats from the waters around them, the development of maritime powers was never the priority. In the middle of the 20th century, as both states emerged strong, came the need to appreciate the power of the sea. During much period of the Cold War, both still focussed on economic development and the sea was relegated to a secondary position. At the end of the Cold War, a new interest in the surrounding seas erupted. A wave of globalisation came up, bringing with it rising sea trade. The rising trend in sea trade led both parties to search for mechanisms to protect the sea lanes of communication. The search culminated in an ambitious naval expansion programme individually adopted by both states. Both have articulated the need to acquire blue water naval capabilities in the future.




The urge to emerge as capable naval players can be perceived in China's attempts to assert its presence in South China Sea, while India does the same in the Indian Ocean. In the times ahead, we may witness a triangular dynamic where an assertive China and India would have to be balanced out by the USA. The USA will remain a security provider in the region, even if its presence or significance is diminished or undercut by China. The Indo-Pacific, connected by Bay of Bengal, South China sea and Strait of Malacca, are going to emerge as key competition areas. The twenty first century has seen a renewed conflict between India and China on new factors. Today, both states differ in their impulses to reshape the world and building communities at the regional level in Asia. Domestically, the two states have moved on to resolve border differences and have taken the border negotiation at the highest levels but India has made it clear to China that it would be forced to do exactly the same in Tibet what China would do in Kashmir. This approach has been a potential source of tension between the two.


The resolution of the boundary dispute may not end the rivalry, because the two will compete for influence in states outside like Africa, Latin America, Afghanistan, East Asia and Central Asia. Their policies towards control of peripheral regions will ensure that geography remain a source of irritant in the ties. Both sides have in the recent times evolved an interest in developing active maritime power and this will set a new stage in the rivalry between the two in the times ahead. During most of the Cold War period, both India and China had internal issues to resolve. During this period, they developed

defensive maritime capability as a part of their national security strategy. Another reason as to why the two states could not evolve a maritime vision is because the two followed a deliberate strategy of de-globalisation with little scope for external trade. In the 1970s, during the era of Deng Xiaoping, China began to pursue an integration with global economy. To facilitate the integration, it began to resolve the border disputes, with Shanghai-5 and the later SCO being testimony to this fact. This gave China an opportunity to productively consider a maritime plan. India's naval expansion too gained momentum at the end of Cold War when India embarked upon a programme of developing maritime power.

The Chinese maritime strategy is based on securing the sea lanes of communication to feed the domestic economy with resources and minerals. Indian maritime expansion is based on not only protecting the sea lanes of communication but also checking Chinese presence in its backyard, that is, the Indian Ocean. As both India and China pursue globalisation, the national security concerns too shift from land to the oceans. More the degree of external trade undertaken, the more would be the outward attention to sea power from both sides. India has well understood the link between the globalisation, economic trade and naval capabilities.



As the two sides build up their navies to secure the sea lanes of communication, they have also realised the need to build up military presence along the sea lanes as new symbols of security. Throughout the book, in various chapters, we have argued that how in India's bilateral relations with West Asia, Africa, Latin America and South East and East Asia, the maritime dimension of diplomacy has gained primacy in Mauritius, Seychelles, Oman, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique and Vietnam.



For India, the navy in the recent times has emerged not only as an instrument to protect the SLOC but also as a tool of foreign policy. The focus of the Indian Navy is to build diplomatic relations with maritime states to project power and create naval interoperability primarily to maintain tranquillity in the seas. The Indian navy has been undertaking modernisation by focussing on class destroyers, frigates and nuclear powered submarines, with a focus on stealth features and modern cruise missiles on board. These developments have to be seen in the larger context of India's Act East Policy, with a special attention towards maritime diplomacy.


For China, the focus issue is of resolving the Malacca dilemma. In 2003, Hu Jintao, while addressing a party conference, asserted that Chinese access to resources and supplies back home are shipped from Gulf, and Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca. China was of the view that an aggression by any player here could cut off vital supply lines for China. Most of the states along the Strait of Malacca are allied with the USA.

These states include India, Vietnam and Singapore and even outlet states like South Korea and Japan. In order to resolve the Malaccan dilemma, the Chinese have undertaken the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Irrawaddy corridor. The recent Chinese assertion in the South China Sea over territorial disputes is a testimony to the fact that China wants a completely secure SLOC. The recent Chinese attempts of OBOR and CPEC are endeavours to develop pipelines corridors to reduce the impact of the Malacca dilemma. To ensure the safety and security of energy resources, China has also focussed on building forward maritime bases.

India perceives Chinese naval engagement with the states in the Indian Ocean as a threat and as part of the larger design to encircle India with a String of Pearls¹. The Indian response has been Project Mausam and the Spice Route. India feel that Chinese port-pearls in Djibouti, Aden, Colombo, Port Victoria, Singapore and Gwadar are military bases for future assertion in the Indian Ocean. China, on the other hand, has maintained that it has not established any military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Chinese port development in Indian Ocean states is to ensure an uninterrupted access to sea lines of communication and such port development is in sync with economic and geopolitical interests of China.

SECTION 4: INDIA'S QUEST FOR A GLOBAL POWER STATUS

It will not be wrong to state here that the Indian foreign policy (IFP), since its inception during the Nehruvian times, strove to achieve the status of a great power. In 1998, when India tested its nuclear weapon, one of the important reasons was to acquire nuclear capabilities, pushing India to the next rung in the global power structure. For great powers, there is always a strong link between its national security and capabilities which enable them to protect their national autonomy through hard power. A major power has to possess autonomy in the realm of military affairs as, through the acquisition of hard power capabilities, they reduce their own vulnerability to military attacks from other states while they develop deterrence capacities.



Even though in recent times India has been a rising power, it remains more poorly integrated than other comparable powers in the international system. Scholars have called India a status-inconsistent nation because there is no congruence between India's ascribed status of what it intends to achieve vis-à-vis its achievements on ground. It is believed that India may not use force as an instrument to alter the power status of the international orders, but it uses diplomatic tools to mount strong resistance to some elements therein. For instance, India has been a vocal critique of the NPT and the CTBT since the time of the creation of these orders.

After India became independent, it envisaged a leadership role based more on the element of soft power than hard power. Indian diplomacy asserted global influence through Non-Alignment Diplomacy and not military capabilities. During the period from

1940s to 1960s, India continued to assert globally on the premise of its civilisational value. Nehru always asserted that India was historically a great civilisation and shall play an important role in global affairs as an independent modern state. The diplomatic value of non-alignment was used to further India's interests during this period. This active role initially played by India was not appreciated by the US. The USA, driven by its Cold War reality and its need to contain Moscow, armed Pakistan and made it a frontline state in its anti-Soviet campaign. This also enabled the USA to indirectly contain India in a limited manner. During this period, India faced the twin challenges of containing regional satellitisation unleashed by the USA as also developing its own industrial and scientific base.

The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict demonstrated to India that without hard power capabilities, the policy of using soft power would remain unrealistic. India decided to shift to being a 'real politic' as removed from its idealistic-normative postures and began an attempt to possess hard power capabilities. As India embarked upon military development in the post-1962 period, the international system thwarted its attempts to emerge as a strong military power through various denial regimes. India also began to keep its nuclear option open, especially after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. As India realised the world wanted to prevent it from exercising the nuclear option, it powerfully defied the international order set by the NPT and the CTBT and went on to test its nuclear weapons in 1998.

Historically, the major power status in international relations was attributed to states which fought the great war and were militarily and economically strong. The settlement post-World War-II bestowed the major power tag upon the USA, the UK, France, Russia and China. Since then, the major powers have tried to maintain status quo and have not permitted the entry of new players into the elite club. In fact, the five major powers have not even evolved a criterion to facilitate the transition. The question then arises as to what power ingredients are needed to emerge as a major power.

Historically, military power was the most vital factor in the assertion of power, where as now, apart from economic and technical capabilities, a state should possess demography, culture, norms and a state capacity driven by a grand strategy. In various chapters of India's bilateral relations, we have seen that India has started asserting demography as a new element in diplomacy. Under the Modi government, we have witnessed steps to enhance India's state capacity through initiatives like Make in India and improvement in the Ease of Doing Business. With testing of Agni-V in 2016 and development of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, India is gradually emerging as a credible military power. By undertaking joint defence programmes with Russia and the conclusion of Logistics Supply Agreement with the USA in 2016, India is well in its way to developing strong military capabilities. India remains a top contender to the major power status in the developing part of the world. However, there are international and domestic constraints that India is likely to witness in its future rise.

As noted previously that the major power status to the countries previously has been granted to states victorious in a war. In 1945, after the World War-II concluded, the post-war settlement bestowed the status of major powers to the victorious states of the World War-II. Since then, the system of adding a new state in the major power category has remained frozen.


When the World War-II ended in 1945, India was still a British colony. The post war settlement was carried out under the leadership of the USA. During the settlement, India had negligible presence in the conference at San Francisco. The US was not in favour of India playing a larger role. The British too took no steps to strengthen India's case as a leading state at the security conference. Thus, the US policies at the end of WW-II did not go in favour of India and it was restrained from playing a leadership role in the international order.

However, India did take steps through non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity to position itself as a leader and a third force during the initial decades of the Cold War. This brought India into close association with the UN where India began to work to support decolonisation. Despite a rising stature, India never used non-alignment as a cohesive power bloc to alter the scene of global governance. The non-alignment posture coupled with India's preference for the Soviet Union in 1971 made western countries all the more suspicious and hostile to India. India was also constrained due to the formation of the USA-Pakistan and China axis. Despite this, many western countries continued to provide economic aid to India. This was primarily done to ensure that India would not collapse economically. The USA believed that if India collapsed economically, it would ease the road for the communist camp to spread communism to Asia. Thus, the Cold War saw the USA simultaneously working with Pakistan to keep an eye upon India while continuing to provide economic aid to India.

After the 1971 war, the western bloc became all the more assertive to prevent India to play a role in the international order. This clash brought a serious dent on the Indo-US relations. In fact, the reason as to why India and USA could not synergise with each other lay in the disagreement each had on issues related to national security. India tried to portray itself as an independent-minded middle power trying to push itself to the category of a major power. The USA perceived India as an ambitious, unwilling and non-accommodative state in the global system. India's strategy was to resist western domination while the USA wanted to maintain its hegemony. The US, therefore, took steps to deprive India of all sympathy in the western bloc and the United Nation and tried to ensure that India had little strategic relevance for the USSR. Apart from this, another dent in Indo-US relationship was India's rejection of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India did reject the NPT for the reasons we have already outlined in previous chapters of the book. However, one of the most significant reasons for India's opposition to the NPT was over major power status. India felt that NPT as a treaty strived to give monopoly of nuclear weapons only to a few states (called Nuclear weapon states-NWS). India felt that by preventing the Non Nuclear Weapon states to enter the NWS category, NPT as a treaty restricted India's global ambitions to emerge as a major power. India perceived NPT as a stumbling block to a Great Power status.

China has been another constraint in India's rise as a global power. Apart from the period in the 1950s, China has always tried to contain India. China has strengthened its ties with Pakistan to keep India regionally contained. Since the 1980s, the Chinese policy towards India has been a mixture of engagement and containment. China too has embarked upon a policy that is quite similar to the US. It continues to use Pakistan to regionally contain India. In fact, Pakistan is the sole ally in South Asia that China can use against India. At this level, the China-Pakistan axis is not very different from the USA-

Israel axis. China has provided Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies and today favours the development of a strong Pakistani economy through the China–Pakistan economic corridor. Thus, China has successfully followed a strategy of keeping India and Pakistan fixated through the distant threat of a nuclear standoff. This gives China an opportunity to treat India and Pakistan as regional powers and not allow India to be treated as a global power at par with China. As China arms Pakistan, it will also ensure the diverting of Indian resources away from China, to balance Pakistan. Apart from Pakistan and China, domestically India has always moved for power. However, India has failed to understand that international power and status comes with tremendous responsibilities at the global level. As we will see in the last chapter of this section, India has now gradually asserted that it is willing to accept responsibilities. This may give a push to India's dream to be a major power in the future.



India as a Net Security Provider

In 2009, US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, while speaking at the Shangri-La dialogue asserted that India should emerge as a Net Security Provider (NSP) in the Indian Ocean. Since the speech, Indian policymakers have started using the term NSP in the Indian foreign policy discourse. NSP means a form of a relationship where two countries enhance their mutual securities by addressing security concerns common to both states. India witnesses common security concerns with many states in the Indian Ocean region ranging from piracy, organised crime, terrorism to natural disasters. In the NSP, there are four core activities- Capacity Building, Military diplomacy, Military assistance and Force deployment. India has been quite active in the first two core activities but has displayed some reticence in the last two. There are some structural challenges that prevent India from emerging a NSP. First is ideological. India has positioned itself as a land of ahimsa and therefore feels that any form of military assistance of any lethal weapons to any state could come into a conflict with its self perceived image as a land of peace. Secondly, India favors less engagement at the military diplomacy level outside the UN flag. India does not favor alliance formations or even acting as a junior partner in defense cooperation at the global level. Thirdly, there is inadequate domestic defense capabilities that hinder India to play a larger role. Fourthly, at the domestic level, there are coordination challenges at the political-military-diplomatic level when it comes to military support. In 2017, India has decided to give 25 Million Pesos aid to Philippines to fight Islamic State in Mindanao Province. This is the first time that India has decided to extend monetary assistance outside to any state to fight terrorism. This signals a rise of India's image as a NSP as it is in sync with the third core activity (Military Assistance) in India's diplomacy.

1. The String of pearls is a geopolitical theory on potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region, developed by

the US consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton in 2005. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Lombok Strait as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal US Department of Defense report, "Energy Futures in Asia." The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, but it is often used in Indian media.