2 CHAPTER India's Grand Strategy

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Introduction
- Grand strategy and China and India Relationship
- Grand strategy and The USA and India Relationship
- Grand strategy and Afghanistan and India
- Grand strategy and India and Iran
- Grand strategy and India and Israel
- Grand strategy and Africa and India

INTRODUCTION

The concept of grand strategy has been explained earlier in the book. A grand strategy is an aggregation of the national resources and national capacity of a country. Scholars like George Tanham and K. Subramaniam are of the belief that India does not possess a systematic thought on strategic matters, which is due to the fact that India is averse to the idea of power. Even western scholars like David Malone, for that matter, have expressed impatience over an absence of a grand strategy by India. On the other hand, Indian scholars, namely Sunil Khilnani and Ramachandra Guha, in their works, have vouched for the idea that India does have a grand strategy since independence. Broadly the three core categorisations at the level of strategic thought are the three schools, namely, Nehruvian, Neoliberal and Hyperrealist.

All three schools accept that the base and core of International Relations is 'anarchy' (a term often used by Realists) and in the situation of anarchy, it is the responsibility of the state to secure its own well-being. The three paradigms accept that the state has to pursue its national interest and should strive to accumulate power in a system which is primarily competitive. Power, according to all schools, comprises of military and economic capabilities whose optimum mix is vital for the security of the state. However, the Nehruvian school of thought inclines more towards idealism. It favours a scenario where international institutions are tasked with maintaining global harmony. It perceives that any form of expenditure on arms may impoverish a state materially and therefore advocates that peace has to be maintained and war to be avoided at all costs. The Neoliberals, on the other hand, favour interdependence and increased interaction amongst states for collective economic well-being. However, the thrust of the neoliberals is on the importance of economic power over military power. They vouch for a free market paradigm and advocate aggressive promotion of trade and economic interactions. The Hyperrealists, in contrast, believe in threat and counter-threat mechanism over Nehruvian methodology of

communication and free market paradigm of neoliberals. The Hyper realists are of the view that in a state of anarchy, conflict and rivalry of the states can be resolved primarily through threat of violence or use of violence. They differ from Nehruvian and Neoliberal view on defence spending as they argue that in no way does defence spending derogates development strategies. The Hyperrealists favour military power over economic power thereby inverting the neoliberal paradigm.

For the Nehruvian model, war in a situation of anarchy is possible, and yet violence is not inevitable, if states pursue their interests judiciously. This model argues that conflict is generated foremost in the minds of the men and it is this mindset that needs to be eradicated. It argues that the occurrence of war is due to misperceptions between two states as the adversary state probably failed to comprehend the goals and methods of India, for which the Nehruvian school squarely holds the leadership responsible. This school agrees that with increased communications, the misperceptions can be reduced. For that matter, misunderstanding and miscalculation are core factors responsible for war in the world. The neoliberal school also believes that sustaining military confrontation under the era of globalisation is old fashioned.

However, in complete contrast, the Hyperrealist view believes that war is not an aberration but a natural phenomenon in international relations. The Hyperrealists argue that states have to be prepared for war to ensure their survival, which must follow the supreme logic of the balance of power. The Nehruvian school would prefer less force and more of communication for resolution of conflicts. They believe that exertion of force or coercion only harms political relationships and states should only possess force sufficient to defend their territory. The Neoliberals use a different explanation to tackle force. The idea of neoliberal thought is that force is an unsuitable instrument in the present world order, which is based on globalisation and the diminishing of socio-economic distances between states. The greatest source of strength for a state should be its ability to propel economic instruments. Hyperrealists accept force as the core instrument in foreign policy to be used for protecting national interest. We may therefore conclude Nehruvian and Neoliberals are relatively dovish while that of the Hyperrealists are hawkish. Also, Neoliberals are more pragmatic in their policy stance than Hyperrealists.

Since the rise of the new BJP government in power in India since 2014, there has been a new debate on the strategic perspective based on the principles of Hindutva. At this ncture, before we adopt an analysis of case studies, it is pertinent to outline the core feature of the Hindutva ideology. Those who advocate the Hindutva ideology emphasise upon the role and importance of civilizations, believing that human beings live his life in the shadow of larger civilizations and it’s the civilizations which leave upon an individual an imprint of culture. The relationships between different civilizations are based on cultural values. The proponents of this school argue that civilizations shape history. They believe that in the world at one point of time, Hindu civilization was at its peak which fell on hard times due to more aggressive Islamic and Christian civilizations. They have a firm belief that a time would come when the Hindu civilization will become the leader of the world and all other civilizations will accept the superiority of the Hindu civilization. The advocates of this school believe that a time will come when India will dominate the world but till then, India, as a defender of the Hindu civilization, will continue to play its role in world politics.


Nehruvian model in practice
USA
Oppose imperialist designs
Cooperate with middle power to check US dominance
Persuade US to change policies when needed without giving up on US
Pakistan
Prefer compromise through agreements and treaties
Would encourage trade and people to people contacts
Advocate a defensive strategy
China
Would prefer closer alliance with the neighbours
Use compromise for dispute settlement
Use NAM to not antagonize China
Cooperate with China to play a larger role in Asia
Neoliberals in practice
USA
Emerge strategically with US
Use a partnership with US to balance and access modern technology
Pakistan
Use trade as an instrument
Avoid non-alignment and prefer globalisation
Engage through the prism of US
China
Military power basic in form sufficient to create deterrence
Asian cooperation is temporary with China as it will be aggressive in Asia and Indian Ocean
India should work with US as a soft balancer
Hyper-realists in practice
USA
Partnerships with developing world are a liability
India's global ambitions are curtailed with deeper Indo – US proximity
India should emerge as an autonomous centre with full capabilities to tackle with the world
Pakistan
Military option is needed with Pakistan
Military enhancement be done by India to deny great powers access in the region
Retaliation to Pakistani adventurism is needed
China
India should ally with US
To deter China, India should establish nuclear forces
Retaliation to Pakistani adventurism is needed

This school also believes that the Islamic state of Pakistan and China are active threats to India. The threats from these states are not only based on values and practices of their society, but from the state machinery of the two states. It is believed that Pakistan is not only an external but also an internal threat to India as Golwalker argues that Pakistan works with Indian Muslims to weaken the Indian state from within. They feel China also works with India communists and other sympathisers to advance Chinese interest on Indian soil. A particular section of scholars in this school believe that the US uses Christian missionaries to convert poor and marginalised Indians to Christianity, which they perceive is a strategy to weaken India. The Hindutva scholars openly advocate the use of force to be used to defend civilizational values. They advocate that Indian as an independent state should have strong armed forces. As we have seen previously noted in the chapter of India's Nuclear Foreign Policy, the Jan Sangha was a proponent of nuclear weapons for India.



This section of the chapter attempts to analyse the Grand Strategy of India at its periphery through a country specific approach.

GRAND STRATEGY AND CHINA AND INDIA RELATIONSHIP

The aim of this study is to explore that how the strategic community of India views China and what could be the way ahead in future to forge a productive relationship between the nations. The study will explore three dominant prisms and conclude with strategic approaches for future.

The study heavily draws upon the literature already explained in the chapter on India–China relationship and expects that the reader is familiar with the basics of the Sino–Indian relations. Patel and Nehru were the key determinants of Sino–Indian policy in the 1950s. Patel presented a very Realist view of China, as he was quite apprehensive of

Chinese ambitions and perceived that China already exhibited assigns of potential enmity towards India. Patel was also concerned about the lack of Indian capabilities to contain China, especially after the invasion of Tibet and forcefully argued that India's North East was highly valuable from a security point of view.



The Nehruvian view of China (as explained in the diagram above) was based on Idealist terms. Nehru had viewed China as a friend and believed that India neither possessed the military capacity to tackle the Tibetan takeover nor should be inclined to antagonise China over Tibet. He, thus, preferred to press for Tibetan autonomy which he considered as a more feasible goal. In a letter written by Nehru to the Indian Ambassador in Nepal, CPN Singh, here marked that China was not a 'real' threat to India as he believed that a military invasion of India would spark a war. However, he agreed that China could resort to gradual infiltration across disputed territory which required improvement in connectivity with far flung areas to prevent Chinese infiltration. In fact, in a letter to Nepalese King Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Nehru emphasised the need to check the infiltration of ideas, especially communist ideas. Nehru explained that the democratic elements in a state are important to check communism. In contrast to Patel, Nehru believed that a military built up was not desirable as it would be counter-productive and would be perceived by China as a provocation. Thus, the Nehruvian view was to arrive at some kind of understanding with China rather than display any form of outright provocation. The difference noted above between Patel and Nehru's thoughts continues in a similar way even today. C. Raja Mohan has aptly stated that there has never been a consensus view on Sino–India relations in India. In fact, different scholars have also recorded different perceptions by the Indian Strategic Community.



There is also a group of optimists which is of the view that India and China will cooperate with each other in the future. The scholars and adherents to the optimistic school believe that China is no longer revolutionary in its outlook and exists more like a status quo power. They believe that China may not resort to military aggression until such action is completely unavoidable. They hold the idea that China has integrated itself very well into the global system and thus many not resort to any destabilising role as it may be self-defeating for China itself.

Important optimists like Amitabh Mattoo and Idealists and Asia-firsters believe that India and China will both eventually establish a strong partnership with each other. In fact, Surjit Mansingh has gone to the extent of implying that the Indo–China partnership to some extent could be based upon the logic of containing American hegemony. However, on a critical note, Mansingh has labelled the Optimists as apologists for China. The Optimists are not very critical of the past of Sino–Indian engagements. They believe that both the conflicts between the two in 1950s and 1960s were due to the super power rivalry occasioned by the Cold War. They rather see Panchsheel as the most important tool for bilateral interaction.

The Optimists admit that it was a misunderstanding and misperception between the two that led to the 1962 war. At the level of territorial dispute between India and China, there are two schools of optimists. One group is of the firm belief that the boundary talks happening between the two since the time of Rajiv Gandhi have been fruitful because they reflect the seriousness of the two players to resolve the conflict. They agree at times skirmishes on the border do happen but, both sides would firmly maintain tranquillity and peace on the borders. The other group, however, feels that Tibet may remain a destabilising irritant in the bilateral ties. They do believe that China has extended all support they could to Dalai Lama but argue that some western nations have instigated Dalai Lama to continue to protest. The optimists also believe that the Sino–Pakistan relations have been over exaggerated and that China is anyway more sympathetic towards India and does not prefer to support any extremism in Kashmir to prevent a spill over to China.

At a critical level, scholars have raised doubts over Optimists' view on Sino–Pakistan relations on the grounds of the newly announced China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The Optimists feel that India and China can cooperate in Africa and Central Asia over resources, especially oil. They prefer to believe that the growing military capability of China is not directed against India but against other powers. At the level of multilateral fora, the Optimists believe that Sino–Indian cooperation in WTO can contain any unilateralism by the US and open up opportunities for both China and India to protect their respective autonomy. The Optimists, specially idealists and Asia-firsters believe that the US acts a destabilizing factor in Asia that could compel both China and India into undertaking an arms race.

The Pessimistic school on the other hand has very differing thoughts. The Pessimists believe that China and India will almost certainly witness competition and conflict in future. Their logic is based on the premise that both nations have a divergent self-image due to the varying nature of their political systems, coupled with their aspirations of power in Asia and beyond. Due to these overlapping aspirations, the two are likely to remain competitive, thereby making political rivalry imminent. Amitabh Mattoo is of the view that as the balance of power is presently not in favour of China, it prefers to cooperate, but it won't always remain this way. As China increases its military capabilities, it would use its military might due to the importance of the Chinese strategic culture that favours the use of offensive force. Thus, according to Gurmeet Kanwal, the possibility of a conflict between India and China is imminent. However, the critics of pessimists like Jairam Ramesh and Swamy call them alarmists and China-baiters. The Pessimists argue that their idea is based on a realistic assessment of the ground situation.

Swaran Singh and Kanti Bajpai argue that the China–Pakistan axis is fuelled by anti-India sentiments. Kanti Bajpai also says that China has cooperated with Pakistan to strengthen its missile programme. Pranab Dhal Samantha argues that China's cooperation with India on the issue of terrorism is limited and is clearly explained by the outright refusal of China to support India in sanctioning and blacklisting Masood Azhar, the mastermind of the Pathankot attack in 2016. Ashley Tellis asserts that the Sino–Pakistan axis is here to stay and for China, Pakistan is a strategic insurance policy to counter weigh India. The Chinese CPEC corridor strengthens the agreement of Ashley Tellis. Brahma Chellaney and Gurmeet Kanwal argue that the Chinese strategy of the string of pearls and

the one belt and one road initiative are attempts to undertake a strategic encirclement of India. The Pessimists thus feel that China's engagement in states peripheral to India is an attempt by China to prevent India's rise as a regional and global player.

Bharat Karnad remarks that this confrontation is visible even in Africa where China resorts to predatory actions for the preservation of its own self-interest. Shishir Gupta, while analysing the economic consequences of Sino–India trade, asserts that India exports its raw materials to China which in return dumps finished products into India affecting the Indian Small and Medium Enterprises. Kiran Rijiju and Gurmeet Kanwal are of the view that aggressive Chinese military modernisations and its deliberate improvement of military logistics in Tibet is bound to have severe strategic implications for India. This fear is further aggravated because of Chinese assertion in the Indian Ocean through its enhanced naval capacity. C. Raja Mohan adds that the Chinese presence in Gwadar port has fuelled more suspicion. Gurmeet Kanwal stresses that China, in the cases of border conflicts in Arunachal or Sikkim, may opt for the use of tactical nuclear weapons because Arunachal and Sikkim are not considered to be non-Chinese territories where the no first use policy applies. The Pessimists do argue, however, that Indo–US cooperation has given India a strong leverage against China.

Sidhu and Yuan are of the view that the Research and Analysis Wing, the Indian military and the BJP are composed majorly of Pessimists. According to Hoffman, these Pessimists are ultra realists who advocate the pursuit of power. As far as the interpretation of the past is concerned, the Pessimists argue that Nehru had made an unrealistic assessment of China, leading to appeasement and conciliation. They argue that Patel would have undertaken a much realistic assessment had he lived a little longer. In the interpretation of the past, the Pessimists draw inspiration from Patel. Bharat Karnad, for that matter, even criticises the Indian bureaucracy for their short sightedness on China. Sumit Ganguly says that India's initial Chinese policy was couched in legalese. He advocated that an apt approach for India after independence should have been to build up military capabilities to tackle China.

The Pessimists say that Nehru made a mistake in trusting China and did not pay heed to the warning signs, like China's approach to Tibet in 1950s. Thus, for the Pessimists, the past proves that China cannot and should not be trusted. The Pessimists assert that Chinese aggression happens due to the many weaknesses of the Indian state but whenever India confronts China, it does back down. Brahma Chellaney feels that talks between India and China on the border issues are fruitless. As the talks linger on, it gives China the time to economically and militarily strengthen its position. They argue that China will use military tactics to tilt the border solution in its favour. A deliberate delay in resolving the border issue also serves Pakistan because it continues to keep Indian resources tied up at the China border. Sumit Ganguly clearly says that the only success of the border talks lies in the fact that they have reduced the possibility of an accidental border conflict, but they have not helped in achieving any breakthrough. Gurmeet Kanwal further states that the Indian government has opted for asymmetrical concessions at the border by imposing restrictions on patrolling in border areas which has upset the Indian army which favours lifting of curbs on patrolling in sensitive border areas. China's assertions in Arunachal and Sikkim and its border transgressions are perceived by the Pessimists as an attempt to undertake the Balkanisation of India. Ashley Tellis strengthens the Balkanisation

argument by suggesting that there is an element in China which is sympathetic towards Maoists in India.

The third group is that of the Pragmatists who feel that in the short run, China is not a threat, but in the long run, it is. Subhajit Roy feels that China and India both have ample amount of space to meet their aspirations. Alka Acharya elucidates various factors that make China a pragmatist power.



According to Hoffman, the Pragmatists base their ideas on the moderate Realist prism. The Pragmatists, in their interpretation of the past, develop proximity to both pessimists and optimists. They agree that misperceptions can cause danger (as Optimists suggest) and recommend the need to build strength (as Pessimists argue). The Pragmatists feel that India should try to focus on developing an understanding of the motivations of the decision makers in China and should calibrate its own goals as per its own capabilities. The Pragmatists feel that China would not escalate any tensions at the border level due to larger stakes involved and assert that the claims China makes on Arunachal and Sikkim are to gain an upper edge in the border negotiations. The Pragmatists believe that the Indian support to Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause can be an expensive element in the relationship (as was visible during the Dalai Lama's visit to India in 2017). Shekhar Gupta, for that matter, favours border negotiations while accepting the fact that the pace of the talks has been relatively slow. The Pragmatists feel that dialogue and diplomacy are, any given day, the most effective tools for solving disputes, including those at the border. Tannu Sharma and Rahul Bedi emphasise, however, that some strength building is also necessary.

A G Noorani asserts that Chinese incursions into Indian territories are probing operations to locate the new depth of defences and therefore should not be perceived as alarming because they are done to test Indian preparedness and are not a sign of war. The Pragmatists view Sino–Pakistan cooperation as something that gives way to Sino–India cooperation. They argue that if Pakistan and China are cooperating, it is so that China may

use the Sino–Pakistan axis to prevent a spillover of extremist tendencies in Xinxiang province, which would be, in turn, beneficial even for India. However, K Subramaniam argues that Sino–Pakistan nuclear cooperation is a serious concern for India. C Raja Mohan feels that India is quite uncomfortable with China's engagement with the other neighbours of India but asserts that such an engagement is inevitable, as India too, after enacting an aggressive Act East Policy, has deepened engagement in South East and East Asia. Thus, C. Raja Mohan feels that both India and China would try jockeying for access in each other's backyard and India would try to balance the Chinese influence through values like democracy and Buddhism.

Some Pragmatists feel that if China does not use its special engagement with others to contain India in the near future, then it can open up new avenues for Sino–Indian cooperation. C. Raja Mohan argues that if Beijing does not use the Islamabad card in Central Asia or pit Afghanistan against India, then New Delhi and Beijing can both cooperate with each other in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Constantino Xavier maintains that India does not have the bank balance to mimic China in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East; however, in all these regions, India has developed certain unique connectors which it should continue to exploit. Lilly Weymouth does view Sino–Indian cooperation in the economic sphere as a positive investment but Acharya and Bruce have recognised some limits to such engagement in the economic sphere. Acharya asserts that an unresolved border issue may limit deeper cross border trade while Bruce has identified the Indian government's restrictions on use of a Chinese equipments in security apparatus to confirm the argument of Acharya.

At the multilateral fore, Kanti Bajpai argues that Sino–Indian cooperation will create friction because China would favour a situation where India is excluded from global governance structures so that China may play a dominant role. The attempt by China to block Indian entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the Seoul plenary meeting in 2016 strengthens the arguments of Kanti Bajpai. Shyam Saran asserts that a possibility of Sino–US strategic convergence by establishment of forums like G–2 could affect Indian interests.

A scholar named Jervis asserts that difference in perceptions can lead to differences in policy prescriptions. The Optimist, Pessimist and Pragmatist perspectives have led to India advocating multiple strategies towards China. The core determinants of India's future strategy towards China are mixed in nature. The answer basically lies in interpreting how different factors would impact Indian policies. The case asserts that an Indian grand strategy towards China would be based on multiple factors. How these factors will link together to the whole thing will decide the future of the Sino–Indian relationship.



GRAND STRATEGY AND THE USA AND INDIA RELATIONSHIP

The chapter detailing the relation between India and the US in the book has already highlighted the historiography of their bilateral relations. This study here attempts to analyse India's strategic behaviour with US with a study of the three examples of Korean crises (1950), Iraq War (2003) and Afghanistan. This study assumes that the reader is familiar with the historiography and basics of Indo–US relations. The ultimate aim of the case study is to capture the change in Indo–US relations from the point of view of the Indian strategic elite and its implications on the Indian Grand Strategy.

Example 1: Korean Crisis

The Korean crises began in 1950. It was on 25th June, 1950, when the forces of Northern Korea invaded southern part of Korea. After the end of the World War–II in 1945, an imaginary circle of latitude known as the 38th Parallel was created and recognized as a frontier to divide the Northern and Southern part of Korea. As the North invaded South Korea, the matter reached the UN Security Council. The strategic elite of US perceived India's support to the resolution very crucial. Anita Inder Singh and Robert McMahon have argued that the US state Department believed that the Indian vote at the Security Council signals India as a nation with tremendous potential in Asia. However, on 27th June 1950, there was another resolution and India abstained from voting in the resolution.

G Parthasarthi explains that India abstained in the vote on 27th June 1950 because it never wanted the support of armed forces to South Korea against the North. Nehru, as Parthasarthi argues, believed that such a support would be tantamount to an extension of the Cold War as India believed that Korean crises was an extension of Cold War politics. G Parthasarthi argues that Indian condemnation of North Korea and refusal to contribution of troops on the ground did not go down well with US and the Truman administration. The breaking point between Indo–US relations became fully visible by September,1950. India believed that a dialogue with People's Republic of China was crucial which was rejected by the world powers. In September, the UN forces would cross over the 38th Parallel to the North. The Chinese Premier Chou En Lai communicated to Indian Ambassador to China, KM Pannikar, that if the UN forces under Douglas Macarthur would cross over to North, then China would come to the rescue of North. Chou En also made it clear that if the UN forces crossed the Yalu River, then the People's Liberation Army of China would have to exercise the military option as China was not a member of the UN and therefore not obligated to honour UN resolutions. India tried to convey the message to the US but to

no anvil. India tried to see this as an opportunity to act as a bridge in the Sino–America relations. On 7th October 1950, the UN General Assembly voted upon a resolution to unify Korea. India voted against the resolution, yet the resolution was passed. As India refused to brand China as an aggressor in the Korean crises, this posited India in a direction diametrically opposed to the majority of the western powers. Vincent Sheen argued that India's vote on 7th October, 1950 was perceived by the Americans as India's greatest crime. Klux and McGhee argue that Nehru was branded as a hypersensitive egoist and a socialist by the US. The Korean crisis cemented Indian strategic elite thinking that the US would not deal with India on an equal footing and the appeal of non-alignment was consequently further strengthened over the logic of dependency upon the US. As the Korean crisis were monopolised by the UN, and India began to develop a distrust of UN system which it began to perceive was monopolised and run by the powers victorious in the World War–II.

Example 2: The Iraq War 2003

The relationship that India had with the US, which was based upon suspicion, as argued in the previous case, continued till 1970s. In 1982, Indira Gandhi made a historic visit to the US, which reignited the spark in the dormant relationship. The new momentum brought about by Indira Gandhi in mid-1980s now continued after India initiated economic reforms in 1990s.



This freshness in the relationship saw its first manifestation in 2003 when President Bush invited India to join the 'Coalition of the Willing' to intervene in the Iraqi operation.

On 20th March, 2003, the US invaded Iraq. India, according to Arunhita Mojumdar, followed a middle path. The idea, as explained by K. Subramanian, was to follow a pragmatic approach by not offending the US and not allowing the Iraq issue to decide the fate of Indo–US relations. Jyothi Malhotra has articulated that India, by its soft approach to US by merely criticising and not condemning the unwarranted US attack, made a departure from the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy.

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Gurmeet Kanwal argues that after the fall of Baghdad, the US asked India to send a division of its army to Iraq. Vishal Thapar argues that the VI division under a two-star general was dispatched. In an interview with Rudra Chaudhuri, the US secretary o efence, Donald Rumsfeld, elaborated that the US never pressed any nation to intervene, taking up the issue privately with high ranking officials of states to seek support. V. Sudarshan argues that the US did show an interest in help from India and that an Indian diplomat, during negotiations, agreed that there was considerable pressure from the US to commit Indian troops in Iraq. In May 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) through the Ministry of External Affairs obtained clarification from R. Ahmed (the UN special advisor to Iraq) on troop deployment and so forth. A section of the Indian elite and Indian army displayed an uncomfortable behaviour on being made to report to US military leadership. V. Sudarshan has mentioned that the Indian political elites wished that if India were indeed given a sector in Iraq, then the division would be under the commander ship of Indian Army. As the Bush administration sent Peter Rodman, the US assistant secretary of defence, for talks to India, C Raja Mohan favoured the idea of India positioning division sized troops in Iraq, as it would enhance India's military profile in the Middle East and would lay down a strong, new security foundation between the US and India in Indian Ocean. However, since the issue of command was not resolved with the visit of Peter Rodman, India turned down the request for troops in June 2003. What is worth appreciating here is that despite India's refusal to commit forces, the US believed that the fact India initiated such a thought reflected changing ground realities. Claudio, who was, one of the members of Peter Rodman's team, also observed that the thought of committing troops by India was indeed a strategic moment for India and represented a changing India. The entente was extended further with the UPA government when India and the US concluded the 'New Framework for US–India Defence Partnership for the next ten years' in June 2005 and subsequently signed the nuclear deal in 2008. A new chapter in the bilateral ties was opened up which was clearly reflected in the essence of the speech of Obama on his visit to India in 2010.

Example 3: Afghanistan, the US and India

This study examines how India, while maintaining top level policy relations with the US, has, on the ground level in Afghanistan, charted out its own policy. An important element of India's approach in Afghanistan is that it follows an alliance-free approach in international politics. As we have already argued in the chapter of India–Afghanistan relationship, India uses the case of its engagement with Afghanistan to position itself as a rising regional power provider. A unique element is that India was not a welcome party in Afghanistan as a lesser presence of India in Afghanistan allows Pakistan to maintain strategic depth against India. Initially, even Donald Rumsfeld argued that India was a complicating factor for the US in Afghanistan due to its proximity with the Northern Alliance and Hamid Karzai. As the US was, according to David Petraeus and General Stanley McChrystal, to engage with Pakistan very closely for operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan favoured less US dependency upon India in Afghanistan. The situation on the ground, however, was very different. India had charted out its own course in Afghanistan as it enjoyed tremendous goodwill. India did not engage either with the US or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The ISAF or NATO's approach was to provide support to groups in Afghanistan that would increase stability in the local region. As Afghanistan is a tribal polity with a mixture of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras, the ISAF and NATO favoured to provide development funds to groups in exchange for stability. This view of giving contracts (of development and infrastructure) to a group in exchange of stability is a policy well accepted amongst NATO states. India does not resort to any group-specific support but rather supports all groups. This gives India an option to engage with the entire spectrum of the Afghan society. As India deepens its engagement in Afghanistan with all groups in the society, its reach deepens and the US has now come to accept this dynamic. The US has understood that India will continue to follow its own unique strategy independent of the US presence or the ISAF. The US is appreciative of the Indian strategy because it still contributes to regional stability. Over the years US has understood that Afghanistan is a litmus test for India's regional aspirations of power. It does not support Pakistani allegations that India's RAW uses the consulates in Afghanistan for a destabilising Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

These studies of India and the US very clearly demonstrate how the two nations have built up their relationship in the last seven decades. The two examples of Iraq and Afghanistan clearly outline that the two states have not only strengthened their relations in the post-Cold War period but also how India has charted out its independent strategy of cooperation despite the Indo–US nuclear deal. With the recent conclusion of a logistics exchange memorandum of agreement between India and the US, we do witness a new phase of deepening and substantiating of the dialogue process between the two states. The newness in the Indo–US relations is based on the dimension of equality where both look at each other as natural partners rather than following a senior–subordinate foreign policy. Despite the differences that India and the US have had on issues like intervention in Libya, Palestine membership of the UN or climate change, this divergence has only strengthened the relations. The future of the Indo–US relations predictably will include hard-headed negotiations but, it will lead to a definite cooperation on shared values.

GRAND STRATEGY AND AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA

This section will provide an insight into the newfound relationship between India and Afghanistan. In order to put things in a context, we will quickly brush up the historical aspects of the relationship. This will help us to put the Indo–Afghan relationship in a context. India's relation with Afghanistan has seen the use of soft power and aid diplomacy. This approach is used by India not only to assist a war-ravaged Afghanistan but also simultaneously presents India with an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. Afghanistan can act as a land bridge to Central Asia and Eurasia. India feels such bridge can power benefits to the entire region. Thus, Afghanistan has become a new source of geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan which Shanthie B. calls the 'new great game'. The aim of this case study is to envisage the 'end game' of this new great game and see if a sustained Indian engagement with Afghanistan can benefit the Indian strategic elite and can help India expand its strategic outreach in Asia.

George Tanham has asserted that due to an absence of a grand strategy in Indian Foreign Policy, India is unable to emerge as a major global player. However, policy researcher Srinath Raghavan argues that an analysis of India's Afghan relations point out to a sustained search for a balance between diplomacy and force. A common policy between India and Afghanistan during the Cold War has been that of non-alignment. In fact, in the 20th century, Afghanistan, especially under king Nadir Shah, had been a proponent of the idea of neutrality. This clicked with the Indian value of non-alignment. As it has been noted in the chapter on India–Afghanistan relations, the bedrock of the Indo–Afghan relations has been the 1950 Treaty of friendship. When Soviet Invaded Afghanistan in 1979, according to JN Dixit, India did have reservations about the Soviet intervention, but resorted to a muted response at the public level. India, according to GS Bhargava, did convey its displeasure to the Soviets at private forums. But a muted public response of India affected India's international credibility.

In fact MK Rasgotra, in his book *A Life on Diplomacy*, even elaborates a conversation between Indira Gandhi and Brezhnev in 1982 where she requested Brezhnev to withdraw forces from Afghanistan and Brezhnev had, in turn, asked Indira Gandhi to show a way out. To this, Indira Gandhi had responded by saying that the way out is the same as the way in. The muted public response of India over Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, according to Surjit Mansingh, also affected goodwill for India amongst the Afghani citizens. But for India, the most important driving factor of its policy on Afghanistan during entire Cold War was that of ensuring peace and a stable Afghanistan. Shelton notes that in the 1985 address to Joint Session of the Congress, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated the need for stability and security in the region. Rajiv Gandhi noted that India cannot be indifferent to developments in Afghanistan, since it had brought Cold War to its doorsteps. The regional situation in Afghanistan deteriorated after the Soviet invasion but India's engagement at levels like sports, education, culture, and so on, remained undiminished. In 1989, Shah Mohammad Dost endorsed the review that India was a crucial stakeholder in region and had an important role to play in helping solve regional problems. Barbara noted that India continued to support Najibullah even after the Geneva Accords. As the Taliban assumed power in 1996 in Afghanistan, Hamid Ansari and C. Christine Fair note that India decided to shut down its embassy in Kabul but continued to engage with the United Islamic Front or Northern Alliance which continued to control

30% population of Afghanistan. India, as noted by John Cherian, became fervently anti-Taliban after the Kandahar hijack of IC-814 Indian Airline aircraft. John Cherian noted that one of the reasons of Indian opposition to Taliban was its support to Pakistan and the terrorism it sponsored against India. Praveen Swami asserts that Pakistan even today favours the presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan as it would give Pakistan an assurance of strategic depth against India.

Shashi Tharoor states that post-9/11 and the subsequent ousting of the Taliban by the US through its invasion of Afghanistan, India resorted to a soft power approach to assist reconstruction of a war-ravaged Afghanistan.

Subhajit Roy notes that India's developmental aid to Afghanistan has generated tremendous goodwill in Afghanistan. The Indian developmental diplomacy in Afghanistan has been unique because it channelises all the money through the Afghan government unlike other foreign donors who create their parallel structures. India's interaction with the Afghan government helps it establish a strong political dialogue. India also follows a very unique capacity building model where in it focusses on women groups and tribal organisations, to which India provides special assistance for employment generation. To ensure local participation in the insurgency-prone Pashtun areas of East and South Afghanistan, the Indian strategy is to support small developmental projects. Shanthie D'Souza observes that Indian strategy of adopting community led, community owned and community driven projects in Afghanistan is based on the Gandhian strategy which is today being emulated by the Western powers. The chapter of India–Afghanistan relations notes the development partnership India has established with Afghanistan. Gul Agha Sherazi, the governor of Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, has deeply appreciated revival of cultural ties between the two states through joint musical performances and football and cricket (for instance, the Subroto Cup for football).

Thus, our analysis of the relationship through a short snapshot has reiterated that India has positioned itself as a major regional and economic player capable of displaying immediate power in India's periphery and has aggressively worked for a revival of Afghanistan to establish a bridge to connect South and Central Asia. Now we shall turn our attention towards the geopolitical rivalry to conclude with the end game of this new rivalry.

Gautam Mukhopadhaya, Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein argue that Pakistan perceives India's cooperation with Afghanistan with a suspicion bordering on paranoia. It believes that a deep Indo–Afghan relation is not allowing Pakistan to maintain a strategic depth against India. Barnett Rubin observes that the Pakistani intelligence and army have always approached Afghanistan with an intention to balance out India. George Friedman further notes that Pakistan favours a weak Afghanistan or an Afghanistan with Pakistani influence, so as to render India's position weak in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, in a confidential report, had noted that India's contribution to Afghanistan has led to a huge benefit to the Afghani people but the rising Indian influence in Afghanistan was likely to cause regional tensions and that, consequently, Pakistan would be more encouraged to contain India. Jeremy Khan has remarked that it is widely accepted now that the road to peace in Afghanistan runs through Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi and Pakistan feels that the rising influence of India in Afghanistan is to encircle Pakistan. The Indian strategic establishment however today feels that India & Pakistan and Afghanistan are playing a 'Zero Sum' game. The Pakistani goals to contain India in Afghanistan have only exacerbated Indian fears.

In India, K Subramanyam, Brajesh Mishra, G. Parthasarthi and Gurmeet Kanwal favour a situation where India, to guard its outer periphery or extended neighbourhood, should use its military as a tool of diplomacy. India has been training the Afghan National

Security Force, which is a mix of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. India, in the recent times during the visit of Indian PM Modi to Afghanistan, has also provided helicopters to Afghanistan. India has refrained from any proximity to ethnic groups but favours direct engagement with Afghan government. Rajiv Sikri, Tim Sullivan and Rahul Roy Chaudhary argue that India should not be a bystander to the developments in Afghanistan and should try to be meaningfully involved in the security setup of Afghanistan. Senior Indian diplomats do further hold that India signing an agreement on strategic partnership with Afghanistan has enabled India to initiate a more security-centric engagement with Afghanistan.

Ahmed Rashid says that India being overstretched in the Pakistani backyard may fall into the reputation trap. In the Indian Foreign Policy office, certain diplomats continue to assert that India should continue to engage with Pakistan to elicit a responsible behaviour from Pakistan related to Indian engagement in Afghanistan. C Raja Mohan has cautioned that it is for India to deepen its engagement with Afghanistan while assuaging Pakistani fears of encirclement. As the US has initiated troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US and other powers have initiated a dialogue with Taliban. As the dialogue with Taliban is under way and as of 2017, the Hekmattyar faction has made peace, India continues to maintain that it would support an inclusive political order which is based on an Afghan led reintegration only. It supports the logic that if any reintegration is undertaken by the government of Afghanistan that it would favour such reintegration. Shukla has observed that India has made it clear to Afghanistan that it would favour reintegration of any faction of Taliban if it abjures violence and agrees to settle down within the framework of the Afghan constitution. But Nirupama Rao, the Indian foreign secretary, has asserted that such an attempt of reintegration will be futile if Pakistan continues to support the strategic assets of the Taliban leadership and positions itself as an interlocutor in power sharing.



Sumit Ganguly observes that though India and the US may have convergence of

interests in Afghanistan, the USA's support to Pakistan shall only exacerbate the irritation between India and Pakistan, thereby fuelling geopolitical rivalry. Brahma Chellaney also clarifies further that unless the US destroys Pakistani sanctuaries of terrorism, it would not win the Afghan War.

The withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan has certainly intensified Indian fears. Even K Subramanyam notes that if US troops withdraw completely, it will lead to a triumph of the Jihadis who would feel that they have successfully defeated the US and the Soviets, further emboldening their aim to take upon India. Thus, to prevent something like this, the Indian diplomatic strategy has been to seek international commitment in Afghanistan and establish a strong Afghanistan government as these initiatives will prevent a Taliban takeover and a spillover of extremism to India. Gurmeet Kanwal has advocated for India to use military power in Afghanistan to create the needed deterrence to ground attacks on Indian embassy officials and workers in Afghanistan.

However, Tim Sullivan says that there is a belief that India might lean towards a self-interested coalition of Russia, Iran and Central Asian states to prevent a future Taliban takeover. Harsh Pant asserts that post 2015, the Lausanne framework between US and Iran, and India and Iran have initiated a new phase of consultation with respect to Afghanistan. Indian Foreign Secretaries, from Ranjan Mathai to S. Jaishankar, have favoured the addition of Iran as a key stakeholder in Afghan resettlement. As the situation on the ground remains unclear, there is a dilemma in India about whether it should continue the 'aid only' policy or whether it should favour reintegration. The strategy that India is planning to adopt in the future is a shift to programme delivery from asset creation. India is likely to take up systemic anti-poverty measures in Afghanistan in the future. This would be coupled with support to bridging critical gaps in the socio-political capital of Afghanistan. Such a strategy would help in an enduring long-term presence of India in Afghanistan with strategic partnership as its basis.



GRAND STRATEGY AND INDIA AND IRAN

In the chapter of India and Iran relations we have noted that India and Iran are civilisational partners that have common extra-regional ambitions. In this section, we will

try to analyse the Indo–Iranian relations through the prism of India's grand strategy. India is an energy hungry country. As a fast-growing economy, it is imperative for India to look for sources of energy to ensure energy security. Iran is geographically and materially significant for India. The location of Iran also serves the security interests of India. India's energy demands are rising, but its dependence on coal and oil, along with hydroelectric power, have not been effective in meeting the rising demands. Tanu Madan has observed India has the option of using renewable energy but such technology is unlikely to be used on a mass scale at least in the immediate future. Praful Bidwai has noted that the Indo–US nuclear deal can only help in meeting approximately 8% of the projected needs of energy but MV Ramana remarks that after the Fukushima nuclear disaster such projections may be too optimistic. Also, due to procedural issues related to the Civilian Liability Nuclear Damages Act of India, the nuclear deal with US is still to see its true potential. Thus, in this situation, keeping the climate change politics in mind, the sole winner seems to be natural gas. Gas has been rapidly put to use in various emerging market economies for the purpose of electricity generation. The only concern with gas is its transportation. We have explained the process of importing LPG to India in the chapter on India–Qatar relations. Theoretically, practically and economically, it is better if the gas supplier is closer to the importer. India is fortunate in this regard with respect to Iran, Qatar and the rest of the Persian Gulf. India has successfully entered into a long-term contract for LNG supply from Qatar. In Afghanistan, Iran perceives the presence of Taliban in Afghanistan as detrimental to regional security. As Taliban owes its overall present-day existence to Pakistan, it becomes a new point of cooperation between India and Iran. Due to a strained Iran–Pakistan relationship, it opens up a new vista of cooperation between India and Iran. Selig Harrison has argued that China's CPEC project has exacerbated Indian fears and India would therefore want to forge stronger security ties with Iran to keep a check on Pakistan, China and more importantly on Baluchistan.

A strong Indo–Iran partnership gives India not only a route to reach landlocked Afghanistan but also the larger Central Asia. Sudha Ramchandran notes, a good Indo–Iran relation will help lay down the foundation for strong Indo–Tajikistan relations as Tajikistan is an important Iranian ally. In future, if US–Pakistan or US–China relations sour, it could lead to a China–Pakistan–Iran axis which would be detrimental for India, and a strong Indo–Iran relationship could act as a possible hedge against such an axis.

A recent work on India and Iran relations has noted that India and Iran have an ancient relation spanning over many centuries. The rift between the two states came during the Cold War period when Iran, under the Pahlavi monarchy, tilted towards the US while India promoted the idea of non-alignment. The rift widened when, in the 1965 Indo–Pakistan War, Iran supported Pakistan. However, it has been noted that despite the difference in the ideologies of the two states, Iran never switched off oil exports to India. The 1979, the Iranian Revolution was viewed by India as a positive assertion of Iranian national identity. According to Farah Naaz, India even congratulated the new regime in Iran post-1979 by sending an unofficial delegation to Tehran. This newness in Indo–Iran relationship was cut short as according to Mohammed Reza, the new regime in Iran began to assert its Islamist character very strongly. Farah Naaz observes that this Islamist assertion by Iran was visible in their support to a Kashmiri Islamist bloc known as the Muslim United Front. In 1992, when the then Iranian President Rafsanjani visited

Pakistan, he condemned the Babri Masjid demolition and asserted the need for self-determination for Kashmir. John Calabrese and Arshin have noted that after the decline of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian foreign policy underwent a shift. This shift was visible in 1989 when Rajendra Pachauri and Ali Shams proposed an Iran–India–Pakistan Pipeline. In 1993, during the visit of Narasimha Rao to Tehran, a memorandum of understanding and on the Iran–India–Pakistan pipeline was signed. The biggest surprise for India came as Farah Naaz asserts, when Iran aggressively used its clout in UN Human Rights commission to persuade Pakistan to drop a resolution condemning Indian actions in the valley of Kashmir. The visit of Rao in 1993 was followed by a state visit by Rafsanjani in 1995 to India–Iran ties back on track.

Harsh Pant observes that the visit of Rafsanjani to India led to India signing key agreements with Iran and Russia to deepen trade with Central Asia by creating the International North–South Transportation Corridor. M Atkins notes that coming of Taliban in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to both India and Iran to cooperate in Afghanistan through their support to the Northern Alliance. We have noted in the chapter on India–Iran relations that in 2001 during Vajpayee visit to Tehran, India and Iran entered into a strategic partnership. This opened up a new space of engagement. The Tehran Declaration not only affirmed the ancient civilisational ties but declared the willingness of the two to cooperate while tackling terrorism. The visit of Mohammed Khatami as the chief guest of Republic Day in 2003 led to the conclusion of the Delhi Declaration which explored the possibility of allowing India to use its military bases in the eventuality of an Indo–Pak War.



The most significant shift in the bilateral relations came in 2005 when India and Iran would agree signing an LNG agreement where India agreed to pay USD 3.51 per million British thermal units. The fate of the IPI pipeline got strained when US announced a nuclear deal for India as an indirect censure to Iran over its nuclear programme. C. Raja Mohan notes that the US agreed to help India meet its energy needs through a regular supply of the nuclear technology. The Indo–Iran relations took a severe hit when India supported the IAEA resolution citing Article III B. 4 of IAEA statute for international sanctions and military action on Iran. Siddhartha Varadarajan observed that Indian voting at IAEA was in contradiction to the Indian position that held that the Iranian nuclear issue would be resolved only through negotiations and not through punitive action. However, the Indian establishment clarified that its vote at the IAEA did not change the Indian policy as the vote did not refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council and asserted that the resolution has only agreed to solve all issues at the level of IAEA. After the Indian vote, Iran stated that it would reconsider its ties with India and hike the price of the LNG supply. In 2006, Iran stated that the 2005 LNG agreement has been invalidated due to differences over LNG pricing. India strongly objected to the unilateral abrogation of the deal by Iran but refrained from taking up any legal actions. There was certainly a very strong circumstantial link between India's vote at IAEA and the Iranian actions on the LNG deal.

The relationship deteriorated further in 2008 when India launched an Israeli spy satellite which was to spy over Iran. The relationship fell apart further when, after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, Iran stated that it had been staged by the US and Israel secretly. India voted in 2009 for the third time against Iran at IAEA. Harsh Pant observes that it was in 2010 during Manmohan Singh's visit to Saudi Arabia that India, in the Riyadh declaration, made an unprecedented move of using the Saudi soil to encourage Iran to remove ambiguities about its nuclear programme.

If it was due to the US that the two nations drifted apart, then it was also US withdrawal from Afghanistan that again brought India and Iran closer to each other to maintain regional security. Anew bonhomie in the relationship erupted when in 2010 India denounced unilateral UN sanctions against Iran sponsored by the West and the European Union. The US did try to link India's nuclear deal with itself to how India would side with the US in its vote against Iran. However, K. Subramaniam, through his material structural framework analysis, suggested that India has gained more from a strategic alliance with US than any loss it may have suffered due to its voting at IAEA against Iran.



The Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has observed that India's exercise of policy choices (read as Indian vote at IAEA against Iran) have had an impact on

accelerating India–US relations and have contributed to more depth in the relations. Since the end of the Cold War, as India positioned itself to exude a liberal democratic identity, it saw the nuclear deal offered by the US to India as a step to rise on a global platform, thereby pushing the relation with Iran to the periphery if it hampered the rise of India. India thought that it could create a distance from Iran for the time being as Indo–Iran ties were secondary as compared to India's ties with Gulf cooperation council states. But with the signing of the USA–Iran nuclear deal in 2015 (Lausanne Framework), India has now made an attempt to reconfigure its ties with Iran. As the Iranian nuclear programme now comes under the ambit of the IAEA safeguards, a stable and integrated Iran is viewed by India as positive alliance that is in its national interest. India owed US 8.8 billion dollars to Iran for the oil it supplied to India. India was unable to pay to Iran for the oil dues due to sanctions. As, since 2015, there has been a downward trend in oil prices, India has decided to increase oil and gas trade with Iran. During Indian PM's Visit to Iran, India has affirmed its commitment to assist Iran in port and railway construction. The US–Iran deal is in favour of India's grand strategy as it permits India to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran. The commitment to develop the International North–South Transit Corridor will allow India to have access to the abundant energy deposits of Central Asia.



GRAND STRATEGY AND INDIA AND ISRAEL

The chapter on India and Israel relations in the book has already explained various aspects of India–Israel relations. India, in 1950, did recognise Israel without advancing diplomatic ties the fact that Israel and India had no direct conflict of interests with each other. However, as noted in the same chapter, we have argued that in 1992, India took the pragmatic decision to bring about a shift in its relations with Israel through the prism of self-interest. This section will build upon the chapter detailing India–Israel relations to use

the grand strategy framework to assess the relationship.

Kanti Bajpai has observed several times that since India's independence, competing visions on Indian strategic thinking have emerged, none of which have ever dominated the decision-making apparatus of India. C. Raja Mohan, on his part, has noted that the Indian Foreign Policy has certainly witnessed a shift to pragmatism since the end of the Cold War.



The framework of C. Raja Mohan has been used by Richard Kozicki to explain India's Israel policy. Kozicki states that India rejected Zionism as it perceived it to be a form of colonialism. This rejection of Zionism had a deep imprint upon India's initial neglect of Israel in 1948. Sreeram Chaulia observes that it was in the light of its later pragmatism that India was motivated to tilt towards Israel when it had the opportunity to completely revisit the West Asia Policy in 1992. Nicholas Blarel has similarly observed that international, regional, domestic and structural factors at the end of the Cold War had necessitated that India to take another look at the its Israel policy. Kanti Bajpai asserts that when India became independent & was faced with a bipolar world, Nehru's nonalignment was India's one of the important strategic priorities. In fact Nehru prioritized economic development after independence and stated that it was development which was an important strategic goal for India as an economically powerful India would be later recognized as a great commercial power by the other global great powers. Kanti Bajpai asserts that even today India's foreign policy has a commercial component where even today it strives to garner global support for India's economic initiatives like Make in India & Smart Cities Project. No doubt, as far as Israel is concerned, it doesn't directly fit into Alastair Johnston's central strategic paradigm for India, but an analytical framework for grand strategy is not just concerned about strategic ends. A grand strategy also looks at instruments to operationalise strategic options and it is with respect to this second part of grand strategy that India's Israel policy fits the case. To ensure the achievement of its main strategic goals, India has included Israel in its grand strategy, which will assist India to cope up with certain threats and vulnerabilities.

India maintained ties with West Asia prior to its independence. In the chapter of India–Israel relations, we have analysed in detail not only the historical aspects but also the support and policy of Indian National Congress to the Khilafat question. Rajendra Abhyankar observes that the INC wanted to use the Khilafat issue to forge a unity between Hindu and Muslims during the National Movement. Though Congress did show its first sign in the Khilafat issue to compromise its secular character to support a religious issue, but with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the entire issue became irrelevant. Najma Heptulla notes that Nehru used the policy of linking Indian and Arab

struggles against British as well as the British support to Zionists as a resistance against the British divide and rule strategy. Indian nationalists rejected the idea of a national home for Jews as India favoured a federal united single Palestine at the UN special commission on Palestine(UNSCOP) and rejected the idea of partitioning Palestine. However, India's support for a federal Palestine was lost to the General Assembly's vote in favour of a partition in November 1947.

PR Kumaraswamy notes that India, initially in 1948, refused to recognise the existence of Israel but after weighing all options, it recognised the nation state on 17th September, 1950. G. Parthasarthi asserts that India had to recognise Israel as it was already recognised by a large number of countries (including Turkey and Iran) but resorted to not establishing diplomatic relations, thereby adopting a limited relationship policy. Sumit Ganguly and Michael Blarel argue that India deliberately delayed the decision of recognising Israel (till 1950) so that it becomes a less decisive international issue. India basically wanted to wait for the first Arab–Israel war to end. Another important dimension that India had in mind was to garner support of the 13 Arab votes in UN on the Kashmir issue in contrast to one vote of Israel. Even as the constituent assembly debated, Nehru did agree that an important factor in delaying recognition of Israel was India's friendship with Arabs. Noor Ahmad Baba notes that as Pakistan failed in exploiting pan-Islamism in the Kashmir issue, it eventually opened up the possibility for India to recognise Israel. As India needed financial aid from the US, it would have become difficult for India not to recognise Israel or adopt a policy of deliberate delay. Thus, India recognised the existence of Israel without advancing diplomatic recognition. This policy of India of keeping diplomatic options opened synchronises with India's strategic behaviour of an independent foreign policy.

R. Sreekant Nair assets that India's balance of factors policy helped in keeping all options open. As the regional situation in 1950s improved, India allowed Israel to open a consulate in Bombay in 1952. Michael Blarel notes that as the regional situation deteriorated after the 1956 Suez crises, India ruled out normalisation of diplomatic relations. Arthur R. argues that India did support Arabs against Israel in 1956, 1967 and 1973 but the Arabs never reciprocated their support to India in 1962, 1965 and 1971. However, as 80% of Indian Oil came from the Gulf, Indira Gandhi enhanced economic ties with Arabs. Gulshan notes that India began to provide engineers and technical manpower to Arab states but could never get support of Arabs for security and strategic issues.

The reassessment of India's Israel policy was occasioned by events during the Cold War. BK Srivastava notes that failure of Arabs to support India in 1962, 1965 and 1971 created a ripple in the Indian political establishment where Jan Sangha favoured the idea of establishing Indo–Israel ties. Rubinoff has suggested that some reassessment has

already happened before 1992 as Israel had supported India by providing military supplies in 1962 Sino–Indian War. In 1977, when Janata Party government came to power, Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defence Minister, was secretly invited to India. JN Dixit notes that Janata Party government wanted to use the visit as a pretext to change the gears to a different Israeli policy. For that matter, Rajiv Gandhi knew that a rapprochement with Israel would incrementally pave way for normalisation of ties with the US. K Shankar Bajpai notes that as Narasimha Rao became the PM, he was able to give the needed impetus to the India's West Asia policy and specially the relations with Israel. J N Dixit asserted that it was a careful analysis of India's national interests that explained normalization of Indian ties with Israel.



C. Raja Mohan remarks that as India opened up to Israel and the US, it generated some insecurity in the Arab world that feared that they may lose out on developing relations with an emerging India. It is in this context that Saudi Arabia urged Pakistan to give up aspirations on Kashmir during the Kargil war.

Kanti Bajpai notes that the end of the Cold War freed Narasimha Rao from the tutelage of the non-alignment philosophy. The market reforms initiated by Rao domestically in India depended to a huge extent on how Rao would arrange for resources from the international bodies and the great powers. Keeping this in mind, India decided to join in the move to revoke the UN resolution that had equated Zionism with racism in 1991. The most important priority of India after the end of Cold War was to bolster its military capabilities and with sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union, India sought assistance from nations offering military capabilities. The changed strategic environment favoured the improvement of relations with Israel and Israel was now a natural partner for India as it possessed the needed military industrial complex to assist India to modernise its defence capabilities. Thus, the Indo–Israel relationship, immediately upon improvement, took up a security dimension. India even decided to include Israel's counter-terrorism expertise in its security relationship. Bruce Riedel notes that military partnership got strengthened. Amit Gupta notes that Israel had developed capabilities in competition of Western powers and as per Stephen Blank, India decided to collaborate with Israel on Light Combat Aircrafts and ballistic missiles. Katz notesthat India purchased Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Advanced Air Defence Systems from Israel.

C. Christine Fair observes that India continues to maintain foreign policy autonomy and does not get entangled in ideological alliances, preferring strategic partnerships with nations based on self-interests (Iran for energy and Israel for defence are examples here). Apart from defence, India has sought Israeli assistance in irrigation and soil management and as per James Lamont and Martin Wolf. India has also launched a negotiation process for a free trade agreement with Israel. As per the Grand Strategy framework analysis, it is imminent now that India's future relationship will Israel will flourish till Israel is able to fulfil the niche defence interests of India. Berman has argued that certain Hindu nationalists in the post 9/11 environment favour a natural Indo–Israel alliance against Islamic fundamentalism but on ground, collaboration may be difficult as India does not feel that the Israeli strategy of punitive wars will yield any positive changes in reality. The Indo–Israel partnership is highly a selective partnership on certain dimensions that assists India to achieve its grand strategy. Abhyankar argues that India, in order to emerge as a global player, should mobilise resources effectively from both Arabs as well as Israel. Dhiraj Nair states that India, despite institutionalising strategic cooperation with Israel, has officially maintained its pro-Palestine position at the international fore.

GRAND STRATEGY AND AFRICA AND INDIA

This section would be better understood if the readers develop an understanding of the themes discussed in the eleven chapters dedicated to Africa in the book. This part attempts to study India's foreign policy making process with respect to Africa to analyse institutional origins and key determinants of the India's Africa Policy. Amitav Acharya has noted that India in the post-independence period resorted to the use of non-alignment to engage with Africa and support anti-colonial movements in Africa. As the Cold War progressed, and Africa gained independence, many nations got entangled in 'hot' proxy fronts during Cold War, while India stayed away from any intervention in the bipolar power politics. A small period of disengagement followed at the end of the Cold War.

C. Raja Mohan asserts that at the end of the Cold War, India's focus shifted towards states in the Look East Policy and improvement of ties with the US. This led to a disengagement with Africa in terms of its strategic importance to India. Not only did trade dip, but India in 1990s, also closed its missions in Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. India did lose some diplomatic capital it had built during Cold War but some Indian diplomats prefer to perceive this period as one of adaptation and transition due to divergent interests in Indian foreign policy. It was in 2000 that India was able to match up again to Africa and initiated a reengagement with the continent. The decade of 2000 brought about a radical shift as India, by now, had developed capabilities to undertake

commitments to Africa. The decade of 2000 saw initiatives ranging from trade to TEAM - 9 to the First India–Africa Forum Summit (2008) leading to the rise of a new programme of soft policy for African development.



There are four main factors that shape the Indo–Africa relations:



The Ministry of External Affairs majorly promotes Indian interest in Africa, in close collaboration with the other ministries in India, like Ministries of Defence, Commerce, and so on. As these other ministries have no overseas representatives in the Indian Mission, the burden of engagement falls majorly upon the MEA. Apart from the MEA, there are officers of the Research and Analysis Wing in the African mission. The R&AW officials are present in Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, Mauritius, and South Africa. The Africa division in the MEA suffers from understaffing of diplomats while another issue is lesser number of diplomats in Indian missions in Africa. A very important hurdle at the diplomatic level is the language barrier. The moment an officer is selected in the Indian Foreign Service they have undergo compulsory foreign language training. Very few officers master French and Portuguese. For the Portuguese language, an IFS officer for CFL is sent to Lisbon, Brazil, Angola and Mozambique while for the French, the officers are mostly sent to Brussels. Apart from this, there is a common problem about an archaic image of Africa that officers have in mind. However, we are witnessing some young diplomats showing keenness to work in Africa as it gives them greater learning opportunities. Within the MEA, diplomats assert that as far as Africa is concerned, the responsibility for policy planning is solely of the institutional mechanism. Diplomats also agree that in Indian planning for Africa, the focus is more on English speaking nations than French and Portuguese speaking countries. These have been occasional efforts on facilitating horizontal interaction between diplomats posted in Africa to encourage inter-

institutional collaboration.

Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia argues that the Indian policy to engage with Africa lacks any coherence and there are no long-term guidelines and targets that India has set. He clearly points out to a lack of a document or a concept note that can be articulated as India's Africa Policy. Thus, according to the Ambassador Navdeep Suri, a sustained engagement with Africa began only after the First India–Africa Forum Summit in 2008 where India began to focus on the softer dimensions of diplomacy for long-term engagement.



Ruchita Bedi emphasises that the pace of the India policy is not fast and furious like Yangtze River, but is more like the Ganges, which is slow and complex, with many curves and changes in course. Therefore, India has an idea of a policy, which may not adhere to the strictest and most stringent interpretation of the term.