Chapter 5
Nationalism

Origins and development

The word 'nation' has been used since the thirteenth century and derives from the Latin nasci, meaning to be born. In the form of natio, it referred to a group of people united by birth or birthplace. In its original usage, 'nation' thus implied a breed of people or a racial group, but possessed no political significance. It was not until the late eighteenth century that the term acquired political overtones, as individuals and groups started to be classified as 'nationalists'. The term 'nationalism' was first used in print in 1789 by the anti-Jacobin French priest Augustin Barruel. By the mid-nineteenth century nationalism was widely recognized as a political doctrine or movement, for example as a major ingredient of the revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848. In many respects, nationalism developed into the most successful and compelling of political creeds, helping to shape and reshape history in many parts of the world for over two hundred years.

The idea of nationalism was born during the French Revolution. Previously countries had been thought of as 'realms', 'principalities' or 'kingdoms'. The inhabitants of a country were 'subjects', their political identity being formed by allegiance to a ruler or ruling dynasty, rather than any sense of national identity or patriotism (p. 167). However, the revolutionaries in France who rose up against Louis XVI in 1789 did so in the name of the people, and understood the people to be the 'French nation'. Their ideas were influenced by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (see p. 165) and the new doctrine of popular self-government. Nationalism was therefore a revolutionary and democratic creed, reflecting the idea that 'subjects of the crown' should become 'citizens of France'. The nation should be its own master. However, such ideas were not the exclusive property of the French. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815, much of continental Europe was invaded by France, giving rise to both resentment against France and a desire for independence. In Italy and Germany, long divided into a collection of states, the experience of conquest helped to forge for the first time a consciousness of national unity, expressed in a new language of nationalism, inherited from France. Nationalist ideas also spread to Latin America in the early nineteenth century, where Simon Bolivar (1783–1830), 'the Liberator', led revolutions against Spanish rule in what was then New Grenada, now the countries of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as in Peru and Bolivia.

The rising tide of nationalism redrew the map of Europe in the nineteenth century as the autocratic and multinational empires of Turkey, Austria and Russia started to crumble in the face of liberal and nationalist pressure. In 1848 nationalist uprisings broke out in the Italian states, amongst the Czechs and the Hungarians, and in Germany, where the desire for national unity

was expressed in the creation of the short-lived Frankfurt parliament. The nineteenth century was a period of nation building. Italy, once dismissed by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich as a 'mere geographical expression', became a united state in 1861, the process of unification being completed with the acquisition of Rome in 1870. Germany, formerly a collection of 39 states, was unified in 1871 following the Franco–Prussian War.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that nationalism was either an irresistible or a genuinely popular movement during this period. Enthusiasm for nationalism was largely restricted to the rising middle classes, who were attracted to the ideas of national unity and constitutional government. Although middle-class nationalist movements kept the dream of national unity or independence alive, they were nowhere strong enough to accomplish the process of nation building on their own. Where nationalist goals were realized, as in Italy and Germany, it was because nationalism coincided with the ambition of rising states such as Piedmont and Prussia. For example German unification owed more to the Prussian army, which defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870–1, than it did to the liberal nationalist movement.

However, by the end of the nineteenth century nationalism had become a truly popular movement, with the spread of flags, national anthems, patriotic poetry and literature, public ceremonies and national holidays. Nationalism became the language of mass politics, made possible by the growth of primary education, mass literacy and the spread of popular newspapers. The character of nationalism also changed. Nationalism had previously been associated with liberal and progressive movements, but was increasingly taken up by conservative and reactionary politicians. Nationalism came to stand for social cohesion, order and stability, particularly in the face of the growing challenge of socialism, which embodied the ideas of social revolution and international working-class solidarity. Nationalism sought to integrate the increasingly powerful working class into the nation, and so to preserve the established social structure. Patriotic fervour was no longer aroused by the prospect of political liberty or democracy, but by the commemoration of past national glories and military victories. Such nationalism became increasingly chauvinistic and xenophobic. Each nation claimed its own unique or superior qualities, while other nations were regarded as alien, untrustworthy, even menacing. This new climate of popular nationalism helped to fuel policies of colonial expansion that intensified dramatically in the 1870s and 1880s and by the end of the century had brought most of the world's population under European control. It also contributed to a mood of international suspicion and rivalry, which led to world war in 1914.

The end of the First World War saw the completion of the process of nation building in central and Eastern Europe. At the Paris Peace Conference, US President Woodrow Wilson advocated the principle of 'national self-determination'. The German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires were broken up and eight new states created, including Finland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. These new countries were designed to be nation-states that conformed to the geography of existing national or ethnic groups. However, the First World War failed to resolve the serious national tensions that had precipitated conflict in the first place. Indeed, the experience of defeat and disappointment with the terms of the peace treaties left an inheritance of frustrated ambition and bitterness. This was most evident in Germany, Italy and Japan, where fascist or authoritarian movements came to power in the inter-war period by

promising to restore national pride through policies of expansion and empire. Nationalism was therefore a powerful factor leading to war in both 1914 and 1939.

During the twentieth century the doctrine of nationalism, which had been born in Europe, spread throughout the globe as the peoples of Asia and Africa rose in opposition to colonial rule. The process of colonization had involved not only the establishment of political control and economic dominance, but also the importation of western ideas, including nationalism, which began to be used against the colonial masters themselves. Nationalist uprisings took place in Egypt in 1919 and quickly spread throughout the Middle East. The Anglo-Afghan war also broke out in 1919, and rebellions took place in India, the Dutch East Indies and Indochina. After 1945 the map of Africa and Asia was redrawn as the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese empires each disintegrated in the face of nationalist movements that either succeeded in negotiating independence or winning wars of national liberation.

Anticolonialism not only witnessed the spread of western-style nationalism to the developing world, but also generated new forms of nationalism. Nationalism in the developing world has embraced a wide range of movements. In China, Vietnam and parts of Africa, nationalism has been fused with Marxism, and 'national liberation' has been regarded not simply as a political goal but as part of a social revolution. Elsewhere, developing-world nationalism has been anti-western, rejecting both liberal democratic and revolutionary socialist conceptions of nationhood. The most important vehicle for expressing such ideas has been religious belief, and in particular Islam. The rise of Islam as a distinctive political creed has transformed political life in the Middle East and North Africa, especially since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In some respects Islam currently represents the most significant challenge to the worldwide predominance of western liberal democracy.

It is, however, often argued that nationalism has had its day and is now an anachronism, relevant only to European nation building in the nineteenth century, or the anticolonial struggles of the post-Second-World-War period. This thesis is examined in the final section of the chapter, particularly in connection with the advance of globalization. Nevertheless, there is evidence not only of the persistence of nationalism, but also of its revival. Since the 1960s apparently stable nation-states have been increasingly disrupted by nationalist tensions. For example, in the UK, Scottish, Welsh and rival Irish nationalisms have become an established feature of political life. Separatist movements have developed in the Canadian province of Quebec and among such groups as the Basques in northern Spain, the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Muslims of Kashmir in India. The transformation of eastern Europe in 1989–91 also led to a resurgence of nationalism throughout the area. The Soviet Union collapsed in the face of rising nationalism amongst its non-Russian peoples. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist in 1992 with the creation of separate Czech and Slovak republics. Yugoslavia was torn apart by intensified ethnic conflict, which resulted in full-scale war between Serbia and Croatia in 1991 and a four-year civil war in Bosnia, 1992–96. Such forms of nationalisms have, moreover, been characterized by the desire for ethnocultural unity, and in some cases they have been openly chauvinistic and expansionist.

For the love of country – central themes

To treat nationalism as an ideology in its own right is to encounter at least three problems. The first is that nationalism is sometimes classified as a political doctrine rather than a fully-fledged ideology. Whereas, for instance, liberalism, conservatism and socialism constitute complex sets of interrelated ideas and values, nationalism, the argument goes, is at heart the simple belief that the nation is the natural and proper unit of government. The drawback of this view is that it focuses only on what might be regarded as 'classical' political nationalism, and ignores the many others, and in some respects no less significant, manifestations of nationalism, such as cultural nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The core feature of nationalism is therefore not its narrow association with self-government and the nation-state, but its broader link to movements and ideas that in whatever way acknowledge the central importance of the nation. Second, nationalism is sometimes portrayed as an essentially psychological phenomenon – usually as loyalty towards one's nation or dislike of other nations – instead of as a theoretical construct. Undoubtedly one of the key features of nationalism is the potency of its affective or emotional appeal, but to understand it in these terms alone is to mistake the ideology of nationalism for the sentiment of patriotism.

Third, nationalism has a schizophrenic political character. At different times nationalism has been progressive and reactionary, democratic and authoritarian, rational and irrational, and left-wing and right-wing. It has also been associated with almost all the major ideological traditions. In their different ways, liberals, conservatives, socialists, fascists and even communists have been attracted to nationalism, and perhaps only anarchism, by virtue of its outright rejection of the state, is fundamentally at odds with nationalism. Nevertheless, although nationalist doctrines have been used by a bewildering variety of political movements and associated with sometimes diametrically opposed political causes, a bedrock of nationalist ideas and theories can be identified. The most important of these are the following:

- The nation
- Organic community
- Self-determination
- Identity politics

The nation

The basic belief of nationalism is that the nation is, or should be, the central principle of political organization. However, much confusion surrounds what nations are and how they can be defined. In everyday language, words such as 'nation', 'state', 'country' and even 'race' are often confused or used as if they are interchangeable. Many political disputes, moreover, are really disputes about whether a particular group of people should be regarded as a nation and should therefore enjoy the rights and status associated with nationhood. This applies, for instance, to the Tibetans, the Kurds, the Palestinians, the Basques, the Tamils, and so on. On the most basic level, nations are cultural entities, collections of people bound together by shared values and traditions, in particular a common language, religion and history, and usually occupying the same geographical area. From this point of view, the nation can be defined by 'objective' factors: people who satisfy a requisite set of cultural criteria can be said to belong to a

nation; those who do not can be classified as non-nationals or members of foreign nations. However, to define a nation simply as a group of people bound together by a common culture and traditions raises some very difficult questions. Although particular cultural features are commonly associated with nationhood, notably language, religion, ethnicity, history and tradition, there is no blueprint nor any objective criteria that can establish where and when a nation exists.

Language is often taken to be the clearest symbol of nationhood. A language embodies distinctive attitudes, values and forms of expression that produce a sense of familiarity and belonging. German nationalism, for instance, has traditionally been founded upon a sense of cultural unity, reflected in the purity and survival of the German language. Nations have also been highly sensitive to any dilution of or threat to their languages. For example, it is essentially language that divides the French-speaking peoples of Quebec from the rest of English-speaking Canada, and Welsh nationalism largely constitutes an attempt to preserve or revive the Welsh language. At the same time there are peoples who share the same language without having any conception of a common national identity: Americans, Australians and New Zealanders may speak English as a first language, but certainly do not think of themselves as members of an 'English nation'. Other nations have enjoyed a substantial measure of national unity without possessing a national language, as is the case in Switzerland where, in the absence of a Swiss language, three languages are spoken: French, German and Italian.

Religion is another major component of nationhood. Religion expresses common moral values and spiritual beliefs. In Northern Ireland, people who speak the same language are divided along religious lines: most Protestants regard themselves as Unionists and wish to preserve their links with the UK, while many in the Catholic community favour a united Ireland. Islam has been a major factor in forming the national consciousness in much of North Africa and the Middle East. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was largely inspired by the fundamentalist beliefs of Shi'ite Muslims, who sought to purge Iran of western, particularly American, influence. Nevertheless, religious beliefs do not always coincide with a sense of nationhood. Divisions between Catholics and Protestants in mainland UK do not inspire rival nationalisms, nor has the remarkable religious diversity found in the United States threatened to divide the country into a collection of distinct nations. At the same time, countries such as Poland, Italy, Brazil and the Philippines share a common Catholic faith but do not feel that they belong to a unified 'Catholic nation'.

Nations have also been based upon a sense of ethnic or racial unity. This was particularly evident in Germany during the Nazi period. The German word for 'people', Volk, implies both cultural unity and ties of blood. The significance of race has also been highlighted by far-right anti-immigration groups such as the National Front in France and the BNP in the UK. However, nationalism usually has a cultural rather than a biological basis; it reflects an ethnic unity that may be based upon race, but more usually draws from shared values and common cultural beliefs. The nationalism of US blacks, for example, is based less upon colour than upon their distinctive history and culture. Black consciousness in the United States, the West Indies and parts of Europe has thus focused upon the rediscovery of black cultural roots, notably in the experience of slavery and in African society. However, ethnic unity does not always provide a basis for national identity. This is underlined by in the multicultural character of most modern

nations and is particularly evident in the idea of the USA as a 'melting-pot' nation and of post-apartheid South Africa as a 'rainbow nation'.

Nations usually share a common history and traditions. National identity is often preserved by recalling past glories, national independence, the birthdays of national leaders or important military victories. The United States celebrates Independence Day and Thanksgiving; Bastille Day is commemorated in France; in the UK, ceremonies continue to mark Dunkirk and D Day. On the other hand, nationalist feelings may be based more upon future expectations than upon shared memories or a common past. This applies in the case of immigrants who have been 'naturalized', and is most evident in the USA, a 'land of immigrants'. The journey of the Mayflower and the War of Independence have no direct relevance for most Americans, whose families arrived centuries after these events occurred. US nationalism therefore has little to do with a common history or traditions, but has been forged out of a common commitment to the constitution and the values of liberal capitalism for which the USA stands.

The cultural unity that supposedly expresses itself in nationhood is therefore very difficult to pin down. It reflects a varying combination of cultural factors, rather than any precise formula. Ultimately, therefore, nations can only be defined 'subjectively', by their members, not by any set of external factors. In this sense, the nation is a psycho-political entity, a group of people who regard themselves as a natural political community and are distinguished by shared loyalty or affection in the form of patriotism. Objective difficulties such as the absence of land, small population or lack of economic resources are of little significance if a group of people insists on demanding what it sees as 'national rights'. Latvia, for example, became an independent nation in 1991 despite having a population of only 2.6 million (barely half of whom are ethnic Lats), no source of fuel and very few natural resources. Likewise, Kurdish peoples of the Middle East have nationalist aspirations, even though the Kurds have never enjoyed formal political unity and are presently spread over parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

The fact that nations are formed through a combination of objective and subjective factors has given rise to rival concepts of the nation. While all nationalists agree that nations are a blend of cultural and psycho-political

Perspectives on …

The nation

Liberals subscribe to a 'civic' view of the nation that places as much emphasis on political allegiance as on cultural unity. Nations are moral entities in the sense that they are endowed with rights, notably an equal right to self-determination.

Conservatives regard the nation as primarily an 'organic' entity, bound together by a common ethnic identity and a shared history. As the source of social cohesion and collective identity, the nation is perhaps the most politically significant of social groups.

Socialists tend to view the nation as an artificial division of humankind whose purpose is to disguise social injustice and prop up the established order. Political movements and allegiances should therefore have an international, not a national, character.

Anarchists have generally held that the nation is tainted by its association with the state and therefore with oppression. The nation is thus seen as a myth, designed to promote obedience and subjugation in the interests of the ruling elite.

Fascists view the nation as an organically unified social whole, often defined by race, which gives purpose and meaning to individual existence. However, nations are pitted against one another in a struggle for survival in which some are fitted to succeed and others to go to the wall.

Fundamentalists regard nations as, in essence, religious entities, communities of 'believers'. Nevertheless, religion is seldom coextensive with conventional nations, hence the idea of transnational religious communities, such as the 'nation of Islam'.

factors, they disagree strongly about where the balance between the two lies. One the one hand, 'exclusive' concepts of the nation stress the importance of ethnic unity and a shared history. By viewing national identity as 'given', unchanging and indeed unchangeable, this implies that nations are characterized by common descent and so tends to blur the distinction between the nation and the race. Nations are thus held together by a 'primordial bond', a powerful and seemingly innate emotional attachment to a language, religion, traditional way of life or a homeland. To different degrees, conservatives and fascists adopt such a view of the nation. On the other hand, 'inclusive' concepts of the nation highlight the importance of civic consciousness and patriotic loyalty, suggesting that nations may be multiracial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and so forth. This, in turn, tends to blur the distinction between the nation and the state, and thus between nationality and citizenship. Liberals and socialists tend to an inclusive view of the nation.

Organic community

Although nationalists may disagree about the defining features of the nation, they are unified by their belief that nations are organic communities. Humankind, in other words, is naturally divided into a collection of nations, each possessing a distinctive character and separate identity. This, nationalists argue, is why a 'higher' loyalty and deeper political significance attaches to the nation than to any other social group or collective body. Whereas, for instance, class, gender, religion and language may be important in particular societies, or may come to prominence in particular circumstances, the bonds of nationhood are more fundamental. National ties and loyalties are found in all societies, they endure over time, and they operate at an instinctual, even primordial level.

Nevertheless, different explanations have been provided for this. 'Primordialist' approaches to nationalism portray national identity as historically embedded: nations are rooted in a common cultural heritage and language that may long predate statehood or the quest for independence, and are characterized deep emotional attachments that resemble kinship ties. Anthony Smith (1986), for instance, highlighted the continuity between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic

communities, which he called 'ethnies'. This implies that there is little difference between ethnicity and nationality, modern nations essentially being updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities. In contrast, 'situationalist' approaches to nationalism suggests that nation identity is forged in response to changing situations and historical challenges. Ernest Gellner (1983) thus emphasized the degree to which that nationalism is linked to modernization, and in particular to the process of industrialization. He stressed that, while pre-modern or 'agro-literate' societies were structured by a network of feudal bonds and loyalties, emerging industrial societies promoted social mobility, self-striving and competition, and so required a new source of cultural cohesion. This was provided by nationalism. Although Gellner's theory suggests that nations coalesced in response to particular social conditions and circumstances, it also implies that the national community is deep-rooted and will be enduring, as a return to pre-modern loyalties and identities is unthinkable.

The national community is a particular kind of community, however. As a social or political principle, community suggests a social group that possesses a strong collective identity based on the bonds of comradeship, loyalty and duty. For example, the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (1855–1936) distinguished between Gemeinschaft, or 'community', typically found in traditional societies and characterized by natural affection and mutual respect, and Gesellschaft, or 'association', the looser, artificial and contractual relationships that are typically found in urban and industrialized societies. For nationalists, the nation is definitely forged out of Gemeinschaft-type relationships. Nevertheless, as Benedict Anderson (1983) pointed out, nations constitute only 'imagined communities'. Anderson argued that nations exist more as mental images than as genuine communities that require a degree of face-to-face interaction to sustain the notion of a common identity. Within nations, individuals only ever meet a tiny proportion of those with whom they supposedly share a national identity. If nations exist, they exist as imagined artifices, constructed for us through education, the mass media and a process of political socialization.

The idea that nations are 'imagined', not organic, communities has been seized upon by critics of nationalism. 'Constructivist' approaches to nationalism regard national identity as very largely an ideological construct, usually serving the interests of powerful groups. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm (1983), for example, highlighted the extent to which nations are based upon 'invented traditions'. Hobsbawm argued that a belief in historical continuity and cultural purity is invariably a myth, and, what is more, a myth created by nationalism itself. In this view, nationalism creates nations, not the other way round. A widespread consciousness of nationhood did not, for example, develop until the late nineteenth century, perhaps fashioned by the invention of national anthems and national flags, and the extension of primary education and thus mass literacy. Socialists, particularly Marxists, have linked this process to the attempt to consolidate inherently unstable class societies. From this perspective, nationalism is viewed as a device through which the ruling class counters the threat of social revolution by ensuring that national loyalty is stronger than class solidarity, thereby binding the working class to the existing power structure.

Self-determination

Nationalism as a political ideology only emerged when the idea of national community encountered the doctrine of popular sovereignty. This occurred during the French Revolution and was influenced by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, sometimes seen as the 'father' of modern nationalism. Although Rousseau did not specifically address the question of the nation, or discuss the phenomenon of nationalism, his stress on popular sovereignty, expressed in the idea of the 'general will', was the seed from which nationalist doctrines sprang. As a result of the Polish struggle for independence from Russia, he came to believe that this is vested in a culturally unified people. The 'general will' is the common or collective interest of society, the will of all provided each acts selflessly. Rousseau argued that government should be based not upon the absolute power of a monarch, but upon the indivisible collective will of the entire community. During the French Revolution these beliefs were reflected in the assertion that the French people were 'citizens' possessed of inalienable rights and duties, no longer merely 'subjects' of the crown. Sovereign power thus resided with the 'French nation'. The form of nationalism that emerged from the French Revolution was therefore based on the vision of a people or nation governing itself. In other words, the nation is not merely a natural community; it is a natural political community.

In this tradition of nationalism, nationhood and statehood are intrinsically linked. The litmus test of national identity is the desire to attain or maintain political independence, usually expressed in the principle of national self-determination. The goal of nationalism is therefore the founding of a 'nation-state'. To date, this has been achieved in one of

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78)

Geneva-born French moral and political philosopher, perhaps the principal intellectual influence upon the French Revolution. Rousseau was entirely self-taught. He moved to Paris in 1742 and became an intimate of leading members of the French Enlightenment, especially Diderot (1713–84).

Rousseau's writings range over education, the arts, science, literature and philosophy. His philosophy reflects a deep belief in the goodness of 'natural man' and the corruption of 'social man'. Rousseau's political teaching, summarised in Émile (1762) and developed in The Social Contract (1762), advocates a radical form of democracy based on the idea of the 'general will'. It is impossible to link Rousseau to any one political tradition; his thought has influenced liberal, socialist, anarchist and, some argue, fascist thought.

two ways. First, it may involve a process of unification. German history, for instance, has repeatedly witnessed unification. In medieval times, the German states were united under Charlemagne in the Holy Roman Empire, referred to by later German nationalists as the 'First Reich'. Germany was not reunited until Bismarck founded his 'Second Reich' in 1871. Hitler's 'Third Reich' completed the process of unification by incorporating Austria into 'Greater Germany'. Following its defeat in the Second World War, Germany was again divided, with the founding of the two Germanies in 1949 – East Germany and West Germany – and the permanent independence of a separate Austria. The two Germanies were finally reunited in 1990.

Second, nation-states can be created through the achievement of independence, in which a nation is liberated from foreign rule and gains control over its own destiny. For example, much of Polish history has witnessed successive attempts to achieve independence from the control of various foreign powers. Poland ceased to exist in 1793 when the Poles were partitioned by Austria, Russia and Prussia. Recognized by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, Poland was proclaimed in 1918 and became an independent republic. However, in accordance with the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 1939, Poland was invaded by Germany and repartitioned, this time between Germany and the Soviet Union. Although Poland achieved formal independence in 1945, for much of the post-war period it remained firmly under Soviet control. The election of a non-communist government in 1989 therefore marked a further liberation of the country from foreign control.

For nationalists, the nation-state is the highest and most desirable form of political organization. The great strength of the nation-state is that it offers the prospect of both cultural cohesion and political unity. When a people who share a common cultural or ethnic identity gain the right to self-government, nationality and citizenship coincide. Moreover, nationalism legitimizes the authority of government. Political sovereignty in a nation-state resides with the people or the nation itself. Consequently, nationalism represents the idea of popular self-government, the idea that government is carried out either by the people or for the people, in accordance with their 'national interest'. This is why nationalists believe that the forces that have created a world of independent nation-states are natural and irresistible, and that no other social group could constitute a meaningful political community. The nation-state, in short, is the only viable political unit.

However, it would be misleading to suggest that nationalism is always associated with the nation-state or is necessarily linked to the idea of self-determination. Some nations, for instance, may be satisfied with a measure of political autonomy that stops short of statehood and full independence. This can be seen in the case of Welsh nationalism in the UK and Breton and Basque nationalism in France. Nationalism is thus not always associated with separatism, the quest to secede from a larger political formation with a view to establishing an independent state, but may instead be expressed through federalism or devolution. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether devolution or even federalism establishes a sufficient measure of self-government to satisfy nationalist demands. The granting of wide-ranging powers to the Basque region of Spain has failed to end ETA's campaign of terrorism. Similarly, the creation of a Scottish Parliament in the UK in 1999 has not ended the SNP's campaign to achieve an independent Scotland within the EU.

Identity politics

All forms of nationalism address the issue of identity. Whatever political causes nationalism may be associated with, it advances these on the basis of a sense of collective identity, usually understood as patriotism. For the political nationalist, 'objective' considerations such as territory, religion and language are no more important than 'subjective' ones such as will, memory and patriotic loyalty. Nationalism, therefore, not only advances political causes but also tells people who they are: it gives people a history, forges social bonds and a collective spirit, and creates a sense of destiny larger than individual existence. Indeed, it may be precisely the strength of

nationalism's affective elements and the relative weakness of its doctrinal ones that accounts for the unusual success of nationalism as a political creed.

Certain forms of nationalism, however, are less closely related to overtly political demands than others. This particularly applies in the case of cultural nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Cultural nationalism is a form

Patriotism

Patriotism (from the Latin patria, meaning 'fatherland') is a sentiment, a psychological attachment to one's nation, literally a 'love of one's country'. The terms nationalism and patriotism are often confused. Nationalism has a doctrinal character and embodies the belief that the nation is in some way the central principle of political organization. Patriotism provides the affective basis for that belief, and thus underpins all forms of nationalism. It is difficult to conceive of a national group demanding, say, political independence without possessing at least a measure of patriotic loyalty or national consciousness. However, not all patriots are nationalists. Not all of those who identify with, or even love their nation, see it as a means through which political demands can be articulated.

of nationalism that places primary emphasis on the regeneration of the nation as a distinctive civilization, rather than as a discreet political community. Not uncommonly, cultural nationalists view the state as a peripheral if not alien entity. Whereas political nationalism is 'rational' and may be principled, cultural nationalism is 'mystical' in that it is based on a romantic belief in the nation as a unique historical and organic whole. Typically, cultural nationalism is a 'bottom-up' form of nationalism that draws more on popular rituals, traditions and legends than on elite or 'higher' culture. Though it is often anti-modern in character, cultural nationalism may also serve as an agent of modernisation by enabling a people to 'recreate' itself.

The importance of a distinctive national consciousness was first emphasized in Germany in the late eighteenth century. Writers such as Herder (1744–1803) and Fichte (1762–1814) highlighted what they believed to be the uniqueness and superiority of Germanic culture, in contrast to the ideas of the French Revolution. Herder believed that each nation possesses a Volksgeist or 'national spirit', which provides its peoples with their creative impulse. The role of nationalism is therefore to develop an awareness and appreciation of a nation's culture and traditions. During the nineteenth century, such cultural nationalism was particularly marked in Germany in a revival of folk traditions and the rediscovery of German myths and legends. The Brothers Grimm, for example, collected and published German folk tales, and the composer Richard Wagner based many of his operas upon ancient legends and myths. Since the mid-twentieth century, cultural nationalism has strengthened as peoples, such as the Welsh in the UK and the Bretons and Basques in France, have sought to preserve national cultures that have been threatened by membership of a multinational state. In some extent, this shift politics to culture, and thus from state to region, within nationalism reflects the declining capacity nation-states in a context of economic globalization to maintain a meaningful sense of loyalty and affection.

In some respects, ethnic nationalism differs from cultural nationalism, even though the terms ethnicity and culture clearly overlap. Ethnicity is loyalty towards a distinctive population,

cultural group or territorial area. The term is complex because it has both racial and cultural overtones. Members of ethnic groups are often seen, correctly or incorrectly, to have descended from common ancestors, and the groups are thus thought of as extended kinship groups, united by blood. Even when ethnicity is understood in strictly cultural terms, it operates at a deep emotional level and highlights values, traditions and practices that give a people a sense of distinctiveness. As it is not possible to 'join' an ethnic group (except perhaps through inter-marriage), ethnic nationalism has a clearly exclusive character.

Tensions within		Nationalism (1)
Civic nationalism	**v.**	**Ethnocultural nationalism**
political nation	–	cultural/historical nation
inclusive	–	exclusive
universalism	–	particularism
equal nations	–	unique nations
rational/principled	–	mystical/emotional
national sovereignty	–	national 'spirit'
voluntaristic	–	organic
based on citizenship	–	based on descent
civic loyalty	–	ethnic allegiance
cultural diversity	–	cultural unity

Black nationalism in many parts of the West has a strong ethnic character. Blacks in the USA and the West Indies are the descendants of slaves, who were brought up in a culture that emphasized their inferiority and demanded subservience. The development of black consciousness and national pride therefore required blacks to look beyond white culture and rediscover their cultural roots in Africa. The Jamaican political thinker and activist Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) was one of the first to argue that blacks in the USA and the Caribbean should look upon Africa as their homeland. In the 1960s, black politics in the USA took a more radical turn with the emergence of the Black Power movement and with the growth, under the leadership of Malcolm X (1926–65), of the Black Muslims, later renamed the Nation of Islam. However, while black nationalism has generally emphasized consciousness-raising and cultural pride, ethnic nationalism also has a darker side. Heightened ethnic consciousness is not uncommonly fuelled by atavistic fears and hatreds, focused on foreign peoples. Ethnic nationalism is therefore often associated with chauvinism and racialism (see p. 231), and is expressed through aggression and conquest. This face of nationalism is discussed more fully later in the chapter in connection with expansionist nationalism.

Nationalism and politics

Political nationalism is a highly complex phenomenon, being characterized more by ambiguity and contradictions than by a single set of values and goals. For example, nationalism has been both liberating and oppressive: it has brought about self-government and freedom, and it has led to conquest and subjugation. Nationalism has been both progressive and regressive: it has looked to a future of national independence or national greatness, and it has celebrated past national

glories and entrenched established identities. Nationalism has also been both rational and irrational: it has appealed to principled beliefs, such as national self-determination, and it has bred from non-rational drives and emotions, including ancient fears and hatreds. This ideological shapeless is a product of a number of factors. Nationalism has emerged in very different historical contexts, been shaped by contrasting cultural inheritances, and it has been used to advance a wide variety of political causes and aspirations. However, it also reflects the capacity of nationalism to fuse with and absorb other political doctrines and ideas, thereby creating a series of rival nationalist traditions. The most significant of these traditions are the following:

- Liberal nationalism
- Conservative nationalism
- Expansionist nationalism
- Anticolonial and postcolonial nationalism

Liberal nationalism

Liberal nationalism is the oldest form of nationalism, dating back to the French Revolution and embodying many of its values. Its ideas spread quickly through much of Europe and were expressed most clearly by Giuseppe Mazzini, often thought of as the 'prophet' of Italian unification. They also influenced the remarkable exploits of Simon Bolivar, who led the Latin American independence movement in the early nineteenth century and expelled the Spanish from much of Hispanic America. Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', proposed as the basis for the reconstruction of Europe after the First World War, were also based upon liberal nationalist principles. Moreover, many twentieth-century anticolonial leaders were inspired by liberal ideas, as in the case of Sun Yat-Sen, one of the leaders of China's 1911 Revolution, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India.

The ideas of liberal nationalism were clearly shaped by J.-J. Rousseau's defence of popular sovereignty, expressed in particular in the notion of the 'general will'. As the nineteenth century progressed, the aspiration for popular self-government was progressively fused with liberal principles. This fusion was brought about by the fact that the multinational empires against which nationalists fought were also autocratic and oppressive. Mazzini, for example, wished the Italian states to unite, but this also

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72)

Italian nationalist. Mazzini, the son of a doctor, was born in Genoa, Italy. He came into contact with revolutionary politics as a member of the patriotic secret society, the Carbonari. During the 1848 revolutions Mazzini helped to liberate Milan from Austrian influence and became head of the short-lived Roman Republic.

Mazzini's nationalism fused a belief in the nation as a distinctive linguistic and cultural community with the principles of liberal republicanism. Above all, Mazzini's was a principled form of nationalism, which treated nations as sublimated individuals endowed with the right to self-government. Mazzini was confident that assertion of the principle of national self-determination would eventually bring about perpetual peace.

==entailed== throwing off the influence of autocratic Austria. For many European revolutionaries in the mid-nineteenth century, liberalism and nationalism were virtually indistinguishable. Indeed, their nationalist creed was largely forged by applying liberal ideas, initially developed in relation to the individual, to the nation and to international politics.

Liberalism was founded upon a defence of individual freedom, traditionally expressed in the language of rights. Nationalists believed nations to be sovereign entities, entitled to liberty, and also possessing rights, most importantly the right of self-determination. Liberal nationalism is therefore a liberating force in two senses. First, it opposes all forms of foreign domination and oppression, whether by multinational empires or colonial powers. Second, it stands for the ideal of self-government, reflected in practice in a belief in constitutionalism (see p. 41) and representation. Woodrow Wilson, for example, argued in favour of a Europe composed not only of nation-states, but also one in which political democracy rather than autocracy ruled. For him, only a democratic republic, on the US model, could be a genuine nation-state.

Furthermore, liberal nationalists believe that nations, like individuals, are equal, at least in the sense that they are equally entitled to the right of self-determination. The ultimate goal of liberal nationalism is, therefore, the construction of a world of independent nation-states, not merely the unification or independence of a particular nation. John Stuart Mill (see p. 31) expressed this as the principle that 'the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality'. Mazzini formed the clandestine organization 'Young Italy' to promote the idea of a united Italy, but he also founded 'Young Europe' in the hope of spreading nationalist ideas throughout the continent. At the Paris Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson advanced the principle of self-determination not simply because the break-up of the European empire served US national interests, but because he believed that the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and so on all had the same right to political independence that Americans already enjoyed.

Liberals also believe that the principle of balance or natural harmony applies to the nations of the world, not just to individuals within society. The achievement of national self-determination is a means of establishing a peaceful and stable international order. Wilson believed that the First World War had been caused by an 'old order', dominated by autocratic and militaristic empires. Democratic nation-states, on the other hand, would respect the national sovereignty of their neighbours and have no incentive to wage war or subjugate others. For a liberal, nationalism does not divide nations from one another, promoting distrust, rivalry and possibly war. Rather, nationalism is a force that is capable of promoting both unity within each nation and brotherhood amongst all nations on the basis of mutual respect for national rights and characteristics. At heart, liberalism looks beyond the nation to the ideas of cosmopolitanism (see p. 182) and internationalism, as discussed later in the chapter.

Critics of liberal nationalism have sometimes suggested that its ideas are naive and romantic. Liberal nationalists see the progressive and liberating face of nationalism; their nationalism is rational and tolerant. However they perhaps ignore the darker face of nationalism, the irrational bonds or tribalism that distinguish 'us' from a foreign and threatening 'them'. Liberals see nationalism as a universal principle, but have less understanding of the emotional power of nationalism, which has, in times of war, persuaded individuals to kill or die for their country, regardless of the justice of their nation's cause.

Tensions within		Nationalism (2)
Liberal nationalism	**v.**	**Expansionist nationalism**
national self-determination	–	national chauvinism
inclusive	–	exclusive
voluntaristic	–	organic
progressive	–	reactionary
rational/principled	–	emotional/instinctive
human rights	–	national interest
equal nations	–	hierarchy of nations
constitutionalism	–	authoritarianism
ethnic/cultural pluralism	–	ethnic/cultural purity
cosmopolitanism	–	imperialism/militarism
collective security	–	power politics
supranationalism	–	international anarchy

Liberal nationalism is also misguided in its belief that the nation-state is the key to political and international harmony. The mistake of Wilsonian nationalism was the belief that nations live in convenient and discrete geographical areas, and that states could be constructed that coincide with these areas. In practice, all so-called 'nation-states' comprise a range of linguistic, religious, ethnic or regional groups, some of which may also consider themselves to be 'nations'. For example, in 1918 the newly created nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Poland contained a significant number of German speakers, and Czechoslovakia itself was a fusion of two major ethnic groups: the Czechs and the Slovaks. Former Yugoslavia, also created by Versailles, contained a bewildering variety of ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Albanians and so on – which have subsequently realized their aspiration for nationhood. In fact, the ideal of a politically unified and culturally homogeneous nation-state can only be achieved by a policy of forcible deportation of minority groups and an outright ban upon immigration.

Conservative nationalism

In the early nineteenth century, conservatives regarded nationalism as a radical and dangerous force, a threat to order and political stability. However, as the century progressed, conservative statesmen such as Disraeli, Bismarck and even Tsar Alexander III became increasingly sympathetic towards nationalism, seeing it as a natural ally in maintaining social order and defending traditional institutions. In the modern period, nationalism has become an article of faith for most conservatives. In the UK, this was particularly evident in Margaret Thatcher's triumphalist response to the Falklands War of 1982, and it has been expressed more generally in the Conservative Party's growing antipathy towards European integration. Ronald Reagan tried to rekindle US nationalism by pursuing a more assertive foreign policy, which led to the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya. George Bush Sr continued this policy by invading Panama and sending US forces to fight in the Gulf War of 1991. George W. Bush's so-called 'war on terror' similarly attempts to link military assertiveness to a defence of national values and demonstration of national character.

Conservative nationalism tends to develop in established nation-states, rather than ones that are in the process of nation building. Conservatives care less for the principled nationalism of universal self-determination and more about the promise of social cohesion and public order embodied in the sentiment of national patriotism. For conservatives, society is organic: they believe that nations emerge naturally from the desire of human beings to live with others who possess the same views, habits and appearance as themselves. Human beings are thought to be limited and imperfect creatures, who seek meaning and security within the national community. Therefore, the principal goal of conservative nationalism is to maintain national unity by fostering patriotic loyalty and 'pride in one's country', especially in the face of the divisive idea of class solidarity preached by socialists. Indeed, by incorporating the working class into the nation, conservatives have often seen nationalism as the antidote to social revolution. Charles de Gaulle, French president, 1959–69, harnessed nationalism to the conservative cause in France with particular skill. De Gaulle appealed to national pride by pursuing an independent, even anti-American defence and foreign policy, which included withdrawing French troops from NATO control. He also attempted to restore order and authority to social life and build up a powerful state, based upon the enhanced powers of the presidency. Such policies helped to maintain conservative control in France from the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958 until the election of President Mitterrand in 1981. In some respects, Thatcherism in the UK amounted to a British form of Gaullism in that it fused an appeal based upon nationalism, or at least national independence within Europe, with the promise of strong government and firm leadership.

The conservative character of nationalism is maintained by an appeal to tradition and history; nationalism becomes thereby a defence for traditional institutions and a traditional way of life. Conservative nationalism is essentially nostalgic and backward-looking, reflecting upon a past age of national glory or triumph. This is evident in the widespread tendency to use ritual and commemoration to present past military victories as defining moments in a nation's history. It is also apparent in the use of traditional institutions as symbols of national identity. This occurs in the case of British, or, more accurately, English nationalism, which is closely linked to the institution of monarchy. Britain (plus Northern Ireland) is the United Kingdom, its national anthem is 'God Save the Queen', and the royal family plays a prominent role in national celebrations such as Armistice Day, and on state occasions such as the opening of Parliament.

Conservative nationalism is particularly prominent when the sense of national identity is felt to be threatened or in danger of being lost. The issues of immigration and supranationalism have therefore helped to keep this form of nationalism alive in many modern states. Conservative reservations about immigration stem from the belief that multiculturalism (see p. 67) leads to instability and conflict. As stable and successful societies must be based upon shared values and a common culture, immigration, particularly from societies with different religious and other traditions, should either be firmly restricted or minority ethnic groups should be encouraged to assimilate into the culture of the 'host' society. In its more extreme versions, practised, for instance, by the Front National (FN) in France and the BNP in the UK, conservative nationalism can lead to calls for the voluntary or forcible repatriation of minority groups. Such anti-immigration positions are based upon an exclusive and historically-defined view of national identity that draws a firm line between those who are members of the nation and those who are alien to it. Conservative nationalists are also concerned about the threat that supranational bodies, such as the EU, pose to national identity and so to the cultural bonds of society. This is

expressed in the UK in the form of Conservative Party 'Euroscepticism', with similar views being expressed in continental Europe by a variety of far right groups such as the FN. Eurosceptics not only defend sovereign national institutions and a distinctive national currency on the grounds that they are vital symbols of national identity, but also warn that the 'European project' is fatally misconceived because a stable political union cannot be forged out of such national, language and cultural diversity.

Although conservative politicians and parties have derived considerable political benefit from their appeal to nationalism, opponents have sometimes pointed out that their ideas are based upon misguided assumptions. In the first place, conservative nationalism can be seen as a form of elite manipulation. The 'nation' is invented and certainly defined by political leaders who may use it for their own purposes. This is most evident in times of war or international crisis when the nation is mobilised to fight for the 'fatherland' by emotional appeals to patriotic duty. Furthermore, conservative nationalism may also serve to promote intolerance and bigotry. By insisting on the maintenance of cultural purity and established traditions, conservatives may portray immigrants, or foreigners in general, as a threat, and in the process promote, or at least legitimize, racialist and xenophobic fears.

Expansionist nationalism

In many countries the dominant image of nationalism is one of aggression and militarism, quite the opposite of a principled belief in national self-determination. The aggressive face of nationalism became apparent in the late nineteenth century as European powers indulged in a 'scramble for Africa' in the name of national glory and their 'place in the sun'. The imperialism of the late nineteenth century differed from earlier periods of colonial expansion in that it was supported by a climate of popular nationalism: national prestige was increasingly linked to the possession of an empire and each colonial victory was greeted by demonstrations of public approval. In the UK, a new word, jingoism, was coined to describe this mood of public enthusiasm for aggressive nationalism or imperial expansion. In the early twentieth century, the growing rivalry of the European powers divided the continent into two armed camps, the Triple Entente, comprising the UK, France and Russia, and the Triple Alliance, containing Germany, Austria and Italy. When world war eventually broke out in August 1914, after a prolonged arms race and a succession of international crises, it provoked public rejoicing in all the major cities of Europe. Aggressive and expansionist nationalism reached its high point in the inter-war period when the authoritarian or fascist regimes of Japan, Italy and Germany embarked upon policies of imperial expansion and world domination, eventually leading to war in 1939.

What distinguished this form of nationalism from earlier liberal nationalism was its chauvinism, a belief in superiority or dominance, a term derived from the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a French soldier who had been fanatically devoted to Napoleon I. Nations are not thought to be equal in their right to self-determination; rather some nations are believed to possess characteristics or qualities that make them superior to others. Such ideas were clearly evident in European imperialism, which was justified by an ideology of racial and cultural superiority. In nineteenth-century Europe it was widely believed that the 'white' peoples of Europe and America were intellectually and morally superior to the 'black', 'brown' and 'yellow' peoples of Africa and Asia. Indeed Europeans portrayed imperialism as a moral duty: colonial peoples were the 'white

man's burden'. Imperialism supposedly brought the benefits of civilization and in particular Christianity to the less fortunate and less sophisticated peoples of the world.

More particular forms of national chauvinism have developed in Russia and Germany. In Russia this took the form of pan-Slavism, sometimes called Slavophile nationalism, which was particularly strong in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Russians are Slavs, and enjoy linguistic and cultural links with other Slavic peoples in eastern and south-eastern Europe. The prefix 'pan' means 'all' or 'every', and therefore pan-Slavism reflects the goal of Slavic unity, which the Russians believed to be their historic mission. In the years before 1914, such ideas brought Russia into growing conflict with Austro-Hungary for control of the Balkans. The chauvinistic character of pan-Slavism derived from the belief that the Russians are the natural leaders of the Slavic people, and that the Slavs are culturally and spiritually superior to the peoples of central or western Europe. Pan-Slavism is therefore both anti-western and anti-liberal. Forms of pan-Slavism have been re-awakened since 1991 and the collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union.

Traditional German nationalism also exhibited a marked chauvinism, which was born out of defeat in the Napoleonic Wars. Writers such as Fichte and Jahn reacted strongly against France and the ideals of its revolution, emphasizing instead the uniqueness of German culture and its language, and the racial purity of its people. After unification in 1871, German nationalism developed a pronounced chauvinistic character with the emergence of pressure groups such as the Pan-German League and the Navy League, which campaigned for closer ties with German-speaking Austria and for a German empire, Germany's 'place in the sun'. Pan-Germanism was an expansionist and aggressive form of nationalism that envisaged the creation of a German-dominated Europe. German chauvinism found its highest expression in the racialist and anti-Semitic (see p. 233) doctrines developed by the Nazis. The Nazis adopted the expansionist goals of pan-Germanism with enthusiasm, but justified them in the language of biology rather than politics (this is examined more fully in Chapter 7 in connection with racialism). After 1945, West Germany espoused a very different national tradition, which openly broke with the expansionist ideals of the past. However reunification in 1990 was accompanied by a revival of far-right activism and anti-Semitic attacks, encouraging some to suggest that contemporary German nationalism has not entirely buried its past.

National chauvinism breeds from a feeling of intense, even hysterical nationalist enthusiasm. The individual as a separate, rational being is swept away on a tide of patriotic emotion, expressed in the desire for aggression, expansion and war. The right-wing French nationalist Charles Maurras (1868–1952) called such intense patriotism 'integral nationalism': individuals and independent groups lose their identity within an all-powerful 'nation', which has an existence and meaning beyond the life of any single individual. Such militant nationalism is often accompanied by militarism. Military glory and conquest are the ultimate evidence of national greatness and have been capable of generating intense feelings of nationalist commitment. The civilian population is, in effect, militarized: it is infected by the martial values of absolute loyalty, complete dedication and willing self-sacrifice. When the honour or integrity of the nation is in question, the lives of ordinary citizens become unimportant. Such emotional intensity was amply demonstrated in August 1914, and perhaps also underlies the emotional power of jihad, or 'holy war', from the viewpoint of Islamic groups.

National chauvinism has a particularly strong appeal for the isolated and powerless, for whom nationalism offers the prospect of security, self-respect and pride. Militant or integral nationalism requires a heightened sense of belonging to a distinct national group. Such intense nationalist feeling is often stimulated by 'negative integration', the portrayal of another nation or race as a threat or an enemy. In the face of the enemy, the nation draws together and experiences an intensified sense of its own identity and importance. National chauvinism therefore breeds off a clear distinction between 'them' and 'us'. There has to be a 'them' to deride or hate in order to forge a sense of 'us'. In politics, national chauvinism has commonly been reflected in racialist ideologies, which divide the world into an 'in group' and an 'out group', in which the 'out group' becomes a scapegoat for all the misfortunes and frustrations suffered by the 'in group'. It is therefore no coincidence that chauvinistic political creeds are a breeding ground for racialist ideas. Both pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, for example, have been characterized by virulent anti-Semitism.

Anticolonial and postcolonial nationalism

Nationalism may have been born in Europe, but it became a worldwide phenomenon thanks to imperialism. The experience of colonial rule helped to forge a sense of nationhood and a desire for 'national liberation' amongst the peoples of Asia and Africa, and gave rise to a specifically anticolonial form of nationalism. During the twentieth century the political geography of much of the world was transformed by anticolonialism. Although Versailles applied the principle of self-determination to Europe, it was conveniently ignored in other parts of the world, where German colonies were simply transferred to British and French control. However, during the interwar period independence movements increasingly threatened the overstretched empires of the UK and France. The final collapse of the European empires came after the Second World War. In some cases, a combination of mounting nationalist pressure and declining domestic economic performance persuaded colonial powers to depart 'relatively' peacefully, as occurred in India in 1947 and in Malaysia in 1957. However, decolonization in the post-1945 period was often characterized by revolution and sometimes periods of armed struggle. This occurred, for instance, in the case of China, 1937–45 (against Japan), Algeria, 1954–62 (against France), Vietnam, 1946–54 (against France) and 1964–75 (against USA).

In a sense, the colonizing Europeans had taken with them the seed of their own destruction, the doctrine of nationalism. For example, it is notable that many of the leaders of independence or liberation movements were western educated. It is therefore not surprising that anticolonial movements sometimes articulated their goals in the language of liberal nationalism, reminiscent of Mazzini or Woodrow Wilson. However, emergent African and Asian nations were in a very different position from the newly created European states of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For these African and Asia nations the quest for political independence was closely related to their awareness of economic underdevelopment and their subordination to the industrialized states of Europe and North America. Anticolonialism thus came to express the desire for 'national liberation' in both political and economic terms, and this has left its mark upon the form of nationalism practised in the developing world.

Most of the leaders of Asian and African anticolonial movements were attracted to some form of socialism, ranging from the moderate and peaceful ideas represented by Gandhi and Nehru in

India, to the revolutionary Marxism espoused by Mao Zedong in China, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Fidel Castro in Cuba. On the surface, as is discussed later, socialism is more clearly related to internationalism than to nationalism. Socialist ideas have nevertheless appealed powerfully to nationalists in the developing world. In the first place, socialism embodies the values of community and cooperation that were already well-established in traditional, preindustrial societies. More importantly, socialism, and in particular Marxism, provided an analysis of inequality and exploitation through which the colonial experience could be understood and colonial rule challenged.

Marxism highlights a class struggle between a 'ruling class' of property owners and the oppressed and exploited working class. It also preaches the revolutionary overthrow of the class system in a 'proletarian revolution'. Such ideas had already been applied to the relationship amongst countries by Lenin (see p. 132). Lenin ([1916] 1970) argued that imperialism is essentially an economic phenomenon, a quest for profit by capitalist countries seeking investment opportunities, cheap labour and raw materials, and secure markets. Developing-world nationalists have applied Marxist analysis to the relationship between colonial rulers and subject peoples. The class struggle became a colonial struggle against exploitation and oppression. The overthrow of colonial rule therefore implied not only political independence but also a social revolution offering the prospect of both political and economic emancipation.

In some cases, developing-world regimes have openly embraced Marxist-Leninist principles, often adapting them to their particular needs. On achieving independence, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia moved swiftly to seize foreign assets and nationalise economic resources. They founded one-party states and centrally planned economies, closely following the Soviet model. In other cases, states in Africa and the Middle East have developed a less ideological form of nationalistic socialism. This has been evident in Algeria, Libya, Zambia, Iraq and South Yemen, where one-party states were founded, usually led by powerful, 'charismatic' leaders such as Gadhafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The 'socialism' proclaimed in such countries usually takes the form of an appeal to a unifying national cause or interest, in most cases economic or social development.

Anticolonialism has been a revolt against western power and influence, and has therefore not always cared to express itself in a language of liberalism and socialism borrowed from the West. In some cases western ideas have been adapted and changed beyond all recognition, as in the case of so-called 'African socialism', as practised in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Angola. African socialism is not based on Soviet-style state socialism or western social democracy, but rather is founded upon traditional communitarian values and the desire to subordinate divisive tribal rivalries to the overriding need for economic progress. Some countries of the developing world have expressed their nationalism by cultivating links with other former colonies in an attempt to articulate a distinctive 'Third World' voice, independent from that of either the capitalist 'First World' or the communist 'Second World'. This was attempted by newly-independent Asian and African states in the Bandung Conference of 1955 and was kept alive during the Cold War period by the non-aligned movement of Third World states. 'Third Worldism' reflected a fierce rejection of imperialism and a common desire for economic progress amongst countries that usually shared a colonial past. However, such ties have weakened as memories of colonial rule

have receded, allowing the cultural and political differences amongst developing states to become more apparent.

The postcolonial period has thrown up quite different forms of nationalism, however. These have been shaped more by the rejection of western ideas and culture than by the attempt to reapply them or remain independent from them. If the West is regarded as the source of oppression and exploitation, postcolonial nationalism must seek an anti-western voice and not merely a non-western one. In part, this is a reaction against the dominance of western, and increasingly US, culture and economic power in much of the developing world. The USA has not practised overt political colonization, but its influence reflects the worldwide dominance of the US economy, controlling investment, creating jobs and making available a wide range of western consumer goods. This so-called neocolonialism has been far more difficult to combat because it does not take an openly political form, but it has also bred fierce resentment. During the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini (see p. 307) dubbed the United States the 'Great Satan'. Anti-Americanism has been a prominent feature of Iranian politics since the revolution of 1979, and it has been significant in Libya under Gadhafi and also in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, especially after the Gulf War of 1991. In rejecting the West in general, and the USA in particular, such forms of nationalism have increasingly looked to non-western philosophies and ideas. The growing importance of religion, and especially Islam, has given developing-world nationalism a distinctive character and a renewed potency. This is discussed in Chapter 10 in relation to religious fundamentalism.

Beyond nationalism

A variety of political creeds can be said to look beyond the nation. This applies to any doctrine or ideology that propounds a transnational view of political identity. It is thus difficult to reconcile nationalism with feminism, since the latter holds gender or sexual differences to be of prime importance and thus implies that national ties are either of secondary importance or are politically irrelevant. Similarly, although racialism and religious fundamentalism are at times linked to nationalism, they cannot merely be viewed as subspecies of nationalism because racial and religious identities cut across national boundaries. In this sense, they can be thought of as weak forms of internationalism.

Internationalism in its stronger form, however, is characterized by the more radical belief that political nationalism should be transcended because the ties that bind the peoples of the world are stronger than those that separate them. By this standard, the goal of internationalism is to construct supranational structures that can command the political allegiance of all the peoples of the world, regardless of religious, racial, social and national differences. Such 'one worldism' has, for example, provided the basis for the 'idealist' tradition within international relations, which is characterized by a belief in universal morality and the prospect of global peace and cooperation. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is often seen as the father of this tradition, his Towards Perpetual Peace ([1795] 1991) having envisaged a kind of 'league of nations' based on the belief that reason and morality combine to dictate that 'There should be no war'. As far as the major ideologies are concerned, this vision has been most clearly associated with liberalism and socialism, each of which has developed a particular brand of internationalism.

Liberal internationalism

Liberals have rarely rejected nationalism in principle. They have usually been prepared to accept both that nations are natural entities, in that cultural similarities tend to build a sense of identity and common belonging, and that nations provide the most appropriate units of political rule – hence the existence of liberal nationalism. What they have not been prepared to accept, however, is that the nation constitutes the highest source of political authority: unchecked national power has very much the same drawbacks as unrestrained individual liberty. There are, broadly, two bases of liberal internationalism. The first is a fear of an international 'state of nature'.

Liberals have long accepted that national self-determination is a mixed blessing. While it preserves self-government and forbids foreign control, it also creates a world of sovereign nation-states in which each nation has the freedom to pursue its own interests, possibly at the expense of other nations. Liberal nationalists have certainly accepted that constitutionalism and democracy reduce the tendency towards militarism and war, but when sovereign nations operate within conditions of 'international anarchy', self-restraint alone may not be sufficient to ensure unending peace. Liberals have generally proposed two means of preventing a recourse to conquest and plunder. The first is national interdependence, aimed at promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. This is why liberals have traditionally supported the policy of free trade: economic interdependence means that the material cost of international conflict is so great that warfare becomes virtually unthinkable. For the nineteenth-century 'Manchester liberals' in the UK, Richard Cobden (1804–65) and John Bright (1811–89), this preference for interdependence reflected a deeper commitment to the principle of cosmopolitanism. Not only would it promote prosperity by allowing countries to specialize in producing what they are best suited to produce (the theory that economists term 'comparative advantage'), but it would also draw people of different races, creeds and languages together into what Cobden described as 'the bonds of eternal peace'.

Liberals have also proposed that national ambition should be checked by the construction of supranational bodies capable of bringing order to an otherwise lawless international scene. This argument draws on precisely the same logic as social contract theory: government is the solution to the problem of disorder. This explains Woodrow Wilson's support for the first, if flawed, experiment in world government, the League of Nations, set up in 1919, and far wider support for its successor, the United Nations, founded by the San Francisco Conference of 1945. Liberals have looked to these bodies to establish a law-governed states system to make possible the

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism literally means a belief in a cosmopolis or 'world state'. As such it implies the obliteration of national identities and the establishment of a common political allegiance, uniting all human beings. The term, however, is usually employed to refer to the more modest goal of peace and harmony amongst nations, founded upon mutual understanding, toleration and, above all, interdependence. Liberal cosmopolitanism has long been associated with support for free trade, based upon the belief that it promotes both international understanding and material prosperity. The cosmopolitan ideal is also promoted by supranational bodies that aim to encourage cooperation amongst nations rather than replace the nation-state.

<mark>peaceful</mark> resolution of international conflicts. However, liberals also recognize that law must be enforced and hence have usually endorsed the principle of collective security, the idea that aggression can best be resisted by united action by a number of states. This sympathy for supranationalism is also evident in the liberal attitude towards bodies such as the European Union. Unlike conservatives, who fear that European integration will undermine national independence and weaken national identity, liberals have been more inclined to support a 'federal Europe', seeing it as a way in which cooperation and interdependence can be promoted amongst nations that nevertheless retain their distinctive traditions and identities.

The second basis for liberal internationalism stems from an overriding commitment to the individual and the principle of individualism (see p. 30). This implies that all human beings, regardless of race, creed, social background and nationality, are of equal moral worth. While liberals endorse the idea of national self-determination, by no means do they believe that it entitles nations to treat their people however they choose. Respect for the rights and liberties of the individual in that sense outranks the claims of national sovereignty. Liberal internationalism is thus characterized not so much by a desire to supersede the nation as a political formation, but rather by the demand that nations conform to a higher morality embodied in the doctrine of human rights. As liberals believe that these rights are universally applicable and lay down the minimum conditions for a truly human existence, they should clearly also constitute the basis of international law. Such beliefs have led to the drawing up of documents such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1956. They also imply support for an international rule of law, enforced through institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.

Critics of this form of liberal internationalism include conservatives and developing-world nationalists. The former allege that the idea of universal human rights simply fails to take account of distinctive national traditions and cultures, while the latter go further and argue that, as human rights are essentially a manifestation of western liberalism, their spread amounts to a covert form of western imperialism.

Socialist internationalism

Socialists are more likely than liberals to reject nationalism in principle, believing both that it breeds resentment and conflict and that it has an implicitly right-wing character. Although this has not prevented modern socialists, as rulers and aspiring rulers, from reaching an accommodation with the nation-state, it has inclined them, at least in rhetoric, to treat internationalism as an article of faith if not as a core value. This has been clearest in relation to the Marxist tradition. Marxism has traditionally embraced a form of proletarian internationalism, rooted in the idea that class solidarity is more powerful and politically significant than national identity. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx (see p. 126) wrote:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

(Marx and Engels, [1848] 1968, p. 51)

Marx recognized the important national dimension of any socialist revolution; as he put it, the proletariat of each country must 'first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie'. Moreover, he accepted that for subject peoples national liberation is a precondition for socialist revolution, a stance reflected, for instance, in his support for Polish and Irish independence. Nevertheless, he did not envisage that the working class would be national 'in the bourgeois sense of the word', by which he meant that, in recognizing the brotherhood of all proletarians, it would transcend what Engels called 'national egoism'. The Communist Manifesto expresses this graphically in its famous final words: 'Working men of all countries, unite!' Socialism therefore has an intrinsically international character. Not only does proletarian class solidarity inevitably cut across national borders, but, as Marx pointed out, the emergence of world markets had turned capitalism into an international system that could only be challenged by a genuinely international movement. This is why Marx helped to found the International Workingmen's Association, the so-called First International, in 1864. A Second or 'Socialist' International was set up in 1889 and revived in 1951. A Third International or 'Comintern' was formed by Lenin in 1919, while a rival Fourth International was set up in 1936 by Leon Trotsky, an arch critic of Stalin's policy of 'Socialism in One Country'.

However, socialists have seldom seen proletarian internationalism as an end in itself. Their aim has not been to replace a world divided on national lines by one divided on class lines, but rather – through an international class struggle – to establish harmony and cooperation amongst all the world's peoples. Socialist internationalism is therefore ultimately based on a belief in a common humanity. This is the idea that humankind is bound together by mutual sympathy, compassion and love, based upon the belief that what human beings share with one another is greater than what divides them. From this perspective, socialists may reject nationalism not Leon Trotsky (1879–1940)

Russian Marxist, political thinker and revolutionary. An early critic of Lenin and leader of the 1905 St Petersburg Soviet, Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks in 1917, becoming commissar for foreign affairs and later commissar for war. Outmanoeuvred by Stalin after Lenin's death, he was banished from the Soviet Union in 1929 and assassinated in Mexico in 1940 on Stalin's orders.

Trotsky's theoretical contribution to Marxism centres on the theory of permanent revolution, which suggested that socialism could be established in Russia without the need for the bourgeois stage of development. Trotskyism is usually associated with an unwavering commitment to internationalism and to an anti-Stalinism that highlights the dangers of bureaucratization, as outlined in The Revolution Betrayed (1937)

only as a species of bourgeois ideology, which conceals the contradictions upon which capitalism and all other class societies are based, but also because it encourages people to deny their common humanity. Internationalism, for a socialist, may thus imply not merely cooperation amongst nations within a framework of international law, but the more radical and utopian goal of the dissolution of the nation and the recognition that there is but one world and one people.

Criticisms of socialist internationalism fall into two categories. The first highlights the failure of international socialists to live up to their high ideals in practice. The various Internationals, for example, were hampered by deep personal and ideological rivalries, as well as by national differences. The second category of criticisms emphasizes the damage done to socialism by its failure to recognize and tap the enduring strength of political nationalism. The tendency to dismiss nationalism as an artificial and doomed force has repeatedly encouraged socialists to overestimate the appeal of the internationalist ideal. Nowhere was this more dramatically demonstrated than in the effective collapse of the Second International in August 1914, when the proletariats of Europe, and many of their socialist parties, succumbed eagerly at the prospect of war and national glory. Nationalism proved to be substantially more potent than the prospect of social revolution.

Nationalism in the twenty-first century

Few political ideologies have been forced to endure prophecies of their imminent demise for as long as nationalism. As early as 1848, Marx proclaimed that 'National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing'. Similarly, the death of nationalism as the project of nation-building was widely proclaimed after the First World War, following the reconstruction of Europe according to the principle of national self-determination, and after the Second World War, as a result of decolonization in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Once a world of nation-states had been constructed, what further role would there be for nationalism? Moreover, as the twentieth century progressed, it appeared that the nation had been made redundant by the progressive internationalization of economic and political life. International organizations – from the United Nations to the European Union and from the World Trade Organization to the International Monetary Fund – have come to dominate world politics, leaving fewer and fewer decisions in the hands of individual nations. This phenomenon has increasingly been described as 'globalization'.

Globalization has had a far-reaching impact on both the nation-state and political doctrines rooted in the idea of national distinctiveness. It has, for instance, led to the emergence of an integrated global economy, meaning that material prosperity is often more determined by the investment decisions of transnational corporations than it is by the actions of national governments. In cultural terms, with the growth of air travel, foreign tourism, satellite television and the internet, globalization means the spread of a market-driven society, sometimes seen as the 'McDonaldization' of the world. Can nations any longer be regarded as meaningful entities when people in different parts of the world watch the same films and television programmes, eat the same food, enjoy the same sports and so on? Given the remorseless nature of such developments, surely the twenty-first century is going to witness the final eclipse of political nationalism.

Nevertheless, at least two factors point to the continued political significance of the nation. First, there is the evidence that precisely by weakening traditional civil and national bonds, globalization may fuel the emergence of ethnically-based and sometimes aggressive forms of nationalism. If the conventional nation-state is no longer capable of generating meaningful collective identities, 'particularisms' based on region, religion, ethnicity or race may develop to take its place. This has already occurred most dramatically in an upsurge of ethnic conflict in

many parts of the former Soviet bloc, particularly in former Yugoslavia, but is also evident in the centrifugal nationalisms that have taken root in states such as the UK, Spain, Italy and Belgium.

Second, globalization may invest the national project with a new meaning and significance, that of mapping out a future for nations in an increasingly globalized and interdependent world. In this sense, globalization may not so much make nations irrelevant as force them to reinvent themselves, continuing to provide societies with a source of social cohesion and identity but within an increasingly fluid and competitive context. In their different ways, states such as Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Canada have undergone a process of self-affirmation, as they have attempted to re-fashion their national identities by fusing elements from their past with an essentially future-looking orientation.

Further reading

Alter, P., Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1989). A good and clear introduction to the origins and development of nationalist ideas and the different forms of nationalism.

Brown, D. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London: Routledge: 2000). A clear and stimulating account of differing approaches to nationalism and of the contrasting forms of modern nationalist politics.

Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). A good and accessible introduction to the subject.

Hutchinson, J. and A. D. Smith (eds), Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). A wide-ranging and useful collection of readings that examine debates on the nature, development and significance of nationalism.

Kedourie, E., Nationalism, revised edition (London: Hutchinson, 1985). A classic account of nationalism from a critical perspective that stresses the importance of self-determination.

Smith, A. D., Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2001). A clear and incisive introduction to the subject of nationalism and its varying manifestations.

Spencer, P. and Wollman, H., Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002). A very useful survey of classical and contemporary approaches to nationalism that addresses all the key issues, theories and debates.