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Terrorism

Terrorism is a problem we have been facing in India for more than two decades. Earlier, we had faced the problem of insurgency in north-east India while dealing with the Naga and the Mizo rebels and the terrorism of the Naxalites in Bengal. Today, terrorism is perceived as a problem capable of destabilizing not only national but also international politics. Terrorism in recent times has affected both the developed and the developing countries. What has made terrorism a significant instrument for achieving desired goals and ends by persons using the terrorist techniques are factors like conviction in the purity of the 'cause', fanatical loyalty, desire for self-sacrifice, a sense of absolutism, and financial and material support from abroad.

The Concept

The words terrorism, insurgency, civil war, revolution, guerilla war, intimidation and extremism are most often interchanged and used very loosely. What is common in all is 'violence'. Terrorism is an organised system of intimidation. It is broadly defined as 'violent behaviour designed to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it for political purposes'. It is also defined as 'a method whereby an organised group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence' (Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences).

Terrorist acts are directed against persons who, as individual agents or representatives of authority, interfere with the consummation of the objectives of such a group. A 'terrorist' is one who imposes the

punishment meted out by his organisation upon those who are held to interfere with the revolutionary programme. The terrorist does not threaten; but death or destruction is part of his programme of action. If he is arrested, he does not try to prove his innocence but he spreads his doctrines.

Though the long-term objectives of terrorism, insurgency and revolution are similar, that is, overthrow of the existing regime or order, but the short-term objectives and strategies or methodology may be quite different.

One view is that the above definitions refer only to that terrorism which is practised by the 'opponents of the state'. There is another terrorism which is practised by the 'state apparatus'. The above definitions do not include the later type of terrorism. The greatest practitioners of the art of terrorism, like Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Yahya Khan, Mussolini and Franco, cannot be termed as 'terrorists' with these definitions in mind. Terrorism practised by the state refers to violence based on extra-legal methods. It may, however, be clarified that all violence practised by the state is not terrorism. In fact, an organised state has sometimes to use violence for certain objectives. The democratic states generally use legal apparatus to achieve their objectives; it is only the totalitarian states which employ terror. But then all totalitarian states are not terrorists. Similarly, sometimes the democratic states can also use terror.

The common definition of terrorism does not include all types of violence used by the organised groups. That violence which is motivated by consideration of pure personal aggrandisement is excluded from terrorism. This excludes common organised crimes like dacoity and robbery. However, all murders and dacoities organised by ideological groups like the Naxalites fall within the purview of terrorism.

Terrorism has also been differentiated from intimidation and insurgency. In 'intimidation', the intimidator merely threatens injury to collect a ransom but in 'terrorism' and 'insurgency,' the terrorists and the insurgents actually use violence. Terrorism is not a fight between individuals but a struggle between social groups and political forces. It has little to do with intimidating individuals as individuals. The terrorists punish those individuals whom their organisation considers guilty of interfering with their programme aimed at the removal of the undesired social or governmental system. According to Paul Wilkinson (1974), terrorism in politics is a weapon of blackmail, coercion, and

imposition of minority will against and upon a majority decision.

Terrorism is different from 'mob violence' also. The latter is unplanned and uncontrolled, guided by some immediate motivation which may not even be rational and is not based on any precise programme. The former has a definite goal and is planned. It aims to demoralise a governmental authority and undermine its power. However, at times, terrorism may use mob violence as its method.

The difference between terrorism and insurgency is that an insurgent has the support of a large section of the local population while a terrorist need not have such support. Again, *an insurgent is a national of a country which is in revolt against the constitutional government of his country and fights to overthrow the government by guerilla warfare*. The terrorist may or may not be a national of the country in which he operates (Saxena, 1985: 14-35)

The above definitions enable us to give six basic *definitional components of terrorism*. These include: (1) terror purpose (that is, creating fear in the minds of the primary target), (2) instrumental or immediate victims, (3) primary targets (population or broad groups and others), (4) an outcome of death to instrumental targets and damage to or destruction of property, (5) violence, and (6) political purpose.

Terrorism appears in many forms—from planting a crude, home-made bomb, hand-grenade or other explosive in a shopping centre, a railway station, a bus-stand and a bus, to kidnapping and assassination of important personalities. The main aim of terrorists is to wreak vengeance of those whom they regard as obstacles or enemies or oppressors.

Characteristics

Terrorism is characterised by a technique of perpetrating random and brutal intimidation, coercion, or destruction of human lives and property, and used intentionally by subnational groups operating under varying degrees of stress, to obtain realistic or illusory goals. The main characteristics of terrorism are :

- it is against the state or community.
- it has a political purpose.
- it is illegal and unlawful.
- it aims at intimidating and creating impact of fear and panic not only for the victim but also for the people at large, caused for the purpose of coercing or subduing.

- it is accompanied by a feeling of impotence and helplessness on the part of the masses.
- it stops rational thinking.
- it leads to reaction of fight or flight.
- it contains arbitrariness in violence as victims' selection is random or indiscriminate.

Objectives

The goals of terrorists may vary from movement to movement but the main objectives of terrorism are same in all terrorist movements. These are: (1) cause the regime to react and also to over-react. Reaction is required to compel the government/community to concede the demand of the terrorists. Over-reaction or indiscriminate reaction is required to demonstrate the repression of the regime so that the people are alienated and their sympathy is achieved. The security forces used by the government (because of over-reaction) to protect the VIPs and the public installations will reduce the amount of security forces available to protect the general public, which will enhance their feeling of insecurity and helplessness and also increase terror amongst them; (2) mobilize mass support and urge potential sympathisers to greater militancy, or increase the involvement of more people. In a foreign territory, the objective of terrorist activity is to influence people rather than win friends. The chief objective in these places is a show of strength and demonstrate the incapacity of the regime to protect people and maintain order; (3) eliminate opponents and informers and remove danger to the movement and also ensure obedience of the followers; and (4) give publicity or magnify their cause and strength.

According to Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 8), the overall objectives of terrorism are : (i) to gain popular support, (ii) to disrupt and destroy the military and psychological strength of the regime, and (iii) to break internal stability and check growth. If the premise is accepted that political terror primarily aims at the psyche rather than at military hardware, the killing of selected important but unpopular public officials and politicians may boost terrorists' morale, create sympathy among the populace and provoke the regime to adopt repressive measures that further alienate the populace.

Jay Mallin (1971 : 9) has suggested five basic short-term objectives of political terrorism: (i) morale building within the ranks, (ii) advertising the movement, (iii) disorientation and psychological isolation of the populace, (iv) elimination of opposing forces, and (v) provocation of the government.

Origin and Development

Political terrorism as an instrument of power came of age during the French Revolution of 1793. Terror incorporated two facets in this Revolution a state of anxiety within a group, and the tool that induced fear and violent acts aimed at influencing political behaviour of the state. After the French Revolution, political terrorism did not score any significant success until 1921, when the IRA in Ireland used it against the British. Following the World War II (that is, after 1939), political terrorism re-emerged on the international scene. Besides India, it was used in Algeria, Cyprus and Kenya for political independence through activities including intimidation, sabotage, abduction and killing.

During the 1960s, political terrorism entered another phase. According to Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 7), the two most significant quantitative changes in terrorism during 1960s were: its trans-national character and its emergence as a self-sufficient strategy, that is, terrorists attempted to operate independently of the larger political arena This was made possible through a revolution in communication and modern urban civilization. Between 1969 and 1975, more than forty countries were involved in terrorist activities (Baljit Singh, 1977 9)

Alexander and Finger (1977 : xi) are of the opinion that the major reasons for terrorism lie in the very nature of modern civilization itself and are inherent in the modern industrial system. They have given following few causes for the origin and development of terrorism :

(1) the present complex technological society is extremely vulnerable to unsuspected and ruthless attacks of terrorism because transportation centres, communication facilities, factories and agricultural fields cannot always be protected against the random acts of dedicated and determined terrorists;

(2) highly sophisticated weapons like missiles, and remote controls are now relatively easy to obtain for various terror movements. In future, the terrorist groups will probably have access even to chemical and nuclear weapons and instruments of death and destruction;

(3) with modern warfare capabilities, the 'powerless' terrorist groups have been transformed into subnational groups with formidable strengths, capable of creating states within states, thereby undermining the ability of legitimate governments to rule or to survive (the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Khalistan Commandos in India and the PLO in Israel are some examples of such strong subnational groups),

(4) communication and transportation opportunities have enabled an international network of terrorism to develop with a certain degree of centralised organisational structure. Collaboration among ideologically linked groups and among those with common political interest has developed relationships involving financing, training, supply of combat materials, organizational assistance and joint attacks. This pattern of 'comradeship' is inevitably expanding the areas of international violence; and

(5) through revolution in communications, terrorists are able to target their violence not only against immediate victims but also direct it at a wide audience as well for psychological intimidation and blackmail. The media coverage also exports the terroristic techniques and inspiration to other terrorist groups.

In addition to above factors, the other factors which have substantially contributed to terrorism are: the weak nations' will to weaken the strong nations, which motivates them to support the subnational groups of strong nations in their terroristic activities, financial support of rich non-residents to terrorist groups on religious and cultural basis ; feasibility of using smuggling and drug trafficking methods by the terrorists and, thus, getting money for purchasing modern weapons; confrontations between the East and the West as well as between the ideologies of the Left and Right ; the rise in religious, linguistic, ethnic and national consciousness of groups throughout the world; the feelings of deprivation and frustration among the minorities struggling for their liberation and a legitimate right to self-determination and, the growth of opposition by citizens to repressive regimes and dictators ruling their countries.

The strategies and tactics employed by political terrorists are generally directed at three groups: the populace, the regime in power and the terrorist organisation itself.

Perspectives

Terrorism has been perceived by different scholars with different perspectives. We may identify four such perspectives: historical, political, sociological and legal (Table 15.1).

Table 15.1: Perspectives in Terrorism

Historical	Political		Sociological	Legal
Origin, development and quantitative change in different phases	War	Low-intensity conflict	Focus on	Focus on : State laws as well as international law for dealing with international terrorism
		Domestic or Intra state Inter-national	1 Functions 2 Participants 3 Situations 4 Resources 5. Strategies 6 Outcomes	

The *historical* perspective focuses on the origin, development and qualitative changes in different phases in terrorism. Baljit Singh (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 5-17) is one scholar who has used this approach to analyse terrorism.

The *political* perspective (James Muller) perceives political terrorism as a political violence movement organised by an organised political group(s) either at national or at international level.

The *legal* perspective concentrates on state laws as well as international law for cooperation among various states in dealing with international terrorism.

In the *sociological* perspective, in analysing terrorism, Jordan Paust (Alexander and Finger, 1977: 19) focuses on · (i) the types of *participants* engaged in terrorism as terrorists, targets, victims, and so forth, (ii) the *objectives* of the participants, (iii) the *situations* of actual interaction, (iv) the type of *resources* at the disposal of each type of participant, (v) the *strategies* of terror utilized (killing, kidnapping, bombing, looting and hijacking) and, (vi) the *outcome* of the terroristic process (deaths, injuries, destruction of property...).

Mass Support

What is the nature and extent of mass support to the ideology, goal, and methodology of the terrorists ? Many a time it happens that the masses accept a particular ideology but not the goal, or they accept the goal but not the strategies of the proponents of terrorism. Even when one agrees with the goal, he may not support the movement or may not go beyond a certain point. Thus, the quantity and quality of mass support varies from one terrorist movement to other terrorist movement Verma

(Tiwari, S.C., 1930: 233) has given some indicators of the characteristics of mass support. These are : supporting the ideology or cause, agreeing with methodology, providing money and material, non-violent participation in rallies, supplying arms and ammunition, providing shelter or harbouring, vocal or written (in media, etc.) support, and active participation in movement (violent support). Verma has also arranged these indicators in ascending order and has given three types of civil strife: terrorism, insurgency, and revolution. According to him, terrorism is characterised by very little mass support but the participants go all the way from ideology to extreme violence. Insurgency or guerrilla warfare is characterized by the small number of insurgents or guerillas supported by a very large segment of population. This happens when the cause is removal of colonial rule or resisting a foreign ruler. Revolution is characterised by much larger number of participants and mass uprising.

Terrorism in India has attracted youngsters more, particularly the unemployed, the misguided and the idealistic youth. As long as there are causes which arouse intense emotions, the idealistic youth will be led to have romantic visions of terrorism for a cause. When a nation loses its purpose owing to a corrupt leadership with vested interests, frustrations and deprivations will lead the aggressive youths to extremist tendencies like naxalism, or parochial issues in Punjab, or religious issues in Kashmir. Some examples of terrorist groups which have attracted the youth outside India are : the IRA in Ireland, Black Septemberists in Jordan, Baader Meinhof in Germany, LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the Red Army in Japan.

Support Base

The success of terrorism depends to a large extent upon its support base which includes not only the political and social support but also support by money, weapons and training. Terrorists obtain money from different sources like "donations and taxes" from people, through bank robberies, by smuggling and selling drugs, and collecting ransom for hostages and hijacked planes. Weapons are often looted from people or snatched from police stations or purchased from abroad. For example, the PLO rebels acquire weapons from the Arab states, China and the USSR. The Khalistani terrorists and Kashmiri militants in India are getting both training and weapons from several neighbouring countries. Some states in South India have recently become active after 1983 riots in Sri Lanka. The ethnic linkage of the Tamils provides local sympathy

for the Sri Lankan Tamils in India. The militant activities of the LTTE have become a nuisance for one or two of our southern states. It has now been established that the LTTE militants were responsible even in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991.

Terrorism in India

The four types of terrorism we face in our country today are : Khalistan-oriented terrorism in Punjab, militants' terrorism in Kashmir, naxalite terrorism in Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and the ULFA terrorism in Assam. Earlier we had faced this problem in Nagaland (1951), Mizoland (1966), Manipur (1976), Tripura (1980) and (of Gurkhaland) in Bengal (1986). The Khalistan-oriented Sikh terrorism is based on a dream of a "theocratic state through secession" ; the Nagaland and the Mizo terrorism was based on the "identity crisis" ; the Manipur and Tripura terrorism was based on "the grievance situation," and the naxalite terrorism in Bengal, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh is based on "class enemity" Had the Sikh terrorism in Punjab been based on "grievance situation," or "identity crisis of Sikhs," it could have been tackled by political negotiations and constitutional means, but so long it is based on the idea of a "theocratic state" through secession and partition of the country, the government has to deal with it through counter-terror tactics.

Terrorism in Punjab entered a dangerous phase in 1984-85. Earlier during 1982-83, scores of innocent people, mostly Hindus, were killed in a reckless spree. In the later phase, along with Hindus, Sikhs were also killed Places of worship were turned by the militants into arsenals. In May 1985, there were many transistor bomb blasts in Delhi, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which took a heavy toll of life. There were conspiracies to kill VIPs including Rajiv Gandhi and the Haryana Chief Minister during their visit to the USA. Sant Longowal, President of the Akali Dal, was murdered inside a Gurdwara on August 20, 1985.

The massacre of selected non-Sikh passengers travelling by bus, the blowing up the Air India Boeing 'Kanishka' and killing nearly 300 innocent Indians, the murder of political leaders, journalists, military and police officers and even innocent people in-between 1984 and 1991, the killing of 114 Hindu train passengers at the Buddowal railway station near Ludhiana in June 1991, the looting of banks both in and outside Punjab, the killing of 24 candidates contesting elections in June, 1991 (later on postponed to February, 1992) at the rate of one candidate a day, were all the activities of terrorists highly condemned by everybody.

The militants were against the elections to the State Assembly in June 1991. The Congress (I) and the Left parties had boycotted the elections. Only the Sikh organisations and the Bharatiya Janata Party were contesting. The Akali Dal in Punjab is divided in seven factions (Mann, Badal, Longowal, Capt. Amrinder Sigh, Baba Joginder Singh, Pheruman and Raj Dev groups). The All India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF) is again split into six groups, each opposed to the other (Manjit, Mehta-Chawla, Daljit Bitto, Bhuttar, Padri and Khalon). There are five Panthic Committees (Sohan Singh, Zaffarwal, Manochahal, Usmanwala, and Bhuttar). The voters were, thus, confused. The election was to be a fight between nationalist and secessionist forces. The free elections were impossible with the terroristic tactics of intimidating and killing the candidates. The government headed by Mr. Chandra Shekhar was adamant about holding the elections. But a day before the Congress government came to power at the Centre, the elections were postponed. The terrorists' demand of a self-governed autonomous State for the Sikhs where "Sikhs could experience a glow of freedom" could not be achieved.

In May and June, 1991, on an average 15 people were killed daily in Punjab. The death toll, including that of civilians, security forces and militants in 1990 was 3,784. The imperialist forces interested in balkanising India and in weakening, destabilising and even disintegrating our country, have been supporting, encouraging and abetting the demand of Khalistan. The internal factor which has helped the terrorists in Punjab is the spread of Hindu communalism. The RSS communalists have been holding the entire Sikh community responsible for the crimes of terrorists. They keep on harping on the slogan of revenge and retaliation. Their assertion that 'Sikhs are Hindus' provides the argument to the separatists that unless there is Khalistan, Sikhism will be absorbed in the Hindu religion. The anti-Sikh riots in Delhi at the time of the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi had resulted in killing of more than 300 Sikhs. The fact that no action was taken against those who were involved in these riots has been exploited by the extremists in Punjab to spread terrorism and gather mass support for their action.

The strategies and tactics adopted by the Khalistan-oriented terrorists are: (i) undermining the authority of the administration by issuing their own orders and demonstrating their strength by killing the deviants, (ii) projecting themselves as the defender of Sikhs and Sikh religion, (iii) killing innocent people, looting banks and shops and

creating terror, (iv) forcing the Hindus of Punjab to migrate to other states and providing opportunities to Sikhs from other states to migrate to Punjab, and (v) developing a nexus with smugglers for raising funds in Punjab. Today, the spirit of the people in Punjab has been fatigued by terrorism. There is no anger but just a gnawing fear that has become a state of mind. In 'Babey Raj' (the local parlance for militants), the people have internalised fear and have learnt to live with it. The word of the terrorists is like a command for the villagers. The poor villagers follow these commands for the sake of their safety, for the safety of their children, for the safety of their fields, and for the safety of their cattle, shops and property. The agony of people in Punjab is that not only have the terrorists progressively held the state to ransom but the administration by its corrupting tentacles has destroyed the faith of the people in the system and the highhandedness of the police raj seems to grow by leaps and bounds. In the face of such anarchy, the people's anguish has been silenced.

The naxalite terrorism appeared in Bengal in 1967. It got impetus in 1969 when CPI (ML) was born with instigation from China which was interested in weakening India. The theoretical backing for Naxalite thought came from the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China held in April, 1969, when Mao's thoughts were declared to be the highest stage of Marxism-Leninism. Using these thoughts, the Naxalite leader, Charu Mazumdar had declared "China's Chairman is our Chairman". From Bengal, the Naxalite movement spread to Bihar to fight for the landless labour. However, Charu Mazumdar's call of annihilation of class enemies did not get much response from the peasantry class and the educated middle class, though many idealistic young Naxalite men and women enjoyed killing landlords, money-lenders and police officers. Between 1969 and 1972, 1,711 persons were killed in Bengal by the Naxalite terrorists. There were 696 cases of looting of cash and 8,857 cases of other acts of violence (Tripathi, B.K., 1990: 151). With the vigorous operations of the government (that is, by the Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force), 384 terrorists were killed and more than 6,000 were imprisoned in West Bengal. The movement also got discredited because professional criminals joined the movement. After 1972, the Naxalite movement spread from Bengal and Bihar to Andhar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura. In Andhra Pradesh, during 1969-72, the terrorists committed 102 murders and indulged in 148 cases of looting. The situation in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar between 1988 and 1991 has

been much worse, though by and large, the exploited poor and the tribals still continue to follow Naxalite terrorism for protecting themselves from ex-*zamindars*, money lenders, and other exploiters. The government deals with this Naxalite terrorism purely as a problem of law and order.

The terrorism of militants in Kashmir has assumed a new shape since 1988. The militants want to capitalise on the political uncertainty at the Centre in the last three years. They have launched a bloody battle to underline their separate identity. The neighbouring countries, determined to see turmoil continuing in the Valley, are providing training and weapons to the militants. The people have also been so brain-washed that they have started talking of the excesses of police and the para-military forces. For example, the firing by security forces on a funeral procession of three militants in Khanyar on May 8, 1990 was criticised by the people. For the militants, the criticism of the government by the people means that the people are more than willing to support them. On the other hand, the Hindus have been forced by the militants to leave Kashmir. It is claimed in a Press Guild of India report that nearly two lakh Hindus have fled Jammu and Kashmir in-between 1988 and 1991. The Hindus claim that the fundamentalists and militants have infiltrated every sphere of the government in the Kashmir Valley and that what rules high is not the writ of the government but that of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. They maintain that the pro-Pakistan forces have overtaken the Valley and in a way, there is a collapse of the administration and the terrorists want them to quit the valley. The Muslims claim that they are innocent and are being unnecessarily harassed. The government claims that 5,000 trained militants are ready to sneak into the valley. The militants have resorted to extortion and kidnapping for monetary gains and political motives. There is no dearth of guns in the Valley; nor is there any dearth of frustrated youths to operate them. Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen (HM) is claimed to have a cadre strength of 20,000 with at least 10,000 persons being trained in camps across the border and in the Valley. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation front (JKLF) still clings on to the concept of an independent state as opposed to a merger with Pakistan, which is the demand of other militant groups like the Muslim Janpaez Force and the Iqwan-e-Musalmeen. All militants have developed a feeling that they have to unite against a common enemy—the Indian Armed Forces.

Some sources claim that the militants are getting help from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Libya. The kidnapping of a daughter of Union Home Minister in 1989, two Swedish engineers in April, 1991 (who ultimately managed to escape on 6th July, 1991) and demanding the release of imprisoned militants, and eight Israeli tourists on June 27, 1991 indicate the new strategies the terrorists are employing today. The present Congress (I) government, thus, is not only faced today with the problem of combating the militants but also of facing the wrath of the people for some of the excesses committed by the armed forces. It has to build bridges of trust by far-sighted political initiatives.

Terrorism in Assam emerged from 1980 onwards. Assamese already had raised the issue of removing 'foreigners' and deleting their names from the electoral roles. When the government failed to take action, there were agitations in February 1983 elections in which 5,000 persons lost their lives. After the AASU movement when the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) came to power, it was felt that the state would develop. But the factions soon led to the split of the AGP. The United Minorities Front (UMF) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) emerged as two militant organisations. The All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) also demanded a separate state resulting in considerable violence. The ULFA stepped up its campaign of murder, loot and kidnapping. The terrorist activities spread panic not only among the non-Assamese but also amongst the Assamese people. The army action—named Operation Bajrang—against the secessionist militant organisation subdued it to the extent that the militant activities did not interfere even with the elections in June, 1991. It was hoped that the formation of the new Saikya Congress government on June 30, 1991 would rout out or weaken organisations like the AASU, the AGP, the UMF, the ULFA and the ASDC and that the new government would be able to contain the terrorist activities of the militant organisations in the state. But the abduction of 14 persons from different parts of the state, including six officials of the ONGC on July 1, 1991 has belied these expectations. Perhaps the government has to face the militants' terrorism for a long time to come.

Terrorism in Other Countries

The terrorist activities are found in different parts of the world. For example, terroristic activities of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Ireland are based on retaliatory action against the British reign of terror in Ireland. The terrorists seek termination of English control in Ireland

and establish Ireland's unification and people's right to national self-determination. Similarly, we find terrorism in Sri Lanka, Israel, Spain, Germany, Japan, Philippines, Canada, Argentina, France, Italy, Portugal and Latin America. Some of the important terrorist groups are the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Red Army in Japan, the Palestinian Guerrillas in Israel, the Basque in Spain, the Red Bridge in Italy, the Kurds in Iraq, the Hukbalahaps and Moros in Philippines, the Baader-Meinhof in Germany, the Symbionise Liberation Army in the US and the Quebecois in Canada.

The legitimacy of the kind of terrorism used by these terrorist groups can be gauged by several socio-economic and political factors, as well as by the fact of whether it was considered as the last resort in their political struggle after unsuccessfully trying all other means of struggle. On the other hand, terrorism loses its legitimacy if it can be proved that the available legitimate means have been bypassed before resorting to the use of terrorism.

Of late, international terrorism has also gained currency. The support to terrorists of one country can come from individuals and groups sympathetic to their cause, or it can come from other state governments, like support given by some Arab states to the Palestinian groups, or support of President Gaddafi to the IRA in Ireland or the Moros in Philippines.

The examples of state terror are found in Russia, China and Cambodia. The three famous examples of Russian terrors are the Tsarist reign of terror in 1905-07, the Bolshevik terror rule in 1917-18, and the Stalin period of terror in 1934-35. In China, people faced the white terror of Chiang Kai Shekh in 1923, Mao's terror in 1950-53 in which 10 to 20 million people were killed, and terror during the Cultural Revolution in 1966-69 in which student power and People's Liberation Army were used to revive Mao's personal authority. The state terror in Kampuchea (formerly known as Cambodia) occurred in 1975 in which two million people out of a total population of eight million were massacred. The examples of state terror are also found in East Pakistan in 1971, in Iran in 1983-85, and in Nazi Germany in 1933-34.

The U.N. General Assembly also passed a resolution in December, 1985 condemning all methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed. It called upon all states to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other states or acquiescing in activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts. It also urged all states to co-

operate with one another through exchange of relevant information and by prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators of such acts and to enter into treaty obligation to that effect.

Theoretical Explanation of Causes of Terrorism

Following Gurr (1977 : 47), the causes of terrorism may be explained on the basis of the Theory of Relative Deprivation. According to this theory, political collective violence may be described as a consequence of gap developing between the value expectations of a given group of people and the value capabilities of the group. Gurr has talked of three types of deprivations

(1) *Declivity deprivation* occurs when the value capabilities of a given population decline, drastically but the value expectations remain the same Bolsheviks' collective political violence in Russia in 1917 was due to this type of deprivation. The Russian people, after World War I, were a discontented lot, and the failure of the government to terminate the Russian involvement in the War led to a swing in popular sentiment in one group (Lenin and his party) that promised immediate peace

(2) *Aspirational deprivation* occurs when the value capabilities of the given population remain the same but value expectations increase. Terrorism in the Kashmir Valley is due to this type of deprivation. Similarly, the ULFA terrorism in Assam is the result of the demands for immediate equality as opposed to the continuing discrimination and prejudice against them

(3) *Progressive deprivation* occurs when value expectations increase and the value capabilities decline. The Khalistan-oriented terrorism is the best example of this.

The process of modernisation and the 'ethnicity explosion' lead to widespread feelings of relative deprivation.

Combating Terrorism

Terrorism is too serious a problem to be left to politicians alone. General awareness among the masses and pressures on people are the only way out The one thing we have to understand is that terrorism is like a common cold It runs its own course and there is need for patience.

Basically, there are three models of combating terrorism : the Indian, the American and the Israeli. A comparison of these three models is necessary for furthering our understanding.

The Israeli Model

Terrorism in Israel has been prevailing for the last four decades. Initially, for about one and a half decades (1953 to 1967), the Palestinians living in west of Jordan and in Gaza strip carried out their resistance through cross border raids by sneaking into Israel. The Israelis responded by carrying out airborne raids and by intruding into Jordan and destroying Palestinian camps with tanks. Since these attacks caused extensive damage to Jordanian army and property, the public opinion in Jordan turned against supporting the PLO. Along with Jordan, other Arab countries also prevented the PLO from carrying out its activities from their soil. Jordan launched a purge in September 1970 against the Palestinians and killed about 15,000 of them. The PLO base in Lebanon also was eliminated when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. Israel, thus. dealt with the PLO terrorists by eliminating their bases. The Palestinians then adopted the tactics of hijacking Israeli civilian aircrafts and also kidnapping the Israeli civilians and demanding the release of their jailed colleagues in Israel. The Israeli government never yielded to such terrorist threats and in retaliation attacked the Palestinian camps. Though the Israeli policy of non-negotiation with the terrorists was often criticised but Israel never budged from its position, maintaining that once they gave into hijackings and kidnappings, they would multiply manifold. Thus, the four primary components of the Israeli strategy in dealing with terrorist violence are: (1) refusal to negotiate with terrorists, (2) retaliatory raids on the bases of terrorists, (3) strict security measures, and (4) covert violence against Palestineans (even innocent) connected with terrorists and sympathisers of Palestinians. Thus, the Israeli model of combating terrorism is based on 'counter terror' and 'anti-terror' rather than passive defensive measures.

The American Model

The United States has global economic interests and is vulnerable to terrorism. The most potent weapon of America to fight terrorism has been its economic clout like cutting off trade and technology export. When this fails, the U.S. bombs the enemy country supporting terrorists. This method was adopted for Cuba in 1962 and for Libya in 1986 when its leader Col. Gaddafi supported terrorist movements like those of the PLO or of the IRA of Northern Ireland or of the HUK rebels of Philippines, or of the terrorist gangs in Latin America. The

same method was adopted by America when it invaded Cambodia for giving shelter to Vietcong during the Vietnam war. Thus, the American model of combating terrorism was 'counter terror campaign' and invasion.

The Indian Model

India has been facing severe problems of violence and terrorism since 1960s. The insurgency in the north-east in 60s and 70s was tackled by the government more through political methods. The violence in Jammu and Kashmir also falls more into the category of insurgency rather than pure terrorism. 'Operation Blue Star' of the military on June 6, 1984, in Punjab and 'Operation Black Thunder' in Assam used to counter terrorism totally failed. They were anti-terrorist measures (implemented mainly through the police forces and partially through the military forces) rather than counter terrorist measures The hallmark of the policies in the former measures are : frequent road checks, sentries at vulnerable points and elaborate security for the VIPs. These measures are extremely costly The prime minister's security alone is reported to cost our country Rs. 200 crore annually. The countries which supply the bulk of arms, or give shelter to terrorists or finance terrorism have not been called to account Even there, the emphasis is on passive measures like border fencing or lodging mild protests. No wonder, that even after 10 years India has not been able to control terrorism The government mostly succumbs to the demands of the terrorists as happened in Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

Thus, the three models (Israeli, American and Indian) of combating terrorism are different in content as well as in temperament. In a way, they reflect the power of the states. The American model is 'counter terror' model which is based on hitting at the very roots of terrorist support. The Indian model is anti-terrorist model The Israeli model is 'blend of counter-terror and anti-terrorist measures'. The terrorist menace cannot be eliminated either through anti-terror or counter-terror approaches. Besides the police and the military measures, the socio-political issues have to be tackled The bases in the countries, at least the neighbouring countries, supporting the terrorists have to be attacked and destroyed. The policy in dealing with such countries has to be deterrent.

The government of India cannot face the problem of terrorism merely by enlisting public sympathy or by blaming countries of giving support to terrorists. Helping terrorists in a hostile country is a fact of

life which no organised government in modern times can ignore. Our country has to evolve its own system of dealing with terrorists.

Some methods which may prove to be helpful to our government in this regard are (Saxena, N.S., 1985: 33-34) :

- seeking cooperation of the citizens by the police to get information against the terrorists.
- reducing the finance at the disposal of the terrorists to contain their operations.
- refusing to accept any demands of any group of terrorists.
- giving swift and judicial punishments to arrested terrorists. The greater the delay in prosecution and greater the detention in the jail as undertrials, the greater the possibility of their (terrorists') escape.
- adopting more effective intelligence methods in retrieving information about the terrorists, their associates, their modus operandi, and their sources of finance and weapons, etc.
- improving security measures continuously at important places.
- giving more scientific training to forces dealing with terrorists.

Sociology of Terrorism

How does terrorism disrupt the political system or social organisations? How does terrorism act as a method for hastening social change? How does terrorism explain the social relationship between a frustrated minority and the ruling political elites, or between a group which feels deprived and a group which has the monopoly on the use of force? A holistic sociological perspective of terrorism will be possible only when we discuss large-scale political events not only in aggregate numerical terms but also in impact terms, that is, we focus not only on quantitative macropolitics but also on qualitative micropolitics.

Terrorism demoralises and demobilizes populations and disintegrates societies, though it is also true that terrorism in some instances serves as an integrative mechanism binding people together in a common cause. Terrorism may involve the problem of law and order, that is, of killing or kidnapping of one group by other group because of its religious affiliations or sub-cultural differences, but it does not disrupt the social systems. Nor is terrorism a special method for hastening historical change. No terrorist movement has ever succeeded in achieving its goals. Terrorists, therefore, do not shape the course of historical events.

For understanding terrorism, it is necessary to measure the amount of violence engaged in by the terrorists to effect their desired ends, the quantum of force utilized by the police and the armed forces to prevent social change, and also to measure the types of violence. Using this perspective to terrorism in India, the number of people killed and kidnapped in Bihar in one year is much more than the killings and kidnappings in Punjab. When a terrorist takes a life in the name of social justice, he faces a problem of social accounting at one level and moral constraint at another. One might also speak of the results of the use of terror to overthrow state authority. Suppose we accept the temporary disruption of the normal administrative activities of politico-social systems, do we not face the same results whenever we are faced with any social or natural calamity ? Does the killing of one or two, or even a few important political leaders by the terrorists change the structure of politics ? By and large, the nature of political process in the society is not interfered with, nor it is interrupted by these killings. Quantitatively, thus, the assassinations by terrorists may not be significant but they do involve the qualitative traumas. This is the problem we faced in the assinations of Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi by the terrorists As a result, we may not label terrorist activities 'unsuccessful', but at the same time, we cannot view them as 'successful', too in terms of the limited numbers involved. Sociologically, therefore, terrorists may not be able to topple the social order but they do loosen that order symbolically by weakening the legitimating capacities of administrative officials and the power elites. To board an aeroplane, one might agree to get his luggage checked or go through the security measures for approaching an important person ; nevertheless, one has a perfect right to raise questions about these new social costs These symbolic changes as the result of consequences of terrorism may be irritable but their transitory nature is invariably important for social evaluation The social impact of terrorism which may totally affect the society on a long-term basis, thus, should be the central focus in any system of analytic measurement. It may, therefore, be concluded that claiming that terrorism disintegrates society or affects the survival of the system will not be very correct.

Nevertheless, mechanisms have to be created to prevent acts of terror. Terrorism and political violence have become the bane of Indian society today. Both are leading the country towards anarchy and chaos. Terrorists kill in the name of religion and region, in the name of language and culture It is time that the prevalent frustration and a sense

of deprivation amongst the people, particularly the youth, be checked. On the one hand, the government has to deal with the terrorists with a very firm hand, and on the other hand, the minorities have to be protected and right atmosphere created for the functioning of a genuine democracy. The terrorism of the terrorists of terrorising the terrorised has to be contained.

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