

India's relations with the European Union

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Introduction

India has a multi-dimensional relationship with the European Union (EU), its largest trading partner, a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), a significant donor, an important source of technology, and home to a large and influential Indian diaspora. India no longer regards the EU as a mere trading bloc, but as an increasingly important political actor in world politics with a growing profile and presence.

Historical background

India took little interest in the movement for European unification during the first years of Indian independence. The European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor to the EU set up in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome, was remote from Indian concerns. There were no statements by the Indian Government or any references to it in debates in the Indian parliament until the United Kingdom expressed its intention to apply for membership of the Common Market in 1961. The question of India's relations with the EEC then took on a new urgency, especially as it came at a time when India's balance of payments had deteriorated sharply.¹ Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued that the EEC would deepen Cold War divisions, widen the gap between the rich and poor countries, and weaken the Commonwealth of Nations.

Nevertheless, India recognized the importance of the nascent EEC and was among the first developing countries to establish diplomatic relations in 1963. Indian efforts to establish a new, post-colonial relationship with the Community proved a challenging task since apart from the 'associated' overseas countries and territories of the member states, the Treaty of Rome contained no references to the rest of the Third World. Indian policy-makers deplored the fact that the EEC Council of Ministers made 'no conscious attempt' in the early years to evolve a development policy towards developing countries; instead the EEC was much too preoccupied with its internal problems, with negotiations for its enlargement, and therefore remained content to follow a limited policy in the framework of old colonial relationships of its member states.²

During the 1961–63 negotiations for the United Kingdom's entry, the EEC was compelled briefly to envisage future arrangements between the enlarged EEC and Commonwealth developing countries. India sought an Association Agreement similar to the one that the Mediterranean countries and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries had concluded with the EEC. However, this was ruled out for 'non-associables' like India lest these concessions were extended to all developing countries.

With the collapse of negotiations for the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC in January 1963, India and the Commonwealth countries, the *Times of India* editorial observed, had 'every reason to thank God and de Gaulle' for the collapse of negotiations for the United Kingdom's entry in the Community in January 1963.³ It led to an abatement of the threat of disruption of Indo-British trade for some time, but the challenge of defining the EEC's relations with developing countries remained. Relations with other developing countries would continue to be governed by their Common Commercial Policy.

For a decade (1963–73), Indian efforts focused on securing better market access for India's major exports and alleviation of its chronic trade deficit with the EEC, which was the largest it had amongst all its trading partners. This was dealt with on a product-by-product basis by the conclusion of annual agreements on the suspension, in whole or in part, of the customs duty. Though the EEC introduced the General System of Preferences (GSP) in 1971, India felt that the GSP was not structured to solve the specific problems created for India by its loss of preferential access to the British market. Many of India's main exports, including jute, coir, cotton textiles and tobacco, were either excluded from the scheme or else subject to special arrangements.

With the United Kingdom's admission into the EEC in 1973, the enlarged Community had to decide on the arrangements to be concluded with the developing countries of the Commonwealth. The EEC was in no position to take on the burden of financial aid to countries as populous as India. Under the Joint Declaration of Intent, annexed to the United Kingdom's Treaty of Accession (1973), the EEC agreed to examine with the Asian Commonwealth countries 'such problems as may arise in the field of trade with a view to seek appropriate solutions'. India was the first country to take advantage of this offer. However, member states, even those with past colonial connections with India, had no real interest in alleviating India's difficulties. India was perceived as 'Britain's baby' and it was up to the British to act in its favour.⁴

The agreement the EEC was initially offering India lacked even 'a core'; it was 'all packaging'.⁵ The EEC was reluctant to agree to any sweeping programme of economic, industrial and financial co-operation lest it open the door to a host of similar agreements with other developing Asian and Latin American countries. The five-year non-preferential Commercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) that India eventually signed in 1973 was the result of the diplomatic acumen of K.B. Lall, the then Indian Ambassador to the EEC. The agreement contained no new tariff concessions, but provided both a focus and a contractual basis for India-EEC relations. India was not particularly jubilant about the CCA; it felt that it was the best it could get under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the CCA constituted a big step forward by the EEC and set the pattern for similar agreements with other South Asian countries. However, conscious development of trade opportunities for India continued to be assigned only 'a low priority'.⁶ Nevertheless, a series of useful trade development and trade promotion programmes were launched, and an expert study was commissioned to identify shortcomings and recommend ways to overcome them.

After the conclusion of the 1973 CCA, India repeatedly urged the EEC to work out a new 'doctrine' covering the EEC's overall relationship with India rather than tackling matters each

time in a piecemeal fashion. India took the initiative in 1978 and sought to expand the scope of the 1973 agreement by the conclusion of a new non-preferential economic and commercial agreement in June 1981, which expanded co-operation to more sectors.

The 1990s

With the end of the Cold War, the EEC (which became the EU in 1993) no longer had to look at India through the lens of Cold War equations. Moreover, India was becoming progressively more interesting. Its policy of liberalization and economic reforms launched in 1991 with consistently high growth rates, acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998, and steadily improving relations with the USA, all led to recognition of India as a potential global player by the EU. In the post-Cold War era India pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, shed most of the ideological baggage, and accorded greater priority to the West as a market, source of technology and FDI.

In the early 1990s India urged an overhaul of its co-operation agreement with the EU and an upgraded political dialogue, since the EU was not merely another trading area, but increasingly was becoming the collective diplomatic centre for Western Europe. A wide-ranging 'third-generation' agreement on Partnership and Development was signed on 20 December 1993 to encompass economic, technological and cultural co-operation, development and investment. The Joint Statement on Political Dialogue (1994) sought to achieve 'a closer and upgraded relationship', and expressed the resolve of India and the EU to reinforce and intensify their mutual relations in the political, economic, technological and cultural fields. The European Commission pushed for stronger links in its Communication on EU-India Enhanced Partnership (1996).⁷

The institutional architecture between India and the EU is now quite multilayered. Apart from the Joint Commission and Sub-Commissions, troika ministerial meetings have been held since 1982. Other institutional mechanisms include Senior Officials Meetings, meetings between the European Commission and Indian planners, bilateral meetings in the margins of multilateral forums, working groups of specialists (on subjects like export controls, terrorism experts and consular affairs), the India-EU Round Table, the India-EU Energy Panel and its working groups, their Security Dialogue, macro-economic dialogue on financial co-operation, a dialogue on human rights, and a science and technology steering committee. Annual summits have taken place since 2000.⁸ Parliamentary exchanges began with the setting up of a South Asia Delegation in the European Parliament. A separate India Delegation was established in September 2009 to reflect the strategic partnership. The Indian parliament also set up a 22-member Parliamentary Friendship Group for Relations with the European Parliament in June 2008.

Indian perceptions

The Indian elite's perceptions of the EU have been and continue to be essentially conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon media, which impedes a more nuanced understanding of the processes and dynamics of European integration, as well as the intricacies and roles of EU institutions. For the Indian policy-maker, the EU is not an easy political animal to deal with partly because of the rotating presidencies, proliferating regulations and so on seen with the EU. India, like many of the EU's other strategic partners, is clearly more comfortable with national bilateral frameworks. While there is some clarity regarding policies of EU member states, it is often difficult to say what EU policy is. Most stakeholders in India feel that India's democratic polity and shared

values do not necessarily earn it any brownie points in Europe, that the EU, including the European think-tank community, continues to have a fixation with the People's Republic of China, and that most senior EU officials feel India 'is getting there, but not quite arrived'.⁹

More perceptive Indians feel that when it comes to India/South Asia there still continue to be three kinds of people in the EU: those who are otherwise very well informed and knowledgeable, but who do not try to understand South Asia because others have tried it before and failed to do so; those who neither understand anything, nor wish to understand anything; and then a small minority of those who have the courage and perseverance to make an effort to understand the more complex problems of India and wish to do something about it. Relations with India are still driven by 'very small circles' in Brussels. In the first circle are those that have substantial economic stakes—primarily the 'Big Three' (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). When push comes to shove, they are the ones that bring the requisite energy to move things forward in an increasingly heterogeneous Union. In the second circle are those member states that have interests in certain sectors, but that do not quite have the big picture. In the third circle are the remaining member states, which broadly feel that if some things are good for others, it is fine with them. The Nordic countries have generally been viewed as the 'moral superpowers'.

'Strategic partnership'

The Joint Declaration of the first India-EU summit (June 2000) resolved that the EU and India should build 'a new strategic partnership' in the 21st century, founded on shared values and aspirations. The European Commission's Communication, *An EU-India Strategic Partnership* (June 2004), proposed to develop a strategic partnership with India in four key areas: a) co-operation, especially in multilateral forums, on conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; b) strengthened economic partnership through strategic policy and sectoral dialogues; c) development co-operation; and d) fostering intellectual and cultural exchanges.¹⁰ A 46-page Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the Communication proposed over 100 actionable points in various sectors, the great majority of which concerned trade and commerce. In its first-ever strategy paper on relations with an outside entity, India responded with a detailed 31-page response to the Commission's Communication.¹¹ The 'strategic partnership' (upgraded) relationship was specifically endorsed at the fifth India-EU summit in 2004. There seemed a sense between them by 2005 that 'India-EU relations have grown exponentially from what used to be a purely trade and economic driven relationship to one covering all areas of interaction'.¹² A new Political Declaration and a Joint Action Plan (JAP) divided into four sections (political, trade and investment, economic policy, and cultural and academic) was adopted at the next India-EU summit in September 2005.¹³ The revised JAP in September 2008, titled *Global Partners for Global Challenges*, added 40-odd items to the 100-odd items already contained in the original JAP.¹⁴

The EU's 'strategic partnership' with India is one of the nine that the EU has world-wide and one of the 30 that India has with other countries. The term 'strategic partnership' is an extremely elusive and elastic concept. Some call it a kind of 'honorary degree' conferred on key international players; others call it a 'charade'.¹⁵ For the EU, a 'strategic partnership' comprises a common template in terms of annual summits, a Joint Plan of Action with a laundry list of actionable areas, and an incrementally increasing number of sectoral and policy dialogues which could foster an internal dynamic to gradually generate deliverables. For India, its strategic

partnership with the EU raised the relationship to a new level where one can have broad-ranging discussions on bilateral, regional and global issues. These consultations, which now encompass around 45 issue areas, have enabled the two sides to better understand and appreciate each other's positions, perspectives and perceptions.

Political dialogue: convergence and divergence

There are fundamental differences between India and the EU on many issues because they are at different levels of development, because they come from two different milieux, and because they have different geographical and geopolitical priorities. Indian perspectives are shaped by its historical experiences and current realities, which include the fact that it lives in a very difficult and dangerous neighbourhood surrounded by failed or failing states, and confronts a variety of external threats and challenges. Despite exhortations to identify possible synergies and initiatives to promote human rights and democracy, there has in practice been little co-ordination on any of these goals.¹⁶

There is some convergence in policy and practice between the EU and India on questions of multilateralism and global governance, but that convergence has notable and significant limitations. There are basic differences in both perceptions and interests between India and the EU in many fields, including trade, development, climate change, the International Criminal Court, globalization, humanitarian intervention, etc. On most issues that matter to India, like enlargement of the UN Security Council and civilian nuclear energy, the EU either has no common policy or is unable to formulate one. Though the EU and India have shared objectives in most South Asian countries, they are often unable to calibrate their foreign policies to work there. India feels that the EU is a marginal player when it comes to the security milieu in South Asia.

India does not seek to replace, but democratize, existing structures of global governance and increase its role in decision-making. India has been consistently advocating a more democratized, more representative and more credible UN system and has sought membership as a permanent member of a reformed UN Security Council. To most stakeholders in India, Europe is clearly over-represented but is in no hurry to reduce such over-representation. Most of the existing financial and trade rules of the current international architecture reflect the power realities at the end of the Second World War in which India was a recipient rather than a framer of norms. India has been a beneficiary of these rules, but has long been a victim of it. In recent years, there is a basic and increasing contestation about the content, value and scope of norms between the developed and developing countries. Europe often presents the normative agenda in a way that seeks to undermine the competitive advantage of developing countries. India wants to play a greater role in the making of new rules of the international economic and financial system.

Nevertheless, on most issues of substance, India's broad interests as a rising major power are consonant with those of the other major powers. In the military-political arena, India shares a common interest with other major powers in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, in fostering maritime security, stabilization of weak states, and coping with health hazards and pandemics. Co-operative relations with them are likely to grow despite differences over specific issues. India will continue to strongly favour the development of multilateral regimes to regulate international trade and politics. In 2007 the EU, along with several other major world powers, gained official observer status in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which reflects keen EU interest in the SAARC experiment.¹⁷ However, unlike the foreign ministers of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

(South Korea), the European Commission was not represented at the 14th SAARC summit held in New Delhi; instead the EU delegation was led by the German Ambassador to India. Another new forum for India to further develop its growing relations with both Asia and Europe is the 45-member Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which New Delhi joined in 2007 and in which the EU's European Commission is one of the co-ordinators.

Combating terrorism and security dialogue

A victim of terrorism since 1980, Indian officials had for years stressed the need for a frank and honest dialogue with the EU on terrorism. Despite recognition by the EU and its member states' dislike for Pakistani adventurism in Kargil (1999), Europe was not willing to confront Pakistan on its 'sponsorship' of cross-border terrorism. During the first India-EU summit (June 2000), Brussels resisted attempts by India to bring terrorism onto the agenda on the grounds that it was an issue best left to direct talks between India and individual member states of the Union. Brussels also did not share Indian characterizations of Pakistan as either a 'failed state' or an 'epicentre of terrorism'.

After the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, the EU itself accepted that terrorism had to be henceforth among the topics of discussion and since then the topic has figured at each summit. Both sides continue to share concern at the scourge of terrorism, and a Joint Working Group on terrorism has been meeting in recent years. However, at the second India-EU summit (2001), there were difficulties in formulating the text of the Declaration Against International Terrorism. After the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament (December 2001), which brought India's threat to go to war with Pakistan and the mobilization of 1m. troops in South Asia in the summer of 2002, several EU leaders visited India in an attempt to defuse the situation. New Delhi was enraged at European efforts at the third summit, held in Copenhagen in October 2002, to pressurize India on talking to Pakistan and exercising restraint through aggressive public diplomacy by the strident tone of Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen. The larger EU member states pleaded ignorance while the Danes denied this.

Unlike the EU, it was the USA that took the lead in compelling Pakistan to ban terrorist groups operating from Pakistani territory. Brussels followed suit and declared several terrorist outfits as terrorist organizations in April 2004, but European bureaucracies soon lost enthusiasm in continuing this time-consuming exercise. In October 2004 the Council expressed willingness to 'consider' the Commission's proposal for the inclusion of India in its list of priority countries for a strategic co-operation agreement with Europol—the EU's centralized police organization. In November 2009 the two sides agreed to advance the negotiations between Europol and the Indian authorities in order to conclude an agreement to 'reinforce cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism'.¹⁸

A security dialogue on global and regional issues has been held annually since May 2006. The security dialogue held in November 2008 shortly after the Mumbai attacks was more substantive and constructive than any of the previous ones, largely because India sought to proactively engage the Europeans. The first Council Working Group on Terrorism (COTER) troika with India took place on 11 June 2009.

Most co-operation between India and European countries has been on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis. In fact, because of disparate priorities most EU member states neither share the same urgency nor interest in co-operating with India. However, the prospects of practical, ground-level security co-operation with the Union are remote, since it is the member states that have the assets and competences, not the Union.

Economic relations

The EU is an extremely important trade partner for India, accounting for 20.1% of its total exports and 13.3% of its total imports in 2009/10. India accounts for a more limited but rapidly growing share of EU trade, with 2.4% of the EU's total exports and 1.9% of its total imports, and with India ranked 10th on the list of the EU's main trading partners in 2008, up from 15th in 2002. India-EU trade increased from US \$1,640m. in 1973 to \$5,700m. in 1980. Over the decade 1981–90, India-EU trade increased by about five times. With India's economic reforms kicking in in 1991, Indo-EU trade recorded an annual rate of growth of around 20% in 1990–94, with substantive annual growth subsequently maintained during the following decade, rising from \$19,500m. in 1996/97, to \$56,690m. in 2006/7, and to \$82,080m. in 2008/9. Some downturn was seen in the overall trade figure of \$75,380m. for 2009/10, reflecting a decline in 2009 as the global economic downturn cast a shadow on the trade performance of both sides. However, by the first half of 2010 trade was recovering, owing to India's resumption of high growth rates; meanwhile Indian exports to the EU were back up 18% from the January–April 2009 figures, whilst Indian imports from the EU were up 28% from the January–April 2009 figures. Services-wise, in Euro terms, India exported €2,500m.–worth of services to the EU in 2001, while EU services exports to India amounted to €2,400m.¹⁹ EU services exports to India had increased to €9,000m. in 2008, whereas India exported services worth €7,400m.²⁰

The EU has been the largest source of FDI inflows for India since the country began economic reforms in 1991. During August 1991 to September 2004, actual FDI from the EU to India was \$6,720m., which accounted for 21.6% of total FDI in India.²¹ EU investment flows to India gained significant momentum in 2007, doubling in euro terms to €5,400m. from €2,500m. in 2006. With the financial turmoil followed by a severe economic crisis hitting Europe, EU FDI into India declined to €900m. in 2008.²² Meanwhile, FDI from India to the EU soared from zero in 2004 to €10,000m. in 2007, and to €2,400m. in 2008.

The EU is becoming a major destination for India's outward investment in a variety of sectors like steel, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, information technology and energy. Recent key purchases have included Tata Steel's acquisition of Corus in 2007, and the iconic Jaguar and Land Rover brands acquired by Tata Motors in 2008. Investment by Indian companies in Europe is mostly strategic in nature, seeking to either gain access to new markets or advanced technology. The United Kingdom remains the most attractive destination for FDI in Europe, accounting for over 50% all Indian FDI projects in the region.

Trade and investment agreement

The stalemate in the Doha Round prompted the European Commission to propose the conclusion of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with India, South Korea and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Helsinki Summit (October 2006) endorsed the High Level Trade Group recommendation for the conclusion of a trade and investment agreement. Some EU member states had expressed a preference for a comprehensive partnership agreement instead of 'a stand-alone FTA'. India had no desire to get involved in discussions on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement for the sake of 'coherence' and an upgrading of the 1994 Cooperation Agreement, an agreement which is still the legal framework for co-operation and satisfies the prerequisites for an FTA with the Union. India preferred a step-by-step approach since negotiating a broad-based trade and investment agreement would be

challenging enough without the inclusion of non-trade issues, and stressed the importance of being conscious of the danger of overloading the agenda and stalling the entire process.

The Council and the Representatives of member states meeting within the Council formally adopted a negotiating mandate for 'a new generation' FTA with India on 23 April 2007. Nine rounds of negotiations have so far been held since negotiations began in June 2007. There continue to be difficulties because of insistence by the Union to include non-trade provisions like an environmental and social clause, differences over issues like intellectual property rights, government procurement, etc., and efforts by Brussels to link trade with climate and India's social sector performance. The Union cites the growing assertiveness and sensitivity of the European Parliament on these issues after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009. India remains staunchly opposed to the inclusion of 'extraneous' non-trade issues in the talks. New Delhi has asserted that under no circumstances will it be willing to undertake any commitments over and above what it has already agreed to in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and that there are other forums, like the International Labour Organization (ILO), in which to address these issues. The two sides will eventually be able to find the appropriate language to deal with these issues. The European Parliament is not likely to own up to the responsibility of rejecting an agreement with India for which there is strong support.

The new trade and investment agreement will set the parameters of the India-EU trading relationship for the coming decades. Their negotiation had in the summer of 2010 entered the final stage, with an 'in principle' agreement between India and the EU on the FTA seen as likely by the end of 2010.²³ The trade and investment agreement aims to triple bilateral trade to around \$200,000m. in five years, up from its \$82,080m. figure for 2008/09. This could, in turn, possibly make political differences more manageable because the overall relationship very often tends to get tainted by differences in the WTO.

Conclusions

After 10 summits, India and the EU are gradually getting used to working together. Rhetoric continues to be strong. Post-Lisbon, the EU sees India as a significant factor:

We see India playing an increasingly important role across a wide range of global issues and problems. Buoyed by your strong economic growth you are engaged more and more on trade and climate change or regional and global security. I believe this is very welcome. So the EU and India have the chance to step up our co-operation – deepening and broadening it. And above all, making it more strategic. The world we live in demands we invest more in new forms of partnership. We have to stand together politically and economically.²⁴

Despite shared values, the lack of shared interests on a number of issues will continue to limit co-operation. India and the EU have many common interests, but transforming them into co-ordinated policies has been rather elusive. Despite the ongoing dialogue and consultations between India and the EU on 45 or so issues, Brussels and the member states complain that they encounter problems of capacity and resources of India's Ministry of External Affairs. In turn, the EU's foreign policy coherence and institutional solidification remains an evolving situation for India to deal with, though the post-Lisbon setting of the European External Action Service gives a further peg with which India must engage.²⁵

Some have even argued that the two sides ought to focus on a smaller number of long-term strategic priorities rather than cluttering the agenda. The EU is becoming more concerned (like

India) with the rise of China and its increasing assertiveness on many issues, apart from the perennial problem of mounting trade deficits (a problem India also faces with China), which may fuel protectionist sentiments. However, despite a declaration of 'strategic partnership', India and the EU have different approaches to security and have not yet built a real structure for real discussion on security issues. However, a working relationship has been established between the EU naval operation, ATALANTA, deployed in the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy and India's naval deployments there.

The driving force behind the relationship for the most part has been, is, and will continue to be, trade and commerce. Their mutual long-term interest is going to be in areas like scientific and technological co-operation, movement of skilled persons, etc. With India becoming a key destination for research and development, outsourcing of segments of the manufacturing process and its pool of scientific talent to foster innovation, there is great potential for partnership in cutting-edge technologies in a manner that combines India's strengths with European capabilities.

A worsening demographic profile with an ageing population is compelling the EU to address the problems and opportunities of in-sourcing highly skilled immigrants or outsourcing services. Since skilled immigrants seek a better location and conditions, European countries are now increasingly willing to conclude social security agreements with India, which could eventually pave the way for the conclusion of an EU-wide social security agreement. India and the EU are exploring the possibility of concluding a Labour Mobility Partnership Agreement (which India has already signed with several Gulf countries) to facilitate 'legal' and 'orderly migration' of the workforce from India to European countries and vice versa.

Hopefully, the future will witness the broadening, deepening and intensification of civil society dialogue between India and the EU as well as greater intellectual and elite interaction. While both display a growing willingness to discuss and engage, they need to re-profile and re-orient their mindsets in order to tap into the vast untapped potential of their relations.

Notes

- 1 India's modest surplus of Rs50 million (US\$10 million) in 1950 with the EEC Six had been transformed into a trade deficit of approximately Rs 1,350 million (\$281 million) in 1960. This deficit was thrice the value of Indian exports to the Community. No other country had a deficit of that order with the Community.
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- 3 Editorial, *Times of India*, 5 February 1963.
- 4 R. Abhyankar, 'India and the European Union: A Partnership for All Reasons', *India Quarterly*, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2009, p.395.
- 5 M. Subhan, 'An "Empty Shell" for India', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1973, p.55.
- 6 K. Lall and W. Ernst and H. Chopra (eds), *India and the EEC*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984, p. xvi.
- 7 European Commission, *EU-India Enhanced Partnership*, COM(96) 275 final, Brussels: European Commission, 26 June 1996.
- 8 India-EU, 'EU-India Partnership in the 21st Century', 28 June 2000, www.delind.ec.europa.eu. This first summit Joint Declaration included phrases like 'the EU and India are important partners in the shaping of the emerging multipolar world'.
- 9 See R. Jain, 'The European Union and China: Indian Perceptions and Perspectives', in G. Wiessala, J. Wilson and P. Taneja (eds), *The European Union and China: Interests and Dilemmas*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009; R. Jain, 'The European Union and the Rise of China and India', in J. Marques, R. Seidelmann and A. Vasilache (eds), *Asia and Europe: Dynamics of Inter- and Intra-Regional Dialogues*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009.

- 10 European Commission, *An EU-India Strategic Partnership*, COM(2004) 430 final, Brussels: European Commission, 16 June 2004.
- 11 Ministry of External Affairs, *EC Communication Titled 'An EU-India Strategic Partnership' – India's Response*, 27 August 2004, Ministry of External Affairs, meainida.nic.in. See E. Kavalski, 'Venus and the Porcupine. Assessing the European Union-India Strategic Partnership', *South Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, for analysis of these key documents.
- 12 India-EU, 'The India-EU Strategic Partnership. Joint Action Plan', 7 September 2005, p.1, www.delind.ec.europa.eu. Also S. Ramchandran, 'The Expanding EU-India Relationship', *The Hindu*, 5 July 2005, 'the growing fascination with India is evident from the fact that it has now been made one of the EU's strategic partners. The single-minded focus on China and the Asian tigers has been replaced with the recognition that India matters in the long run'.
- 13 India-EU, 'Political Declaration on the India-EU Strategic Partnership', 7 September 2005, www.delind.ec.europa.eu; India-EU, 'The India-EU Strategic Partnership. Joint Action Plan'.
- 14 India-EU, *Global Partners for Global Challenges: The EU-India Joint Action Plan (JAP)*, 29 September 2008, www.eeas.europa.eu.
- 15 C. Jaffrelot, 'India and the European Union: The Charade of a Strategic Partnership', March 2006, www.ceri-sciencespo.com.
- 16 R. Jain, *The European Union and Democracy Building in South Asia*, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, October 2009.
- 17 See R. Jain, 'The European Union and SAARC: The First Enlargement and After', in S.-H. Park and H. Kim (eds), *Regional Integration in Europe and Asia: Legal, Economic, and Political Perspectives*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009.
- 18 India-EU, *India-EU Joint Statement*, 6 November 2009, paragraph 12, www.eeas.europa.eu.
- 19 Delegation of the European Commission to India, *The European Union and India*, New Delhi: Delegation of the European Commission to India, 2005.
- 20 Eurostat, 'An EU27 Surplus in Trade in Goods with India of 2.1 billion in 2008', *News Release*, No. 157/2009, 4 November 2009.
- 21 Delegation of the European Commission to India, *The European Union and India*, op. cit.
- 22 Eurostat, 'An EU27 Surplus in Trade in Goods with India of 2.1 billion in 2008', op. cit.
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- 25 A. Mukhopadhyay, 'The EEAS and the EU-India Strategic Partnership', *IDSIA Comment*, 22 July 2010.