

4 CHAPTER

Overview of Indian Foreign Policy from Nehru till the Present

After reading the chapter, the reader will be able to develop an analytical understanding on the following:

- Foreign policy of Nehruvian era
- Foreign policy of Indira Gandhi
- Foreign policy of Rajiv Gandhi
- Foreign policy of P V Narshimha Rao
- Foreign policy of I K Gujaral
- Foreign policy of Atal Bihari Vajpayee
- Foreign policy of Manmohan Singh
- Foreign policy of Narendra Modi
- Analysis of major shifts in foreign policy from Cold War to the post-Cold War period
- Final analysis

INTRODUCTION

This chapter traces the foreign policy of Indian Prime Ministers from Nehru till the present times. As the analysis progresses, the focus would be on understanding the dramatic transitions witnessed by Indian foreign policy. Then the chapter will proceed to scrutinise the overall evolution of Indian foreign policy of the last seven decades. There will be special emphasis upon theorising the transition of foreign policy of India at the end of the Cold War and how India adjusted its relationship with the West. The chapter then further examines the foreign policy of the new government in India since 2014 and discusses the doctrines of the Modi era.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEHRUVIAN ERA

History and geographical coordinates are two primary factors that influence the foreign policy of a country. The most important factor influencing the operational part of foreign policy is the geopolitics that governs the nation and its neighbouring region. After India became independent in 1947, it initiated the process of developing its foreign policy. The Indian Foreign Policy (hereafter referred to as IFP) that came to be developed was under the leadership of Nehru. Nehru nurtured and shaped the IFP but did not invent the IFP. The IFP has its roots in India's past and its traditions. When India became independent, it was economically and militarily underdeveloped. It was imperative, at that moment, to evolve the right set of priorities. India had to make a choice of either developing the state

militarily or economically. Nehru realised that states like Pakistan and Thailand focused on developing their military establishments at the cost of developing their nations economically; these states thereby had unstable politics. In this context, Nehru understood that the foundation of social coherence lies in economic strength. The Nehruvian perspective was that economic strength is the guarantee of security of a state and a strong economic base could also later enable India to develop a robust military. Nehru, therefore, shifted India's focus on industrial development.

An understanding of the weaknesses of a nascent nation at the time of independence and the potential of India as a great power were the two core approaches that dominated the IFP in that period. Some scholars assert that Nehruvian policy lacked a sense of realism. This may not be entirely true because events during his tenure suggest that he steered the country through the prism of the Cold War without sacrificing the quest for India's strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, when the USA and the USSR were trying to bring other states into their ideological orbit, Nehru, in order to shield India from predatory international powers, made a decision to join the Commonwealth as a security guarantee. Joining the Commonwealth in no way affected India's quest for strategic autonomy in the international affairs. It would be right to assert that Nehru was against ideologisation, but favoured the logic of power of ideas in foreign policy even while rejecting any sort of fundamentalism in the foreign policy discourse. In fact, Nehru never favoured moralism in the application of foreign policy; rather, he stated that it was the bipolar world that had resorted to preaching one or the other kind of ideology. Nehru clarified that the art of conducting foreign policy is about asserting the national interests of India. Nehru stated that while a country is focussed on its own self-interests, it may enter into situations leading to clash of interests with other states. In such scenarios, Nehru favoured focussing on enlightened self-interest as a tool to harmonise the differentiated interests of the states.


Though the origin of IFP is traced to ancient texts and leaders, its immediate roots lay in the Indian struggle for independence against the British. It was during the Indian National Movement (INM) that India developed certain principle elements to its foreign policy that were used by India throughout the Cold War. It was during the INM that India declared its commitment to fight imperialism and colonialism and support the unity of all nations struggling to fight imperialism and colonialism. The period after the World War-II saw the decline of imperialism but also led to the economic and military dominance of the USA. This led to an arms race between the USA and the USSR which ultimately became nuclear in nature during the Cold War. It was against such a backdrop, with an arms race and an ideological war waging across the world, that India had to evolve its foreign policy. India, being a non-communist country, was not welcomed in the Soviet bloc. India on its part did not entertain any intentions of joining the Communist bloc either. Joining the US bloc was out of the question as India perceived USA as a mouth piece for capitalism which it believed to be a form of neo imperialism. During the Cold War, India always felt that the USA is trying to step into the shoes of the erstwhile imperialist powers. Joining the US bloc would have therefore meant for India to go against the entire tradition of its national movement.

The Nehruvian idea was very clear. Joining any bloc would lead to lessening of the sovereign space for decision making that India fought for during the INM. For Nehru, the

priority was to promote global peace and support anti-colonial struggles while adopting independence in deciding domestic, foreign, economic and military policy. For India, its immediate foreign policy priority was not the conflict in Europe but India's immediate neighbourhood. For that matter, Nehru himself asserted that India's neighbouring countries were the first on his mind and this was followed by other Asian states and Africa. For Nehru, the main problem during the Cold War was not Communism or its containment but the development of India and to do so, it had to avoid falling in line either with the Soviet camp or the Washington led 'Freedom' camp that was gaining prominence in Asia. At the heart of our foreign policy was an urge to advance our national interests and ensure our space for strategic autonomy. For India, its priority was to have an independent foreign policy. An independent foreign policy involved interactions with all players of the system while retaining the ability to make one's own decisions regarding one's own issues. It is from here that the spirit of non-alignment was born. Non-aligned movement (NAM) eventually emerged as India's core foreign policy tool for the next few decades.



In fact, it is not wrong to assert that non-alignment emerged as the sister policy of the non-violent Satyagraha movement pioneered by Gandhi. As more and more independent nations were sucked up into the ideological orbit of the two superpowers in Asia and Africa, India saw this as a rise of neo-colonialism. For Nehru, the falling of the shadow of Cold War in Asia and Africa was colonialism in new clothes. Thus, India and its foreign policy took up the lead to support movements against colonialism and imperialism (perceived as neo-colonialism) to maintain world peace. These two were deeply enmeshed in the IFP concept of non-alignment which was based on the core principle of rationality.



The basis of non-alignment was the ancient Indian philosophy of looking at reality from different prisms and recognising that reality is not merely black and white and that it could have many shades of grey. For the US, during the Cold War, the world was a completely polarised affair, with a clear demarcation of black and white and no other shade in between. Thus, the US found it very difficult to reconcile with the Indian concept of NAM all throughout the cold war.



International Politics and the Kashmir Question

Pakistan, after independence, sent its armed forces personnel disguised as tribesmen to invade the Kashmir valley. This brought India and Pakistan into conflict with each other. To complain about the Pakistani aggression, India, on advice of the British, took the matter to the UN Security Council. The western powers led by the USA were determined on getting an unfavourable resolution passed at the UNSC against India. They wanted to favour Pakistan for allowing its territory to be used by the West to contain the Soviets. The USA, for that matter, had urged Turkey and Pakistan to sign a mutual defence treaty which was followed by the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955. Pakistan emerged as a member of both SEATO and CENTO, thereby bringing Cold War politics right to India's doorsteps. In order to strengthen the case of Pakistan, the West started to support Pakistan outright at the Security Council. This compelled India to deter Western action by tilting towards Soviets and compelling the Soviets to use their veto power in the Council. In fact, the Kashmir issue and the Soviets veto brought India and the USSR closer. This proximity deepened in 1954 when Nikita Khrushchev on a visit to India visited Kashmir and asserted it to be an integral part of India. It is not wrong to conclude that the Kashmir issue led to qualitative improvements in Indo-Soviet relations.

India, throughout the initial years, kept its foreign policy focus on providing support to nations to fight imperialism and preserve peace post-independence. Preservation of peace became an integral part of our own foreign policy because only with peace in the world was consistent economic development possible. The preservation of peace found its presence even in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned states held in 1961 from where a delegation was dispatched to both USA and USSR to halt nuclear testing. All these initiatives of Nehru, despite the economic and military backwardness of India, brought India to the centre of the world stage.

Many times, India's offices were used to sort out international differences. In early 1950's, Northern Korea invaded South Korea. North Korea stated that the invasion was launched as an attempt to unify Korea. The US forces joined the war to assist South Korea. The US forces, led by General MacArthur, drove the forces of North back and the USA forcibly unified Korea, stretching the unified territory till the Chinese and North Korean frontier. The Chinese felt that the US could attack their territory and they immediately responded by dispatching their volunteer forces to check USA. The unfolding Korean crisis led to the establishment of a Korean Commission at the UN under the chairmanship of India to resolve the issues. This issue of the Korean crisis proves how the good offices of India were used in unravelling the knots between USA and China.

China's history had been dominated by feudalism and a lot has depended on the ability of the Emperor to provide staple food (rice) to the people. From 1945 to 1947, a nationalist uprising in China led to the coming of a new government. The erstwhile sick man of Asia had finally turned around with a powerful central government that ended all disruption affecting China since the last century. India also understood clearly, like the rest of the world, that the Chinese revolution indeed entailed a fundamental transformation of the Chinese society where the new nationalist upsurge led to the rise of a communist state. In this rise of a new China, India now had to adopt its policy. The new China became very assertive and even dispatched a military force to Tibet compelling Sardar Vallabhbhai

Patel to draw the Indian government's immediate attention to the issue. Patel perceived Chinese aggression in Tibet and India's North-Eastern borders as fertile grounds that could be used by Indian communists to access ideas and commands from across. Though Patel was right in ringing the alarm bell, many believe that his focus was less on Chinese nationalism and more on the emergence of Chinese communism. If we draw an analogy here, it may not be wrong to argue that what USA did with respect to confusing nationalism in Vietnam with Communism in Vietnam (leading to USA–Vietnam war subsequently), is what Patel did with respect to China.

In 1959, while speaking in the Lok Sabha, Nehru echoed the concerns of Patel. Nehru asserted that a study of Chinese history showed that China tended to territorially expand when it had a strong central government and such expansionist aspiration was definitely a cause of concern for India as its borders would be threatened. However, Nehru argued that the focus of India was to maintain friendly relations with China and overlook such issues at the larger cost of friendship. India could not undertake any form of military adventurism in Tibet as it lacked the military strength and because the Indian army was busy on the Pakistani front post the first Indo–Pakistan war of 1947–48. Also, any intervention in Tibet by India would not make sense as Tibetan independence was not recognised internationally. Nehru did, however, make a mistake in making an uninformed judgment. He failed to understand that in the ancient imperial era, the empire pulsated outwards and expanded, and Chinese expansion happened only at the peripheries as China did not favour contact with the 'barbarian' world outside. On the other hand, after the World War–II, a revolutionary China, propelled by a heady mix of intense Nationalism and Marxism, pulsated outwards to recover lost territories of the past. For Nehru, clash with China was inevitable; but his priority was to postpone it and pursue peace. For him, peace with China was the key focus area of India's neighbourhood policy. He even attempted to normalise the Tibet issue and concluded the Panchsheel agreement whereby India accepted Tibet as a part of China. Though USA was very critical of Panchsheel, in the same way as it was critical of NAM, ironically, it later adopted the same five principles of Panchsheel to undertake rapprochement with China under the Nixon administration. This was known as the famous Shanghai Declaration.

In 1959, after the Tibetan revolt was crushed by China, Dalai Lama took refuge in India. Though Nehru favoured that China be recognised as a responsible international power, USA always perceived the revolutionary China as a hostile state and thereby ended up undercutting Nehruvian policies on China. Soon, a border issue began to brew between India and China. China began to circulate maps where it showed territories regarded by India as their territory as Chinese territory. India took up the issue with China to which the Chinese responded by suggesting that these maps used by China (with claim over Indian territories) were maps belonging to KMT regime and due to internal domestic issues and civil war, the new revolutionary Chinese government had not had the time to look into the maps. However, a little later the Chinese began to make official claims of Indian territories and declared that such claims were correct. At this juncture, Nehru made a move of making Indian position on the border public. Nehru's perception was that a confrontation with China was useless and publicising the issue would give Chinese the opportunity to undertake objections and reactions. This, however, might have been a strategic error. Instead of Nehru publicising the Indian position (to which Chinese did not react), it would

have been better had India made an offer of a formal recognition of Tibet as a Chinese region in return for a written agreement from China on border alignment, with concessions on India's border positions. Had the Chinese objected to a written agreement on the border alignment, such an issue raised with China by India would have enhanced Indian sincerity about the issue.

The situation was especially sensitive since after the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India in 1959, China began to feel that the 1959 Tibetan revolt could have had encouragement from the Indian side. This made China more hostile to India and it saw its manifestations on the border dispute. Perceiving no Chinese retreat from the disputed area, coupled with discovery of Chinese roads through the Aksai Chin region; India initiated a forward policy ultimately compelling the Chinese to react in October 1962. The Chinese reaction in the form of a strike from across the border was again miscalculated by India as it thought that the Chinese could possibly launch a full-scale offensive in the Assam hills and occupy large tracts of North-East India. This led India to hastily seek USA's support where a letter from Nehru to John F. Kennedy was sent to solicit military assistance to mitigate the Chinese threat. The Chinese, before USA could even respond, retreated back to the old positions and observed status quo. The intention of the Chinese was not to launch an outright offensive with India but, to teach India a lesson and assert Chinese superiority. Ultimately, China did not gain anything from the hostilities, as it later resorted to what Nehru had advocated. It initiated a replica of Nehruvian NAM in the name of Chinese independent foreign policy. The Chinese too later realised the need to make peace with honour, which itself was at the core of the Nehruvian ideology. Even till date, in dealing with China, no alternative policy to peace with honour has been encouraged and it continues to be at the heart of Indian diplomacy with China.

FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIRA GANDHI

After the death of Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded him as the next Prime Minister. It is during the regime of Shastri that India and Pakistan fought an inconclusive war in 1965. Though the war of 1965 remained inconclusive, it boosted the confidence and morale of the Indian army, especially after the crushing defeat of India in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. It was also important, as for the first time after the 1962 war, the USSR assisted India and Pakistan to launch an initiative to bring peace. The USSR invited Shastri and Ayub Khan to Tashkent where both sides agreed to resolve future bilateral disputes peacefully and concluded the Tashkent agreement. However, after the conclusion of the Tashkent Agreement on 10th January, 1966, Shastri passed away, to be then succeeded by Indira Gandhi on 24th January, 1966.

When Indira Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister, the domestic and security environment of India was not too benign. Domestically, India faced famine and serious food shortages. The food imports were at an all-time high and this had put a severe burden on the country's foreign exchange as well. At the security level, India had fought expensive wars with Pakistan and China and both were looming as new security threats, threatening India's sovereignty. Indira Gandhi embarked on her foreign policy mission by paying a visit to Egypt and Yugoslavia to reassert their strong relationship, using NAM as a tool. She then visited USA with a hope of evolving a new dimension in the bilateral relationship based on democratic values. Her visit to the USA, however, failed to

fraternise an abrasive bilateral relationship. The USA spent its powers of persuasion in muting Indian criticism of USA–Vietnam war, linking Indian response to the USA–Vietnam conflict to future food shipments, which led Indira Gandhi to adopt a domestic strategy to revive agriculture. Indira Gandhi, after her USA visit, was firm that India would not remain dependent upon foreign states for food security and would achieve self-sufficiency in food production within the next five years.

It was during the 1970 Lusaka NAM summit where scholars were able to get an insight into the essential tenets of foreign policy as was being adopted by Indira Gandhi. For the first time, she emphasised that India wished to be friends with all nations but on the basis of equality. She asserted that no state can look to India as an inferior state and India would conduct its diplomacy with all states (read the USA and the USSR) on equal footing. In fact, Indira Gandhi boldly criticised the US at various NAM meetings for their aggression in Vietnam while the Indian agriculture saw a revival.


However, it wasn't long before India faced another crisis in the form of East Pakistan's bid for secession from the unity of Pakistan. When the British left India and Pakistan, they had divided Pakistan into West and East Pakistan. East Pakistan or East Bengal was a Muslim majority area, with the population consisting of mostly Bengali Muslims. East Pakistan had always received a step-brotherly treatment from West Pakistan. West Pakistan even imposed Urdu over their native Bengali Language and looted East Pakistani resources without focussing on any substantial economic development of the region. This neglect paved way for the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who, under the umbrella of Awami League, championed the cause of Bengali nationalism. In December 1970, elections took place in both East and West Pakistan and as per the result, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of the Awami League won the elections in East Pakistan while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won in West Pakistan. Bhutto, trying to mitigate his party's loss in East Pakistan, began to initiate a new 'democratic' principle and began to assert that as per this principle, both West and East being at par with each other, the West has an equal right to form the government in the East. West Pakistan, thereafter, imposed martial law in East Pakistan, leading to arrest of Mujibur Rehman and a massive crackdown in the region. Due to the arrest of Rehman, an internal crisis began in East Pakistan and a lot of East Pakistanis began to enter into India for safety. India began to build international pressure on West Pakistan to halt suppression and revert back to the democratic processes. The USA remained unmoved even as the international media highlighting the atrocities in the East. As USA refused to budge, India took up the opportunity to conclude a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation¹ with the USSR in August 1971 where the Soviets agreed to an immediate consultation with each other if either side met with any form of aggression. The treaty served the purpose of warning Washington not to pursue any military design against India.

In December 1971, Pakistan resorted to a pre-emptive strike on Indian Air Force airplanes. The Indian side perceived this as an attack on Indian sovereignty and decided to retaliate. War broke out yet again and within three days, Indian forces reached Dacca and recognised Bangladesh as a new state, compelling Pakistani troops to finally surrender. The USA even sent a nuclear armed USS Enterprise Aircraft Carrier into the Bay of Bengal but the Indo–Soviet treaty constrained it further. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was handed over power finally while India held 92,000 prisoners of war. This was followed by

the Simla Summit of June 1972, where Pakistani PM Bhutto urged for release of not only the prisoners of war but also the territory captured by India belonging to West Pakistan. On 1st July 1972, the Simla Agreement was signed urging peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue through dialogue and negotiations. The creation of Bangladesh came as a big blow to USA, with US president Nixon, along with Henry Kissinger, having to reconcile to the new ground realities of South Asia.

The USA faced another issue in 1974 when India tested a nuclear explosion. It understood that India cannot be taken lightly and that it is a major regional power. Indira Gandhi, however, chose to keep the nuclear testing to level of peaceful use only and did not go a step further to declare India a nuclear weapon state. India clearly understood that the root cause of the regional imbalance plaguing South Asia was created by the USA's supplying of arms to Pakistan, which wanted to attain parity with India. The USA on the other hand, after the 1974 nuclear test by India, again announced an arms package designed for Pakistan. It asserted that 1974 nuclear test has disturbed the balance and the new power structure favours India, compelling USA to redress and re-maintain the balance. However, due to the severe economic costs of the 1971 war, India again slipped into crisis and the subsequent domestic developments like emergency contributed to the fall of Indira Gandhi and the rise of Morarji Desai. Even during the Desai regime, there was no change in the major practices of the IFP. However due to internal disturbances, the government fell and was then replaced in 1980 with an Indira Gandhi government yet again. Indira Gandhi, upon taking power in 1980, was confronted with the question of Afghanistan.

In 1979, on the invitation of Kabul, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan. The USA realised the problem and further began to pump aid and arms to Pakistan. The USA began to use Pakistan as a frontline state to support and arm elements to weaken Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Such elements created by the USA and nurtured by Pakistan emerged in the form of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This period saw the birth of the Al-Qaeda to target the Communist front in Afghanistan. India maintained neutrality. It neither condemned the Soviet invasion nor supported it. The USA asserted that non-condemnation by India is a sign of Indian support to the Soviet policy. But India stood upright and based its policy on the merit of the situation. Indira Gandhi sustained a prolonged dialogue with the US and maintained the economic dimension of their bilateral diplomacy. She did the same with respect to China and followed the same policy to break the ice with India's mighty neighbour. In both cases, she restored the same hallmark of the IFP, that is, to follow the India's basic interests without sacrificing India's strategic autonomy. She beautifully enmeshed flexibility with national interests and continued her foreign policy on realistic terms. Her most important contribution was to make India into a brand equal to the great powers.



FOREIGN POLICY OF RAJIV GANDHI

Foreign policy under Rajiv Gandhi had a fine blend of idealism and realism. His approach in foreign policy was to follow the tradition of non-alignment but he simultaneously attempted giving it a contemporary touch. In his visit to the USA in 1985, he reaffirmed the common values that India and USA stood for while also highlighting the dangers of the possibility of a nuclearised Pakistan. A considerable amount of diplomatic efforts unfolded between India and USA in political and economic aspects. Social and cultural diplomacy found a new place in the evolving relationship. The major focus of Rajiv Gandhi was on India's neighbourhood where considerable diplomatic and political capital was invested. During his times, India and Pakistan signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities but the rapid acceleration of Pakistani nuclear capabilities became an immense concern for India. Though Rajiv Gandhi was a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and in 1988 had even presented the Rajiv Gandhi action plan for nuclear disarmament, he had to also guarantee India's security. Rajiv gave a nod to the Indian nuclear scientist fraternity and authorised them to manufacture nuclear weapons for India. This decision was taken to prevent any nuclear blackmailing from any side. Sri Lanka was another state that demanded Rajiv's attention. The Sri Lankan army had taken siege of Jaffna region and the Tamilian Sri Lankans faced tremendous chaos and persecution. India decided to airdrop supplies of essentials for the people of Jaffna which was perceived by Sri Lanka as a violation of its sovereignty. To break the ice, in 1987, Rajiv and J. Jayawardene concluded India-Sri Lanka Accord. As per the accords, LTTE would surrender; there would be a unified Sri Lanka; Sri Lanka to undertake devolution in Tamil majority areas and Sri Lanka will allow its territory be used by foreign powers. As per the Accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) would supervise the surrender of LTTE to ensure peace. The accord and IPKF were perceived by many in Sri Lanka as a violation of their sovereignty. Jayawardene was succeeded by Premadasa who ordered immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka. Rajiv Gandhi, in the meantime, was assassinated by LTTE cadre and this led to withdrawal of all Indian sympathy for LTTE.

Rajiv Gandhi also took steps to speed up relations with China. During his 1989 visit to China, both sides agreed that the border issue should not hinder the improvement of bilateral ties in other dimensions. The idea of Deng Xioping was that the border issue should be separated from other issues and both sides should deepen ties in other

dimensions and later renegotiate the border issue in a more relaxed atmosphere. Rajiv Gandhi agreed to this logic. During his tenure, Rajiv Gandhi remained committed to the core values of non-alignment and supported anti-racist struggles in Africa. He also used NAM as a tool to promote the economic interests of India. Thus, it is not wrong to conclude that Rajiv Gandhi, too, followed the policy of “enlightened self-interests”.

FOREIGN POLICY OF P V NARASIMHA RAO

In the general elections of 1990, Rajiv Gandhi lost, paving way for the V P Singh government. At that moment, IFP had to face some serious challenges. These challenges are going to be elaborated in depth in the chapter ahead. Here, we attempt a brief glimpse of the situation.

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This led to the beginning of the Gulf War–I. As Gulf War–I broke out in a region which was the economic lifeline for the west, USA jumped into the conflict to help Kuwait. USA could not allow Saddam Hussein to have a free run in this strategic region. For India, the Gulf War–I had severe consequences. India had perceived Iraq very differently. Iraq was not only one of the most secular states but also not a member of Organization of Islamic States. From the Indian point of view, Iraq was a crucial state because it had always been favourable towards India on the Kashmir question. In 1990, India and Iraq had even entered into an agreement where Iraq was to supply 2.5 million tons of oil to India in 1990–91. All this led to a delayed response from India on the Gulf war. India, however, supported the UN resolution against Iraq and urged Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. By that time, the USA had launched a fully-fledged military invasion of Iraq to force it to withdraw from Kuwait. What also worked in favour of the USA was the situation in Russia. In 1989, the Soviet Union had already disintegrated. The Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed. This ended the sole adversary of USA in the world. The US displayed tremendous military power in Iraq during Gulf War. The situation ended the bipolar world order established after the World War–II and eventually led to the origin of a new, unipolar world order. The USA now emerged as the sole superpower. Its military intervention against Iraq could not be challenged by any player in the international system.

After a while, in India, P V Narasimha Rao emerged as a new PM. Rao inherited a crumbling domestic economy and a rapidly changing international situation. At the domestic level, Rao initiated a dialogue to intensify relations with the USA and China. However, at that time, USA wanted a roll back of the Indian nuclear programme. The Clinton administration, aiming for parity between India and Pakistan, began the hyphenation of the two states. In America, Senator Larry Pressler had passed an amendment to some laws which stated that any state engaging in a nuclear weapons programme would not receive any aid and if any aid was being given to such a nation, it shall be suspended automatically. The Clinton administration, in their tilt towards Pakistan, lobbied with the Congress aggressively for abolishing the Pressler amendment which, according to the USA administration, was a barrier to equip Pakistan with military aid. Aid to Pakistan was suspended during the administration of George Bush Senior. It is ironical that, to counter the USSR’s influence in Afghanistan, not only did USA aid Pakistan, but also conveniently turned a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear programme. Things, however, changed after Geneva Accords 1989 and subsequent Soviet

disintegration. The priorities of Clinton administration were the hyphenation of India and Pakistan and to make both parties sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the period immediately after the Cold War, though USA had begun to favour Pakistan and wanted to revive its alliance with the country, it also realised that it could not ignore India as India was a new emerging market.

On the other hand, by 1990, following the complete disintegration of Soviet Union, the erstwhile USSR was now succeeded by Russia, which meant that India had now lost the patronage of the erstwhile USSR. What was worrisome for India was the future supply of defence products. During the Cold War, Russia was one of the major defence suppliers to India. Now after the end of Cold War, India had to renegotiate all contracts and at certain places even sign new contracts. However, the greater dilemma was with whom were these new contracts to be negotiated. There was a vacuum and not much clarity. At this juncture, many in Russia felt the need to end the special favour for India. Under intense USA pressure, Russia even refused to provide India with cryogenic technology for its space programme, citing that the technology could be used by India for military purposes. However, things normalised when Boris Yeltsin visited India in 1993. During his visit, the 1971 India–Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was revised with 14 additional clauses and was signed to mark a new era in bilateral relationship post-Cold War.

At the same time Rao also developed new contacts with the five Central Asian Republics that emerged after the breakup of USSR. Today, Central Asia continues to be the area of the New Great Game where search for oil continues even at present. India is actively engaged in the region now, officially as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). During the time, when Rao was reaching out to USA, China Russia and Central Asia, India's relationship with Pakistan remained tensed. In 1992, the Babri Masjid demolition by Swayam Sewaks and the subsequent 1993 Mumbai blasts deteriorated the relationship and could not be normalised as Pakistan initiated verbal threats about using a nuclear bomb in case of a future conflict with India. By this time, it was an open secret that China had helped Pakistan acquire its nuclear capabilities. Despite all these developments, Rao tried to put up a strong face but during this tenure, any improvements in the relationship with Pakistan could not materialise.

FOREIGN POLICY OF I K GUJRAL

In 1997, Gujral became the PM and evolved a fresh approach vis-à-vis the foreign policy which is now known as the Gujral doctrine. The basic foreign policy idea of Gujral was that India is a dominant power in the South Asian region and by this virtue when it deals diplomatically with states around itself, it should not look for arithmetical reciprocity. The core of the idea was to give more than what you may take from a foreign state. In a simpler language, the Gujral Doctrine meant that if a neighbour moved an inch, India should move a yard. This policy would enable India, according to him, to pursue a new quality of relationship with its neighbours, leading to sober and constructive responses from the neighbourhood.

Gujral took his first lead with Bangladesh. Bangladesh and India relations were deeply frozen since the assassination of Mujibur Rehman. Gujral took into confidence Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, and began to initiate a dialogue with

Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh on settling the issue related to water utilisation of Ganga River. A thirty-year treaty on Ganga River water sharing was hammered out. This brought about a new air of freshness in the relationship. After the death of Rajiv Gandhi, India had stayed away from the domestic political concerns of Sri Lanka and the relations had slipped to an all-time low. But Gujral also initiated talks with the Chandrika Kumaratunga government in Sri Lanka.

With respect to Pakistan, Gujral asserted to call off all verbal warfare tactics which were on in full swing due to the issues arising out of the nuclearisation of Pakistan. He even instructed RAW to dismantle all human assets it had established in Pakistan for covert operations as he perceived them as tools that would hinder constructive engagement with Pakistan. Gujral revived the dialogue process with Nawaz Sharif at the foreign secretary level. India wanted a dialogue on the political, economic, cultural and social fronts while Pakistan's sole agenda was Kashmir. A dialogue was initiated but ties hobbled. During Gujral's term, relations with China improved significantly. Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996. Both sides signed an agreement to maintain peace and tranquillity at the border. Jiang visited Pakistan after his visit to India. He urged Pakistan to shelve those issues for some time that hinder bilateral cooperation and explore other diplomatic dimensions. The reference indirectly was to Kashmir. But hardly any change was seen in the Pakistani establishment. As argued previously, the core goal of Clinton administration was to make India sign the CTBT; India realised that CTBT along with NPT would create a discriminatory world order. During Gujral's meeting with Clinton in 1997 on the side lines of the UN General Assembly meeting, Gujral explained the reasons for India's refusal to sign the CTBT but also showcased the tremendous economic opportunities available for the USA with India. This dual approach worked well. Thus, during the tenure of Gujral, a push for economic diplomacy with the US became the core driver of the foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY OF ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE

After the withdrawal of support by the Congress party, the Gujral government fell and was later replaced by the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. From 11th to 13th May 1998, the government carried out nuclear tests. These tests were significant because one of the tests conducted in Pokhran was a thermonuclear test which indicated hydrogen bomb capability. India reached the sub-critical level in the tests and generated enough data in these experiments where further improvements could be carried out through computer simulation. Thus, after the operation Shakti I-V (the codename for the tests), India declared itself a Nuclear Weapon State. The most important achievement of Pokhran-II was the fact that India no longer required to undertake underground nuclear tests but could successfully use the data generated for computer simulations to improvise the yield of the bomb. India thus declared a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing. The tests done by India were immediately followed by nuclear tests by Pakistan. The Pakistani side also tested their atomic bombs. Vajpayee in a letter to Clinton asserted that India faced threats from China and Pakistan and that these were compelling reasons for India to undertake nuclear tests. The letter to Clinton was leaked to the *New York Times* and this aggravated tensions further between India and China. After the tests in India, there were international sanctions including sanctions by IMF and World Bank on further assistance to India.

However, Vajpayee decided to break the logjam with Pakistan and inaugurated a bus service between Delhi and Lahore. Vajpayee also visited Lahore and concluded the Lahore Declaration. Even as new enthusiasm between the two states to improve ties was being generated, the Pakistan army led by General Pervez Musharraf planned a new campaign in Kashmir. The manifestation of this planning was seen in May–June 1999 when the Pakistani side crossed the Line of Control and captured peaks on the Indian soil in Kargil. As India began to drive out the intruders, Nawaz Sharif asked for help from the Clinton administration in US in case India increased the offensive. Clinton, on the other hand, advised Sharif to order his army to pull back from the occupied territories and not breach the LOC. The conflict ended after Indian forces captured all the peaks occupied by Pakistan. In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif was deposed and after a dubious referendum, Musharraf took over as the President of Pakistan.


In 2001, another initiative towards dialogue took place between Vajpayee and Musharraf at Agra. The Agra Summit failed to achieve any breakthrough as Pakistan wanted Kashmir to be added as the core issue in the joint statement while India wanted the addition of cross border terrorism. Both sides rejected each other's demand and therefore no joint statement came out after the Agra summit.

The last year of Clinton administration saw a new approach towards India. The administration tilted in favour of India during the Kargil conflict. This was followed, in 2000, by a visit of Clinton to India and Clinton became the fourth USA president after Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter to visit the country. Clinton's visit saw a push towards bilateral economic diplomacy as deals worth three billion dollars were signed, ranging from broadband connectivity to energy dimensions. The emerging economic opportunities for USA in India and a presence of a vibrant Indian diaspora in USA that played a pivotal role in US politics proved instrumental factors in creating a new bridge in the bilateral relationship. The Clinton administration was replaced by the Bush administration. The momentum of establishing a new relationship with India gained strength with the coming of Bush. The 9/11 attacks bolstered some major changes in the subcontinent. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, India went ahead to put on record that it was willing to enter into military alliance with and work with USA on its war on terrorism. Bush, on the other hand, while appreciative of the Indian offer, turned to strengthen its military alliance and partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan not only emerged as a non-NATO ally but also a new USA–Pakistan axis was born. The US entered the subcontinent by invading Afghanistan in 2001. The rule of Taliban in Afghanistan ended. This was a big blow to Pakistan which favoured the Taliban in Afghanistan as it enabled it to maintain strategic depth against India. The cross-border terrorism from Pakistani side in 2001 increased and saw its first manifestation in the form of an attack on Kashmir assembly, culminating in the attack on Indian Parliament. India responded to this by launching a mega-military mobilisation exercise on Indo–Pakistan border under the name of operation Parakaram.

The US faced a severe dilemma on how to respond to the situation as, on one hand, it was building up a grand coalition at the global level against terrorism. It could not afford to take the terrorist attacks on India lightly but could not be hard on Pakistan as it needed their support in the invasion of Afghanistan. The United States had to also ensure that India did not retaliate aggressively in response to the provocation perpetrated by Pakistan. The strategy of the Bush administration was now to prevent a South Asian war and

thereby increase its outreach to both India and Pakistan. As the American war on Afghanistan was ongoing, USA launched another invasion, that of Iraq, in 2003. The regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled and elections were organised. However, a sectarian conflict unfolded in Iraq and the region has remained unstable since then. The sectarian conflict led to the rise of ISIS as a new force in the region since 2014.

The Iraq war brought about a shift in the Indian policy as well. We noted previously that India welcomed the US invasion of Afghanistan as the intention of the invasion was to dismantle the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But the US invasion of Iraq did not go well with India. Though the Vajpayee government wanted to go ahead with its intention of providing military assistance to the USA for the Iraq war, public opinion in India was against any support to USA since people were largely unconvinced by the logic that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Due to the fierce resistance by the opposition parties, the Vajpayee regime dropped the idea. The US accepted India's decision and still continued to strengthen ties with India. For the Bush administration, ties with India needed to be strengthened at the highest level.



The sanctions imposed by the US on India post Pokhran were lifted. A new initiative called the 'Next step in Strategic Partnership' was launched and cooperation on Civilian Nuclear and Missile defence dimensions began. As the relations with America progressed, in the 2004 SAARC summit, India and Pakistan not only resumed dialogue but issued a joint statement that laid down a framework to enhance bilateral commercial cooperation. As the peaceful dialogue with Pakistan and strategic dialogue with the US began, India held its next general elections and Vajpayee was replaced by Dr Manmohan Singh as the next Indian PM.

FOREIGN POLICY OF MANMOHAN SINGH

The government of Manmohan Singh initiated a policy to intensify the peace process and dialogue with Pakistan. On 24th September 2004, Manmohan met Musharraf on the side lines of the UNGA Summit in New York. Singh outlined his vision of deepening the relationship with Pakistan to such an extent that the borders on the ground dividing the two nations would become irrelevant. Confidence Building Measures (CBM) were taken to normalise the situation in Kashmir as well. The launch of a composite dialogue between the two sides saw intensive discussions on bilateral issues ranging from Wullar Barrage to Siachen Glaciers demilitarisation to discussions on Tulbul Project. A bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad was undertaken as an important CBM. Public opinion on both sides welcomed the diplomatic overtures. The policy of Manmohan was to evolve bilateral relations based upon a strong constituency of peace, and working towards the establishment of a favourable public opinion. But we should not forget that the trust deficit was not bridged and the cordial atmosphere of the relations were constantly affected due to Jihadi attacks in India. Despite attacks in Delhi (2005), Varanasi (2006) and Mumbai

(2006) however, dialogues continued, with Indian public opinion gradually tilting towards impatience.

The relationship with China under Manmohan took a momentous step ahead. In 2005, the Indian foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, and Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Wu Dawei, met in Beijing. A new strategic dialogue unfolded between the two sides, on topics ranging from UN reforms to combating terrorism. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India and both sides entered a new phase of strategic and cooperative partnership. Emphasis was laid upon improving economic and trade relations and cooperation in the defence dimension. Efforts were made to resolve the border dispute by the adoption of a new set of guidelines. Intense negotiations followed on bilateral issues, especially on the border disputes, but no solution was reached except that the differences were significantly narrowed. In 2006, both sides agreed to intensify military cooperation and defence became a new CBM between both sides. In 2006 itself, the two sides decided to boost bilateral trade and reopened the Nathu La Pass. The two sides also agreed to cooperate than compete with each other in each other's search for energy supplies. The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in 2006 led to a continued search for peace by the two sides.

The India–Russia ties that had been stabilised by Boris Yeltsin were renewed afresh during the regime of Vladimir Putin. In 2004, Manmohan and Putin met at the India–Russia Summit. The two sides decided to resolve their long pending disputes related to defence. India was concerned about the supply of defence spares and their timely delivery and pricing. Russia was concerned about India's IPR laws. During the 2004 summit meeting, India conveyed its assurance to Russia that it would respect intellectual property rights of all equipments supplied to India by Russia and ensure they were neither copied nor secretly stolen by any state. The two sides subsequently strengthened cooperation in defence and energy in the years ahead.

The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership launched during the Vajpayee regime between India and USA ultimately culminated into the India–USA Civilian Nuclear Cooperation in 2005. The nuclear deal between India and USA not only opened up a new chapter in bilateral relationships but also signified that the USA had come to accept India as a major power of the future.

One of the big challenges that Manmohan Singh faced during his tenure as the PM at the foreign policy level was related to Nepal. In 2005–2006, Nepal initiated a movement to rewrite its Constitution. The public opinion in Nepal was majorly against the monarchy. As Nepal took up the path of democracy, the Maoist elements in Nepal joined the democratic momentum. Though India did favour democracy in Nepal, it was worried about how or whether the Maoists would integrate well within the democratic process. Under intense international pressure, in 2006, the King restored democracy which was under suspension since the beginning of the Jan Andolan. India welcomed the move and kept a close watch on the unfolding Constitutional saga in Nepal.


Manmohan Singh continued to deepen India's relationship with the ASEAN states which had started with a sectoral dialogue partnership between India and ASEAN at the end of the Cold War. During Manmohan Singh's regime as the PM, India and ASEAN concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods (2010) and services (2012). Singh also

invested tremendous diplomatic capital to strengthen ties with Japan. The two sides, under the leadership of Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe, concluded an agreement to establish a single seamless whole envisaging free movement of navy, capital and people. Between India and Japan Manmohan also strengthened Indian ties with Africa. India launched multiple initiatives, ranging from Focus Africa Programme to Pan-Africa-e-Network Projects, to enhance people-to-people ties. The ties with West Asia saw resurgence based on the theme of oil diplomacy. It was during Manmohan Singh's regime that the India and Saudi Arabia concluded a strategic partnership agreement. Cooperation with UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman continued. India and Qatar signed an agreement on LNG and Qatar decided to supply India LNG for energy security. The foreign policy of Manmohan Singh saw India emerge as one of the lead players in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. His ten year tenure as a Prime Minister gave Manmohan Singh an opportunity to touch all dimensions of international relationships, ranging from the Great Powers, Middle Powers to the immediate Neighbours.

FOREIGN POLICY OF NARENDRA MODI

The year 2014 saw Modi coming to power as the Prime Minister of India. His very first foreign policy initiative won the hearts of many globally. Modi invited the heads of South Asia (SAARC leaders) during his oath taking ceremony in New Delhi in 2014. This gesture reflected of what awaited ahead in the high-powered diplomatic ventures he was about to undertake. The earliest signs of Modi's diplomacy date back to his tenure as the Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat. During his decade-long stint as the CM, he travelled to various countries to get investment for his state. During his foreign visits, he developed a style of personal diplomacy where he emphasised building of strong personal relationships with leaders of the states he visited. This style of personal diplomacy is now recognised as the hallmark of Modi's way of engaging with the world. Modi's diplomatic skills were further strengthened when Vajpayee, as the PM, deputed Modi to travel abroad for party work where he always displayed avid interest in learning how foreign states solved problems related to infrastructure, roads and rivers etc. and applying that learning to Indian situations. This ability of learning from foreign states to replicate the same in India is visible in his style of India First diplomacy.

Modi's background in RSS has also inculcated in him a sense of a wider engagement with people of all walks of life for suggestions. In fact, during his RSS days in 1970's and 1980's, Modi effectively worked upon the RSS pillar, *Samvad*. *Samvad* also eventually emerged as a key pillar of his foreign policy. He has effectively developed contacts with followers at all levels. When he travels abroad, he does not restrict his engagement with merely the heads of states but widens his reach to include private sector firms to monks to students to workers in factories. His idea of foreign policy or diplomacy is that it should not just be perceived as the art of government-to-government interaction but more as a leader-to-people interaction. Diplomacy involving leader-to-people interactions is called retail diplomacy. In retail diplomacy, the state leader interacts, meets and shakes hands with a wide spectrum of scholars to monks to workers. Retail diplomacy not only enhances the perceived approachability of the leader in the eyes of the public but also helps in developing very strong interpersonal relationships. Thus, the two core diplomatic values identified in the Modi Doctrine are as below:



While interacting with world leaders, Modi ensures that he develops a strong personal chemistry with them. Modi's idea is that a strong personal bond helps India to bargain its national interests at the highest level possible. One of the most important influences of RSS on Modi's foreign policy has been his interest in spearheading India's culture and values and promotion of the same at a global level. The RSS background has infused this value in Modi who practises the same with much vigour in the foreign policy. His cultural and civilizational diplomacy is clearly reflected in his visits to temples in foreign states. The Modi doctrine is defined by his emphasis on 4D's:

Modi has adopted Democracy, Demography and Demand as key drivers to highlight India's economic powers abroad. However, Diaspora is the oxygen to his foreign policy. Modi has, from day one, addressed concerns related to the Indian diaspora. On any foreign tour, Modi makes it point to address a gathering of the Indian diaspora. There are two purposes of addressing the diaspora. First, he addresses the diaspora to not only reconnect with them as a messenger from their homeland but also to convey to them the problems India faces in the twenty first century. In most of his addresses to the diaspora, Modi outlines domestic issues of India and government initiatives to tackle them. He often discusses issues like lack of manufacturing base in India, issues related to cleanliness and so on. In the address, he apprises the diaspora of initiatives the government has taken, ranging from Make in India to Swachch Bharat and so forth. The intention of this exercise is to convince the diaspora that they can emerge as effective stakeholders in the problems faced by India. He intends to convey to the diaspora that their contribution is imperative for India's development story and its rise as a global power. Second, his address to the Indian diaspora in foreign countries are a message to the governments of those countries 'if you take care of this constituency, they will take care of your governments in elections'.

This diaspora diplomacy is a classic example of how the diaspora can be a catalyst for transformative diplomacy in the era of globalisation. His focus, in the long run, is to use the diaspora for domestic development. His intention is to attract the interests of the diaspora back home and affect a reversal from brain drain to brain gain. Thus, it is not wrong to say that Modi knows that the diaspora is a part of the great Indian family which will be a partner to India's emergence as a global player. This is also in sync with the

BJP's perception of the importance of the diaspora. An important thing to remember here is that in his addresses to the diaspora, he would link the past, present and the future in such an array that the diaspora gets galvanised, energised and enthusiastic to play a role in India's future. His addresses to the diaspora in the USA, Australia and the UK reflect the intermixing of past, present and future. The doctrine of the diaspora here aims to attract FDI to India and use it for domestic development. Modi's idea of diaspora diplomacy is to ensure a collective Indian voice in the countries of their residence where they are simultaneously loyal citizens.

Another very crucial dimension of the Modi doctrine is his thrust on economic diplomacy. All diplomatic engagements undertaken by Modi till date are driven by the economic thrust of making India a commercial power. The value of economic diplomacy was imbibed by Modi from Gujarat. Gujarat had been an important port of international trade during the peak of trade via the ancient silk route. Trade was natural to Gujarat and this had emerged as a crucial element of the Modi doctrine. Modi understood well that domestic growth rates cannot be boosted by domestic initiatives alone and that geo-strategic imperatives arising out of external engagement with rest of the world are a key to India's growth story. The economic diplomacy strategy of Modi is based on a model where domestic growth is to be propelled by FDI in the manufacturing sector. To make FDI absorption easy, the 'Make in India' initiative and 'Skill India' initiatives have been launched and steps have been taken to improve India's performance in the ease of doing business.

In 2014, Modi addressed the IFS probationers and instructed them to focus on enhancing India's export potential in textile and traditional medicine. The important element here is that Modi understands the needs of the investors well and has worked upon government-to-business contacts. For example, in order to illustrate this idea, Modi, during an address at a business lunch in Tokyo in 2014, said that while he had been the CM of Gujarat, he had invited Japanese investments. As Japanese businesses came, he began to study Japanese tastes and found that the Japanese like to play golf. This led Modi to establish world class golf courses in Gujarat, thereby showing that what a proactive government can do for investors. For Modi, economic diplomacy is about marketing, streamlining, downsizing and modernisation brought about in a seamless manner within a global economy.



Under the new neighbourhood first policy, Modi's key focus vis-à-vis India's relations with its neighbours is economic trade. Modi believes that aggressive economic trade with neighbours will benefit all and the benefits will percolate deep down in the society. This will bring about a radical shift in the way its neighbours perceive India. The erstwhile image of India, projected to its neighbours as a 'Big Brother,' will transform into one of a collaborative ally and shall prove positive spill over for the entire region. At the neighbourhood level, connectivity has emerged as an inbuilt dimension of economic diplomacy. Apart from that, usage of India's soft power capabilities has taken primacy in

the Modi doctrine. For instance, the intense diplomacy to get 21st June declared as the International Day of Yoga at the UN General Assembly is an example of soft power diplomacy. Thus, one may conclude that the Modi Doctrine is all about putting India into a higher international orbit and for achieving the same, tasks have been clearly cut out for the future.

Our understanding of the foreign policy of Modi helps us to analyse few goals the IFP intends to achieve in the future. Modi has clarified that India is not going to be a balancing power but intends to aspire to be a leading power. India is to have a three step foreign policy

- (a) Observe and react to international events
- (b) If needed, infuse energy to shape international events
- (c) Occasionally, play a role to drive the events

The government's Indian Ocean strategy, economic diplomacy, development diplomacy, African Outreach, Pacific Island Outreach and Act East Policy are some of the bold and timely initiatives. The 3C formula of Connectivity, Contacts and Cooperation is being used. There is new energy for cultural diplomacy and Indian Diaspora and soft tools like yoga. We will see in the various chapters of India and bilateral diplomacy in subsequent sections that a new tool of gifting spiritual texts of India to world leaders is a new phenomena. Though there is a thrust on building a personal chemistry with leaders, we need to be careful as personal chemistry does not always give results. The issues with China on NSG, Masood Azhar are some examples. Modi has realised that even if diplomacy may not fetch political votes domestically, it does enhance India's standing in the world and helps garner resources for developing India. At times, domestic political standing can be improved if a country leverages external partners well. In 1969, deeper embrace of USSR won the Congress support of the Left parties in India. This helped the Congress party counter the rivals on the Right side of the political spectrum. Though India's great power diplomacy only boosts some excitement at the domestic political level, it is in reality, the neighbourhood diplomacy where there is greater domestic political resonance. For example, Nepal on Bihar, Sri Lanka on Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh on West Bengal explain the same.



Faith and Diplomacy

In the recent times, Modi has taken steps to bridge a link between faith and diplomacy. In India's Asian Policy, Buddhism has acquired a new focus. When Modi went to Mongolia, he delivered a lecture in their Parliament where he highlighted the importance of Buddhism to solve contemporary Asian and global challenges. The IFP has always emphasised upon cultural, historical and civilisational ties and has tried to keep religion out of foreign policy engagements. Modi has initiated a new diplomatic path of using religion as a tool to promote global harmony, Globally there is a trend of using religion as a diplomatic tool. US has an Office of Religious and Global Affairs in the Department of State which assists the US Secretary of State on religious issues. European Union does so in case of West Asia while China has been doing so since long. India is trying to put its IFP in line with this global trend. It has

begun with Buddhism which helps India reinforce its leadership in South East Asia.

Some scholars assert that under Modi, the IFP has turned towards a mixture of inward policy and internationalism. This policy strives to seek support for development of the country and at the level of Internationalism, aims to contribute to global humanity. At the inward level, our focus is on our national interests and at the international level we focus upon being a part of global institutional architecture.

Modi focuses on three core points in diplomacy.

1. Personal energy with pragmatism
2. Focus on problem solving based diplomacy
3. Prioritizing national interests with economic diplomacy

ANALYSIS OF MAJOR SHIFTS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA FROM THE PERIOD OF COLD WAR TO THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD


The basic theme we analyse in this section is the qualitative transformation in India's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Our concern would be to investigate the philosophical changes in the foreign policy of India that compelled it to embrace a completely new relationship with the external world. The essence of the section is to capture the key drivers of foreign policy transformation at the end of the Cold War. One important thing to note here is that when Nehru was the PM, he tried to educate the political leaders and the public of India on foreign policy issues through his speeches. This was not the case after the end of the Cold War. The Indian Prime Ministers, from Rao till Manmohan Singh, did not favour much debate about the change of direction in the foreign policy. I K Gujral was the only exception and he did vocalise a few ideas and shed some insights on his doctrine.

In January 1992, Narasimha Rao attended the special session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) on nuclear issues. At the special session, the UNSC declared that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to world peace. Rao understood that the world is envisaging collective action to restrain states from acquiring nuclear weapons. The immediate priority of the USA was to make India sign CTBT and ensure India does not acquire nuclear weapon. Rao perceived that the special session of the UNSC had the backing of world powers. However, the greater dilemma for Rao was whether he could have allowed the international community to decide something that was at the very core of the national security of India, especially when the previous decade of 1980's had been spent in verbal clashes with Pakistan with regard to the latter's nuclearization policy? India's domestic and economic position was not strong enough at that juncture to give the country any weight at the global level.

The US, led by Bush at that time, proposed a multilateral agreement to India where India, along with Pakistan, China, USA and Russia, undertake discussions on nuclear non-proliferation in the subcontinent. For India, such a multilateral format of discussion was completely unacceptable because it favoured only a global framework in case of any discussion on nuclear issues. What irritated India further was that, as per the initiative envisaged by Bush, Russia, China and USA could supervise India-Pakistan nuclear issues. This was not acceptable to India as it saw China as a new guarantor of security in the

region in which India considered itself an equal player. Instead of committing to the proposal outright, Rao favoured a deeper discussion with the US at a bilateral level. Rao successfully launched a dialogue with the US on one hand, and on other hand, at an invisible level, began to prepare India for a nuclear weapon. The nuclear scientists were instructed to prepare for a nuclear test but they demanded a delivery time frame of minimum two years. At the diplomatic level, India kept on bargaining for more time and searched for all rules possible in the diplomatic book to avoid an entry into a multilateral nuclear treaty. By 1995, India was ready to enter a different strategic pedestal by conducting a nuclear test. On 15th December, 1995, the *New York Times* reported that India was making preparations for a nuclear test at Pokhran. India, in order to give a sign of relief to the international community, affirmed that India is not planning Rubicon but also decided not to give up the future option of tests. Rao continued to face two key dilemmas. The first was what could be the economic consequences of the test and second was how could he finally undertake nuclear tests, thereby shedding off all normative dimensions in favour of the security considerations of the realpolitik.

After the end of the Cold War, the security situation drastically changed. India's sole supporter during the Cold War—the USSR—was no longer in the picture. China had been constantly arming Pakistan and equipping it with covert nuclear capabilities. The US, instead of developing relations with India as the largest democracy in the world, favoured the containment of India and its nuclear programme through the Clinton administration's overt fixation on non-proliferation. Though India since Nehru was an ardent supporter of a CTBT aimed for complete Disarmament, in 1996, when India read the draft of CTBT, it realised that the real intention was not to go for complete Disarmament but ensure that states like India don't acquire weapons. At this juncture, a school of thought argued that India should not undertake a nuclear test but instead outline the journey for developing credible deterrence. However, the scientific community ruled that for the deterrence to be credible, India would need to conduct a small number of tests to get data for sub-criticality. The BJP government led by Vajpayee took the risk and went ahead with nuclear testing. The nuclear tests in 1998 gave India the opportunity to redress the contours of nuclear diplomacy. India was an ardent supporter of the fact that the world is discriminating between nuclear haves and have nots. After testing the weapons and being armed with a new confidence, India now began to call for incremental nuclear reforms. India shifted to advocacy for pragmatic arms control from its earlier strategy of disarmament.



Even post-1998, India has not given up the goal of complete disarmament. For India, the immediate priority was to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) because India was of the view that states should focus on reducing the production of nuclear material. A cessation on the production of the nuclear material could be the first step towards a treaty for complete disarmament ahead. The Indian policy had thus shifted from

being a dissident at global nuclear level to a nation with its focus on developing an arms control regime.

As the Cold War ended, there was considerable uncertainty about the future of India's non-alignment. As the IFP progressed in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, India kept on defending the concept but the way its foreign policy was unfolding clearly indicated that India's focus was no longer simply on non-alignment. The idea of non-alignment was developed by Nehru. Later, it turned into a movement called NAM. NAM offered India a platform to pursue its international relations. The Indian policy of staying non-aligned during the Cold War was based on the logic of maintaining strategic manoeuvrability. India professed the idea that the decolonised states could lead an independent worldview and a developmental strategy without getting entangled with the ideologies of the Capitalist West and the Socialist East. Non-alignment emerged as a third way of articulating the philosophy of the third world countries. As the Cold War ended, the idea of non-alignment lost its relevance and transformed into a philosophical relic. But many years into the post-Cold War world order, India kept on insisting that the spirit of NAM was still as relevant. Many Indian foreign policy practitioners asserted that the spirit of NAM was alive in the pursuit of multilateralism and opposition to military alliances. India followed a policy of adopting itself to the changing world scenario after the end of Cold War but decided not to give up the past altogether.

During this time of a changing world order, Narasimha Rao emerged as a chief architect of the change of the IFP. He did not reject NAM altogether but began to reorient the IFP incrementally. As Rao opened up the Indian economy, and at the foreign policy level, Rao steadily began a more serious rapprochement with the West. India's pro-West tilt later on continued under the regime of Vajpayee. The Vajpayee government, without discrediting NAM, somewhat marginalised it and continued with a pro-USA approaching its foreign policy. The relevance of NAM during cold war lay in giving international voice to a country like India which had not much real power. After the 1998 nuclear test, India had now acquired a new tool of military power to bargain with the world and thereby the utility of NAM automatically diminished. During the Cold War, non-alignment was used as an economic tool to seek economic aid from both camps. At the end of the Cold War, the old economic system led to severe economic crisis and had to be reformed. This also reduced the relevance of non-alignment.

However, though the practitioners of IFP realised that the utility of non-alignment was decreasing, they failed in identifying an alternative to the policy. This, they felt, could deprive India of a force in global affairs. After the 1998 nuclear tests, India realised that the only way it could leave a mark on the international system was through a demonstration of its capacity to maintain peace. It realised that the idea of playing third worldism and anti-westernism cards would not help. India began to search for an alternative to non-alignment in the form of capacity demonstration. India now had the option of either sticking to NAM or establish a new partnership with the US and other powers. India began to conclude pivotal strategic partnerships with great powers to enhance its national strength.

In fact, four months after the 1998 tests, Vajpayee announced that India and USA are natural allies. This announcement was a radical departure from India's erstwhile foreign

policy which was bent upon non-alignment. This insistence on a natural alliance by Vajpayee saw its magnification during the regime of Bush who took the Indo–USA relations to an unthinkable level and brokered a nuclear deal with India, enabling it to emerge as a true world power. As India enhanced its ties with USA, it insisted that the IFP stood for multi-polarity and not an alliance with the west. India clarified that its policy was to engage with all world powers who served India's national interests. India began advocating a multi-polar world but this advocacy clashed with its natural alliance with the US. Indian diplomacy, however, embraced this duality. India called for a deep relation with the US while keeping open the option to expand cooperation with other powers under the idea of multipolarity. The emphasis on non-alignment was replaced with advocacy of multipolarity and the gradual democratisation of foreign policy. The emphasis upon multipolarity asserted India's rise as a major power in global politics. The new self-image of India was enhanced further by rapid thrusts in domestic economy since the end of Cold War, including the opening up of the Indian markets for the west.

The recent developments in Indo–USA relations, like the conclusion of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which is a tweaked version of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), which the US has with several countries it has close military ties, suggest that India will enhance its strategic space under the framework established by the US and that it may not be wrong to say that the possibility of a future alliance with west has started taking a root in Indian thinking. Indian advocacy of a multipolar world reflects that India intends to retail space for strategic autonomy. India, during Cold War, intended to be the leader of the third world. Since the end of the Cold War, India has switched over to becoming a developed power in the twenty first century. India, while negotiating with the west, asserts that it is the sole state outside Europe and North America that stands for the core values of European enlightenment. For that matter, scholar and professor Sunil Khilnani asserted that the Indian experiment is the third great moment of democracy in the world after American being the first and French being the second.

For the practitioners of Indian foreign policy, Lord Curzon is a great source of strategic inspiration as his writings emphasised upon a powerful role India could play in the Indian Ocean and the rest of Asia. The Curzonians in the Indian foreign policy are of the view that India has the potential to influence not only the Indian Ocean but the entire arc from Iran to Thailand. During the time of Nehru, the partition of India and Pakistan became an obstacle to the influence India could leverage in the Indian Ocean. The complicated post independence relations with Pakistan and China imposed limitations on the exercise of hegemonic influence in the Indian Ocean. Throughout the cold war, India's proximity to the USSR and its anti-USA approach also acted as deterrents to its display of power in the Indian ocean. Even though Curzon's idea of India being a dominant player in the Indian ocean were formulated on the basis of British interests, there is no reason why India today, decades after the end of the Cold War realise the vision. Since the end of Cold War, India has switched its Indian Ocean policy. If during the Cold War, India's policy was to keep foreign powers away from the Indian Ocean, now India intends to cooperate with the US and achieve influence over the Indian ocean as its natural strategic space.




It will not be wrong to assert that since the end of Cold War, India has initiated a forward policy and its diplomatic activism is visible in India's neighbourhood from its actions in Afghanistan to strategic partnership with Africa to the Act East Policy in East Asia. During the Cold War, because of the Indian policy of non-alignment and its closed economic orientation, India remained isolated. At the global level, it did talk about macro-security matters but could not provide any security to small states (like Singapore) in the region. Thus, during the Cold War, Indian policy was primarily a policy of masterly inactivity. The end of the Cold War ushered in a wave of freshness in the foreign policy thought of India. As it began to reorient its economy, it initiated commercial contacts with various states. The focus for energy security shifted to west Asia and for investments and trade to east Asia. An important element of the IFP became the focus upon building institutional link with regions. As India initiated a Look East Policy, it found easy synchronisation with ASEAN's Look West Policy and thus began the Indo-ASEAN institutional co-operation. A new component of Indian strategy was to go for improvements in physical connectivity. The recently concluded BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) agreement and India-Myanmar-Thailand highway are steps in the direction of a new forward policy. To shed off isolation, India stepped up defence cooperation with states in the region. The recent defence and naval contacts from the Gulf to East Asia are testimony to India's growing defence diplomacy. India is now focussing upon institutionalised defence contacts and strategic dialogue as themes of its forward policy of defence diplomacy. India wants to be a key element in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Indian Ocean to balance an aggressive and rising China.

FINAL ANALYSIS

It was only when the Cold War ended that India began to realise material capabilities and began to aspire to be a great power. It engaged with the US and began to boost the economic arms of its diplomacy. Two and a half decades of economic growth finally provided India the resources to modernise its defence forces. The biggest impact at the defence level is seen in the Indian Navy. Though Indian foreign policy has seen fundamental shifts since the end of Cold War, it has failed to bring about deep-rooted changes with Pakistan and China also at times India has failed to demonstrate leadership in matters of global governance, like climate change and foreign trade. The polemical arguments advanced by India at both places are hardly of any merit. Even recently, some foreign policy practitioners aim at reviving the idea of non-alignment which, as a paradigm, has lost its sheen in the post-Cold War times. Thus, unwillingness to shed off the past is preventing India from taking stands on global issues of critical importance. The unresolved question in the Indian foreign policy is what role India aspires to play at the global level. India does advocate for multi-polarity, and as we saw in the previous section, it also favours democratisation of institutions so that it can be a part of the decision making process of the bodies like the UN Security Council and the World Bank.

In order to conclude this section, a few assertions can be made. Our study of IFP till

now shows us that Indian Foreign Policy during the Cold War had limited manoeuvrability. The limitations were imposed by India's normative policy of non-alignment and an insular economic policy. Nehru gave India the needed push at the foreign policy level. He ensured that India's idea of non-alignment gives it a standing in the international arena, which, at the time, was highly divided due to ideological warfare. The tenure of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi saw attempts to take India away from the ideological accents introduced by Nehru. In this regard, the efforts of Rajiv Gandhi to remove the choke points in India's external interests are worth noting. Rajiv not only injected blood in Indo–USA relations but went a step forward with China. The end of the Cold War led to a root-and-branch overhaul of India's economic and foreign policy imperatives. The Nehruvian outlook of perceiving capitalism as an extension of imperialism leading to a deep hospitality to the West was replaced by new undercurrents in the foreign policy. The diplomatic straitjacket was now loosened up and India began a rapprochement with the West. The Cold War rhetoric of non-alignment and of being a protestor in the global system was replaced with greater aspiration for power in a multipolar world where India was now willing to take up responsibilities. The era saw diplomatic innovations by Indian diplomats who became reapers of investment from across the globe. The testing of nuclear weapon gave India a new power stature to influence and win over new friends in the international system.



Whether India's being a part of these institutions at the global level will reshape the world remains ambiguous. India is not very comfortable with the 'doctrine of responsibility to protect' and is also, at the same time, reluctant in shaping the global programme to fight climate change. Though India is critical of existing arrangements, it fails to provide an alternative. What prevents India to adopt a more intellectual approach to foreign policy? The reason is perhaps India is too imaginatively limited and for the present, just willing to outline its own role in reshaping the global order as an emergent pole in the same multipolar world. The absence of quality trained foreign policy practitioners in the system has also prevented the policy makers to get access to rigorous analysis and changing paradigms in international relations. Thus, the future of the IFP lies in establishing new imaginative approaches at the diplomatic level which shall eventually decide what kind of role India would like to play in a multipolar world.

End of Section Questions

1. Personal chemistry has emerged as a powerful tool in India's diplomatic kit since 2014. Discuss.

2. Foreign policy rarely figures in domestic political debates in India. Discuss.
3. If India plucks the low hanging diplomatic fruit with the world, India's efforts to detox the domestic environment will get a boost. Examine.
4. Convergence of Buddhism and democracy provides us a path to build a world of peace, cooperation, harmony and equality. Discuss.
5. Indian foreign policy is trying to be in line with the trend of faith diplomacy but India must guard against the dangers involved in implementation of religious diplomacy. Examine.
6. Turning statesmanship to salesmanship is a new phenomenon in Indian Foreign Policy. Examine.

1. For details of the Treaty and its Articles, please visit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Soviet_Treaty_of_Friendship_and_Cooperation