



# VISION IAS

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| Name of Candidate | ANKIT   |                     |   |   |   |   |
| Medium Hindi/Eng. | ENGLISH | Registration Number | 2 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Center            | DELHI   | Date                | 1 | 1 | 0 | 9 |

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| Q. No.                | Page No. | Maximum Marks | Marks Obtained | <div>1. Do furnish the appropriate details in the answer sheet (viz. Name, Registration Number and Test Code).<br/>उत्तर पुस्तिका में सूचनाएं भरना आवश्यक है (नाम, प्रश्न-पत्र कोड, विद्यार्थी क्रमांक आदि)।</div> <div>2. All questions are compulsory.<br/>सभी प्रश्न अनिवार्य हैं।</div> <div>3. The number of marks carried by a question/part is indicated against it.<br/>प्रत्येक प्रश्न/भाग के अंक उसके सामने दिए गए हैं।</div> <div>4. Answers must be written in the medium authorized in the Admission Certificate, which must be stated clearly on the cover of this Question-Cum-Answer (QCA) Booklet in the space provided. No marks will be given for answers written in medium other than the authorized one.<br/>प्रश्नों के उत्तर उसी माध्यम में लिखे जाने चाहिए जिसका उल्लेख आपके प्रवेश पत्र में किया गया है और उस माध्यम का स्पष्ट उल्लेख प्रश्न-सह-उत्तर (क्यूसीए) पुस्तिका के मुख्य पृष्ठ पर अंकित निर्दिष्ट स्थान पर किया जाना चाहिए। उल्लिखित माध्यम के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी माध्यम में लिए गए उत्तर पर कोई अंक नहीं मिलेंगे।</div> <div>5. Word limit in questions, if specified, should be adhered to.<br/>प्रश्नों में शब्द सीमा, जहाँ विनिर्दिष्ट है, का अनुसरण किया जाना चाहिए।</div> <div>6. Any page or portion of the page left blank in the Question-Cum-Answer Booklet must be clearly struck off.<br/>उत्तर पुस्तिका में खाली छोड़ा हुआ पृष्ठ या उसके अंश को स्पष्ट रूप से काटा जाना चाहिए।</div> |  |
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## EVALUATION INDICATORS

1. Alignment Competence
2. Context Competence
3. Content Competence
4. Language Competence
5. Introduction Competence
6. Structure - Presentation Competence
7. Conclusion Competence

**Overall Macro Comments / feedback / suggestions on Answer Booklet:**

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

**All the Best**

## SECTION-A

From Non-Alignment to  
Multi-Alignment → Shift in  
India's foreign policy

In a small area off the coast of  
Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean, a diver  
also saw a nursery of fish everyday,  
observed their natural behaviour.

Even though, the small fish competed  
with one another for eating the  
plants on the phytoplanktons, whenever  
a shark came near their group,  
they huddled together to create a  
mirage & confuse the shark, thus  
ensuring their collective security. This  
provides us a glimpse of the world,  
as it is today.

India's engagement with the  
world probably started during the

Indus valley civilization, wherein trade of important commodities propagated the diplomatic relations, especially with the Mesopotamians.

Such relations were carried forward throughout Ancient and Medieval India, when some South India rulers began conquering South-east Asia, while rulers like Ashoka, Kanishka brought various 'modern' countries under their control & established cultural diplomacy as well.

India's vast wealth soon became a bane as it became the reason for its colonisation. The British foreign adventures in the world wars, as well as in our neighbouring countries, shaped the boundaries of our present day relationships, which finally culminated in India's partition.

1947, is the year from which India's modern age Foreign policy actually began taking shape, guided by the contours contours of its past.

Non-Alignment: A ray of warmth in the wave of coldness

The first stance of India's foreign policy soon after independence, was to separate itself from the bipolar international order and support the ideological movements for independence in various colonies.

This took shape in the form of the Non-Alignment policy, whose seeds were sown in the Bandung Conference of 1955. The leaders of Egypt, Indonesia, Yugoslavia etc, too came together and supported India to create

a new world order based on peace, sovereignty and welfare for all.

The countries of the bipolar world order, strongly objected to such a stance by claiming that, "Either you are with us or against us". ~~Be~~ In spite of being resource starved and in dire need of help to feed the masses, India as a flagbearer of NAM, held onto its position for many years.

As the cold war became colder and bitter, USA & Russia tried to woo India through help in various scenarios. USA's support to India during the Indo-China war in 1962, on the plethora of weapons that Russia provided to India even during wars with Pakistan, highlight such

attempts. This phase of India's foreign policy can be called as the heydays of non-alignment, where it seemed that the world ~~was~~ had the choice of looking at NAM as a serious third choice, rather than joining USA or Russia.

## The Rise of unipolarity - Vulnerabilities of Non-alignment

As the Cold war ended, USA rose as the superpower that questioned the validity of NAM as an option. India, suffering from its own issues regarding fiscal crisis, sought help from other countries and IMF, in particular from USA, to initiate economic liberalization.

The loss of USSR as a defence

provider, due to its own domestic issues, brought India closer to USA & pushed it away from NAM.

The rising threat of China and Pakistan on both sides of India's borders, pushed India towards a realignment of its alignment policy. Terrorism too emerged as a global threat, with USA suffering from 9/11 attacks while India saw the terrorist attack on her parliament in 2001. Such scenarios, led to the realisation of the need for collective action in a world faced with global threats and hence non-alignment began losing its relevance.

The Modern Phase - Strategic  
autonomy as opposed to NAM

With India's march as a  
possessor of nuclear weapons,  
since 1998, India began facing  
various sanctions, bearing an  
impact on its energy security &  
environmental commitments.

The nuclear agreement with  
USA in 2008, was a ~~the~~ proof  
of India's strategic engagement  
with the Superpowers. This  
agreement led to a domino  
effect that opened a Pandora's  
box for India's strategic  
collaboration with other  
countries.

with India becoming a major

defence partner of USA with access  
to critical defence equipments in  
recent times.

Such strategic collaborations  
were also implemented with the  
European Union, Japan, etc.

In fact, Japan went a step ahead,  
allowing the transfer of critical  
nuclear energy production  
technologies to a non-signatory  
of the non-proliferation  
treaty.

India's strategic shift from  
NAM is also seen in its  
dehypenation principle with  
regards to Israel-Palestine  
relations. Rather than non-  
involvement in their conflicts,  
India has been seeking active

engagement with both of them, to resolve their issues in a peaceful manner, as well as pursuing its own strategic interests with each of them bilaterally. Such efforts are seen in Indo-Israel cooperation in research, agriculture, water desalination, entrepreneurship (I4 fund), etc.

The dehyphenation principle has been a part of a larger strategy, largely derived from the Panchsheel principles, ~~and~~ and the Gyal doctrine. India pursues collaboration in certain fields even with its long term competitors, inspite of contentious issues in certain areas.

for example, in the case of Indo-China, the Doklam issue did not become a roadblock in their collaboration in RCEP negotiations, on their joint leadership for justice & equality in climate change negotiations.

In the case of USA-India, though trade protectionism, IPR issues, visa issues regularly became thorny issues, their collaboration against China in the Indo-Pacific, or their joint efforts for Afghan led peace process, show the viability of such an approach.

The world has increasingly moved away from a billiard ball model, towards a caboodle

model, of increased collaboration  
and engagement. India's approach  
of strategic autonomy is  
efficacious in the age of  
globalisation and interdependence.

Collaboration in diverse fields

Due to the effects of  
globalisation and the advent  
of the digital age, the world  
has become more interconnected.

A country's foreign policy  
is heavily guided by the  
aspirations of its people, and  
people today are increasingly  
questioning the relevance of  
boundaries. Ironically, the  
migration of people due to wars

and climate change has also fuelled feelings of xenophobia and nationalism. The recent case of NRC (National register of citizens), showed the animosity prevalent in Assam towards illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Such events, cause

hiccups in India's foreign relations, as was also seen in the migration of Rohingyas.

Such events also put the focus on global collaboration as the most viable solution for prosperity. The recent case of Kerala floods, where donations and aid came in from all corners of the world, was a case in point.

The peculiar advantages that countries enjoy, also push India to seek their expertise in their fields of strategic excellence. This can be seen in India's collaboration in the LIGO project, or its work with Iran in the Chabahar project to gain access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The world today is highly dynamic with political leaders acting like sharks, propagating their own benefits before anything else. In such scenarios, it is imperative for all countries to act together and tackle these problems collectively to establish

a sustainable, rules based,  
and just society for everyone's  
prosperity.

Thus, it can be seen that  
India's shift in foreign policy  
from Non-Alignment to  
multi-alignment has indeed  
become a reality. But such  
alignment must be pursued  
with the goal of becoming  
a leader as well as a  
reliable partner to the  
corresponding countries. In spite  
of the lack of effective  
implementation, the ideals of  
NAM - to garner respect &  
sovereignty for every country  
to ensure peace, must be

upheld as the underlying principle  
of India's engagement with  
the world.

\*

## SECTION - B

Nuclear disarmament is the  
need of the hour.

Abhay is an engineer working in Japan.  
Like everyday, he took a bus in the  
morning for his office, and the fully  
congested bus stopped abruptly on the  
road. Everyone's phones started ringing  
with the alert "A missile is coming  
from North Korea". At that moment,  
without any hope of evacuation, he  
along with the others in the bus,  
realized the helplessness in the  
event of a possible nuclear attack.  
The above experience is a real life  
example of the need for urgency in  
nuclear disarmament process to start.

## Beginning of the Nuclear Race

The research on nuclear weapons started in USA during the late 1930s under the Manhattan Project, led by famous scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer.

Though the project progressed in secrecy, it came into the spotlight with the "little boy" and "fat man" bombs thrown over Japan in 1945.

Such was the impact of the explosion, that the pilot of the plane that carried the bombs, himself crashed the plane. The role of nuclear weapons for becoming a superpower became clear, and Russia challenged USA into a nuclear arms race. The test of the Tsar Bomba, whose shock wave travelled across the world 3 times, marked

the culmination of nuclear arms  
research. The fear of an all-out  
nuclear war reached a new high  
during the Cuban Missile crisis of  
1962. Over time, every aspiring  
nation wanting to be a superpower,  
decided to possess nuclear weapons.  
Starting with China, India and  
followed by Pakistan, the technology  
even reached North Korea. The  
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1979, in  
response to India's nuclear tests,  
failed to act as a reliable  
regulatory authority and even in  
principle it appeared unjust and  
incapable of resolving the  
security dilemma of countries like  
India.

Fast forward to today, we  
find nuclear diplomacy as a new found

phenomenon in global politics.

Countries such as North Korea  
constantly pose a security threat to  
their neighbours and the  
growing insecurities have  
motivated countries in east Asia  
(like Saudi Arabia) and pacifist  
countries like Japan to look at  
possession of nuclear arms as a  
safety valve.

Nuclear Arms → Direct, short term  
considerations

Nuclear weapons today act as the  
primary guarantee of safety  
for countries that may not have  
enough resources at hand to  
develop large capacities of conventional  
weapons. They also act as the

basic safeguard for regime  
security of countries ruled by  
autocrats and dictators. Example,  
North Korea, Libya, Iran etc.

On the security front,  
in addition to their role in ensuring  
security, they also act as a  
constant source of fear of the  
looming threat of war. This  
was the primary reason why  
first India tested nuclear weapons  
after China already did, and  
later following followed by  
Pakistan's tests due to India's  
possession. Due to a lack of  
effective monitoring in some  
countries, nuclear arms are also  
feared to be in easy reach of  
rogue elements such as terrorists  
in Pakistan. In comparison to  
the limited impact from conventional

weapons, nuclear arms end up in  
major collateral impact in both  
fighting nations and thus, are  
used for coercion, to bring the  
other party to the negotiating  
table, as was done between  
North Korea and USA.

Nuclear arms can also  
lead to significant escalation of  
a war. For example, though  
India's nuclear doctrine proposes  
a No-first use policy, exceptions  
are present in the case of  
biological or chemical attacks,  
wherein India can reply with a  
nuclear attack.

On the environmental  
front, the nuclear radiation  
fallout, can cause genetic mutations  
over generations, causing long term

disabilities. Significant calamities  
can occur if fuel processing  
facilities are present in disaster  
prone areas. Though not  
directly related, the Fukushima  
incident serves as a grim  
reminder of such possibilities.

During the nuclear arms  
race, a lot of explosions also  
took place under water, with  
no studies undertaken to  
understand their impact on  
marine geology, fish, marine plants  
as well as the larger issue of  
marine pollution. Even cases  
by Marshall Islands to bring USA  
to accept its fault of nuclear testing,  
were swiftly dismissed without  
any concern for the environmental  
impact.

Another major issue is the

disposal of the nuclear waste  
generated during the enrichment  
process. The Arizona desert,  
for example has a waste  
disposal facility that recycles  
tonnes of waste every year and  
since it's already brimming to its  
limit, new sites are being searched  
for. Such disposal, can lead to  
groundwater pollution, soil  
infertility, genetic mutations in  
inhabitants, etc. This was one  
of the reasons why the Kudankulam  
plant, even for energy purposes, was  
relentlessly opposed by inhabitants.

The impact of uranium underground,  
is seen in Punjab too, where a  
large number of cancer patients  
have surfaced drinking contaminated  
water. Their daily travel to  
Rajasthan for treatment, has  
brought the name of cancer train to

their mode of transportation.

Long term - indirect considerations

In addition to the immediate impacts, nuclear weapons pose a number of long term challenges for a nation.

The first is the need for constant monitoring and supervision of the weapons production & storage facilities.

Such monitoring functions entail a considerable diversion of funds and manpower, which can be problematic in developing countries, which must prioritise the basic sustenance of livelihood for its citizens.

The pursuit of nuclear arms, especially in the absence

of proper monitoring, can invite  
international sanctions, which  
can further exacerbate the  
economic hardships of the  
people. This was recently  
seen in the case of Iran,  
where the failure of JCPOA,  
led to sanctions, causing outflow  
of foreign investment and a  
rapid downfall of the rial.

Sanctions on North Korea too,  
have led to cases of hand to  
mouth living, famines and even  
cannibalism in some areas.

Besides this, arch enemies  
perennially live ~~is~~ under fear of  
a nuclear war, such as in  
South Korea, where bunkers are  
present in all the major cities and  
mock drills are continually held.

On the environmental front,  
the pursuit of such weapons,  
requires large scale mining of  
uranium, which itself being  
a threat to the environment, can  
lead to years of medical  
complications for the residents.

from a social viewpoint, the  
threat of nuclear weapons leads to  
a discrimination between tier-I  
and tier-II/III cities, especially in  
cases of resource crunch. The  
Indian govt's plans to secure the  
airspace over major cities like  
Delhi, Mumbai etc. against  
nuclear missile attacks, highlights  
the security related discrimination  
towards rural areas. It is  
further worsened, when rural or  
tribal inhabitants are forced to  
relocate when enrichment facilities are

Set up.

Steps to realise a future without  
nuclear arms

Since the primary reason for possession of nuclear weapons, is the security dilemma, any plan for disarmament, must at least answer this problem. The recent initiative by Nobel Peace prize winning ICAN, at the UN, to muster support for worldwide spirit of disarmament is good in spirit but unattainable in practice, since it doesn't tackle the security dilemma. This is why none of the nuclear weapon nations signed the agreement.

The second important requirement is justice and equality in the negotiations. The primary

Reasons why NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed or have failed are, the blanket immunity provided to nations that already possessed nuclear arms before these treaties took shape.

Even though the NPT tackles the root cause of nuclear arms, i.e. nuclear proliferation, the absence of proper implementation and monitoring mechanism has made it a toothless tiger. At the UN too, the veto possessed by UNSC members, which are nuclear armed nations too, limits the success of any disarmament negotiation.

Therefore, any negotiation must incorporate a mechanism to bring adversaries to the negotiating table and first resolve their issues.

of thorn. Then the discussions can  
focus on simultaneous disarmament,  
or disarmament in return of  
security guarantee and economic  
benefits as was done by USA - North  
Korea at Singapore. Such  
security guarantees have worked  
successfully in the case of NATO,  
as well as USA's nuclear  
umbrella over Japan, South Korea.

The emerging threats  
of cyber insecurity, can pose a  
great technical challenge, wherein  
a remote access to a weapons  
facility, can create havoc worldwide.  
This must push countries to set  
aside their differences and  
ensure worldwide peace.

The now defunct JCPOA  
with Iran, showed the efficacy of

negotiations in denuclearisation  
process.

The environmental impacts too  
are so wide and diverse, that  
a single nation by itself cannot  
dispose off all its nuclear waste  
and thus, collaboration, especially  
through the UN would ensure  
technical research towards  
such problems, like using  
waste at CERN for radioactive  
decay studies etc.

Hence, nuclear disarmament  
is quintessential for people like  
Abhay to never again experience the  
horror of that day's attack, and  
only open minded discussions can  
help in the progress towards this  
goal.

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