

10. MARITIME REGULATION

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a seazone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from its coast. In colloquial usage, the term may include the continental shelf. The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 n.m. limit. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) comprises an area which extends either from the coast, or in federal systems from the seaward boundaries of the constituent states (3 to 12 nautical miles, in most cases) (370 kilometres) off the coast. Within this area, nations claim and exercise sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all fish and all Continental Shelf fishery resources. The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a “sovereign right” which refers to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea. The surface waters, as can be seen in the map, are international waters.

India thus obtained a wide exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of about 2.172-million km² in the sea all along the 7500 km long coastline around her. The living and nonliving resources in this zone, which measures about two-third of the landmass of the country, are exclusive to India, so also the trading and transport facilities navigated through this area. Moreover several million people living along the coastline are directly influenced by oceanography of the EEZ, various environmental hazards and related social issues. Hence from geo-scientific angle, the first thing needed for India is to comprehensively map the entire EEZ, and to start with, detailed swath bathymetry map with near- complete coverage needs to be prepared. Second round of activities should focus on to understand the natural processes that have been active in EEZ through systematic scientific research. Demarcation and sustainable exploitation of non-living resources of this

zone could form the third set of activities. Encouraged by the bountiful resources that EEZ can generate, several coastal countries have initiated major dedicated exploration program to know their own backyard. Besides oceanographic research and harvesting of resources, such efforts would help defense, communication and navigation. The National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) has initiated the process to explore the EEZ of India using state-of-the-art multibeam swath bathymetry system over the next 6 years. The plan includes spending more than 1800 ship days at sea, with about 75% time using for multibeam echosounder surveys. The rest of the cruise time shall be used for seafloor sampling and other miscellaneous needs. The enormous task of EEZ mapping shall be carried out in collaboration with other national institutions, like NIOT (Chennai), NCAOR (Vasco), GSI and Universities. During this project, the physiographic features in the EEZ including their formation and evolution shall be studied in detail. The sedimentological studies should help understand various sedimentary regimes, sediment transport dynamics, biogeochemistry and provenance characteristics. It is also proposed to also carry out paleoclimatic studies that should provide information on the monsoon characteristics, riverine inputs and Himalayan tectonics in the past. The search for the indication of mineral resources in the EEZ should be a continuing part of this activity. It is believed that this systematic approach of data gathering, map preparation and laboratory research should help understand the integrated evolution of Indian EEZ, and assess possibility of sustainable use of non-living resources in future.

LOCATION OF INDIA IN INDIAN OCEAN

Why does New Delhi care about the Indian Ocean region?

India is, after all, a large nation, a subcontinent in itself. Why is it driven to exercise itself in a larger arena, one larger in fact than the South Asian subregion?

The reality is that while India is a “continental” power, it occupies a central position in the 10 region, a fact that will exercise an increasingly profound influence

on indeed almost determine— India's security environment. Writing in the 1940s, K. M. Pannikar argued that "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected." India is, strategically located vis-a-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region.

From India's perspective, key security considerations include: the accessibility of the Indian Ocean to the fleets of the world's most powerful states; the large Islamic populations on the shores of the ocean and in its hinterland; the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf; the proliferation of conventional military power and nuclear weapons among the region's states; the importance of key straits for India's maritime security; and the historical tendency of continental Asian peoples or powers (the Indo-Aryans, the Mongols, Russia) to spill periodically out of Inner Asia in the direction of the Indian Ocean. The position of India in this environment has sometimes been compared to that of Italy in the Mediterranean, only on an immense scale. Indians live in uncertain times and in a rough neighborhood. A scan of the littoral shows that, with the exception of a few countries, all others are afflicted with one or more of the ailments of poverty, backwardness, fundamentalism, terrorism or internal insurgency. A number of territorial and maritime disputes linger on. Most of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War have also taken place in or around the Indian Ocean region. Confronted by this environment, India like other states that are geographically large and also ambitious believes that its security will be best guaranteed by enlarging its security perimeter and, specifically, achieving a position of influence in the larger region that encompasses the Indian Ocean. Especially powerful states are strongly inclined to seek regional hegemony.

Unsurprisingly, India regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region—the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. This is what the United States set out to do in North America

and the Western Hemisphere at an early stage in America's "rise to power": "American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century had one overarching goal: achieving hegemony in the Western Hemisphere." Similarly, in the expansive view of many Indians, India's security perimeter should extend from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz and from the coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia. For some Indians, the emphasis is on the northern Indian Ocean, but for others the realm includes even the "Indian Ocean" coast of Antarctica.

In this same vein, Indian scholar judges that "a rising India will aspire to become the regional hegemon of South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, and an extraregional power in the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. *Ceteris paribus*, a rising India will try to establish re-regional hegemony just like all the other rising powers have since Napoleonic times, with the long term goal of achieving great power status on an Asian and perhaps even global scale."

The strength of India, so many strategists thought, alone prevented Russia from spilling through the Himalayan passes into Southeast Asia, and the preoccupations of generals in Simla were important to the whole world.

A second motive for India, and one obviously related to the foregoing, stems from anxiety about the role, or potential role, of external powers in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Maritime Doctrine asserts: "All major powers of this century will seek a toehold in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, Japan, the EU, and China, and a reinvigorated Russia can be expected to show presence in these waters either independently or through politico-security arrangements." There is, moreover, "an increasing tendency of extra regional powers of military intervention in [10] littoral countries to contain what they see as a conflict situation."

India's concern about external powers in the Indian Ocean mainly relates to China and the United States. The Sino-Indian relationship has improved since India's war with China in 1962 and the Indian prime minister's 1998 letter to the U.S. president justifying India's nuclear tests in terms of the Chinese "threat,"

However, and notwithstanding the probably episodic progress registered of late, China and India

likely will remain long-term rivals, vying for the same strategic space in Asia.

India cannot help but be wary of the growing capability of China's navy and of Beijing's growing maritime presence. In the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea, especially, New Delhi is sensitive to a variety of Chinese naval or maritime activities that observers have characterized collectively as a "string of pearls" strategy or a "preparation of the battlefield." For Beijing, this process has entailed achieving the capability, and thereby the option, to deploy or station naval power in this region in the future. A key focus in this connection is Burma (Myanmar), where Chinese engineers and military personnel have long been engaged in airfield, road, railroad, pipeline, and port construction aimed at better connecting China with the Indian Ocean, both by sea and directly overland.

Some of this activity, moreover, spills over onto Burma's offshore islands, including St. Matthews, near the mouth of the Malacca Strait, and the Coco Islands (Indian until their transfer to Burma in the 1950s), in the Bay of Bengal. On the latter, China is suspected of maintaining a communications monitoring facility that collects intelligence on Indian naval operations and missile testing. In addition to this "presence" in Burma, China is pursuing a variety of infrastructure links with Southeast Asia through the Greater Mekong Subregion program and is building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong, and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota—directly astride the main east-west shipping route across the Indian Ocean. Elsewhere, and perhaps most ominously for India, China is constructing a large new naval base for Pakistan at Gwadar.

India also remains somewhat nervous about the large U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean to India's west—in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the continuing development of ties with the United States lately seems to have moderated Indian sensitivity to the U.S. presence in the Arabian Sea.

A third factor animating Indian interest in the Indian Ocean region is anxiety about the threat posed by Pakistan and, more broadly, Islam in a region that is home to much of the world's Muslim population. Formerly this may not have been an important

consideration. Today, however, Islamic civilization often finds itself at odds with the West and with largely Hindu India, and this conflict frequently will play out in the Indian Ocean region.

A fourth motive for India in the Indian Ocean is energy. As the fourth-largest economy (in purchasing-power-parity terms) in the world, and one almost 70 percent dependent on foreign oil (the figure is expected to rise to 85 percent by 2020), India has an oil stake in the region that is significant and growing. Some Indian security analysts foresee energy security as India's primary strategic concern in the next twenty-five years and believe it must place itself on a virtual wartime footing to address it. India must protect its offshore oil and gas fields, ongoing deep-sea oil drilling projects in its vast exclusive economic zone, and an extensive infrastructure of shore and offshore oil and gas wells, pumping stations and telemetry posts, ports and pipeline grids, and refineries. Additionally, Indian public and private-sector oil companies have invested several billion dollars in recent years in oil concessions in foreign countries, many of them in the region, including Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and Burma. These investments are perceived to need military protection.

The foregoing considerations are the primary ones for India in the region. However, there also are important commercial reasons for New Delhi to pursue a robust Indian Ocean strategy. In the Indian view, "the maritime arc from the Gulf through the Straits of Sea of Japan is the equivalent of the New Silk Route, and total trade on this arc is U.S. \$1,800 billion." In addition, large numbers of overseas Indians live in the region—3.5 million in the Gulf and Arab countries; they, and their remittances, constitute a factor in Indian security thinking.

In light of these interests, India is pursuing a variety of policies aimed at improving its strategic situation and at ensuring that its fears in the theater are not realized. To these ends, New Delhi is forging a web of partnerships with certain littoral states and major external powers, according to India's foreign secretary, to increase Indian influence in the region, acquire "more strategic space" and "strategic autonomy," and create a safety cushion for itself. To spread its leverage, from Iran to Myanmar and Vietnam, India is mixing innovative diplomatic cocktails that blend trade agreements, direct

investment, military exercises, aid funds, energy cooperation and infrastructure-building. In addition, India is developing more capable naval and air forces, and it is utilizing these forces increasingly to shape India's strategic environment.

WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF INDIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN?

Over the past few years, India has placed itself on a path to achieve, potentially, the regional influence in the Indian Ocean to which it has aspired. To this end, New Delhi has raised its profile and strengthened its position in a variety of nations on the littoral, especially Iran, Sri Lanka, Burma, Singapore, Thailand, and most of the ocean's small island nations. India also has become a more palpable presence in key maritime zones, particularly the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Of equal or greater importance, India's links with the most important external actors in the Indian Ocean—the United States, Japan, Israel, and France also have been strengthened. These are significant achievements, and they derive from India's growing economic clout and from a surer hand visible today in Indian diplomacy.

Gaps inevitably remain in India's strategic posture. New Delhi will need to strengthen further its hand in coastal Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. More work also will be required to upgrade still somewhat distant relationships with Australia and Indonesia. At the same time, India will need to be more skillful than it has been in cultivating or "compelling" better relations with, and an environment more attuned to Indian interests in, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Further, much will depend on the performance of the Indian economy and on India's ability to avoid domestic communal discord. Another variable will be the extent to which other states particularly China and the United States but also Pakistan and others in southern Asia are willing or able to offer serious resistance to India's ambitions. The future of political Islam is another wild card. However, barring a halt to globalization one of the megatrends of the contemporary world, the rise of India in the 10 is fairly certain.

That will have a transforming effect in the Indian Ocean basin and eventually the world. In the region, the rise of India will play a key role in the gradual integration of the various lands and peoples of this basin. Whether in the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal, this

trend while still nascent is already evident. The long-term result will be a more prosperous and globally more influential region.

India's rise in the Indian Ocean also will have important implications for the West and China. Perhaps most significantly, New Delhi's ascent suggests strongly that the ongoing reordering of the asymmetric relationship between the West and Asia will be centered as much in the Indian Ocean as in East Asia. It was in the 10, moreover, that the effects of Western power first made themselves manifest in the centuries after 1500. On one hand, it would therefore not be surprising if it were here that the Western tide first receded. On the other, India's role will for a long time to come be no longer in opposition to the United States but in cooperation with it.

Moreover, its rise will be welcomed by the United States and other "Western states" to the extent that it counteracts the challenge posed by China, the world's other salient rising power. Seen from Beijing, the rise of India in the Indian Ocean will be an opportunity but, even more, a challenge. A strong and influential India will mean a more multipolar world, and this is consistent with Chinese interests. Nonetheless, as China increasingly regards India not Japan as its main Asian rival, India's rise in the Indian Ocean also will be disturbing. As has been the case with virtually all great powers, an India that has consolidated power in its own region will be tempted to exercise power farther afield, including East Asia.

The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceanic divisions, covering approximately 20% of the water on the Earth's surface. It is bounded by Asia including India, after which the ocean is named on the north, on the west by Africa, on the east by Australia, and on the south by the Southern Ocean (or, depending on definition, by Antarctica).

As one component of the World Ocean, the Indian Ocean is delineated from the Atlantic Ocean by the 20° east meridian running south from Cape Agulhas, and from the Pacific Ocean by the meridian of 146°55' east. The northernmost extent of the Indian Ocean is approximately 30° north in the Persian Gulf. The ocean is nearly 10,000 km (6200 mi) wide at the southern tips of Africa and Australia, and its area is 73,556,000 km²

(28,350,000 mi²), including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The Indian Ocean's volume is estimated to be 292,131,000 km³ (70,086,000 mi³).^[9] Small islands dot the continental rims. Island nations within the ocean are Madagascar (the world's fourth largest island), Comoros, Seychelles, Maldives, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. The archipelago of Indonesia borders the ocean on the east.

13th Council of Ministers Meeting of the Indian Ocean Rim Association

Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) held its 13th Council of Ministers meeting in Perth, Australia on 1 November 2013. On the occasion, India handed over the chair of the IORA to Australia. India chaired the IORA, since 2011. The thirteenth Council of Ministers' Meeting was visited by the member states Foreign Ministers namely Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Perth Principles

- Reiterating that IORA is the apex pan-regional organisation for the Indian Ocean.
- Recalling the six priority areas of cooperation agreed at the eleventh COMM (Council of Ministers' Meeting) in Bengaluru, namely: Maritime Safety and Security; Trade and Investment Facilitation; Fisheries Management; Disaster Risk Management; Academic and Science and Technology Cooperation; and Tourism and Cultural Exchanges.
- Recalling Also our desire to promote the sustainable growth and balanced development of the Indian Ocean region and IORA Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic cooperation.
- Committed to promoting cooperation and collaboration between IORA and other Indian Ocean regional stakeholders including Dialogue Partner States and other regional and international forums.
- Reaffirming our commitment to the Charter of the United Nations, to the Charter of IORA, and to the applicable principles of international law.

- Reaffirming Also our commitment to 'The Future We Want', as adopted at the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and to the protection, restoration, health, productivity and resilience of the Indian Ocean and its resources.
- Recognising that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and their resources and plays a vital role in maintaining peaceful cooperation and stability across the Indian Ocean.

ABOUT THE IORA

The IOR-ARC was formally launched at the first Ministerial Meeting in Mauritius on 6 - 7 March 1997. This meeting adopted the IOR-ARC Charter, and determined a number of administrative and procedural matters.

The apex body of the IOR-ARC is the Council of (Foreign) Ministers (COM). The meeting of the COM is preceded by the meetings of the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG), Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF), Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI), and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Coordinating Secretariat of IOR-ARC is located at Ebene, Mauritius. Apart from a Secretary-General, its present staff strength at the executive level includes two Directors and eight local staff.

IORA was formerly known as IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation).

MEMBERS OF IORA (IOR-ARC)

The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), initially known as the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative, is an International/Diplomatic Organization with 20 Member States namely Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Arab Emirates and Yemen.

Whereas the China, Egypt, France, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States of America are Dialogue Partners of the IOR-ARC. The Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation (IOTO) and Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) have been granted Observer Status.